
OassJi^ 

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BOYCOTTS 

And the Labor Struggle 



BOYCOTTS 

And the Labor Struggle 

ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ASPECTS 



BY 

HARRY W. LAIDLER 



WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY 

HENRY R. SEAGER, Ph.D. 

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, 
COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY. 



NEW YORK — JOHN LANE COMPANY 
LONDON— JOHN LANE— THE BODLEY HEAD 
TORONTO — BELL & COCKBURN — MCMXTV 



/O 



Copyright, 1913. by 
JOHN LANE COMPANY 



s: v 



o 



Press 01 J. J. Little & Ives Co. 
New York, U. S. A- 

JAN2i 1914 

(S,'CI.A3Glt>S5 a. 



TO 

MY FATHER 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

The boycott has been used repeatedly by widely 
scattered groups in the community, for many centuries 
past. The boycott in labor disputes is of compara- 
tively recent origin. The word itself is but a little 
over a generation old. Yet the employment of this 
weapon has been evidenced in some of the most spec- 
tacular labor wars in the history of this country, and, 
if present indications do not fail, its future role is 
destined to be a potent one. 

Labor on the economic field has thus far used effec- 
tively two main weapons, in addition to that ultra- 
modern and mysterious instrument of warfare, sabot- 
age. The first is the strike, with its universal con- 
comitant, picketing; the second, the boycott. The 
strike aims to gain better conditions for labor by de- 
priving the "unfair" employer of the labor power 
necessary to produce goods ; the boycott, on the other 
hand, seeks these same ends by depriving the employer 
of the market for those goods which labor has created. 

The word "boycott" originated in Ireland in the 
year 1880, during the bitter warfare between the Irish 
Land League and the English landed gentry. Its in- 
troduction into the United States occurred a few years 
later, when the Knights of Labor were in the ascend- 
ancy and the American Federation of Labor was just 
beginning its activity. 

The boycott leapt into prominence again at the time 
of the famous railroad strikes of the nineties, led by 
Eugene V. Debs and others, and, more lately, during 



8 AUTHOR'S PREFACE 

the widely heralded controversies popularly known as 
the Buck's Stove and Danbury Hatters' Cases. 

Every session of Congress in recent years has wit- 
nessed the introduction of bills to legalize the use of 
this weapon. In 19 12 a measure to prevent the em- 
ployment of injunctions against secondary boycotts 
passed the House of Representatives by the over- 
whelming vote of 244 to 31. Such endeavors will 
probably be redoubled in the coming session, and a 
concerted effort will be made to give to labor the ad- 
vantage which it has so long claimed as its right. The 
recent judicial decisions in such states as Montana, New 
York, California, Oklahoma, the recent conspiracy 
statutes of Maryland and California and the lessons 
from English history, all lead to the belief that labor 
is destined to obtain the legal right to use this de- 
vice. 

To what extent is the employment of the boycott 
legal at present, and how can the present status of the 
law be legally justified? Is labor in need of the pos- 
session of the boycott? Has its past use been beneficial 
to society, and to what extent and how wisely will it 
be employed, if legalized? Will labor, if permanently 
deprived of the boycott, resort to weapons more or 
less dangerous to the social well-being? These and 
countless other questions should be answered by the 
legislator before he commits himself on this important 
question. 

These are among the questions which the author 
has endeavored to answer in the following pages. It 
has been the aim of the book to describe the exact part 
which the boycott has played in the American Labor 
movement; to differentiate the various forms of the 
boycott; to analyze the causes leading to the success 
or failure of its employment; to give a clear idea of 
the present status of the common law and statute law 
in the states and in the federal government; to sum- 



AUTHOR'S PREFACE 9 

marize the legal reasoning for outlawing this weapon; 
and to test the validity of this reasoning in the light 
of the more recent legal tendencies. 

Finally, the social and economic reasons for and 
against boycotting have been here considered. The 
social utility of an economic activity cannot be de- 
termined by abstracting that activity from its economic 
environment, but only by observing its use in its rela- 
tions to the various other activities and influences which 
call it into play. Therefore, it seems necessary to pre- 
sent, in a measure, a cross-section of the labor struggle, 
portraying not only the workings of the boycott, but 
those of the various weapons which the employing class 
is constantly using against the workers in their fight 
for a higher standard of life. 

In closing, I wish to express my deep appreciation 
for the assistance of the Faculty of Political Economy 
of Columbia University; particularly for the many 
valuable suggestions given by Professor Henry R. Sea- 
ger. I am also indebted to Dr. Jessie Wallace 
Hughan and Miss Mary R. Sanford, for their careful 
reading of the monograph before its publication. 

Harry W. Laidler. 

New York, December, 19 13. 



CONTENTS 

Introduction . . . . By Prof. Henry R. Seager 17 

PART I 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BOYCOTTS 

CHAPTER I 

HISTORY OF THE BOYCOTT 

PAGE 

Captain Boycott and the Irish League .... 23 

Boycotting in Past History 27 

The Boycott and the American Revolution ... 28 

CHAPTER II 

some modern forms of boycotts in the united states 

The Consumers' Boycott 31 

The Employers' Boycott 35 

The Blacklist 39 

The Trade Boycott 49 

The Political Boycott 51 

The International Boycott 53 

Other Forms of Boycotts 54 

CHAPTER III 

the nature of boycotts employed by labor 

Reasons for the Boycott 56 

Definitions 60 

The Union Label 60 

The Positive Boycott 63 

11 



12 CONTENTS 

CHAPTER IV 

EARLY BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 

PAGE 

Hatters' and Printers' Boycotts 69 

Periods of Boycotting 70 

Boycotting in the Eighties 72 

Illinois and Wisconsin Boycotts 77 

CHAPTER V 

boycotts in new york state 

Survey of Boycotts, 1885-1892 82 

Success and Frequency of Boycotts 85 

Boycotts by Industries and Trades 87 

Boycotts and Strikes — A Comparison 90 

Durations of Boycotts 92 

Causes of Boycotts 93 

Summary 95 

CHAPTER VI 

railroad boycotts in the nineties 

The Ann Arbor Strike 98 

The Pullman Strike 100 

CHAPTER VII 

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND THE BOYCOTT 

A. F. of L. Conventions 109 

The "We Don't Patronize" List 115 

International Unions and the Boycott .... 125 

The I. W. W. and the Boycott 129 

Summary . 131 

CHAPTER VIII 

The Buck's Stove and Range Case 134 



CONTENTS 13 

CHAPTER IX 

DANBURY HATTERS' AND OTHER CASES 

PAGE 

Danbury Hatters' Case 151 

The Butterick Boycott 156 

The Building Trades' Boycotts 157 

The Miners' Boycotts 158 

CHAPTER X 

Elements of Success in Boycotts 160 

PART II 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF BOYCOTTS 

CHAPTER XI 

some boycott laws and decisions 

Legality of Negative Boycotts 169 

The I. C. L. and Sherman Anti-Trust Laws . . . 170 

State Legislation and the Boycott 174 

Primary Boycotts and the Courts 177 

CHAPTER XII 

udicial reasons for illegality of boycotts 

Summary of Reasons 180 

The Law of Combination 181 

The Boycott and Illegal Ends 184 

The Boycott and the Doctrine of Malice . , . 189 

The Boycott and Illegal Means 194 

Freedom of Speech and Press 198 

CHAPTER XIII 

judicial argument for legality of the boycott 

Summary of Reasons 200 

Doctrine of Combination 201 



i 4 CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Injury of Business 209 

Doctrine of Immediate and Ultimate Results . . 212 

Doctrine oe Malice 213 

Doctrine oe Interest 225 

Doctrine of Free Speech and Press 227 

Doctrine of Threats and Coercion 230 

CHAPTER XIV 

attitude of courts toward boycotting and 
remedies applied 

Attitude of Courts Toward Boycotting .... 234 
Legal Remedies 239 

CHAPTER XV 

STATUS of boycotts abroad 

The English Law of Conspiracy 241 

Germany 251 

Other Countries 253 

CHAPTER XVI 

efforts to legalize boycotts and tendencies 
toward legalization 

Attempts in Congress 255 

Tendencies 262 

PART III 

BOYCOTTS IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 

CHAPTER XVII 

Social and Economic Reasons Against the Boycott . 267 

CHAPTER XVIII 

social and economic reasons for legalizing the boycott 
Summary of Reasons . 274 



CONTENTS 15 



PAGE 



Present Condition of Labor 275 

The Wealth and Position or the Employing Class . 279 

Employers' Organizations . . 281 

The Blacklist 289 

"Spies" in Labor Unions 290 

Private Detectives 297 

Private Detectives Armed with State Authority . 302 

Organizations for Supplying Strike Breakers . . 304 



CHAPTER XIX 

social and economic reasons for legalizing the boycott 
public opinion and the government 

The Control of the Press 307 

Free Speech 315 

The Pulpit 317 

Governmental Forces and the Worker — The Police 318 

The State Constabulary 320 

The Militia • . 322 

The Courts 325 

Boycotting a Fundamental Right 328 



CHAPTER XX 

POSSIBLE recourse of labor if permanently deprived 
of the boycott 

Secret Practice 331 

The Union Label and Trade Union Cooperatives . 332 

Political Action 334 

Sabotage and the I. W. W. Tactics 340 



CHAPTER XXI 
Probable Outcome if the Boycott is Legalized . . 344 



10 CONTENTS 

APPENDIX 

SUMMARY AND DIGEST OF DECISIONS IN BOYCOTT AND 
ALLIED CASES 



PAGE 



New England States 356 

Middle Atlantic States 365 

North Central States 386 

Southern States 406 

Western States 419 

Federal Decisions 430 

Buck's Stove and Danbury Hatters .... 450 

Table of Cases 456 

Bibliography 473 

Index 481 



INTRODUCTION 

To most Americans "boycott" is a word of ill-omen. 
The pictures it calls up are of acts like those charged 
against the striking coal miners in the Report of the 
Anthracite Strike Commission of 1902. It says: U A 
young school mistress of intelligence, character, and at- 
tainments was . . . boycotted, and her dismissal from 
employment compelled for no other reason than that 
a brother, not living in her immediate family, chose to 
work contrary to the wishes and will of the striking 
miners. A lad, about fifteen years old, employed in 
a drug store, was discharged, owing to the threats 
made to his employer by a delegation of the strikers, 
on behalf of their organization, for the reason that 
his father had chosen to return to work before the 
strike was ended. In several instances tradesmen were 
threatened with a boycott — that is, that all connected 
with the strikers would withhold from them their cus- 
tom, and persuade others to do so, if they continued 
to furnish the necessaries of life to the families of cer- 
tain workmen, who had come under the ban of the 
displeasure of the striking organization." 

Such insistence on the solidarity of the family and 
punishment of sisters, sons and even wives and infant 
children for the offenses of their brothers, fathers, and 
husbands seems unjust. It is the purpose of the law 
to prevent injustice. Consequently laws against the use 
of the boycott, whether common or statute, are good 
laws and should be enforced. This is the line of rea- 
soning that has heretofore dominated public opin- 
ion in the United States. 

But the issue is not quite so simple. To prevent in- 

17 



1 8 INTRODUCTION 

justice is the purpose of the law; but in an imperfect 
world it must content itself with a very imperfect ac- 
complishment of that purpose. If in the endeavor 
to remedy one kind of injustice another kind that is 
more serious is committed, the cure is clearly worse 
than the disease. And this is the view which intelligent 
wage-earners take of the law restricting their right to 
use the boycott. In their struggle to improve their 
condition their two most powerful weapons are their 
right to refuse to work for employers whose policies 
they disapprove, and their right to refuse to buy com- 
modities of dealers whose policies they disapprove. 
Through the gradual development of Anglo-American 
law the first right has come to be more and more 
completely recognized. Strikes, concerted refusal to 
work for employers whose policies are disapproved, 
which were condemned as criminal conspiracies in the 
first quarter of the last century, are now universally 
upheld as lawful when their purpose is direct benefit 
to the strikers. Strikes to secure the discharge of non- 
members of a union and sympathetic strikes are still 
condemned in some jurisdictions, but more and more 
the English view, expressed by Judge Parker in voicing 
the majority opinion of the New York Court of Ap- 
peals in an important labor case, 1 that strikes for any 
purpose are lawful, so long as unlawful means are not 
employed, is winning acceptance. This view is not 
founded on the belief that strikes do not often inflict 
cruel injustice on individuals. The contrary is notori- 
ously the case. It grows rather out of the principle 
that, in a free country, the wage-earner must be free 
to work, or not to work, for whom he will, and that 
curtailing this freedom and depriving him of his lib- 
erty involve, on the whole, more injustice than giving 
it the widest scope and trusting to his sense of fair- 

1 National Protective Association v. Cummings, 170 N. Y. 315 
(1902). 



INTRODUCTION 19 

ness, to the controlling influence of public opinion and 
to the ability of employers to combine on their side 
to resist unreasonable demands and to curb the unjust 
acts to. which it may lead. 

The right of workers to refuse to buy commodities 
of dealers whose policies they disapprove has not yet 
been given the same wide extension. In its simple 
form, the boycott of a dealer who is himself obnoxious 
to his customers, it is generally upheld. In its com- 
pound form, corresponding to the strike to secure the 
discharge of a third person and the sympathetic strike, 
it is generally declared unlawful. 

In the following monograph Mr. Laidler has under- 
taken to examine the economic and legal aspects of 
the boycott. Approaching the problem without preju- 
dice or preconception, he presents to the reader, 
through a clear summary of important cases, the judi- 
cial reasoning that has led some of our courts to con- 
demn the boycott; others to uphold its legality. The 
use that has actually been made of the boycott and 
the social and economic arguments for and against 
such use are reviewed with equal thoroughness. Re- 
enforcing his conclusion that there is no justification 
either in law or economics for the distinction which 
most of our courts have drawn between the right to 
strike and the right to boycott, his concluding chapters 
show the probable consequences if wage-earners be per- 
manently deprived of the right to boycott and the safe- 
guards, in the self-interest of the workers themselves, 
in public opinion and in the defensive measures which 
employers and dealers may adopt, if this right be 
freely conceded. 

The publication of so careful a study of this im- 
portant phase of the labor problem could hardly be 
more timely. A Federal Commission on Industrial 
Relations is just beginning its inquiry. In this mono- 
graph it will find all of the facts and arguments on 



20 INTRODUCTION 

which its conclusions with reference to the boycott must 
be based. Congress is certain in the near future to con- 
sider the amendment of the Anti-trust act so far as it 
relates to labor organizations. Here are reviewed the 
important boycott cases, the Danbury Hatters' case 
and the Buck's Stove case, which have arisen under 
that statute and the common law. Lawyers and 
judges are constantly called upon to advise clients or 
to settle cases touching the law with reference to boy- 
cotts. Mr. Laidler shows clearly the trend of judicial 
opinion from the conservatism of our Eastern courts 
to the radicalism of those of Western states, like Wash- 
ington and California. Finally, in our colleges there 
is growing interest in the study of the labor problem 
and increasing appreciation of books which bring stu- 
dents close to the realities of the situation. This is an 
excellent "case book" on the boycott which could be 
profitably employed even by instructors who were dis- 
posed to dissent from the author's conclusions. Thus, 
to the Federal Commissioners, to members of Con- 
gress, and legislators generally, to lawyers, to judges 
and to students and teachers of economics, as well as 
to labor leaders and employers of labor, the book is 
to be heartily commended. If, as a result of its peru- 
sal, light be thrown upon a difficult problem and the 
way prepared for making the law at once more rational 
and more uniform in a field where it is now illogical 
and conflicting, the purpose of the author will be 
attained. 

It is a special gratification that the requirements for 
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Columbia Uni- 
versity have resulted in the publication of so excellent 
and useful a book. 

Henry R. Seager. 
Columbia University, 

New York, December, 19 13. 



PART I 
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF BOYCOTTS 



CHAPTER I 

HISTORY OF THE BOYCOTT 

Boycott and the Irish League 

Few words can boast of as curious and interesting 
an introduction into the English language as can the 
subject of this book — the boycott. 

"I was dining with Father John O'Malley," writes 
James Redpath, in his "Talks of Ireland," 1 88 1, 1 u and 
he asked me why I was not eating. I said, 'I am both- 
ered about a word.' 'What is it?' asked Father John. 
'Well,' said I, 'when a people ostracise a landgrabber 
we call it social excommunication, but we ought to 
have an entirely different word to signify ostracism 
applied to a landlord or a land agent like Boycott. 
Ostracism won't do. The peasantry would not know 
the meaning of the word, and I can't think of any- 
thing.' 'No,' said Father John, 'ostracism wouldn't do.' 
He looked down, tapped his big forehead, and said, 
'How would it do to call it "to boycott him" ?' 

"Then I was delighted, and I said, 'Tell your people 
to call it boycotting, so that when the reporters come 
down from Dublin and London they will hear the 
word. Use it yourself in the Castlebar Telegraph. 
I'm going to Dublin, and will ask the young orators of 
the land league to give it that name. I will use it in 
my correspondence, and between us we will make it 
famous.' Father John and I kept our compact. He 

x Magazine of Western History, v. 5, pp. 214, 215. 
23 



24 BOYCOTTS 

was the first man who uttered the word, and I was the 
first who wrote it." 

It thus happened that through the wit of an Irish 
priest and an American journalist a name was given, 
in the summer of 1880, to that method of warfare 
which was then being resorted to by an enraged people 
against the exactions of the landlord class, a method 
which has since been used time without number by op- 
pressed and oppressors throughout the civilized world. 
Incidentally also the infamies of Captain Boycott were 
immortalized. 

The events giving rise to the conversation between 
Father O'Malley and Redpath are noteworthy. For 
years the Irish peasantry had been heavily burdened by 
the British landlord class. Lands had been confis- 
cated, homes of the peasants destroyed, starvation 
wages paid. As the year 1880 approached, evictions 
became more numerous and their causes more trivial. 
In 1879 there were 1,000 evictions, as against an aver- 
age of 500, from 1 872-1 877, and in the first half of 
1880 the number exceeded 1,000. The landlords were 
taking advantage of the famine of 1878 to clear their 
estates. Intense suffering was the inevitable result. 
The outcome was the Land League, formed to repre- 
sent the peasants. 1 

Among the most hated of the retainers of the land- 
lord class was Captain Boycott, an agent of Lord Erne 
in County Mayo, in the district of Connemara. In the 
summer of 1880 he sent his tenants to the field to cut 
oats, offering the men and women 32 and 24 cents a 
day respectively, instead of 62 and 37 cents, the regu- 
lar wages. They refused to serve, and Boycott, his 
wife, nieces, nephews and servants undertook to har- 
vest the crop, but desisted, thoroughly exhausted, after 
a few hours' labor. The tenants were finally induced 
by the pleas of Mrs. Boycott to return to work, but on 
1 Herbert Paul, History of Modern Europe, v. 4, p. 164. 



HISTORY OF THE BOYCOTT 25 

rent day were confronted by a formidable array of 1 8 
constables equipped with eviction papers. Three 
papers were served, whereupon the outraged workers 
called a great mass meeting, induced the servants, 
herders and drivers to desert Boycott, and secured the 
pledges of those present to cease all relations with the 
captain and his family. 

At the call of Boycott, a relief expedition, consist- 
ing of seven regiments and fifty hired men, was soon 
rushed to the estate, and the potatoes and other com- 
modities were finally gathered at an expense of between 
$35,000 and $50,000 — many times the value of the 
crop. Three days after the decree of social ostracism 
was pronounced, the word "boycott" was invented. It 
was first used publicly by Redpath in August, 1880, in 
the village of Deenane. In September of the same 
year, at Clare Morris and Clonbur, in describing the 
workings of this device, Redpath declared: 

u This great reform, as you can see, can be achieved 
without shedding a drop of blood, without violence, 
without breaking any law — English, human or divine. 
But if a man does take a farm from which a poor ten- 
ant has been evicted, I conjure you to do him no bodily 
harm. . . . Act toward him as the Queen of England 
would act to you if she lived in Clonbur. Act toward 
his wife as the Queen of England would act toward 
your good wife if she lived in Clonbur. Act toward his 
children as the Queen of England would act toward 
your children! . . . She would not regard you nor 
your wife nor your children as her equals. Now, imi- 
tate the Queen of England, and don't speak to a land- 
grabber nor a landgrabber's wife nor to a landgrab- 
ber's children. ... If a landgrabber comes to town 
and wants to sell anything, don't do him any bodily 
harm. ... If you see a landgrabber going to a shop 
to buy bread, or clothing, or even whiskey, go you to 
the shopkeeper at once, don't threaten him. . . . Just 
say to him that under British law he has the undoubted 



26 BOYCOTTS 

right to sell his goods to anyone, but that there is no 
British law to compel you to buy another penny's worth 
from him, and that you will never do it as long as you 
live." 1 

Similar advice was given to the peasants by Parnell 
and others during this period. 2 That the peasantry 
were not slow in availing themselves of the suggestions 
given was the opinion of the London Times, Novem- 
ber 5, 1885: 

"It means that a peaceful subject of the Queen is 
denied food and drink, and that he is run down in his 
business, that his cattle are unsalable at fairs; that the 
smith will not shoe his horse nor the carpenter mend 
his cart; that old friends pass him by on the other side 
of the street, making the sign of the cross; that his 
children are hooted at the village school; that he sits 
apart, like an outcast, in his usual place of worship, all 
for doing nothing but that the law says that he has a 
perfect right to do." 

The boycott as tried in Ireland was almost univer- 
sally condemned by the landholding class. However, 
it was effective. It called the attention of the people of 
England and Ireland as perhaps did no other weapon 
to many grave injustices. Doubtless in many instances 
it worked hardship upon innocent people. It was a 
crude and often an undiscriminating weapon in the war 
against greed. It was called into being by that greed. 
It was a result, as Whiteboyism and Molly Maguirism 
were results, and, although seemingly harsh in appli- 
cation, was one of the mildest forms of protest experi- 
mented with up to that time, and mild indeed when 
compared with some of the weapons used by the edu- 
cated ruling class. In fact, it was but a counterpart 

1 Magazine of Western History, v. 5, pp. 213 et seq. 

2 Barry O'Brien, Life of Parnell, pp. 236, 237. 



HISTORY OF THE BOYCOTT 27 

of the weapon used in innumerable instances by the 
propertied classes in their contests with the peasants. 

"You all know that Mr. Gordon is the best shoe- 
maker in Connaught," said Redpath again, in address- 
ing the people of Clonblur, u and that he once em- 
ployed a dozen workmen. He made all the boots and 
shoes for the gentry in that part of the country. Just 
as soon as he addressed a land league meeting his 
custom fell off, landlords wouldn't buy shoes from him, 
and my friend Gordon was almost ruined. Now imi- 
tate these landlords." 1 

Boycotting in Past History 

Although the word "boycott" is of comparatively 
recent origin, the practice of boycotting, if we disas- 
sociate that term from any necessary connection with 
labor disputes, and define it for the time being as an 
organized effort to withdraw and induce others to 
withdraw from social or business relations with an- 
other, has been resorted to since the dawn of history. 
The Jews shunned the Samaritans; the Pharisees boy- 
cotted the Publicans, as far as social intercourse was 
concerned. In Greece, for many years, following the 
rule of Cleisthenes, the people ostracised their unsuc- 
cessful claimants for political preference, and in the 
Roman Empire, by the ignis et aqua interdictio, many 
of the best Romans were rendered outcasts. Those in- 
curring the wrath of the church of Rome during the 
Middle Ages, and receiving the interdicts of excom- 
munication, may also be said to have felt the force of 
at least one form of this weapon. 

A unique combination for the purpose of boycotting, 
and one in many ways strikingly similar to that inau- 
gurated by the Irish Land League, existed in France 
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 2 In 

1 Magazine of Western History, v. 5, p. 213. 

2 R. E. Prothera, French Boycott and Its Cure, 10th Century, 
v. 28, pp. 778-785. 



28 BOYCOTTS 

Picardy, in northern France, the farmers, renters of 
land, claimed not only the right of perpetual enjoy- 
ment of the plot of land which they occupied, but also 
power to dispose of this right to their representative 
by sale or will. They also denied the right of the 
landlord to let or sell their land over their heads, to 
evict them from their holdings, to raise the rent or to 
refuse to lease the land to their nominees. For this 
right, which was in conflict with the French law, the 
farmers paid a certain premium, and if the landlord 
had the temerity to refuse to recognize these unwrit- 
ten laws, the aggrieved renter would hasten to the 
village cabaret, and indignantly inform his neighbors, 
"Je n'ai jamais demonte personne; j'espere que per- 
sonne ne me demontera." (I have never yet dispos- 
sessed anyone; I hope that no one will dispossess me.) 
The farm was then boycotted by the countryside. It 
was almost impossible to rent it. A new tenant was 
denounced as a landgrabber. He could not hire labor. 
His sons obtained no employment; his daughters, no 
husbands. He was ostracised by his neighbors, who 
refused him assistance. His fields were often sown 
with tares by men with masks ; his implements were 
broken; his cattle mutilated; his houses burned, and 
sometimes he himself was fiercely attacked. In one 
instance, when a farmer was hanged for participating 
in these onslaughts, his fellow farmers decreed that 
the wealthiest bachelor in town should marry the dead 
man's widow, and secure a dower from the town, "et la 
chose jut execute." This system lasted from 1679 
until far into the nineteenth century, and resulted in 
many bitter feuds. 

The Boycott and the American Revolution 

From the year 1327, the date of the boycotting of 
the monks of Christ's Church by the citizens of Can- 



HISTORY OF THE BOYCOTT 29 

terbury, 1 to the time of the Revolution, many were the 
instances of boycotting in England. 

In America this weapon was first used on a large 
scale in the troubles with Great Britain leading up to 
the Revolutionary War. Its frequent practice at that 
period is often cited by the supporters of boycotts in 
labor disputes to indicate its thoroughly American 
character. 

Following the passage of the Stamp Act of March, 
1765, the Boston, New York and Philadelphia mer- 
chants resolved to cease importing British goods until 
this obnoxious measure should be repealed. Retail 
merchants refused to sell British goods, and customers 
to buy them. The Daughters of Liberty were among 
the most militant of the boycotters. Later on the Sons 
of Liberty began an active boycotting campaign against 
merchants dealing with goods imported from *.he 
mother country, distributing circulars broadcast and 
posting them on the doors of the Tory merchants. A 
typical poster read: 

"It is desired that the Sons of Liberty would not 
buy any one thing of them (naming the merchants), 
for in so doing they will bring disgrace upon them- 
selves and their posterity forever and ever. Amen." 

Perhaps the most famous attempt followed the im- 
position of the tax on tea, when, in December, 1773, 
succeeding a period of peaceful boycotting, the Boston 
Tea Party boarded the British ship in the Boston har- 
bor and threw three hundred chests of tea into the 
sea. Many of the state legislatures, the Continental 
Congress and numerous seaports also passed boycot- 
ting resolutions, 2 and after the war considerable of this 
practice was resorted to between the states. 3 In the 

1 Ely, The Labor Movement, p. 297. 

2 Coman, Industrial History of the United States, p. 104, and 
Magazine of Western History, v. 5, pp. 218-220. 
•McMaster, History of the United States, v. 1, p. 404. 



30 BOYCOTTS 

embargoes against British vessels during the War of 
1 8 12 we witness another example of the use of this 
device. 

It is thus seen that boycotting in its broader sense 
has been a potent weapon for many centuries in the 
hands of state and church, organizations of the agra- 
rian population and of political rebels, and, in fact, 
of all strata of the population. We will now turn to 
its employment in America during the last few gen- 
erations. 



CHAPTER II 

SOME MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS IN THE 
UNITED STATES 

The Consumers' Boycott 

Many forms of boycott have been practiced in re- 
cent years in America. A variation generally given 
wide publicity is the consumers' boycott. It is used 
chiefly as a protest against the high cost of living, 
although, organized under the National Consumers' 
League, it is directed primarily to improving labor 
conditions. 

Meat has been one of the articles most frequently 
subjected to attack. "Mayor of Boston Boycotts 
Meat" reads a typical headline in the New York 
Herald. 1 The article declares that Mayor John Fitz- 
gerald calls the people throughout the country to eat 
as little meat as possible. "We can defeat those who 
are responsible for the high cost of living," says the 
Mayor, "by boycotting every kind of food on which 
the price is raised." 

The women of Brooklyn and Philadelphia, in the 
summer of 191 2, forced many butchers to close shop 
until lower prices were charged. Especially effective 
was a movement in the Jewish section of New York, 
where, at one time, according to reports, 6,000 retail 
dealers in kosher meat in Manhattan, and 400 in 
Brownsville, Brooklyn, had closed shop, awaiting a 
reduction in the prices of the wholesalers. During 
this period a Brooklyn butcher shop was entered by a 

1 New York Herald, Aug. 4, 1912. 
3* 



32 BOYCOTTS 

number of angry housewives and the meat sprinkled 
with kerosene. 1 

An even more carefully planned campaign against 
the same industry was instituted in January of 1910, 
when labor, business men's and other organizations, 
particularly in the important cities of the middle West, 
pledged to abstain from the purchase of meat for sixty 
days, and circulated huge petitions, some of them 
signed by thirty thousand men and women, against the 
eating of meat. 2 Secretary Dickinson of the War De- 
partment some time ago was said to have ordered the 
army commissary to cease patronizing the "Standard 
Oil Trust," and a similar ban was placed on the "To- 
bacco Trust." The House Wives' League of New 
York has also been prominent in the use of this weapon 
against unobliging retailers 3 and high priced butter 
dealers. 

A unique example of a threatened consumers' boy- 
cott was witnessed in Chicago in 191 1, when the Ameri- 
can Federation of Catholic Societies menaced the the- 
ater managers with their disfavor should they stage 
Salome and certain other prescribed productions. 
Other instances may be multiplied. 

The effectiveness of these spasmodic efforts is ex- 
ceedingly difficult to estimate. It usually happens that 
the public gives heed the first few days, when the or- 
ganized boycott is widely heralded by the press as a 
striking news item. When the boycott, however, ceases 
to be "good copy," and its existence is more or less ig- 
nored by the newspapers, the average citizen quickly 
forgets about the existence of the ban, and continues his 
purchase of the boycotted article. We are told that, 
as a result of the meat boycott in Cleveland in 19 10, the 
price of meat was reduced, on the average, two cents 

^Brooklyn Eagle, June 22, 1912. 

2 Ibid., January 21, 1910. 

3 New York Times, March 26, 1912. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 33 

a pound. 1 Another report of the same general boycott 
declares, however, that the boycott resulted in decreas- 
ing the supply of beef, but not the price. "Report in 
the Chicago papers yesterday," runs the article, "shows 
that 16,000 steers had been sent to the slaughter house, 
whereas 25,000 had been the normal Monday ship- 
ment." 2 

Another indirect form of the consumers' boycott, 
primarily for the purpose of bettering the conditions 
of women and child labor in department stores and 
factories, has been employed for a number of years by 
the National Consumers' League. For years this 
league maintained and widely distributed a so-called 
"white-list" of those department stores which sup- 
posedly observed certain rules as to wages, hours and 
sanitation. Although its publication undoubtedly had 
some effect in diverting trade from department stores 
not on the list and in improving conditions of labor 
among these establishments, the difficulty encountered 
in persuading these stores to give sufficient wages to 
their help has led the League to discontinue its issu- 
ance, at least in New York City. Mrs. Florence Kel- 
ley, general secretary of the League, in a communica- 
tion of September 6, 19 12, writes: 

"The Consumers' League of the City of New York 
has abandoned the publication of the white list chiefly 
by reason of the insufficient wages paid in every depart- 
ment store in New York City. In fact, I think that all 
discussion of white lists may henceforth be treated as 
studies in ancient history; and the advocacy of mini- 
mum wage boards is likely to take the place formerly 
held by the advocacy of the white list on the part of 
officers and members of the Consumers' League. The 
experience of twenty years is conclusive that wages can- 
not be dealt with by the method of persuasion. There 
must be coercion, either through efficient organization 

1 New York Times, January 20, 1910. 
a New York Call, February 1, 1910. 



34 BOYCOTTS 

of the wage earners — which is impossible in the case of 
the shifting mass of young department store employees 
— or by legislation for minimum wage boards." 

The League also grants the Consumers' League 
Label to those factories which, in its opinion, obey 
the state factory law, make all of the goods on the 
premises, do not overwork their help and do not em- 
ploy girls under sixteen years old. The label is used 
now only on women's apparel. Up to January, 19 12, 
the League had authorized the use of this label in 
fifty-eight factories of the country, and claimed good 
results in raising the standard of employment in many 
industries. 

While chief emphasis is laid by the League on the 
betterment of living conditions for women and girls, 
the consumer is often urged to purchase labeled goods 
on the ground that they are more likely to be free from 
disease. The white list before referred to has often 
been called the negative boycott. The legality of this 
form of boycott has not been questioned. 

Another unique experiment in inducing friends of 
labor to purchase garments made under decent condi- 
tions, and indirectly to boycott dealers unfair to labor, 
is the Label Shop, located, at present writing, at 14 W. 
37th Street, New York City. The reason for such an 
establishment is given by Helen Howell Moorhead, 
one of its officers, as follows : 

"A frequent experience of anyone who has spoken 
about the work of the Consumers' League has been the 
following: After a stirring appeal to an audience not 
to buy goods made by sweated labor comes the ques- 
tion in many voices : 'Where can I be sure of buying 
goods made under proper conditions?' As an answer, 
the Consumers' League used to give the names of regu- 
lar shops where label goods were sold. But customers, 
on asking for these articles, received scant courtesy and 
sometimes even met with a refusal to display any arti- 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 35 

cles at all. So a showcase was established in the 
Women's Trade Union League headquarters, showing 
samples of underclothes bearing a Trade Union Label. 
Here orders could be given, and the consumer could be 
sure that her power — the theoretically immeasurable 
power of the consumer which seems to individual exer- 
cise so infinitesimal — was wisely expended. From this 
one showcase, and from its conscientious but despair- 
ing purchasers, sprang The Label Shop." 

The shop has been in existence since 191 1. It has a 
capital stock of $10,000, distributed in $10 shares 
among about 100 members of The Consumers' League, 
The Trade Union League and The Association of Col- 
legiate Alumnae. The business in 19 12 amounted to 
from $15,000 to $20,000, and permitted the company 
to declare a dividend of 4%. 

The shop confines its sales to clothing for women. It 
carries only goods which bear the label of the Con- 
sumers' League and of the Trade Unions. When a 
protocol label is created, it will probably recognize this. 
Its sales among the women members of the trade 
unions are but small, partly on account of the com- 
paratively high prices of the goods. 

The shop is constantly sending literature and lec- 
turers to such sympathetic organizations as the Wom- 
en's Municipal League, and various collegiate and re- 
form organizations, is securing the indorsement of 
these bodies, conducting exhibits in various parts of the 
city, and persuading trade unionists to send lecturers 
throughout their unions advocating the purchase of 
goods from the shop. Whether or not this experiment 
will prove a permanent success it is too early to say. 
Given the proper support, the work has splendid possi- 
bilities. 

The Employers 1 Boycott 

Another important class of boycotts in the United 
States is that of the employers' boycotts. These arc 



3 6 BOYCOTTS 

of two kinds: those waged against other firms or in- 
stitutions which show too favorable an attitude toward 
labor, and those directed primarily against troublesome 
wage-earners. The latter are generally called black- 
lists. 

The employers' boycott may be defined as an or- 
ganized effort of employers of labor and monied in- 
terests generally, to induce others of their class to cease 
business relations with those who, in their opinion, are 
too active in the cause of labor. 

An illustrative instance of this form of boycotting 
was given in the American Industries, the official maga- 
zine of the National Association of Manufacturers — 
an organization bitterly opposed to boycotts as prac- 
ticed by working men. The Canadian Bank of Com- 
merce of Windsor, Canada, according to an article 
in this publication, October, 1909, had advertised 
in the San Francisco Bulletin and in several of the 
Scripps-McRae papers, newspapers favorable to or- 
ganized labor. The bank, on September 9, 1909, re- 
ceived the following letter from C. W. Post, the mili- 
tant antagonist of so many forms of trade unionism: 

"This growth toward Socialism and ultimate confis- 
cation and division of property, set up and kept in mo- 
tion by those unthrifty individuals consumed with hate 
for the thrifty, who by hard work and economy acquire 
a little means, is to a large extent kept alive by certain 
newspapers which pander to the unthrifty class, believ- 
ing the numbers in that class to be in the majority. . . . 
We have decided not to continue to supply money to 
such papers to be used in the destructive work they 
are engaged in, and have therefore withdrawn adver- 
tisements from the San Francisco Bulletin and several 
of the Scripps-McRae papers, particularly the Detroit 
News and the Akron Press, as well as some others. 
Aside from the principle involved, we have good rea- 
sons to doubt the earning capacity for advertisers of 
such papers whose circulation should be most closely 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 37 

investigated, and the character of the readers ob- 
served. Believing it time for the peaceful, law-abiding 
citizens to stand together in defence of the growing 
and insidious attacks of the unthrifty, we have been led 
to place this matter before you. Merchandise can be 
best sold by advertisers in papers which stand in open 
support of the thrifty citizens, by far in the majority. 
On the other hand, support of the papers which pander 
to the mob is dangerous to the prosperity and well 
being of the community and nation. Every thoughtful 
citizen should ponder well, look to the future, and do 
his share toward preventing the growth of the de- 
structive theories now being taught." (Italics mine.) 

The Lincoln Farm Association case provides an- 
other instance of this form of boycotting. This asso- 
ciation was formed for the purpose of securing a Me- 
morial National Park in commemoration of Abraham 
Lincoln. Samuel Gompers, president of the American 
Federation of Labor, was made one of the members 
of its Board of Trustees, and the union label was used 
on the association's printing. Several members of the 
National Association of Manufacturers were asked to 
give contributions. The National Founders' Associa- 
tion, the Metal Trades' Association and the Board of 
Directors of the N. A. M. thereupon passed a vigor- 
ous resolution in deprecation of the favoritism shown 
to organized labor, and requested their members to re- 
fuse funds until the alleged favoritism ceased. The 
resolution read in part: 

"Whereas there is evidence that the association has 
adopted the closed shop principle under which the work 
of the project is to be conducted, inasmuch as it has 
selected as one of its trustees the President of the 
American Federation of Labor, and its stationery and 
other literature bear the union label; . . . whereas we 
are fighting to save twenty million free men from in- 
dustrial bondage . . . we . . . emphatically dlsap- 



38 BOYCOTTS 

prove the use in connection with this enterprise of an 
insignia which represents and stands for the overthrow 
of the fundamental rights which Lincoln cherished 
most dearly. Resolved, That the officers in charge of 
the sacred memorial be, and they are hereby respect- 
fully but earnestly urged to abandon the objectionable 
closed shop emblem, which stands for industrial bon- 
dage, and publicly assure those from whom the money 
must come that every vestige of the class domination 
will be eradicated. . . . We recommend that the mem- 
bers of our Association, as well as all other citizens 
who believe in industrial freedom, withhold their con- 
tributions until the proper assurance is given that the 
open shop principle will be recognized in all depart- 
ments of labor in connection therewith."^ 

Letters were also sent by John Kirby, Jr., after- 
wards president of the N. A. M., and others, to the 
Memorial Committee, protesting against the label, 
"the red emblem of anarchy, the emblem of organized 
effort to prevent those for whom Washington fought 
and Lincoln died by the hand of an assassin, from 
earning their bread in the sweat of their brow, except 
at the pleasure of the organization for which the label 
stands," and stating that he will not only refuse to sub- 
scribe as long as the present attitude is maintained, but 
that he will use all his influence against such an "un- 
righteous and infamous proposal." The union label 
finally disappeared from the letterhead of the Associa- 
tion. 2 

A few years ago, the A. F. of L., in its petition to 
President Taft, alleged that the U. S. Steel Corpora- 
tion had been resorting to this weapon. 3 The petition 
described the boycotting of the hotel in Vandergrift 
which harbored officers of the Federation, and of em- 

1 American Industries, December 15, 1907, pp. 42 et seq.; italics 
are author's. 

2 Ibid., January 1, 1908. 

3 Statement Against the Steel Trust, etc., 1910, pp. 21-23. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 39 

ployees who patronized the hotel, and alleged that the 
company even threatened to boycott the United States 
Engineering Company if it continued to encourage or- 
ganizers of labor. 

"Following the prohibition of the celebration of 
Labor Day," runs the report, "the shop committee of 
the molders employed by the United States Engineer- 
ing Company of Vandergrift were approached by their 
employers, and urged to abstain from attending the 
union meetings because the United States Steel Cor- 
poration had threatened to cancel orders for steel cast- 
ings and rolls if the molders continued to encourage 
the organizers." 

The foregoing instances are particularly interesting 
in view of the outspoken opposition of the same groups 
to any form of boycotting by labor. 

The Blacklist 

The blacklist is, perhaps, one of the most insidious 
forms of the boycott practiced in America. It is a 
variety of the employers' boycott and may be defined 
as an agreement of employers to refuse employment to 
certain workmen obnoxious to them, generally on ac- 
count of their activities in behalf of labor. 

In organizing a system of blacklisting, a list of 
names of workmen is prepared by the employers, ac- 
companied by a number of statements regarding their 
personal appearance, qualifications, the reasons for 
their discharge — if they have been dismissed — and 
other information deemed desirable, which list is open 
to the inspection of certain other employers. At times 
a central bureau is maintained where this information 
is placed on file by all of the business men within the 
agreement. By means of this list manufacturers and 
others can readily discover whether or not applicants 
for work are likely to prove "dangerous labor agita- 



4 o BOYCOTTS 

tors." Many are the cases in which workers have been 
refused employment or have been suddenly discharged 
as a result of the secret use of this weapon. 

In describing the workings of the blacklist, Prof. 
Richard T. Ely writes : 

"A man who for any reason, be it even whim, 
caprice, or personal spite, falls into disfavor with his 
employer is placed on the blacklist, and his name, at 
times accompanied by a personal description, is sent 
to the allied employers all over the country. . . . The 
blacklist will pursue a man for years, will drive him 
out of an honest trade . . . and will follow him across 
the continent, and everywhere defeat his efforts to gain 
a livelihood." 1 

"Blacklisting has the merit of being very effective," 
says Woodrow. "Its edict is final; it troubles no jury; 
sends for no sheriff; its machinery is purely clerical, 
with the magnificent advantage of being operative 
wherever its agencies exist. It has its watchdog by 
every door, and woe to the man who, with its brand 
on his brow, seeks work and bread in any one of its 
departments. He is proclaimed by a corporation 
Czar. He is in Siberia, yet under the dome of Wash- 
ington." 2 

Mr. John Mitchell thus describes its workings: 

"The blacklist ... is generally covert and secret. 
In former times, and possibly still to-day, employers 
frequently wrote letters of recommendation to em- 
ployees discharged upon some trivial pretext or other, 
but by a secret sign the employer who read the testi- 
monial would know that the workman was blacklisted. 
In many cases, in fact, the blacklist has been negative, 
and has been simply a secret arrangement by employ- 
ers not to engage any workman without a special 
recommendation from another employer." 3 

1 Ely, The Labor Movement in America, p. no. 

2 Woodrow, Labor Problem, pp. 288-289. 

3 Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 291. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 41 

Since 1832, when a group of merchants and ship 
owners of Boston resolved to employ no journeymen 
who belonged to a labor union, or to deal with any 
master mechanic who gave work to such journeyman, 1 
this weapon has been used with great effect in many 
parts of the country. 

Prof. Ely cites an instance a score of years ago in 
which 23 men were blacklisted in Fall River for ask- 
ing for an increase of wages, 2 and were compelled to 
seek work under assumed names. "It is reported on 
apparently good authority," he declared, "that one 
railroad corporation has a book containing the names 
of a thousand blacklisted persons, with a full descrip- 
tion of each." 

Much evidence of blacklisting, especially in the min- 
ing regions and on the railroads, was adduced by the 
Industrial Commission in their hearings of 1899. 

Before this commission, D. C. Coates, president of 
the Colorado Federation of Labor, testified 3 that, in 
spite of prohibitory laws, wage earners were black- 
listed from one end of the state to the other. He 
added: 

"I know from my own experience that men are kept 
from positions in all parts of the State of Colorado 
because of their connection with organized labor. . . . 
They (the employing class) practically have the power 
to say that a man shall not have work; to destroy his 
credit with the merchants; to destroy or make value- 
less what little property he has; to separate him from 
his family and make him a wanderer upon the face of 
the earth." 

Mr. John Mitchell ap-ain declared before the same 
commission : 4 

x Jbid., p. 290. 

2 Ely, The Labor Movement in America, p. no. 
''Industrial Commission Report, v. 12, p. 248. 
4 Ibid., v. 12, p. 37 (April 11, 1899). 



42 BOYCOTTS 

"The blacklist has been one of the worst weapons 
organized labor has had to contend against. For in- 
stance, if a miner was discharged by a coal company 
for insisting upon better conditions, or trying to in- 
duce his fellow workmen to join his labor organization, 
he often found it impossible to find employment in the 
State where he then resided. It has always been diffi- 
cult for our organization to secure proof that this 
method has been resorted to by employers. It is a 
well-known fact, however, that in the State of West 
Virginia, if a man dares to assert the rights guaran- 
teed, he is deprived of the opportunity to earn a liv- 
ing for himself and family by his employment, and 
many times is unable to secure employment at any other 
mine in the State." 

Of the same import were the testimonies of Ed- 
ward McKay of Pennsylvania, 1 George Clark, a miner 
of Colorado, 2 and Harry Stephenson, also a miner. 3 
Clark expressed the belief that the system of black- 
listing was pretty well perfected throughout the state 
of Colorado. Stephenson gave the names of a num- 
ber of mines which, he alleged, used this weapon. 

In several instances during the nineties, railroads 
were held guilty of this practice. 4 Workers prominent 
in the 1894 strike of the American Railway Union de- 
clare that for years numbers of them were victims of 
the blacklist. 

To what extent this device has been used during the 
last ten years, it is extremely difficult to state, because 
of the secrecy surrounding its employment. In an 
effort to gain a more adequate idea of its use, the writer 
communicated with a number of prominent officers of 
the national and international unions. Of the twenty 
who replied, twelve, or more than one-half, stated 

1 Industrial Commission Report, v. 12, p. 65 (April 12, 1899). 

2 Ibid., p. 328 (July 17, 1899). 
3 Ibid., p. 22 (April 10, 1899). 

4 Hundley v. Louisville Railroad Co. (Ken., 1898) and Mattison v. 
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern R. R. (Ohio, 1895) are examples. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 43 

that blacklists were used more or less effectively, while 
eight replied that they could not cite particular in- 
stances. 

Those prominent in the engravers', foundry work- 
ers', hod carriers', carpenters' and joiners', machine 
printers' and pipe caulkers' unions declared that, so 
far as they were aware, the blacklist was not employed 
to any marked extent in their trades. Mr. Gompers 
expressed the opinion that it was not at present re- 
sorted to extensively. Many officials stated that labor 
did not fear the blacklist, wherever a strong union 
existed which embraced a large percentage of the work- 
ers in a particular trade, and that, in proportion as 
the union became strong, in that proportion the black- 
list became ineffective. 

Officers connected with the railroad, telegraph, tex- 
tile, garment making, granite, glass, leather saddlery, 
pattern, mining and machine industries, and with the 
theatrical profession, on the other hand, wrote that 
they knew of numerous instances where this list was 
resorted to. Most of them added that it was exceed- 
ingly difficult to obtain legal proof. 

In the garment makers' trade it was averred that 
the blacklist was used in very many instances, and that 
a card index system for tracing "undesirable" em- 
ployees was used by one of the employers' associations. 

"There are thousands of instances of blacklisting, 
far too numerous to specify," wrote an official of one 
of the railroad unions. "There are so many and they 
come so often that it would be hard to even think of 
writing a list," stated an officer of another international 
union. "It is done so quietly and in such an under- 
handed and secret way that it can't be proved, but hap- 
pens every day." A leather worker avowed that the 
members of a certain manufacturers' association in 
his trade resorted to the blacklist whenever there was 
a strike in their shops. "There are some dozens of 



44 BOYCOTTS 

cases," wrote a member of one of the professional 
unions, "this especially in Canada and the Southern 
States." 

The machinists averred that the blacklisting system 
found in many large industrial centers often made it 
necessary for their members to change their names in 
order to get work. A journeyman tailor recently told 
the writer that he was effectively blacklisted a few 
years ago in Brooklyn, N. Y., because of his activity 
in a labor struggle. Many other allegations of simi- 
lar import have been received. 

One of the most recent charges of the extensive use 
of this weapon was made in 19 12, in connection with 
the Steel Trust investigation, 1 by Mr. H. H. Eagle, 
city editor of the Pittsburgh Leader. Mr. Eagle tes- 
tified that he had in his possession a list of 3,000 for- 
mer employees of the Carnegie Steel Company, who 
had caused disturbance in the ranks of labor. This, 
he said, had been received from one Morgan, who 
represented himself as a labor agent of the corpora- 
tion. He further stated that, on interviewing a num- 
ber of the men on the list, he was informed that they 
had been absolutely unable to obtain work in the mills 
of the Steel Corporation. 

Again, in a recent strike against lumber firms of 
Louisiana, in the summer of 19 12, the strikers accused 
the Operators' Association of blacklisting over a thou- 
sand men, and of forcing every man applying for a job 
in the lumber industry to take an anti-union labor 
oath. 2 A somewhat curious form of blacklist was or- 
ganized in 191 1 by the bankers of New York and vi- 
cinity against bank clerks, who testified against Charles 
W. Morse in the National Bank of North America 

1 New York Call, February 16, 1912, testimony before Stanley In- 
vestigation Committee, February 15, 1912. 

2 Coming Nation, June 22, 1912, on "The Southern Lumber War," 
by Covington Hall. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 45 

investigation, according to United States District At- 
torney Henry A. Wise. 

From the few cases which have actually been brought 
into court during the last twenty years, we can form 
some conclusion regarding the existence of this form 
of the employers' boycott. In 1898 the Louisville 
Railroad was convicted of agreeing with other com- 
panies not to employ any man who had been discharged 
from any of the companies, and of entering on the 
books of the company a false reason for the discharge 
of the defendant employee. 1 In 1895 the Lake Shore 
and Michigan Railroad was declared guilty of some- 
what similar practices, 2 as was, more recently, the 
Great Northern Railroad Company. 3 The metal 
trades, 4 the cotton mills, 5 and many other industries 
furnish examples of blacklists which have brought the 
alleged offenders into court. 

One of the latest of the adjudicated cases occurred 
in the shoe industry in Haverhill, Mass., where the 
Shoe Manufacturers' Association of that city was 
found guilty of preventing the employment of strikers 
in Haverhill and vicinity, by means of the blacklist, 
and of bringing pressure on merchants to refuse credit 
to their former employees. 6 

In many of the cases brought into court, while dis- 
crimination against unionists was shown, the court took 
the position that no such discrimination had been 
proved as would warrant conviction. Following the 
American Railway strike of 1894, for instance, a for- 
mer employee of the Illinois Central Railroad declared 
that it had been impossible, for several years, for him 

1 Hundley v. Louisville Railroad (Ken., 1898). 

2 Mattison v. Lake Shore & Michigan Southern (Ct. of Common 
Pleas, Ohio, 1895). 

3 Joyce v. Great Northern Railway Co. (Minn., 1907). 
4 Atkins v. W. & A. Fletcher Co. (N. J., 1*903). 

5 Willis v. Muscogee Man. Co. (Ga., 1904). 

6 A. Cornellier v. Haverhill Shoe Manufacturers' Association, re- 
ported in New York Call, April 2, 1913. 



46 BOYCOTTS 

to secure employment on any of the other railroads, on 
account of the character of the clearance card which 
he had received. His loss was estimated at $50,000. 
The court exonerated the railroad, stating that it was 
not proved guilty of denying all clearance cards what- 
soever, but only such as would enable the complainant 
to obtain work. 1 Various courts have decided that it 
was not actionable for railroads to agree not to employ 
men who had been on strike, 2 or for them to inform 
other railroads, on request, that a former employee had 
been a labor agitator, 3 or to discharge a worker be- 
cause he was a union man. 4 In fact, in the case of 
Adair v. U. S. (1908), that part of the Erdman law 
which made it illegal to discharge a workman, because 
of his union affiliations, was pronounced unconstitu- 
tional by the Supreme Court of the United States. In 
the eyes of some labor leaders this decision practically 
legalized this war measure. 

In view of the many proved instances of the use of 
the blacklist, the blacklisting possibilities of many of 
the publications and employment bureaus of the em- 
ployers' associations have special significance. The 
American Industrial and Commercial Agency Com- 
pany, with headquarters at Toledo, Ohio, recently com- 
piled a book which purported to give the rating of 
workmen as to wages, workmanship, character, produc- 
tion, hours of labor, etc. "Labor men familiar with 
the plan and scope of the enterprise," stated the Brook- 
lyn Eagle, "declare that it is the biggest blacklisting 
scheme ever attempted, while on the other hand the 
general manager insists that it holds out to the working 
man opportunities for advancement not hitherto en- 
joyed." 5 

J McDonald v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (111., 1900). 

2 New York City Street Railway Co. v. Schaffer (Ohio, 1902). 

3 Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young (Ind., 1904). 

4 Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Company (C. C. E. D., Mo., 
1903). 
5 Brooklyn Daily Eagle, June 10, 191 1. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 47 

An employment bureau which could easily be used 
to blacklist union laborers is described by Dr. Ed- 
wards. 1 The organization is known as the Manufac- 
turers' Bureau of Hartford County, and consists of 
the officers of some thirty factories in Hartford and 
vicinity. It aims to supply work to applicants in its 
allied factories, and requires all applying to fill out a 
comprehensive application card. When the laborer 
obtains work, a card indicating the place of employ- 
ment, wages, etc., is filed in the employment office. As 
soon as the employee leaves, the manufacturer is re- 
quired to fill out a blank, carefully stating the cause 
of the worker's withdrawal from the factory, his abil- 
ity, wages, and other facts of value to the bureau. 
Many union men claim that a workman dismissed for 
organizing the workers would look in vain for work 
in any of the other factories. This association, they 
contend, is connected with others in New Haven, 
Springfield, Worcester, Boston, New York and other 
cities, while all are associated with the National Asso- 
ciation of Manufacturers. A somewhat similar bu- 
reau of the National Metal Trades' Association, with 
branches in a dozen large cities, is described in the 
World's Work of December, 1905. 

Yet, in spite of this evidence of blacklisting, em- 
ployers will almost invariably state, when approached, 
that they are absolutely opposed to its use. Thus, 
Mr. James W. Van Cleave, then president of the Na- 
tional Association for Manufacturers, stated: 

"When I condemn the boycott, I condemn it in all 
its forms and ramifications, including the blacklist, 
which is only the boycott in another form. Whether 
used by the labor organizations to hurt employers or 
by employers' associations to hurt workers, the boy- 

1 Alba M. Edwards, Ph.D., American Economic Assoc, 1907, 3rd 
series, v. 8, pp. 578 et scq. 



48 BOYCOTTS 

cott and the blacklist are un-American, immoral and 
vicious, and have no place in a country like ours." 1 

Again he said: 

"In every instance in which I have heard the black- 
list mentioned by the members of the National Asso- 
ciation of Manufacturers, or by employers of any sort 
or in any place, it was condemned as a cowardly op- 
pression of the weak by the strong. For this practice 
no defense, no apology, has ever been offered, or even 
can be offered which is worth a moment's considera- 
tion. To this statement there are no exceptions, no 
reservations, no limitations. The question of the black- 
list has only one side, and that is base." Mr. Van 
Cleave then referred to the boycott as equally base, and 
continued: "The manufacturer or employer who uses 
or sanctions the use of a blacklist has no right of com- 
plaint against the labor organization which employs 
the boycott as a method, since both are beyond the 
pale of the moral and the civil law." 

By November, 191 1, the blacklist had been pro- 
hibited specifically in some twenty-three states of the 
union, and also by federal statute. It was furthermore 
condemned under conspiracy acts in most of the other 
states. The states specifically prohibiting it were: 
Connecticut in New England; Alabama, Florida, North 
Carolina and Virginia in the Southern Atlantic States; 
Arkansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma and Texas in the 
South Central; Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Minne- 
sota, Missouri, North Dakota and Wisconsin in the 
North Central States and Colorado, Montana, Ne- 
vada, Oregon, Utah and Washington in the Far West. 

The court decisions on the subject are referred to 
elsewhere. 

It will thus be seen that the blacklist is well-nigh 
universally condemned, both by public opinion and by 
law, but that, in spite of this prohibition, it has fre- 

1 American Industries, February 15, 1908, p. 19. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 49 

qucntly been used in the past, and is being employed 
at present in many industries, with telling effect. It 
is doubtless true, as many union men argue, that the 
only permanent corrective is to be found in a thor- 
oughly organized labor movement. 

The Trade Boycott 

While employers of labor have, from the very be- 
ginning, protested vigorously against the use of that 
"un-American weapon," the boycott, when practiced 
by working men, they have repeatedly resorted to this 
same weapon in their competition with other firms. 
Among the most frequent offenders have been the retail 
lumber dealers. During the past few years these deal- 
ers have felt the pressure of the large lumber yards 
and money order businesses which sold directly to the 
consumer, and have combined to prevent business an- 
nihilation. Some of these combinations have formed 
agreements with associations of manufacturers, and 
together they have used their purchasing power to in- 
jure the business of "irresponsible, unscrupulous, un- 
ethical manufacturers, wholesalers and dealers," those, 
in other words, who did not observe the rules of the 
association. The bitter experiences of those dealers 
who were not "in the ring" have often been described. 1 

Many times have these associations been haled into 
court for misconduct. As far back as 1893, for in- 
stance, Mr. Hollis, an official of the Northwestern 
Lumbermen's Association, at that time comprising one- 
half of the lumber dealers in Iowa, Minnesota, Ne- 
braska and the Dakotas, was charged with boycotting 
retail dealers not belonging to the association. 

The method followed was to compel those of its 
members who disobeyed its rules and sold lumber to 
non-members, to pay ten per cent, of the amount of 

1 Hearst's Magazine, April, 1912. 



50 BOYCOTTS 

its sales to such members among the retail dealers who 
resided in the same town with the non-member cus- 
tomers. This practice, however, was not deemed il- 
legal. 1 

Similar lumber organizations in Texas, Indiana, 2 
Louisiana and Mississippi 3 have been declared guilty 
of unlawfully boycotting competitors. A Pennsyl- 
vania association, however, accused of attacking a 
dealer who conceded certain demands to strikers, was 
exonerated from wrongdoing. 4 

Drug associations, wholesale and retail, have been 
conspicuous boycotters. Some years ago, the Atlanta 
Retail Drug Association established a rule that none 
of its members would purchase anything from a sales- 
man who disposed of his goods to drug stores outside 
of the group. 5 The National Wholesale Drug Asso- 
ciation also at one time indulged in a similar practice. 6 

Other frequent experimenters in the gentle art of 
boycotting have been the newspapers, 7 news agencies, s 
printers, 9 plumbers, 10 granite manufacturers, produce 
exchanges, coal associations, liquor associations, real 
estate, ice, coal and other companies, and, in fact, 
combinations dealing with almost every conceivable 
commodity. 

Trade boycotts, then, have played quite an impor- 
tant role in modern business competition. While they 
have frequently led to the oppression of small con- 
cerns, they have at other times been the salvation of 

^ohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis (Minn., 1893). 

2 Jackson v. Stanfield (Ind., 1894). 

3 Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi (U. S. Supreme Ct, 1910). 

4 Cote v. Murphy (Penn., 1894). 

5 Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. (Georgia, 1902). 

6 Park & Sons v. National Wholesale Drug Assoc. (N. Y. Appel- 
late Div., 1898). 

7 Aikens v. Wisconsin (U. S. Supreme Ct., 1905). 

8 Collins v. American News Co. (N. Y. Appellate Div., 1902) and 
Dunlap's Cable News Co. v. Stone (N. Y. Supreme Ct, 1902). 

9 Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co. (Ga., 1902). 

10 Macauley v. Tierney (R. I., 1895). 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 51 

such small industries, in their fight against the other- 
wise overpowering competition of huge aggregations 
of capital. 

The Political Boycott 

Political boycotts, involving the refusal to vote for 
those officials disapproved by labor, are somewhat 
common in America. In a few instances boycotts in 
labor disputes have been carried over into the political 
field, and in at least one case, if we are to credit its 
promoters, a boycott decided a presidential election and 
resulted in the defeat of James G. Blaine. 

The dispute in question began in 1877, in the office 
of the New York Tribune, 1 in an argument over the 
ever recurring subjects of wages and the closed shop. 
The compositors, members of the Typographical 
Union, who were instigators of the dispute, gained 
a temporary victory in 1883, but were afterwards 
discharged. Then followed a country-wide boycott. 
The unionists published a weekly, The Boycotter, and 
in June, 1884, sent delegates to the National Repub- 
lican Convention, asking that the Tribune, then the 
mouthpiece of the Republican party, be repudiated. 
The delegates were treated with scant courtesy, and 
their demands were rejected. The union, thereupon, 
at its session of August 3rd, resolved that, until a 
written repudiation was made of the attitude of this 
newspaper, their members would boycott the "Tribune 
and James G. Blaine," who was then running as a can- 
didate for president of the United States. When the 
votes were counted in November, it was found that 
the Democratic electors were chosen by the citizens of 
the state by a small margin (1,149 votes), and the 
printers declared that it was mainly due to their ef- 
forts that the Democratic nominee, Grover Cleveland, 

1 Annual Report of Bureau of Labor Statistics, 191 1, pp. 2S4 ct seq. 



52 BOYCOTTS 

was enabled to gain the presidency. The boycott of 
the Tribune was not finally called off until June 5, 
1892, when it was announced that a union foreman 
was to be placed in charge of the composing room, 
with full power, and it was recommended that a com- 
mittee be sent to the national convention of that year 
announcing the agreement. The political nature of the 
boycott throughout these years was among the ele- 
ments which led to the final victory of the union. 

Another such boycott was threatened in the nineties 
on the Pacific Coast, when the Multinomah Typo- 
graphical Union, in furtherance of their fight against 
the Longshore Printing Co. in Oregon, warned the city 
council of their displeasure at the polls, should it vote 
to give the city printing to Longshore. 1 

Among other instances which may be classed under 
the general heading of political boycotts, although 
slightly different in their nature from the foregoing, 
are the boycotting of British goods proposed by Mrs. 
Martha Wentworth Suffren, vice-chairman of the 
Woman Suffrage Party, to avenge the imprisonment 
of Mrs. Pankhurst; 2 the boycotting of the Seattle 
Times in the summer of 19 12 by the Socialists of Se- 
attle, because of its contemptuous treatment of the So- 
cialist movement; 3 and the boycotting of a South Salem 
(New York) postmaster appointed against the wish 
of the majority of the citizens of that community. 4 
In the last named instance the citizens journeyed to 
another town to post their letters rather than deposit 
them in the regular office. 

The organized effort of the American Federation 
of Labor and the National Association of Manufac- 
turers, cited elsewhere, to elect representatives favor- 

1 Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell (Oregon, 1894). 

2 New York Times, May 28, 1912. 

3 Appeal to Reason, June 6, 1912. 

4 New York Report, Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1885, p. 361. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS 53 

able to them, may also be included in the list of politi- 
cal boycotts. 

The International Boycott 

Of late, some curious examples of international boy- 
cotts, in which one nation has boycotted the commod- 
ities of another, have appeared. Chief among these 
have been the refusal of the Chinese to purchase cer- 
tain American goods, and of the Persians and Hindoos 
to handle British commodities. 

The Chinese boycott occurred in 1905, as a pro- 
test against the supposed attempt of the United States 
to force the signing of another exclusion treaty. Pro- 
test meetings in Shanghai and elsewhere were held, 
parades of Chinese girls were organized, cartoons, 
characterizing the Americans as tyrants, were widely 
distributed, and everywhere the populace were admon- 
ished not to deal in American products. The agita- 
tion had a temporary effect in a few provinces in de- 
creasing the sales of American goods, but died out 
within a few months. 1 

In the Persian boycott, angered at the Shah for giv- 
ing the tobacco monopoly to an English company for 
$75,000 annually, the inhabitants in many parts of 
Persia rose in rebellion and had to be put down by 
armed force. Some of the nobility stopped smoking, 
followed by the women of the harem. Meetings in 
the mosques and bazars were stopped, merchants closed 
their stores, trade fell to almost nothing, and the gov- 
ernment was finally compelled to renounce its conces- 
sion. 2 In India, the Swadeshi movement, organized to 
give preference to goods made in India over those 
from Great Britain, has gained considerable headway. 3 

1 Hearings, United States Immigration Com., 1906, on "Boycott 
of American Manufactured Goods by the People of China." 

Pavlovitch, "Le Boycott Eeonomique ct la Greve Generate en 
Perse," Le Mouvcment Soeialiste, v. 28, pp. 16-24, July, 1910. 

3 The Szvadeshi Movement, a Symposium, published by G. A. 
Natesant & Co., Esplanade, Madras. 



54 BOYCOTTS 

As a result of the denunciation of the Russian Treaty 
in America in 19 12, in the province of Kursk, Russia, 
the assembly met and resolved that the Russian farm- 
ers boycott all American agricultural implements. Cop- 
ies of the resolutions were sent to all of the other prov- 
inces, urging that similar action be taken. 1 

Rumor had it in June, 191 2, that rich Americans, 
fond of hunting in the Scottish Highlands, were being 
boycotted by a semi-political organization called the 
"Young Scots," who contended that such sport was 
taking away much of the cultivatable land. Some of 
the American families were reported to have given up 
their houses on account of the consequent difficulty of 
securing provisions locally. 2 A boycott of the Panama 
Fair by the Germans, in case the "stand-pat" policy on 
the tariff was continued, was also proposed prior to the 
191 2 presidential election. 3 

During the Ettor-Giovannitti trial in Lawrence, in 
the same year, a strong organization of Swedish work- 
ing men requested the International Trade Union Sec- 
retariat to "take steps toward the organization of a 
world-wide boycott of all American goods," in case 
of the conviction of these two labor leaders. Many 
other instances may be cited. 

Other Forms of Boycotts 

The farmers of the country have also at times urged 
this method of dealing with their supposed enemies. 

"Resolved, That farmers buy no implements of 
those manufacturers or their agents who have entered 
into any conspiracy agreeing not to sell their imple- 
ments to farmers' associations," runs a resolution at 
the Second Bloomington, 111., Convention, 1873. 4 The 

1 New York Times, May 1, 1912. 

2 Brooklyn Eagle, dispatch from Edinburgh, June 14, 1912. 

3 New York Times, September 12, 1912. 

4 Documentary History Am, Indust. Soc., v. 10, p. 52. 



MODERN FORMS OF BOYCOTTS $S 

agreement of farmers in North Carolina to refuse to 
purchase jute bagging so long as the makers charged 
such high prices, is instanced in a North Carolina boy- 
cott case. 1 

The boycott by the abolitionists against slave-made 
goods before the Civil War and by the prohibitionists 
against liquor and the liquor dealers, are among the 
many other instances which may be gathered from 
American history. j 

It is thus seen that the working class, in its fight 
for better and more humane conditions, is not the only 
element in society which uses its purchasing and selling 
power to force other groups to grant concessions. The 
general public resorts to the boycott to force a reduc- 
tion of monopoly prices; the class conscious capitalist 
uses it to silence the organs of public opinion; the em- 
ployer ruthlessly employs it to crush the union spirit 
among his workmen; the merchant wields it to cut the 
market from beneath unmanageable competitors; the 
citizen uses it to place his friends in office; the peoples 
of one country practice it to gain concessions from 
other countries or to prevent aggressions; labor, busi- 
ness, social, ethical, religious, political, educational 
associations fashion it to their ends — some for the weal 
of society, some to its detriment. We will next see 
more specifically what service it has rendered to labor. 
1 State v. Van Pelt, N. C, 1901. 



CHAPTER III 

THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS EMPLOYED BY LABOR 

Reasons for the Boycott^ 

While boycotting has invaded well nigh every field 
of endeavor, its most important battleground is, per- 
haps, that of labor. A description of the use of this 
weapon by the labor forces will occupy the remaining 
pages of this book. Let us first inquire into some of 
the reasons for the boycott's popularity. 

Labor has a two-fold relationship with the employ- 
ing class. It supplies that class with the labor power 
necessary to produce commodities. It also furnishes, 
to a considerable extent, a market for the commodi- 
ties produced. In both relationships it can so conduct 
itself as vitally to affect the profits. 

In aiming to better the condition of labor by means 
of the strike, the worker uses his power of persuasion 
or coercion, only in his position as producer. The strike 
cuts off the supply of labor from the employer, and 
thus deprives him, at least temporarily, of his power 
to produce. If labor is thoroughly organized, if every 
man in a certain trade or industry stands staunchly 
with his fellow in a labor struggle; if the army of the 
unemployed refuses to "scab," and if, finally, the work- 
er's economic power to resist proves as great as that 
of the employer, the mere cessation of work, if con- 
tinued long enough, will probably be sufficient to bring 
the employing class to terms. A settlement of some 

56 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 57 

sort, or an absolute stoppage of production, is the 
alternative. 

The unionists of the eighties in the United States 
discovered that these conditions but rarely existed. 
They found that in many instances a threat to strike 
failed greatly to disturb the employer, believing, as 
he did, that his one problem, in case of such a strike, 
was to obtain other workers, and that the condition of 
the labor market made that problem a comparatively 
simple one. Following the hiring of others, business 
would proceed as formerly. 

The workers therefore came to realize that they 
had utterly neglected to use their power as consumers, 
in their struggles for improved conditions. 

"If we can tell the unfair employer that he may 
fill our places with other workmen, but that he will 
be unable to sell the goods his new employees pro- 
duce; if we can assure him that, unless he concedes 
our demands, labor and its friends will leave his goods 
unsought, and that it will take many a day to regain 
his former patrons, our argument will gain double 
weight. Should we not then unite to cease all deal- 
ings with 'unfair' firms, and thus cut off, as far as 
possible, not only their labor force but their market as 
well?" 

Along such lines were they beginning to reason in 
the early eighties, about the time that the word "boy- 
cott," accompanied with tales of the effective ostracism 
of the English landlord class, was borne in upon them. 
It was a period in America of widespread labor trou- 
bles, waged for the most part by the then prosperous 
Knights of Labor, an organization especially adapted 
to appeal effectively to large masses of friendly con- 
sumers. The weapon was naturally seized upon with 
vigor. 

The New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor gives 



58 BOYCOTTS 

some reasons for the acceptance of this method of in- 
dustrial warfare. 1 

"It seems likely that if a body of workmen feel that 
a strike is the only way of enforcing what they con- 
sider just and reasonable claims, they will try to make 
that strike valid, and to bring it to a crisis by adopting 
any other legal method which will further embarrass 
the employer and bring him to a decision. The strike 
is negation. The boycott is action. It is not here a 
question of morality or even of legality, but simply of 
logical sequence. Most trades have been content to 
strike, putting themselves to loss of wages, the great- 
est deprivation of a poor man known; in many cases, 
however, the men have argued that they have a right 
to go further, and to compel a settlement of the issues. 
Hence the boycott. . . . If the employer can dismiss 
his dissatisfied work people and replace them, the bur- 
den falls on the shoulders of labor alone, and the em- 
ployer may profit by the change. If, on the other hand, 
the workman resorts to boycott and so intercepts the 
employer's profit, the employer is brought to a quicker 
sense of the expediency of friendly settlement/' (Ital- 
ics are author's.) 

Another reason for the use of this weapon was its 
comparative inexpensiveness : 2 

"Boycotting possesses this one merit over striking — 
it is less costly. As formerly conducted, strikes were 
very expensive, and, in the long run, unsuccessful. . . . 
Now, as soon as a strike is declared hopeless, meas- 
ured by the old methods of attack, a boycott is de- 
clared. In some instances the men return to work and, 
as far as surface indications go, the war with the firm 
is at an end. Not so with the boycott. Its work is 
quietly but persistently directed against the sale of the 
goods of the firm. The union itself is put to little ex- 

1 Report of New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1886, pp. 

7U, 714. 
' New York Report of Statistics of Labor, p. 334. 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 59 

pense. Beyond printing the boycotting circulars and 
the expense attending their distribution and the per- 
sonal expense of committees appointed to visit their 
organizations throughout the State, the outlay is very 
small. Where the union or organization is associated 
or affiliated with a national one, even this last item of 
expense is saved. If the men conducting the boycott 
are industrious, it will sooner or later give evidence 
that the sale of the boycotted article is affected. If it 
is an article which enters into daily consumption and 
is of such a character that it can be made the subject 
of ordinary conversation, it will soon force the em- 
ployer to expend money in advertising it, in order to 
counteract the silent influence of the boycott." 

The broader social reason given for adopting this 
weapon appeared in the Illinois reports i 1 

"The theoretic justification of the boycott, as ex- 
pounded by those who claim for it a legitimate func- 
tion in industrial differences, may be briefly stated as 
follows : Behind all economic laws of trade, behind the 
considerations of supply and demand, is that which 
creates the demand, that which gives force to all indus- 
try, and vivifies all commerce — the social need. The 
requirements of society are various, intricate and in- 
terwoven. It needs food, raiment, dwelling places, 
means of rapid communication and travel; besides 
these, and more than any of these, except food and 
raiment, it needs moral uprightness, business and social 
integrity, education and moral worth. All industry is 
carried on because of some social need, because the 
social need has created a demand for the article pro- 
duced by such industry; but when persons supplying 
such demand violate some other social law to protect 
which is of far more importance than the gratification 
of this artificial demand, then the demand ceases, and 
the offending party is crushed. Society, in a broad 
sense, is the employer not only of all labor but of all 

Illinois Report of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1886, pp. 446. 
447. 



60 BOYCOTTS 

capital, and of all who produce or distribute the fruits 
of labor and capital. When any of its employees vio- 
late moral or social laws, the maintenance of which 
is of more importance than the services of the offend- 
ers, society may discharge such employees, that is, re- 
fuse to deal with them or use their products — in short, 
boycott them." 

Having considered, in broad outline, the reason for 
the appearance of the boycott in the labor world, let 
us analyze more closely its character and forms. 

Definitions 

A boycott in labor disputes may be defined as a com- 
bination of workmen to cease all dealings with an- 
other, an employer or, at times, a fellow worker, and, 
usually, also to induce or coerce third parties to cease 
such dealings, the purpose being to persuade or force 
such others to comply with some demand or to punish 
him for non-compliance in the past. 1 

Boycotts may be divided into negative and positive 
boycotts. The primary purpose of negative boycotts is 
to secure for "fair" firms the patronage of labor and 
its friends. Indirectly, they divert trade from "unfair" 
employers. In the prosecution of this form of boy- 
cotts, a union label is usually placed on goods as a guar- 
antee to the trade unionists and to the public generally 
that the goods are produced under conditions favorable 
to the unions. "White" or "fair" lists which announce 
to the public those who have complied with trade union 
conditions are also printed and distributed. 

The Union Label 

The union label which is used, as has been stated, 
in enforcing negative boycotts, is an emblem placed on 

1 See Seligman, Principles of Economics, p. 440; Adams and Sum- 
ner, Labor Problems, p. 197. 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 61 

commodities produced under union conditions. This 
design is also printed on shop cards to indicate that 
the stores in which they are distributed observe union 
rules, and is, as well, worn on the coat lapels of union 
men. 

The label was first instituted by the Cigar Makers' 
Association of the Pacific Coast, in 1875, an d was 
placed on all cigars made by white labor, in San Fran- 
cisco and other cities of the coast, to indicate that the 
cigars were not made by Chinese labor, then so preva- 
lent in California. The label, in fact, was the outcome 
of this competition between Chinese and American 
workmen. 1 

In 1879 tne St. Louis Cigar Makers' Union adopted 
the label, and in 1880 the Cigar Makers' International 
Union of America, in Chicago, placed a blue label on 
cigars made by its members. This indicated to labor 
that the cigars "had been made by a first-class work- 
man, a member of the Cigar Makers' Union, an or- 
ganization opposed to the inferior rat shop, coolie, 
prison or filthy tenement house workmanship." 2 

In the second period of the label, from 1 8 80 to 1 890, 
several trades, chief among them the Hatters and 
Can Makers, adopted the label to combat the foreign 
low paid labor, and the public was appealed to to pur- 
chase union made goods, and thus place their stamp of 
condemnation on tenement, sweat shop and prison 
labor. The Knights of Labor were particularly active 
during this period, and, besides the Hatters and Cigar 
Makers, the German Typographia (1885), Typo- 
graphical Union (1886), Garment Workers (1886), 
Coopers (1886), Boot and Shoe Workers (1887), 
Bakers ( 1886), Molders (1887) and Tailors (1886), 
adopted the label. 3 It was the controversy over the 

1 Spedden, The Trades Union Label, p. 10. 

2 Ibid., pp. 14, 15. 
'Ibid., p. iS. 



62 BOYCOTTS 

label of the cigar makers which finally led to the breach 
between the Knights of Labor and the International 
Cigar Makers' Union and the edict from the Knights 
to the effect that all of its members must sever their 
connections with the Cigar Makers' Union. 1 

Since 1890 the use of the label has grown steadily, 
and the unions have appealed primarily to organized 
labor, rather than to the public at large, to purchase 
union made goods. In 1909 the Union Label Trades 
Department was established by the American Federa- 
tion of Labor to encourage the use of the label through- 
out the country. This department reported in 19 12 2 
that there were sixty-seven international unions then 
using the union label, thirty-eight of which were affili- 
ated with the Union Label Department, and that fifty 
local departments for the spread of the label were in 
existence in the industrial centers of the country. The 
department, during the previous year, conducted an 
aggressive campaign for advertising the label. It dis- 
tributed over 150,000 pieces of literature, including 
55,000 directories containing, in its ninety-three pages, 
the names of firms permitted the use of this label 
emblem, and brought the claims of these "fair" firms 
before the trade unionists in many of the official jour- 
nals of the international union. It also operated mov- 
ing picture shows and entertainments illustrating the 
various labels, and sent a number of organizers into 
the field. Some idea of the use of the labels may be 
gleaned from the following figures from a few trades 
unions: 

Name of Union No. Labels Used 191 2 

Bakery and Confectionery Workers 555>439>°°° 

United Garment Workers 45,430,000 

United Brewery Workers 44,239.850 

1 Spedden, The Trades Union Label, p. 19. 

3 Convention Proceedings, American Federation of Labor, 1912, 
pp. 23-25 and 332-334- 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 63 

Name of Union No. Labels Used 1912 

Cigar Makers' International Union 28,600,000 

American Federation of Labor 9,423,000 

United Cloth Hat and Cap Workers 5,305,000 

Journeymen Tailors' Union 529,681 

Travelers' Goods and Leather Novelty Workers 47,000 

This was a large increase over the figures of the 
previous year. The Woman's International Union 
Label Leagues, recently organized, are assisting ma- 
terially in the label campaigns. 

The unionists often impose penalties on their mem- 
bers, to induce them to use the label. The Boot and 
Shoe Workers' Union fine any member purchasing 
shoes not containing the union stamp, and the Hatters' 
Union recently passed a resolution exacting $5 from 
any man purchasing a non-union cigar. 

In several unions no delegate can be seated at the 
convention unless he can show at least three labels on 
his various garments. 1 

The effectiveness of the use of the label, according 
to Dr. Spedden, depends on whether the goods are 
purchased chiefly by unionists or other classes in the 
community; whether they are usually purchased by 
men or by women; whether they are of such a char- 
acter that other unionists can easily ascertain if their 
fellow member is buying union or non-union goods, and 
whether the purchases are made frequently or at long 
and irregular intervals. 

The Positive Boycott 

The positive boycott generally takes the form of 
the "unfair" or the "We Don't Patronize" list and 
the boycott proper. 

The unfair list is a list of those firms which, from 

Proceedings of the Fourth Convention (1911) Union Label 
Trades Department, pp. 19, 20. 



64 BOYCOTTS 

the standpoint of the trade unionists, are unfair to 
labor. The list is published for the most part in trade 
union periodicals under the caption, "Unfair" or "We 
Don't Patronize," or posted at trade union headquar- 
ters. The publication of this list in the papers of one 
trade often leads through "courtesy" to its publication 
in other trade journals. Unionists are supposed to 
cease all dealings with those whose names thus appear. 
Since February, 1908, following the Danbury Hatters 
and Buck's Stove decisions, the "We Don't Patron- 
ize" list has been of little importance. 

The boycott proper may be divided into the 
primary, the secondary and the compound boycott. 
The appellation, tertiary boycott, is also frequently 
applied to the most indirect forms. A primary boy- 
cott may be defined as a simple combination of per- 
sons to suspend dealings with a party obnoxious to 
them, involving no attempt to persuade or coerce third 
parties to suspend dealings also. 1 Thus, if workmen 
in one industry go on a strike against a firm and agree 
to refuse to purchase any product from that firm, with- 
out endeavoring to persuade others to do likewise, a 
primary boycott will be the result. This form, how- 
ever, is rarely used in labor disputes as it is compara- 
tively ineffective. 

A secondary boycott may be defined as a combina- 
tion of workmen to induce or persuade third parties 
to cease business relations with those against whom 
there is a grievance. A compound boycott appears 
when the workmen use coercive and intimidating meas- 
ures, as distinguished from mere persuasive measures 
in preventing third parties from dealing with the boy- 
cotted firms. 

Compound boycotts are of two kinds — those in- 
volving threats of pecuniary injury to the parties ap- 
1 Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, p. 197. 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 65 

proached, and those involving threats of actual physi- 
cal force and violence. 

The primary, secondary and compound forms of the 
positive boycott may be directed against a fellow work- 
man or against an employer of labor. If this weapon 
is employed against another working man it is some- 
times called a labor boycott. This form generally 
appears when a laborer refuses to join a labor or- 
ganization and the members of such an organization 
endeavor to induce or coerce the employer, through 
threats of strike, to discharge the non-unionist unless 
he allies himself with them. At times efforts are made 
to prevent storekeepers from selling to such "scabs." 
This form of boycott, connected, as it is, so intimately 
with the closed shop, will not be dealt with to any great 
extent in this book. 1 

There are three important points of attack against 
a boycotted employer in the use of the secondary and 
compound boycott. An endeavor is often made to 
boycott him through inducing or coercing his em- 
ployees to quit working for him. One of the weapons 
employed in carrying out this form is picketing. 

Secondly, the workmen often attack the source of 
supply, and try to induce or coerce wholesalers, job- 
bers, manufacturers or mining companies, as the case 
may be, to refuse to sell any further supplies to the 
employer under the ban. This latter method is used 
most extensively in the building trades where the prod- 
ucts disposed of are not finally sold to the general pub- 
lic, but are used in the construction of buildings. 

The third and generally the most important method 
of injury is the inducing or coercing of customers to 
withdraw their patronage from the obnoxious concern. 

The arguments used to obtain the cooperation of 
these third parties may be merely persuasive or coer- 
cive in their nature. The employee may be urged 

1 See Stockton, The Closed Shop in American Trade Unions. 



66 BOYCOTTS 

simply in the interest of his class to quit his job in order 
to prevent the employer from winning the dispute. He 
may be threatened with violence or he may be incon- 
venienced in the matter of securing a boarding place, 
or obtaining provisions, on account of the threat of 
the workers to refuse to patronize those harboring or 
selling to him. 

In the building trades and other industries the sup- 
plier of material may be induced through his sense of 
justice to refuse to sell further supplies to the firm op- 
posed by organized labor. He may be confronted, and 
often is. confronted, on the other hand, with a threat 
that the members of organized labor in other building 
trades will refuse to work on material supplied by him, 
so long as he continues to deal with the "unfair" em- 
ployer. If this threat does not prove an inducement 
the workers may then appeal to the building contract- 
ors to cease purchasing supplies from this third party, 
and threaten the contractors with a strike of all the 
workers on the building if they continue their dealings. 
By this method the contractors often bring sufficient 
pressure on the manufacturer to induce him to refuse 
to supply the obnoxious employer with further goods, 
and the employer in turn is often thus induced to con- 
cede the demands of the workers. 

If the firm boycotted supplies wholesalers and re- 
tailers with goods, the latter are approached by the 
boycotters, and are persuaded or coerced, covertly or 
otherwise, to cease purchasing from the concern under 
the ban, through fear that they, in turn, will lose the 
patronage of the friends of labor. Instances may be 
cited where the boycotters have extorted money from 
these dealers for continuing their patronage. When 
it becomes the turn of organized labor to cease patron- 
izing retail dealers, or to cease working on "unfair" 
jobs, the union either resorts again to persuasion or to 



THE NATURE OF BOYCOTTS 67 

coercion — generally through fines. These latter, how- 
ever, are imposed by the workers on themselves. 

A tertiary boycott again may be instituted against 
those citizens who continue to purchase from stores 
selling "unfair" supplies. In these cases the second 
form of compound boycott, where actual violence or 
threats of violence are used, is comparatively rare. 

After a boycott is declared, it is promoted primarily 
by public addresses, personal conversation, the distribu- 
tion of circulars and letters, the sending of delegates, 
the publication of "unfair" lists and by articles in trade 
union papers. 

Circulars setting forth the claims of the union 
"sinned against" are sent to all of those unions which 
seem likely to be in a position to aid. When the prod- 
uct sold has a national patronage, the unions through- 
out the country are frequently circularized. Special 
letters are sent to many of the unions. Circulars are 
also distributed among the public generally, if the con- 
cern has a local patronage, and if the goods sold are 
purchased by large numbers of the laboring class. 
These circulars generally recite the grievances com- 
plained of, and call upon the friends of labor to cease 
dealing with the company named. 

The trade unionists are asked to give funds to aid 
in the boycott, to send their delegates to dealers in the 
boycotted articles, and to write letters of protest to the 
unfair establishments. Delegates are frequently sent 
around the country by the union conducting the boy- 
cott. It is the business of these to visit dealers and to 
present their claims before the trade unionists of the 
various cities, urging cooperation. 

Until 1908 the "We Don't Patronize" list, contain- 
ing the names of firms which had not conceded labor's 
demands, was published in the American Federationist 
and other labor papers. As a feeble substitute at the 
present time, the labor periodicals now often call at- 



68 BOYCOTTS 

tention to and recite the facts of union struggle, leaving 
it to organized labor to "do the right thing." 

Members are urged to discuss the matter with their 
friends, and various devices, such as "sandwich men" 
and transparencies, are used to draw attention to the 
fight. The central labor unions of each city are often 
effective agents to further the interests of boycotters. 

The ingenuity of the unionist is frequently put to a 
test in his endeavor to discover those who deal with the 
boycotted concern. Many are the complaints of the 
manufacturers that their goods are followed to the 
trains, and the names of the patrons secured before 
shipment. One firm complains that its salesman was 
followed across the continent to the Pacific Coast by a 
delegate from the trade union, and that its dealers were 
visited and induced to cancel their orders. In the 
case of the newspapers, the paper's advertisers are 
often seen, and urged to discontinue advertising in the 
"scab" paper, under penalty of the boycott. 

It would be impossible to describe all of the other 
devices used in connection with labor boycotts, but the 
foregoing are believed to be the most important. 



CHAPTER IV 

EARLY BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 

Hatters' and Printers' Boycotts 

What appears to be the first boycott in the coun- 
try connected entirely with a labor dispute, was organ- 
ized by the Baltimore hatters in 1833. 1 

According to the newspaper accounts of that day, all 
the master hatters of Baltimore, with the exception of 
seven, had reduced the wages of the journeymen 
hatters about 25%, and labor throughout the city was 
justly indignant. The Journeymen Hatters had issued 
an appeal to the other mechanics of the town and to 
the citizens generally, asking them to have no more 
dealings with the combination of employers, and to 
patronize only the loyal masters. Following this, the 
Mechanics u of all denominations," on July 24, 1833, 
held a meeting, indorsed the appeal, and urged the 
boycotting of the employers. This meeting was in 
turn followed by one composed of the citizens gener- 
ally. This agitation brought forth a vigorous reply 
from the master hatters, who defended their treatment 
of labor by the declaration that nine persons in one 
establishment earned the munificent wage of $10.50 
a week, and that the average wage was more than $8. 

The Mechanics' Resolution viewed the 25% wage 
reduction as "replete with evil and injustice, and sub- 
versive of the dearest principles for which our fore- 

1 Documentary History Am. Ind. Soc, v. 6, pp. 100-107. 
69 



70 BOYCOTTS 

fathers bled," expressed its hearty approval of the 
boycott, and resolved to support only those employers 
who sternly resisted "the odious proposition of the 
combination," 

About the same time the printers of New York State 
were active in the promulgation of unfair or u rat" 
lists, lists of employers and workmen who refused to 
abide by the rules of the Typographical Union No. 6. 1 
On September 17, 1831, the union resolved "that, as 
soon as a correct list of 'rats' now employed in the 
city can be obtained, said list be printed and circu- 
lated in every city and country in the Union." On 
October 26, 1833, a publication of a list conducting 
non-union shops was determined upon at the behest of 
a fair employer, and three years later it was resolved 
"that the 'Rat' Committee be instructed to ascertain in 
the Union and Transcript the names of all employers 
who do, as well as those who do not, conform to the 
prices." The publication of these lists continued with- 
out a set-back until April, 1840, when court proceed- 
ings were instituted by one who alleged that he had 
been libeled by the "Rat" Committee. The result of 
the suit is not known. 

Periods of Boycotting 

Shortly after the invention of the word "boycott" 
by Father O'Malley in 1880, the boycott became a pop- 
ular and effective weapon in the hands of organized 
labor in the United States. It was in 1886 that the 
Knights of Labor came to the zenith of its power, 
with a membership of some 600, 000, 2 and that the 
Federation of Organized Trades and Labor Unions, 
afterward the American Federation of Labor, was 
formed (1881). 

1 Annual Report, New York Bureau of Labor Statistics, 191 1, pp. 
143 et seq. 

2 Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, pp. 219 et seq. 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 71 

The first real wave of boycotting swept over the 
country in 1885. In that year a careful investigation 
of its use was published by Bradstreet's. This appears 
to be the only attempt that has yet been made to de- 
scribe the use of this labor device in the various parts 
of the United States. The labor commissioners of 
Illinois and Wisconsin made mention of its employ- 
ment in their report for 1886, and the Bureau of Sta- 
tistics of Labor of New York published annually an 
account of its practice from 1885 to 1892. 

Because of the application of the law to suppress 
various forms of the boycott, and resulting changes 
in the method of warfare of labor unions, boycotts 
came to be regarded by the labor commissioners as of 
too little consequence to report. It thus becomes more 
and more difficult to obtain adequate reports of their 
use since about 1890. In many jurisdictions the com- 
missioners proceeded on the theory that, prohibited 
by law as many forms were, the boycott no longer 
existed, and, consequently, it was not possible to re- 
port that which was not in existence. The last official 
report, therefore, available in this country is the 
N. Y. Report of 1892. 

The second period of boycotting was that in which 
the railroad employees of the country were engaged 
in the early nineties, particularly during the American 
Railway Strike of 1894. 

The national boycotts of the American Federation 
of Labor, the prominent use by them of the "We Don't 
Patronize" list, culminating in the great Buck's Stove 
and Danbury Hatters' boycotts, might be said to con- 
stitute the third period of boycotting in labor disputes. 

With the exception of the boycott of the Industrial 
Workers of the World, in conjunction with the West- 
ern Federation of Miners in Goldfield, Nevada, there 
have been no conspicuous boycotts by that organiza- 
tion. The probable reason for this is that the I. W. 



72 BOYCOTTS 

W. have thus far organized chiefly in the basic indus- 
tries, and the members are not generally the consumers 
of products fashioned in the plants organized by them. 
The organization, however, believes in using the boy- 
cott wherever it can be employed effectively. 

Boycotting in the Eighties 

In 1885 Bradstreefs gathered the first and only boy- 
cotting figures of national scope. 1 "Its (the boycott's) 
growth in the hands of developing trade unions and 
organizations in the United States has been prodigious 
within the two years past," comments that journal. 
Referring to the trades which most prominently used 
this weapon, Bradstreefs summarizes: 

"It is noticeable that the typographical unions have 
resorted to the use of the boycott in excess of all others. 
Cigar manufacturers and dealers have been boycotted 
with the next greatest frequency and with the largest 
proportion of success noted in any line, about 42% of 
the boycotts being claimed as accomplishing the desired 
end. Hat manufacturers and dealers have been boy- 
cotted with the next greatest frequency, yet the success 
thus far obtained is less striking, except in individual 
instances. Boycotts against carpet makers and dealers 
in 'scab' nails made in Ohio valley have been actively 
waged. Out of the 119 boycotts in the six lines enu- 
merated, 29 have been successful and 16 have failed, 
while 85 are still on." 2 

A further analysis of the figures given, shows that 
of the 196 boycotts, 130, or over 66°/c, were divided 
among the six trades: the newspaper (45) and cigar 
(26) industries, the hat manufacturers and dealers 
(22) and the clothing (14), the carpet (13) and the 
nail industries (10). Of the eight ranking first in the 

1 Bradstreefs, 1885, v. 12, pp. 394-397 (Dec. 19, 1885). 

2 Italics are the author's. 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 73 

number of boycotts waged, four of the industries af- 
fected were engaged in the production of wearing ap- 
parel. 

Surveying the entire number of boycotts, exclusive 
of those against Chinese labor, it is seen that those in- 
dustries engaged in the making of clothing led in num- 
ber of boycotts ($5)1 the newspaper business came sec- 
ond (45), and food supplies and furniture, third and 
fourth (37 and 20), respectively. Then followed iron 
and steel (10), transportation (7), paper and print- 
ing (7), metal (5), personal service (4), post office 
work (2), amusement (2), and laundry supplies (2). 

If we analyze the relative success of boycotts waged 
in the seven industries credited with the largest number 
of boycotting cases, we will find that the percentage of 
successful boycotts to the total number actually ended 
was highest in transportation (85.7%), next highest 
in the clothing business (77.8%), followed in turn by 
the food (69.5%), paper and printing (66.7%), fur- 
niture (60%) and newspaper (56.5%) industries. We 
will observe that transportation leads (85.7%) with 
food next (43-3% )> in the percentage of boycotts 
brought to a successful conclusion to those actually 
undertaken. 

Considering the first eight items in the table on 
p. 74, it will be noted that all of the boycotts in the 
hat and clothing industries — using the latter in its nar- 
rower sense — of whose outcome the labor bureau 
had knowledge, were in favor of the boycotters, giv- 
ing these trades 100% of victories won over defeats 
recorded. If, however, we are in quest of the highest 
percentage of victories reported among the total num- 
ber of boycotts waged, we will discover that the cigar 
makers' industry takes the lead with 42.3%, and the 
newspaper and hat industries follow, with the clothing 
industry far in the rear. Success is claimed for all 
boycotts instituted against excursion and other steamer 



74 



BOYCOTTS 



companies, theaters, publishers, postmasters, starch 
makers, baking powder companies, laundry soap man- 



Table compiled from Bradstreet's, December 19, 1885, p. 394. 



Industries 



Newspaper 

Hat Manufacturers 

Cigar Manufacturers 

Carpet 

Clothing (Suits of) 

Nail and Mills 

Drygoods 

Boot & Shoe Mfrs 

Stove Makers 

Flour Mills 

Hotels and Pub. H 

Breweries 

Printers 

Bakers 

Excursion Steamers 

Silver Factories (Watch 

Cases) 

Tailors 

Theater 

Publishers 

Steam Railway 

Steamship Co 

Sp. Beverage 

Postmaster 

Starchmaker 

Baking Powder Maker . . . 

Washing Soap 

Can Maker 

Stereotype Plates 

Pianos and Organs 

Broom Manufacturers. . . . 

Cooper Workers 

Box Manufacturers 

Knit Goods Mfrs 

Chinese Employers 

Excluding Chinese 



45 
22 
26 
13 
H 
10 

7 
7 
5 
3 
4 
4 
3 
2 

5 



237 
196 



1 
o 
o 
o 

o 
o 

40 



99 
59 



10 

5 

1 



24 
23 



22 
18 
10 
12 

13 
10 

7 
6 
2 
2 
1 
o 

3 
o 
o 

3 
2 
o 
o 
o 
o 
I 
o 
o 
o 
o 
o 
I 

o 
o 
o 
o 
o 



03 
JfcoS 

£:hp 



114 
114 



56.5 

1 00.0 

68.8 

0.0 

1 00.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

1 00.0 

1 00.0 

1 00.0 

75-0 

0.0 

50.0 

1 00.0 

0.0 

IOO. o 

1 00.0 

100.0 

0.0 

IOO 

o 

100 

100 

100. 

100.0 

1 00.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

100.0 

0.0 

0.0 

97.6 



80.5 
72.0 



c3 O 

Is 



28.9 
18.2 
42.3 

0.0 

7-i 
0.0 
0.0 

0.0 

60.0 

33-3 
75-0 
75 o 
0.0 
50.0 
1 00.0 

0.0 

50.0 

1 00.0 

1 00.0 

0.0 

100.0 

0.0 

100.0 

100.0 

1 00.0 

1 00.0 

1 00.0 

0.0 

0.0 

0.0 

100.0 

0.0 

0.0 

97.6 



41.8 
30.0 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 75 

ufacturers, can makers and cooper workers. As but 
one or two boycotts were employed in a number of 
these last named industries, however, the results are 
not especially significant. 

The greatest success of any boycotts waged during 
this period was found in those conducted in the West- 
ern States against the Chinese. Forty out of the forty- 
one instances were reported as entirely successful. 
These boycotts, however, often involved more than 
mere boycotting. They were race wars. In Port- 
land, Oregon, they were organized by an Anti-Coolie 
Law and Order Association, with a membership of 
2,000, formed in seven encampments. The agitation 
led to the discharge of 400 Chinese in 40 firms. In 
Squeak Valley, on Puget Sound, seven or eight coolies 
were reported to have been killed. In Tacoma, Wash- 
ington, more than 700 Chinese were escorted from 
the city by prominent citizens. In Idaho and Oregon 
the workers threatened to hang any coolie who came 
their way. None came. In Montana these Orientals 
were forced by the Knights of Labor to leave their 
localities. The success is therefore not to be won- 
dered at. 

In summary it is found that, excluding the boycotts 
against the Chinese, 72°/o } or nearly three-fourths of 
the boycotts actually decided, were declared successful. 
Thirty per cent, of all those undertaken were brought 
to a successful conclusion before the compilation of 
Bradstreet's report. In view of the large percentage 
of boycotts among those concluded, it might be con- 
jectured with some degree of safety that about one- 
half of the boycotts begun finally succeeded. The 
effectiveness of the boycotts in certain trades is thus 
evidenced. 

What is the relative success of strikes and boycotts? 
It has been estimated that, of those strikes ordered by 
labor unions in 1885, 62.42% succeeded, 10.58^ sue- 



7 6 BOYCOTTS 

ceedcd partly, and 27% failed; while, of those not or- 
dered by labor unions, 27.05% succeeded, 6.6% suc- 
ceeded partly, and 66.35% failed. 1 These percentages 
take no account of strikes pending, or those whose 
results were not reported. The percentage of suc- 
cessful boycotts, to the total number reported termi- 
nated, is thus greater than that of wholly successful 
strikes ordered by labor unions, and greater than that 
of wholly successful strikes ordered by unorganized 
workers, but not so large as the percentage of wholly 
and partly successful strikes conducted by unions. 

It is of interest also to note, in connection with the 
boycotts entered into in 1889, that 157 of the 196 
boycotts, or 80% of the entire number, were organized 
in industries which supplied the common necessities of 
life — clothing, food, furniture, and reading matter. 

About one-fourth of the boycotts engaged in this 
year were conducted in New York State. The New 
England States contented themselves for the most part 
with assisting in the success of those boycotts originat- 
ing in other regions. 

One of the most conspicuous boycotts in the Middle 
Atlantic States was that waged against J. Kaufman's 
clothing and furniture store of Philadelphia. So bit- 
ter did the antagonism become against this concern, 
that several employees of the street car lines of that 
city struck because the cars carried its "ad." A few 
cases were instanced in New Jersey and Maryland. 
In the South union men in Wheeling, West Virginia, 
refused to patronize a barber shop in which "scabs" 
were shaved. Comparatively infrequent was the use 
of this weapon in the national capital, in Virginia and 
Georgia. A number of boycotts were evidenced in 
the Western States — Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, 
Missouri, Nebraska, Utah, California, and Iowa — 
principally in the last named state, while instances were 

1 Statistical Abstract, 191 1, p. 266. 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 77 

cited in Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Texas and 
Arkansas, of the South Central Division. In Galves- 
ton, Texas, the telegraph operators were charged with 
refusing to forward messages to the ships, until a strike 
in that city had been settled. 

Most of the boycotts conducted were instituted by 
the Knights of Labor. The Knights had great faith 
in the power of the consumer to assist labor in its 
struggles and, at times, even credited the boycott with 
being a more effective instrument than the strike in 
bettering the conditions of labor. However, many of 
their leaders, ostensibly, at least, were opposed to boy- 
cotting, and placed most emphasis on political and co- 
operative action. Grand Master Powderly, for in- 
stance, was quoted in 1886 as saying: "I hate the 
word boycott, and have ordered the local executive 
boards and secretaries to simply tear or burn up the 
flood of boycott notices and circulars that have been 
pouring in. It is a bad practice." 1 

Illinois and Wisconsin Boycotts 

The following year an investigation of this new 
labor device was made in the state of Illinois. 2 Some 
fifty boycotts were observed, twenty-five of which were 
waged by the Knights of Labor, and twenty-five by the 
American Federation of Labor. 

The most striking features of the boycotting cam- 
paigns were the percentage of successful boycotts and 
the somewhat intimate relation shown between the 
causes and the success of boycotts. 

The number engaged in the trade unions' boycotts 
was estimated at 4,259; in those of the Knights of 
Labor, at 5,927, total 10,186. In 13 cases the results 

1 Fourth Annual Report, Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1886, 
pp. 446 et seq. 

3 Ibid., 1886, pp. 446 et seq. 



78 BOYCOTTS 

were not stated, and in 6 no results had been reached 
at the time of the report. Of the 31 where the out- 
come had been ascertained, 14, or 45-2%, were said to 
have been completely successful, 16 were partly suc- 
cessful, and only one was reported as a complete fail- 
ure. It is thus seen that 96.8% of the boycotts whose 
results were ascertained were successful in whole or in 
part. 

"Judging from the foregoing returns," runs the re- 
port, "the proportion of boycotts which have met with 
some degree of success is greater than is usually found 
in a corresponding number of strikes, and of course the 
cost to the aggressors in this form of boycott is very 
much less than it would be in conducting strikes." 

The outcome of the boycotts in this state was in- 
fluenced considerably by their underlying motives. 
Eight boycotts were waged against dealers in prison- 
made goods, and in every case these were wholly suc- 
cessful. Of the 1,193 union men conducting two boy- 
cotts against the reduction of wages and the employ- 
ment of non-union workers, 1,183, or over 99%, were 
completely victorious. One boycott was also cited 
against merchants' high prices, in which 42 were en- 
gaged. This also was successful, as was the one par- 
ticipated in by 30 workers for the recognition of the 
union. Most of those contending for a shorter day, 
on the other hand, won only part of the demands, 
while no success at the time of the report was credited 
to the 250 laborers who conducted a boycott against 
the employers refusing to hire union men. Comment- 
ing on the want of success of the last named endeavors, 
the commissioner states: "Boycotts based upon the 
employment of non-union men rarely succeed, because 
Society is not prepared to assist either in driving men 
into unions or out of employment." 1 

1 Fourth Annual Report, Illinois Bureau of Labor Statistics, 
1886, p. 447. 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 79 

In Illinois, as in the country at large, the newspapers 
were the chief objects of attack, fourteen out of the 
fifty boycotts having been directed against them. Nine- 
tenths of the participants in these boycotts claimed to 
be partly or wholly successful, although less than one- 
seventh were completely so. Coal companies, nail 
mills and Chinese laundries also came in for a con- 
siderable share of attention at the hands of the boy- 
cotters. 

While the boycotts were scattered throughout the 
state, 12, or nearly one-fourth, were organized in Chi- 
cago. Over 7,000 persons, about 70% of the total 
number, were connected with these Chicago contests. 
One-half were centered in four cities. 

Of the trade union boycotts, about one-third (8) 
were conducted by the cigar makers; 4 by the mem- 
bers of the typographical union; 3 by the glass blow- 
ers; 2 by the tailors, and 1 each by the bakers, butch- 
ers, coopers, iron molders, nail mill men, and plumb- 
ers. 

In striking contrast with the boycotts of the trade 
unionists were those engaged in by the Knights of 
Labor. Here an effort was made to unite all of the 
Knights in town — bricklayers, carpenters, blacksmiths, 
cigar makers, engineers, plasterers, miners, shoe 
makers, etc. — in injuring the trade of the obnoxious 
capitalist. In was perhaps for this reason that the 
Knights appeared the more successful in their cam- 
paigns. While in five instances the trade unions report 
complete victory and in ten cases, a partial success, the 
Knights claim to have won all demands in nine 
instances, and part of their demands in six. From 
the foregoing figures the boycott is seen to have 
justified itself in this state as an effective labor 
weapon. 

The only remaining state where an investigation was 



80 BOYCOTTS 

made with the exception of New York was Wisconsin. 1 
Little, however, can be gleaned from this report, as it 
was devoted chiefly to denunciation rather than to de- 
scription. "In Wisconsin," the commissioner declares, 
"the boycott has been an active instrument either of 
revenge or of an attempt to compel a given person to 
do something against his will." 

For the third time the prominence of the newspaper 
boycotts may be noted. Three were waged, two suc- 
cessfully. The proprietor of the "Quiet House" was 
tabooed during an attack on the Milwaukee Republican, 
because he continued to subscribe for that paper, and 
union men were admonished not to eat or drink in his 
restaurant. Advertisers of the Evening Wisconsin 
were effectively boycotted during the fight against that 
organ, and for one year the printers published a Print- 
ers' Bulletin, with which to oppose this newspaper. 

In their fight against Dueber watches, the boycot- 
ters so overcrowded an auction room that no further 
goods could be sold. For his activity in the Kosciusko 
guards, a well known lawyer and supervisor of Bay 
View found his business ruined. As elsewhere, a num- 
ber of industries producing cigars, bread, flour, beer, 
shoes, trunks, etc., were affected by this weapon. Sev- 
eral arrests were made. The percentage of successful 
boycotts is not given. The alacrity shown by the em- 
ployers in starting court proceedings, indicates, how- 
ever, that this weapon was here attended, as elsewhere, 
with considerable success. 

It is thus seen that, although boycotts in labor con- 
flicts were occasionally resorted to in the first half of 
the last century, they were not used extensively until 
the eighties. The glimpses which we have of their 
workings during this period indicate that their use, 

1 Report of Wisconsin Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1885-1886, pp. 
372 et seq. 



BOYCOTTS IN LABOR DISPUTES 81 

generally speaking, was productive of good results to 
labor. The biggest fact which stands out as a result 
of the examination of the Bradstreet's, Illinois and 
Wisconsin reports is, perhaps, that boycotts may be 
waged most frequently and effectively in connection 
with common necessities and inexpensive luxuries pur- 
chased regularly by the mass of workers, such, for 
instance, as newspapers, cigars, hats and certain other 
articles of clothing, food and furniture. 

The character of the grievances resulting in the use 
of the boycott, and the power wielded by labor as 
consumers of the product boycotted are also factors in 
the success attending the use of this device. 

The most illuminating investigations were those con- 
ducted in New York State, which will now be con- 
sidered. 



CHAPTER V 

BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 
1885-1892 

The one state which stood foremost as an experiment 
ground for the boycotts in the eighties was New York. 
Fortunately, the Bureau of Statistics of Labor in this 
state made a careful analysis of the situation here 
between 1885 and 1892. The facts which may be 
gleaned from these reports are of special significance. 

Although the year 1880 witnessed a vigorous boy- 
cotting campaign against a starch concern, the first 
real outburst occurred in the year 1885, when some 
59 cases were reported. Among the singular features 
of this year's fights were the endeavors of some of 
the workers to compel the boycotted firms to pay the 
expenses incurred in boycotting; 1 the alleged active 
encouragement of a cigar boycott, by rival manufac- 
turers, 2 and the threatened boycotting at the polls of 
public men who continued to patronize the Fifth Ave- 
nue Hotel. 3 

The following year boycotting became so popular 
that the number of instances reported almost trebled, 
leaping from 59 to 163. This increase was due, ac- 
cording to the Commissioner of Labor, to the great 
wave of labor disturbances which swept over the coun- 

1 New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1885, p. 339. 

2 Ibid., p. 359. 
z Ibid., p. 358. 

82 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 83 

try, obtaining its initial impulse from the strike of the 
surface railroad employees in New York City. 1 

In the year 1886 the first of the legal prosecutions 
was noted in connection with the employment of this 
weapon. Over 100 labor unionists in New York City 
alone were indicted at this time for conspiracy, coer- 
cion and extortion, and sentenced to the state peni- 
tentiary. 

The same year jealousies between rival labor or- 
ganizations complicated the use of this labor device 
in the cigar industry. One manufacturer reported 
that he had been boycotted by the International Cigar 
Makers' Union No. 6, and injured thereby to the ex- 
tent of nearly $10,000, in spite of the fact that all of 
his actions had been sustained "by the entire Execu- 
tive Board of Knights of Labor from Mr. Powderly 
down." The bureau was unable to determine the exact 
cause of this conflict. 

The advantages that sometimes accrue to firms os- 
tracised by labor, when they gain the sympathy of the 
general public, were suggested in the boycotting of 
Mrs. Gray's bakery in New York City. In this dis- 
pute, the employees, in their fight for a union shop, 
followed customers to their homes and urged them to 
cease purchasing bread. At the same time they placed 
a peripatetic sandwich man in front of the store, bear- 
ing huge placards containing the legend, "Boycott 
Gray's Bakery." The newspapers took up the matter 
and aroused widespread sympathy for Mrs. Gray. 
"Prominent citizens sent checks, and hundreds of per- 
sons in and out of the city forwarded encouraging let- 
ters, enclosing, in most instances, substantial checks 
and orders for bread, etc., to be sent to charitable in- 
stitutions. The business of the bakery quadrupled, and 
the demand for comestibles soon exceeded the resources 
of the establishment." A number of boycotters were 
1 Ibid., 1886, pp. 744, 745. 



84 BOYCOTTS 

finally arrested and the unionists acknowledged them- 
selves defeated. 1 

As a result of the large numbers of arrests in con- 
nection with the boycott during 1886, the following 
year witnessed a considerable diminution in the ag- 
gressiveness with which this weapon was used. Boy- 
cotts in the building trades were, perhaps, the feature 
of the year, and held up, it was alleged, the construc- 
tion of no less than $2,000,000 worth of real estate. 
For the most part, however, it was declared that the 
year's boycotts caused only inconvenience and slight 
loss of business. The brewers' boycotts of these and 
the succeeding years were also noteworthy. 

While the numbers continued to increase the fol- 
lowing year, the potency of the weapon diminished, 
only 40.2% of boycotts actually ended resulting in vic- 
tory. This, however, was the lowest percentage of any 
year. Of this year's struggle, the Commissioner of 
Labor writes : 2 

"The boycott is not as potent a weapon as it used 
to be. Its power for offence has been very much 
limited by legal decisions and the interpretations of 
conspiracy law by the court have discouraged its adop- 
tion as a means for redress of grievances." 

During 1889, 1890 and 1891 the numbers reported 
remained approximately the same, 177, 175 and 182, 
respectively. In 1892, however, the last year in which 
the bureau collected statistics, the number had de- 
creased to less than half that of each of the three pre- 
ceding years (88). The growing cautiousness of or- 
ganized labor, combined with increasing legal compli- 
cations, probably affected this result. 

Partly on account of the supposed non-existence of 
the boycott, as a result of the law's condemnation, no 

1 New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1886, pp. 749, 750. 
a Ibid., 1888, p. 214. 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 85 

further notice of the use of this weapon has appeared 

in any of the succeeding reports. 

Success and Frequency of Boycotts 

During this eight-year period — 1885 to 1892 in- 
clusive — 1,352 boycotts were reported to the Bureau 
of Labor. In no cases no mention was made of their 
final outcome. Figures are therefore available regard- 
ing the success, failure or pendency of but 1,242. Of 
these, over 500 are marked as pending. A number 
of those indicated as pending one year may be included 
in the figures of success or failure of the succeeding 
year, but there is no way of arriving at the amount of 
duplication from this source. Of the 686 cases re- 
ported as either succeeding or failing, we find that 
461, or about two-thirds, are said to have succeeded 
(67.2%). The percentage will be very slightly raised 
if we include in this number the 13 reported as par- 
tially successful. The figures also indicate that 37.2% 
of the boycotts actually undertaken, including those 
pending at the time of the various reports, were pur- 
sued to a successful issue. 

The first year of the reports, 1885, shows the high- 
est percentage of success over failures. It was then 
estimated that 81.5% of those actually concluded were 
wholly successful, while 95.4% were either completely 
or partially won by the boycotters. The next year 
the results were not reported so fully, but from the 
figures available there appears to be a slump in the 
number of victories, the percentage being lower than 
in any year except 1888. In this latter year, when the 
greatest number were waged, only two-fifths succeeded. 
The second most encouraging season for the unionists 
was in 1891. 

It is perhaps more than a mere coincidence, and 



86 



BOYCOTTS 



probably indicates a vital truth about the effectiveness 
of boycotting, that the greater the number, the less 
the success, in many cases, of the use of this weapon. 
The smallest number of boycotts reported was in 1885, 
when the proportion of successes was the greatest, and 
the largest number reported was in 1888, when the 
percentage of victories was the smallest. In 1889, 
when a considerable number of boycotts were waged, 
the success was comparatively small. The results of 
1890 are also significant. However, it is not wise 
to lay too much stress on this relationship, as so many 
other factors, such as legal complications, inevitably 
enter in. 



Table showing number of boycotts in trades connected with par- 
ticular industries in New York State from 1886 to 1802, inclusive : 



Industries 



Food 

Building 

Materials Entering Bldg 

Clothing 

Transportation 

Printing (Newspapers) . . 

Iron and Steel 

Furniture 

Clay, etc 

Lumber 

Metals 

Miscellaneous 1 



174 
101 

20 
32 
25 
19 
10 

5 

1 

4 

1 

32 



424 



o a 



245 
121 

28 

47 
52 
38 
24 

14 
12 

7 

3 

52 



643 






£ « " 

U 3 o 

9m <j 



65-9 



.2 o 
o ft 



596 

242 

47 
102 

79 
53 
40 

45 
23 
20 
6 
93 



1,323 



o O 



40.0 

30 

8.64 

4-6 

18.2 

15-3 
12.7 

8-5 

19.8 

13-4- 

6-7 

29.6 



9.2 



m 

o £ 



M 



! S* 



Swot- 



451 

3-5 
H-3 

8.6 
26.3 
17.8 
14.9 
10. 1 
26.4 
16.7 

8.0 
44.0 



H-5 



1 Miscellaneous includes: barbers, with 73 boycotts, of which the 14 
settled were successful; musicians, 7; theaters, 5; coal handlers, engi- 
neers, label-makers, storemen and laborers. 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 87 
Boycotts by Industries and Trades 

A further examination of the New York situation 
will disclose the fact that more boycotts were waged in 
connection with the food industries than in any other 
group. 

The boycotts in the building trades were next in 
number, with clothing, transportation, printing, furni- 
ture, iron and steel and lumber following. The order 
given in the table on page 86 is based upon the rela- 
tive number of successful and unsuccessful boycotts 
reported. 

In examining the third column of figures in the table 
it will be observed that boycotts in the building trades 
attained the largest degree of success. These trades 
showed four victories for every five boycotts instituted 
and carried to a settlement. The boycotting of the 
food products came second in the percentage of success 
attained, with clothing third, lumber fourth, printing 
fifth, and transportation sixth. The iron and steel, 
furniture, metal, and clay industries have the lowest 
percentages. In the last-mentioned occupation only 
one-third of those reported succeeded. 

While boycotts in the building trades were attended 
with the greatest success, they were waged in that in- 
dustry in but a very small percentage of the cases in- 
vestigated (3.5%). Since these cases investigated by 
the Bureau of Labor corresponded roughly to the num- 
ber of labor disturbances of which they had cogni- 
zance, it is evident that the boycotts in this trade, while 
numerous, were resorted to in comparatively few labor 
disputes. 

On the other extreme, the boycott was employed in 
over 40% of the cases examined in the industries con- 
nected with the preparation of food products. Of the 
other larger groups, we find that the workers in the 
printing and transportation industries report its use 



88 BOYCOTTS 

in about one-sixth of the cases investigated, and the 
iron and steel industry, in one-eighth, while the cloth- 
ing, furniture and metal industries wielded it only 
occasionally. 

Narrowing our inquiry to specific trades, we discover 
the preeminence of the bakers' trade as a fertile field 
for the use of this weapon. In fact, 38% of the boy- 
cotts reported during seven years in the food group, 
and nearly one-half of those resulting in success or fail- 
ure, were waged in the bakers' industry. Further, 
over one-fifth {22%) of all the boycotts in all indus- 
tries, brought to a successful conclusion during the 
seven-year period, were waged and won in the bread- 
making trade. The brewery business came second in 
numbers, followed by cigar making and waiting. 

Over one-half of the disputes in which the bakers 
were entangled during these years are seen to have in 
them an element of the boycott. This was true also of 
the waiters, while the butchers and the brewers showed 
a large proportion of boycotts to the total number of 
labor disputes (45.8% and 34% respectively). 

In the building trades the painters and plumbers 
waged about one-half of the boycotts. These, to- 
gether with the carpenters, artificial stone masons and 
framers, conducted nearly three-fourths of the boy- 
cotts undertaken among the workers on buildings. A 
high degree of success was attained in most of the 
trades, the framers and masons having 100% to their 
credit, the plumbers over 90%, and the painters 
71.5%. In fact, 13 of the 22 building trades reported 
complete success. The stone masons, in the larger 
group, resorted to boycotting in about one-fourth of 
the instances reported. The painters made use of this 
weapon in but one out of every thirty disputes. 

If we group together the trades where work is done 
on material ultimately entering into building, the same 
success is noted, as is also the same small proportion of 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 89 

boycotting compared with the number of controversies. 
The stone cutters and marble workers are the most 
active. 

Of those connected with transportation, directly and 
indirectly, it is found that the horseshoers used the 
boycott to the largest extent, and with a considerable 
degree of success. In this trade over nine-tenths of 
the battles decided were won by the boycotters, and in 
over one-third of the labor contests, this method of 
warfare was resorted to. Absolutely no success was 
attained by those employed directly by the railroad 
companies. Too small a number of cases were cited 
in the other allied occupations to point to any con- 
clusion as to the boycott's effectiveness. 

The printing compositors are seen to have had the 
greatest number of boycotts to their credit in the print- 
ing trades, and to have used this weapon with unquali- 
fied success. The employment of this weapon is seen 
in nearly 30% of the cases of labor disputes investi- 
gated in this trade. The locksmiths and railmakers 
won the highest per cent, of victories in the iron and 
steel industry, while the iron workers were but rarely 
successful. 

In the other industries the small number of cases 
observed makes it impossible to generalize on the rela- 
tive efficacy of this expedient. Among the miscella- 
neous group, the barbers were the most energetic in 
their boycotting methods, and their work was pro- 
ductive of good results. According to the figures at 
hand, they used this weapon in approximately four out 
of five labor disputes investigated. 

If we take the individual trades having the greatest 
number of boycotts to their credit year by year, from 
1886 to 1892, we will find that here again the bakers 
show the most consistent efforts in this direction. This 
trade reported boycotting campaigns every year, at no 
time less than 17 cases being cited, while in 1891 this 



9 o BOYCOTTS 

number was increased to 66. It held first place in the 
number of boycotts from 1889 to 1892 inclusive, sec- 
ond place, two years, and fifth, one year. The cigar- 
makers came next in the number of boycotts, although 
they totaled less than one-third the number promoted 
by the bakers. These workers brought this weapon 
to bear every year, in 1886 having the largest number 
of any trade, although they occupied a minor place in 
the contests of the succeeding year. The waiters were 
the only others reporting the use of this weapon every 
year. 

In 1887 tne plumbers excelled in number, and in 
1888 the brewers were the foremost. The painters, 
printing compositors and framers were also active. 
Should we consider the relative proportion of boycotts 
to the number of disputes, in the particular trades in 
which boycotts figured to any extent, we will note that 
the barbers, bakers and waiters employed this de- 
vice in more than one-half of their labor wars (81.2%, 
63.6% and 54.7% respectively), the printing com- 
positors in more than one-fourth of the cases investi- 
gated (31.9%), the cigarmakers in about one-sixth of 
the cases (17.1%), and the plumbers, painters and 
framers, connected with the building trades, in less 
than 7% of the disputes (6.6%, 3-7% and 3.5% re- 
spectively) . Here again it is noted that trades which 
have to do with food and drink, as well as such per- 
sonal services as are performed by the barbers, were 
most practiced in this weapon. 

Boycotts and Strikes — A Comparison 

Glancing at the various relationships of boycotts 
with strikes, we discover that, whereas 1,352 boycotts 
were reported from 1885 to 1892, some 22,534 strikes 
had been waged. The number of boycotts, in other 
words, was about six per cent, of the number of strikes. 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 91 

In one year, 1888, there was one boycott to every four 
strikes; in 1887, one to every seven; in 1889, one to 
every eight, while in the years 1885, 1886, 1890, 1891 
and 1892 there were from 20 to 35 times as many 
strikes as boycotts. As the boycotts, during the last 
few years of the report, were being condemned so 
vigorously by the law, it may be that a number of the 
boycotts undertaken by the unions were never reported 
to the authorities at Albany. 

An examination of the two tables will fail to disclose 
any fixed relation between strikes and boycotts during 
the different periods. In fact, when .he boycotts were 
greatest in number, 1888, the strikes were the smallest. 
The year 1890 showed the largest number of strikes, 
but came fifth in number of boycotts. While 64.1%, 
or nearly two-thirds of the strikes during these seven 
years occurred in the three-year period, 1890 to 1892 
inclusive, in these same years but 32.9%, or less than 
one third of the boycotts took place. The hostile atti- 
tude of the law, however, undoubtedly affected this 
result. 

If we compare the varying success of strikes and 
boycotts during these years, we will note a con- 
siderable parallelism. The years 1885, 1890 and 1891 
showed the highest percentage of success in both 
boycotts and strikes. In 1885 tne highest percentage 
of success was accredited to the boycotts and the sec- 
ond highest to the strikes. The year 1886 revealed 
the lowest percentage in successful strikes and the 
next to the lowest in the success of the boycotts, and 
the years 1887, 1889 and 1892 occupied from the 
fourth to the sixth places in the success of the use of 
both labor weapons. It will also be noted that a 
larger percentage of strikes during that period resulted 
in a successful issue than was the case with boycotts 
(73- 2 3% a s compared with 67.1%). 

That the boycott is undertaken during the strike 



92 BOYCOTTS 

only as a last resort, seems to be a correct deduction 
from the figures of the relative success of strikes with 
and without the use of boycotts, in the New York Re- 
port of 1889. It is there found that, of the 108 strikes 
occurring that year, in which the boycott was used, 
but 31, or 28.4%, were successful, while in that year 
80.4% of all strikes were successful, threatened strikes 
having even a greater percentage of victories to their 
credit. These figures seem to indicate that the boy- 
cott was resorted to only after other measures had 
proved ineffective, and that its use saved the day in 
about one-fourth of the cases. 

Of the 17 boycotts which accompanied "threatened 
strikes," 9 were reported as successful, 8 as pending 
and none as unsuccessful. The use of the boycott here 
evidently warded off strikes in a number of instances. 
About 19% of the threatened strikes, not accompanied 
by the boycott, were reported as unsuccessful. How- 
ever, a much larger percentage of the total number of 
threatened strikes, waged without boycotts, succeeded 
in whole or in part. 

In this year a little less than one-third (32.1%) of 
the boycotts were conducted without the aid of strikes, 
or threatened strikes, and their percentage of success, 
in those actually concluded, was about the same as the 
success of the total number of boycotts (70% as 
against 68.4%). 

Durations of Boycotts 

The duration of boycotts was given in the various 
tables in only a portion of the cases. Enough in- 
stances were cited, however, to indicate some idea of 
the average duration. Of the 322 cases where the 
length of successful boycotts was noted, from 1886 to 
1892 inclusive, it was found that the largest num- 
ber, 93, were won in from one day, or less, to one 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 93 

week. Of these, 71 produced the desired results in 
between three days and a week, 17 in between one and 
two days, and 5 in one day or less. The next largest 
number was won in from one to two weeks, and the 
third, in from two weeks to one month. Sixty-nine per 
cent, of the victories among those whose durations 
were given, occurred before the thirty days' period had 
expired. It took from one to two years for seven boy- 
cotts to produce results desired, and more than two 
years for five others. The figures are as follows : 

Number succeeding in one day or less, 5 ; in from one 
to two days, inclusive, 17; from three to seven days, 
inclusive, 71; from 8 to 14 days, inclusive, 76; from 
two weeks to one month, 53 ; from one to two months, 
32; from two to four months, 17; from four to six 
months, 18 ; from six months to one year, 21 ; from one 
to two years, 7; and from two years and over, 5. 

The duration of but 81 boycotts which resulted in 
failure could be obtained. One-third of these were 
waged between two and four months. More boycotts 
were ended in this period than in any other. Over 
one-fourth, the next largest number, were conducted 
for from two weeks to one month. The durations 
were: 

Three to seven days, 3 ; eight to fourteen days, 6 ; 
two weeks to one month, 2 1 ; one to two months, 1 2 ; 
two to four months, 27; four to six months, 4; six 
months to one year, 6; one to two years, 2. 

From the foregoing figures it is seen that after the 
expiration of the month the chances of success were 
comparatively small. 

Causes of Boycotts 

If we seek to discover the causes of boycotts, we will 
find that disputes over the employment of non-union 



94 BOYCOTTS 

members furnished the basis of the greatest percent- 
age. Other prominent causes were demands for higher 
wages, for the observance of the union rules, for the 
reduction of hours, and for the maintenance of pres- 
ent wages. Approximately three-fourths of the fights 
for an increase of wages, an increase of wages and 
the reduction of hours, for fellow workers belonging 
to the union and for the observance of rules of the 
unions, seem to have succeeded. The boycotts insti- 
tuted to secure better hours, to obtain the recognition 
of the union, and to work with unobjectionable fellows 
were apparently much less successful. 

The causes of strikes in the same years are not 
materially different. If we compare the reasons for 
striking given in the year 1890 with those for boy- 
cotting of that year, we will observe that the four 
causes which gave rise to the largest number of strikes 
were included in the group of five causes which were 
responsible for the largest number of boycotts. 

The demand for increased wages came second in 
order in each strike and boycott. Objections to non- 
union employees furnished the motive for the greatest 
number of boycotts and for the fourth largest number 
of strikes. A demand for the reduction of hours 
was the shibboleth in the greatest number of 
strikes, and in the fifth largest number of boycotts, 
while the desire to assist others gained the fourth place 
in boycotts and the third in strikes. A combination 
cause — a violation of an agreement plus an insistence 
on union workmen — which ties for second place in the; 
boycotts, is scarcely an issue in strikes. The refusal to 
sign agreements, which holds sixth place in strikes, 
comes eleventh in the boycotts. 

These figures are chiefly of interest when the ques- 
tion of the maliciousness of boycotts, according to legal 
learning, is considered. 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 95 
Summary 

The New York reports disclose many features of 
interest and importance concerning the boycott. They 
indicate that, when used with caution, the boycott may 
be an exceedingly effective weapon in gaining demands. 
Over two-thirds of the boycotts which were brought 
to a final conclusion were reported successful. This is 
not far from the percentage of successful strikes. 
"Thus far it is undeniable from the proofs advanced," 
declared the report of 1885, "that it (the boycott) 
has proved successful in the settlement of labor dis- 
putes." 1 

The reports show that boycotts are used with the 
greatestjrequency and success in connection with the 
primary necessities of the laboring class, those, in the 
words of the report, "which enter into daily consump- 
tion and are of such a character as to be made subject 
to ordinary conversation." The largest number of 
boycotts, for instance, were waged against food prod- 
ucts, and the boycotts against these products were at- 
tended with the highest amount of success, if we except 
those in the building trade. It is furthermore to be 
noted that bread, the most common of these food prod- 
ucts, was the subject of nearly three times as many boy- 
cotts as any other one product, while the efforts di- 
rected against the sale of this article were attended 
with the greatest degree of success. Meats, beer, 
cigars and newspapers, all of which are purchased con- 
stantly by the laboring class, were frequently and suc- 
cessfully boycotted. 

Articles of clothing, which are classed also among 
necessities, felt the force of this weapon. Here a 
fair degree of success was noted, although less than 
was evidenced in the food industry. It was shown 
that this weapon could be used effectively in trades 
3 Report of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1885, p. 353. 



96 BOYCOTTS 

involving personal service, such as the barbers' and 
waiters' occupations. The success of the latter, how- 
ever, was below the average. The boycott was also 
found adaptable to the building trades, in which it 
proved most effective whenever it was used. Its em- 
ployment, however, was comparatively infrequent. 
Its effectiveness here may perhaps be attributed, to 
some extent, to cooperation which held between these 
various trades. 

The reports also indicate that the success of boy- 
cotts is likely to be in inverse ratio to their frequency; 
that those boycotts which do not act effectively within 
the first few months are much less likely to succeed 
than those vigorously pushed from the very beginning; 
also that the causes underlying the boycott are among 
the determining factors in its success. 

The New York experience furthermore teaches that 
the boycotts are subject to abuse, but that that abuse 
is liable to prove a boomerang against labor, and that 
with the continued use of this weapon, the abuse is 
likely to become less. The chief instances of injus- 
tice occurred when labor unions were unduly influ- 
enced by rival employers, or were divided into 
separate camps, as well as when they endeavored to 
extort money from the victimized firm. In justifica- 
tion of the latter practice, the union men argued that 
strikes and boycotts constituted a type of war, and 
that it was just for the victor to force the defeated 
party to pay the expenses of war. This necessity to 
bear expenses, it was argued, would teach employers to 
be more careful in the future about engaging in such 
frays. Violence, which appeared in some of the early 
cases, where the foreign element was said to be in- 
volved, did not accompany the boycott in the latter 
period. 

Concerning the use and abuse of the boycott, the 
reports state: 



BOYCOTTS IN NEW YORK STATE 97 

"The boycott is not in this country attended with 
violence except in the case of foreigners." 1 

"Organized labor has attained that period in its de- 
velopment when it can see the necessity of wielding 
this potent weapon with extreme caution. Time was 
when the boycott was declared at the slightest provoca- 
tion. Not so now, for the record proves that the or- 
ganizations are loth to use it except in a prudent way, 
and then as a last resort." 2 

The injury to labor of any abuse is thus stated: 3 

"It (the boycott) has nearly always proved suc- 
cessful when the parties who applied it represented a 
public or moral sentiment. If it is allowed to degener- 
ate into a simple fight between competing firms, and if 
the pretended leaders of the labor movement assume to 
apply it indiscriminately, foolishly and maliciously, it 
will result in complete disaster to the movement itself." 

The attitude of labor -leaders concerning the boy- 
cott's use is thus set forth: 4 

"It may be remarked that the more advanced think- 
ers in the ranks of labor disapprove of the boycott 
except in extreme cases in which no ordinary remedy is 
attainable." 



Report of Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1886, p. 714. 

2 Ibid., 1892, p. 418. 

3 Ibid., 1885, p. 352. 

4 Ibid., 1887, p. 521. 



CHAPTER VI 

RAILROAD BOYCOTTS IN THE NINETIES 

The Ann Arbor Strike 

Two extensive and spectacular railroad strikes took 
place during the nineties, in which, for the time being, 
the boycott was employed with telling effect. The 
first of these occurred in 1893 against the Toledo, Ann 
Arbor and North Michigan Railroad Companies; the 
second, the following year, was known as the Ameri- 
can Railway or Pullman Strike. 

In the Ann Arbor strike an attempt was made by 
the strikers to induce connecting railroads, and fellow 
members of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
on other railroads, to refuse to handle the property of 
the boycotted road. 

The strike, resulting in a refusal to pay higher 
wages, began in February, 1893. Immediately after 
it was decided upon, Grand Chief Arthur of the 
Brotherhood issued an order to the eleven chairmen of 
the general adjustment committees of the various rail- 
roads of Ohio to boycott the Ann Arbor roads. The 
order read: 

"There is a strike in force upon the Toledo, Ann 
Arbor and North Michigan Railroads. See that the 
men on your road comply with the laws of the Brother- 
hood. Notify your general manager." 

The boycott law of the Brotherhood, to which Mr. 
Arthur referred, was a provision passed in 1890 at 
the Denver Convention, but unpublished, which read: 



RAILROAD BOYCOTTS 99 

"That hereafter, when an issue has been sustained 
by the Grand Chief, and carried into effect by the 
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, it shall be 
recognized as a violation of the obligation for mem- 
bership of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
who may be employed on the railroad run in connection 
with said road to handle the property belonging to said 
railroad or system in any way that may benefit said 
company with which the B. of L. E. is at issue, until the 
grievance or issue of whatever nature or kind has been 
amicably settled. Disobedience to this order means 
expulsion." (Italics mine.) 

The chairmen of the various railroads, on receipt 
of these instructions, requested the general managers 
of the railroads to order their engineers, "in the in- 
terest of peace and harmony," not to handle the freight 
from the boycotted railroad. A few days later, March 
11, this request was suspended during negotiations for 
settlement, but was continued again on March 16, when 
negotiations had failed. The very next day, however, 
Arthur was compelled by the court to rescind his man- 
date to boycott, and a similar injunction was also issued 
against eight of the connecting railroads entering 
Toledo. 

The whole question came for decision before Judge 
Wm. H. Taft, then Circuit Judge of the Northern Dis- 
trict of Ohio. Judge Taft declared that the boycott 
order was a violation of the Interstate Commerce Law, 
which required that each road give equal facilities to 
every other connecting road. Every person employed 
by the railroad, including Arthur, the judge declared, 
was subject to the penal provisions of the act. In a 
separate case, brought by the Toledo, Ann Arbor & 
Southern Railway, one of the engineers, Lemon, was 
held in contempt for refusing to run a car from the 
Ann Arbor line, until he had received permission from 
the officers of the union. These decisions proved a 



ioo BOYCOTTS 

death knell to the use of the boycott by the Brother- 
hood. 

About the same time the Circuit Court of the South- 
ern District of Georgia decided that it was illegal for 
an engineer on the Georgia Railroad to refuse to 
transport the cars of the connecting Savannah Rail- 
road. The Georgia railroad was in the hands of a 
receiver. The Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers 
tried to obtain the reinstatement of their fellow mem- 
ber who had been discharged because of his refusal to 
handle the cars. The practice was proclaimed in viola- 
tion of the Sherman Law and the Interstate Commerce 
Law and of the United States statutes. 



The Pullman Strike 

The classic example of boycotting in connection with 
the transportation system of the country, appeared dur- 
ing the great Pullman strike of 1894. This strike was 
conducted by the American Railway Union, of which 
Eugene V. Debs was president. The boycott, while 
in operation, tied up the traffic of nearly two dozen 
lines converging into Chicago, and vitally affected the 
business of the entire country. 

The American Railway Union, the initiator of this 
boycott, was formed in June, 1893. It permitted all 
employees connected with the railroads to become mem- 
bers of the organization, and by June of the following 
year, had a membership variously estimated at from 
150,000 to 250,000. One of the locals included many 
of the employees of the Pullman Palace Car Company. 

As a result of the period of depression which was 
then sweeping over the country, the wages of the work- 
ers in Pullman had been considerably reduced. The 
Strike Commission appointed by President Cleveland 
testified that the "percentage of loss (as a result of 
the depression) borne by labor was much greater than 



RAILROAD BOYCOTTS 101 

that sustained by the company upon material." 1 Rents 
charged by the company were 20 to 25 per cent, greater 
than in Chicago or in surrounding towns for similar 
accommodations, and these the company refused to 
reduce. Great discrimination was shown against or- 
ganized labor and shop conditions were in need of 
improvement. 2 

Believing that they would be backed to the limit 
by the American Railway Union, the employees de- 
cided to strike, May 11, 1894. On June 21 this union, 
in its convention, decided to do all in its power to 
assist the Pullman strikers, even though it had ad- 
vised them not to strike at that unfavorable moment. 
It furthermore urged arbitration. Before adjourn- 
ment the convention declared that, in case no agree- 
ment could be arrived at within five days, the officers 
of the union should call on the 450 lodges and request 
them not to handle Pullman cars. All efforts to settle 
the strike proved fruitless, and on June 26 a telegram 
announcing a boycott was sent from the union as fol- 
lows: 

"A boycott against the Pullman Company, to take 
effect at noon to-day, has been declared by the Ameri- 
can Railway Union. We earnestly request your aid 
and cooperation in the fight of organized labor against 
powerful and oppressive monopoly. Please advise if 
you can meet with us in conference, and, if not, if you 
will authorize someone to represent you in this matter. 
Signed, E. V. Debs." 

Some of the other telegrams addressed to members 
of the union are thus quoted : 

"A boycott has been declared against the Pullman 
Company, and no Pullman cars are to be handled. 
If men are discharged for refusing to handle Pullman 

1 Report on the Chicago Strike by U. S. Strike Com., p. 32. 

2 Ibid., pp. 25, 26, 35, 36. 



102 BOYCOTTS 

cars, every employee should at once leave the service 
of the company." 

On June 28: "There should be no forceful inter- 
ference with mail trains, but any man who handles 
trains or cars will be a 'scab.' No man will handle any 
train at all on your system. Tie up every line possible 
to enforce a boycott. If your company refuses to 
boycott Pullman, tie it up." 

June 30 : "Do no violence, but every man stand pat 
and firm. All lines in Chicago are paralyzed. Do not 
interfere with mail trains in any way." 

July 2 : "Advices from all parts show our position 
strengthened. The Baltimore & Ohio, the Pan Handle, 
Big Four, Lake Shore, Erie, Grand Trunk and Michi- 
gan Central are now in the fight. Take measures to 
paralyze all those that now enter Cincinnati. Not a 
wheel is turning on the Grand Trunk between here and 
the Canadian line." 

July 10: "Debs, Keliher, Rogers in jail. Rest ex- 
pected to go. This is the last act of the corporation. 
Our cause is just. Victory certain. Stand pat." 

"You will notice," Debs is said to have declared a 
few days after his arrest, "that it is impossible to buy 
a ticket to the Pacific Coast in Chicago to-day except 
by way of the Great Northern Railroad, over which 
no Pullman cars are running." 

The employees of the various railways never re- 
fused, according to Mr. Debs, to move mail trains or 
passenger trains, declining only to haul Pullman cars 
until the Pullman Company should consent to arbitrate 
its agreement with its employees. The railroad offi- 
cials, however, determined that if the Pullman cars 
were not handled, the mail cars should not move. 1 

A complete paralysis of many of the railroad lines 

1 Debs, His Life, Writing and Speeches, pp. 191-192. 



RAILROAD BOYCOTTS 103 

followed. Mr. Debs thus describes the situation when 
the judiciary and the federal government interfered: 1 

"The railroads were paralyzed. Profound peace 
reigned. The people demanded of the railroads that 
they operate their trains. They could not do it. Not 
a man would serve them. They were completely de- 
feated and the banners of organized labor floated tri- 
umphantly in the breeze. Beaten at every point, their 
schemes all frustrated, outgeneraled in tactics and 
strategy, the corporations played their trump card by 
an appeal to the Federal judiciary and the Federal 
administration." 

Edwin Walker, counsel for the Chicago, Milwaukee 
& St. Paul Railroads, was appointed by President 
Cleveland Special Counsel for the government. At 
his recommendation and that of the railroad managers, 
3,600 deputy marshals, clothed with extraordinary 
power, were sworn in. Of the anomalous position of 
these marshals the Strike Commissioners reported: 2 

"United States deputy marshals, to the number of 
3,600, were selected by and appointed at the request 
of the General Managers' Association and of its rail- 
roads. They were armed and paid by the railroads, 
and acted in the double capacity of railroad employees 
and United States officers. While operating the rail- 
roads they assumed and exercised unrestricted United 
States authority when so ordered by their employers, 
or whenever they regarded it as necessary. They were 
not under the direct control of any government offi- 
cials while exercising authority. This is placing offi- 
cers of government under direct control of railroads. 
It is a bad precedent that might lead to serious con- 
sequences." 

Nearly 2,000 United States troops and 4,000 mem- 
bers of the State militia were afterward ordered to 

x Ibld., p. 187. 

2 Report of Chicago Strike Commission, p. 49. 



io 4 BOYCOTTS 

Chicago, Pullman and elsewhere by President Cleve- 
land, against the protests of Governor Altgeld and 
Mayor John P. Hopkins of Chicago. 

At the time of the invasion of the militia in Chicago 
there was undoubtedly disorder, although the strikers, 
for the most part, were peaceful. 

"There is no evidence before the Commission that 
the officers of the American Railway Union at any time 
participated in or advised intimidation, violence or de- 
struction of property," declared the Commission. 
"They knew and fully appreciated that, if mobs ruled, 
the organized forces of society would crush the mobs 
and all responsible for them in the remotest degree, 
and that this means defeat." However, the Commis- 
sion believed that some strikers were concerned in some 
of the deeds of violence. 1 

Trouble followed the coming in of the troops. A 
number of injunctions were issued and arrests were 
made on the charge of contempt of court, obstruction 
of the mail, conspiracy in restraint of trade, and other 
crimes, in the hope, according to the strikers, that the 
strike and boycott might be crushed. If this was the 
moving cause of these actions, the results must have 
produced satisfaction. 

On July 2, 1894, a blanket injunction was issued 
against Debs and others, ordering them to desist from 
interference with the United States mails and inter- 
state commerce on certain enumerated railroads. 

Specifically, it forbade them "from in any way inter- 
fering with, hindering, obstructing or stopping any mail 
trains, express trains or other trains, whether freight 
or passenger, engaged in interstate commerce or carry- 
ing passengers or freight between or among various 
States. From compelling or inducing or attempting to 
compel or induce by threats, intimidation, persuasion, 
force or violence, any of the employees of said rail- 
1 Report of Chicago Strike Commission, p. 45. 



RAILROAD BOYCOTTS 105 

roads to refuse or fail to perform any of their duties on 
said railroads, or the carrying of United States mail 
by said railroads, or the transportation of passengers 
between or among the several States. From doing any 
act whatsoever in furtherance of any conspiracy or com- 
bination to restrain either of said railroad companies 
or receivers in the free and unlimited control or 
handling of interstate commerce over the lines of said 
railroads, and the transportation of persons and 
freight among the States." 1 

On July 7 the principal officers of the American 
Railway Union were indicted, and on July 13 an 
attachment for contempt of court in disobeying the 
injunction was issued. July 12, at the request of the 
American Railway Union, twenty-five of the officers 
of various of the international unions connected with 
the American Federation of Labor, met in Chicago to 
discuss the strike, and advised a return to work. The 
American Railway Union agreed to give up the strike, 
providing that the strikers, except those convicted of 
crime, should be returned to their former positions. 
This adjustment was urged with the General Man- 
agers' Association, which had charge of the strike pro- 
ceedings for the 24 railroads connecting with Chicago, 
and which was working with the Pullman Company 
throughout the controversy. The Association de- 
clared in advance that it would receive no communica- 
tions from the American Railway Union, and returned 
the communication unanswered. 

Mr. Debs was duly tried for contempt, and was 
sentenced to a six months' imprisonment in the Wood- 
stock jail. In his decision Judge Woods asserted that 
the Sherman Law could be called to the support of the 
injunction, but that, inasmuch as the property in ques- 
tion was in the custody of the court, any improper 
interference with the management of the railroad con- 
1 Italics are the author's. 



106 BOYCOTTS 

stituted contempt, and that it was unlawful to advise 
a strike for the purpose of doing, in conspiracy, an 
unlawful thing, knowing that violence would result. 

Mr. Debs was also accused of criminal conspiracy, 
but during the trial, and immediately after the defend- 
ants had called for the record of the proceedings of the 
General Managers' Association, a juror became ill, 
and in spite of urgent requests from the defendant's 
lawyer that the trial be continued, it was finally dropped 
from the docket. 

In the meanwhile, on January 14, 1895, the con- 
tempt case was appealed to the Supreme Court of the 
United States on a writ of error and a writ of habeas 
corpus. The writ of error was denied January 17, 
on the ground that the order of the circuit court was 
not a final order or decree. May 27, 1895, tne writ 
of habeas corpus was refused. Justice Brewer, who 
rendered the decision, asserted that the findings of fact 
of the circuit court were not open to review on habeas 
corpus proceedings. He asserted that the govern- 
ment had power to prevent any unlawful interference 
with the United States mails and interstate commerce, 
but did not discuss the relation of the Sherman Anti- 
Trust law to the case. 

Another prominent officer arrested was Mr. Phe- 
lan, who was also charged with contempt. July 13, 
1894, Judge Taft, then of the Circuit Court of the 
Southern District of Ohio, declared Phelan guilty of 
conspiracy, of violating the Sherman law, interfering 
with United States mails, inducing others to break their 
contracts, and unlawfully conspiring. The original in- 
junction was issued at the behest of Samuel W. Felton, 
receiver of the Cincinnati & Ohio Railroad, who 
claimed that Phelan, in combination with Debs and 
others, was endeavoring to coerce him to withdraw his 
patronage from the Pullman Company. 

On June 28, 1894, a number of the strikers on the 



RAILROAD BOYCOTTS 107 

railroads in California were tried before the District 
Court of the Southwest District of California, charged 
with criminal conspiracy and interference with the 
United States mail. On July 10 another group was 
brought before the District Court of the Northern 
District of Illinois, and declared guilty of criminal 
conspiracy, insurrection, interference with interstate 
commerce and with the United States mail. In the 
Circuit Court of Indiana, on July 12, defendant, Agler, 
was found guilty of contempt of court, and of violat- 
ing the Sherman Anti-Trust law. 

The following day, July 13, another District Court, 
in the Northern District of California, charged other 
defendants before the Grand Jury with criminal con- 
spiracy involving the Sherman Law and the United 
States mails. 

A number of other cases were decided in California 
and Missouri. 1 

The Ann Arbor and Pullman controversies indicate 
that the particular form of boycott adaptable to rail- 
road disputes can exert a powerful influence in further- 
ing the demands of the workers. In both of these 
boycotts the concessions asked by the workers were, 
for the most part, reasonable, although the time for 
presenting them was probably inopportune. In the 
American Railway strike the perfect cooperation 
among the 24 railroads involved through the General 
Managers' Association seemed to justify similar co- 
operation among the employees of these railroads by 
means of this labor contrivance. 

If wielded thoughtlessly, the boycott on the trans- 
portation system could undoubtedly play havoc with v' 
the business of the country. On the other hand, there 
is no business in which abuse in the conduct of this 
weapon brings a more immediate and pronounced con- 

1 Ex parte Lennon, October 2, 1894, C. C. Appeals, Sixth District: 
U. S. vs. Elliott, October 24, 1894, C. C. E. D. Mo.; U. S. vs. Cas- 
sidy, Ap. 1, 2, 1895, D- C., No. D., Calif. 



108 BOYCOTTS 

demnation from the public. These cases, resulting as 
they did, in the decisions of Judge Taft, Justice 
Brewer, Judge Woods and others, permanently 
stopped the employment of the boycott by railroad 
employees. 

Incidentally the American Railway Union boycott 
and the resulting legal entanglements led to the devel- 
opment of the workingmen's political movement. The 
leader of the strike, Eugene V. Debs, soon after en- 
tered the Socialist movement, and brought with him a 
considerable following, convinced that the only resort 
of the workers, after being deprived, in their economic 
struggle, of the use of the boycott and other weapons, 
was the political field. 



CHAPTER VII 

THE AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR AND 
THE BOYCOTT 

A. F. of L. Conventions 

During the past twenty-five years, the American 
Federation of Labor has been the chief representative 
of organized labor in this country. What has been its 
official attitude toward the boycott? This attitude can 
best be studied by reviewing the proceedings of its vari- 
ous conventions. 1 

The negative boycott — the union label — was first 
mentioned in the American Federation of Labor Con- 
vention of 1 88 1. The term "boycott" was first em- 
oloyed in the 1884 convention, in connection with a 
scathing resolution against the New York Tribune, in- 
troduced by John F. Hagan of Brooklyn. The reso- 
lution mentioned the Tribune as an importer of scab 
labor, while it pretended to be the advocate par ex- 
cellence of protection to American mechanics. It 
urged that the Federation continue to boycott and de- 
nounce Whitelaw Reid and the Tribune "while the 
name of independent American mechanics is known to 
the land." 

The following year (1885) the Tribune was again 
denounced as a newspaper which used its composing 
room as "a recruiting station for wage pirates and a 
rendezvous from which gangs of freebooters were 

1 See Reports of Proceedings of Conventions, American Federa- 
tion of Labor, 1881 to 1912. 

109 



no BOYCOTTS 

sent to prey on the wages of the American worker." 
In this convention the unscrupulous use of the boycott 
by other organizations, presumably the Knights of 
Labor, was vigorously condemned. These organiza- 
tions were accused of employing this weapon on "friv- 
olous, trivial and imaginary grievances," without giv- 
ing the question the attention and thorough investiga- 
tion which it required. The convention voted that no 
boycott be approved by the Federation, until it had 
been carefully considered by the legal committee. 

Of the same tenor was the convention's position in 
1886, when it advocated only the boycott's "careful 
and energetic use as a last resort." 

In 1887 the growing importance of this weapon led 
to the appointment of a Committee on Label and Boy- 
cott. This committee recommended the boycotting of 
the Douglas shoes, the Tribune and five other firms 
which dealt in cigars, coffee, beer and iron. It con- 
demned the action taken against the Sun and against 
Milwaukee beer. 

The list of boycotted firms grew to such proportions 
by 1889, that a concerted effort was made to decrease 
the number, and in the following year a resolution was 
passed that "no boycott be endorsed by the A. F. of L. 
until ordered by the Executive Council, and then only 
after arbitration and other means had been exhausted." 
The first mention of Buck's Stove Company was made 
at this session, the grievance against the company 
being referred to the Executive Council. 

In 1 89 1, to restrict still further the careless use of 
the boycott, it was required that the Executive Council 
thoroughly investigate every threatened boycott, in 
conjunction with the officers of the national and inter- 
national unions. The following year the convention 
resolved that no boycott be considered, unless the A. 
F. of L. receive a special request from an affiliated 
body under its seal. In 1893 the Federation decided 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR in 

to concentrate its attention on a few firms most sus- 
ceptible to boycotting. 

The first issue of the American Federationist, the 
official organ of the Federation, appeared in 1894, and 
with it the "We Don't Patronize" list. This list grew 
steadily. It was soon discovered that many of the 
unions failed to enforce the boycott against the firms 
which they were instrumental in placing on the list, 
and in 1897 tne delegates decided to erase the names 
of such firms. To remedy this inertia in the future, it 
was also resolved that no boycott should be indorsed 
thereafter until the union members, working for the 
accused firm, had been given an opportunity to show 
why the concern should not be placed upon the unfair 
list. The Federation, in 1898, took a decided stand 
against the circularizing of its unions with boycott 
literature without its official indorsement, declaring 
that "the continuous and overwhelming flood of boy- 
cott circulars leads to confusion and ineffectiveness." 
The same year it took steps toward limiting particu- 
larly boycotts of those firms employing union men. 
The resolution read: 

"Whereas the placing of a boycott upon any product 
the manufacture of which is participated in by two or 
more crafts may and often does work an injury to 
union workers; therefore, be it "Resolved, That 
the American Federation of Labor shall endorse no 
boycott where the products of several organized unions 
will be affected thereby until every possible effort has 
been made to secure a settlement, and all organizations 
to be affected shall be given a hearing and an oppor- 
tunity to assist in securing a settlement in which the 
existing grievance may be settled." 1 

Perhaps its most radical step in the constant agita- 
tion for few and effective boycotts was taken in the 
1899 convention, when the Federation struck out all 
1 Convention Proceedings, A. F. of L., 1808, p. 131. 



V 



in BOYCOTTS 

of the names from the "unfair" list. These were re- 
published again a few months later, after many settle- 
ments had been made. There were 98 names on its 
list before its temporary abolition. The Federation's 
desire to limit local boycotts led it the same year to 
forbid any central labor body of a city to indorse a 
boycott, unless the local union proclaiming it had sub- 
mitted the matter in dispute to the central body before 
the boycott was decided on, and unless the union had 
made every effort to settle the dispute. The inter- 
national unions were also strongly advised to place no 
more than one firm on the unfair list at the same time. 

The suspicion with which labor regarded the pro- 
miscuous use of this weapon was again indicated in 
1900, when the convention refused to indorse any 
newly ordered boycott. In 1901 it was decided that 
no international union could have more than three 
firms on the list at any one time. The Boycott Com- 
mittee in 1904 clearly voiced the sentiment of the 
delegates, in its declaration that "if any one is unjustly 
placed on the unfair list it tends to injure not only the 
organization directly in interest, but the entire labor 
movement." 

The growing caution of the leaders of the movement 
in approving boycotts is indicated by the decrease of 
the number approved in each successive year. From 
1902 to 1903, 81 boycotts were indorsed for the list; 
from 1903 to 1904, 40; from 1904 to 1905, 21; and 
from 1905 to 1906, 21. Thirty-three names of firms 
in the latter year were dropped without notice. 

A new section was added to the constitution in 
1905 (Art. 9, Sec. 4), which provided that the Execu- 
tive Council present to the convention, before ap- 
proval, an account of the details leading to the use of 
each boycott. Perhaps the clearest enunciation of the 
growing policy of the Federation to concentrate its 
efforts in the employment of this labor device, was con- 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 1 13 

tained in the report of Owen Miller, Chairman of the 
Boycott Committee, in the 1905 Convention: 

"We must recognize the fact that the boycott means 
war, and to carry on a war successfully we must adopt 
the tactics that history has shown are most successful 
in war. The greatest master of war said that war was 
the trade of a barbarian, and the secret of success was 
to concentrate all forces upon one point of the enemy, 
the weakest, if possible. 

"In view of these facts the committee recommends 
that the State Federations and Central Bodies lay 
aside minor grievances and concentrate their efforts 
and energies upon the least number of unfair parties 
or places in their jurisdiction. One would he prefer- 
able. If every available means at the command of the 
State Federations and Central Bodies were concen- 
trated upon one such, and kept up until successful, 
the next on the list would be more easily brought to 
terms, and within a reasonable time none opposed to 
fair wages, conditions or hours but would be brought 
to see the error of its ways, and submit to the in- 
evitable." 1 

Still another plan to increase effectiveness was pro- 
posed in the 1907 Convention, namely, that unions 
which had firms on the list should report every three 
months the progress made, failure so to do being at- 
tended with the withdrawal of the name from the list. 

The February, 1908, number was the last issue in 
which the "We Don't Patronize" list appeared. The 
decision of the Supreme Court in the Danbury Hat- 
ters' case, which rendered unions liable under the Sher- 
man Anti-Trust law for threefold damages due to 
boycotting, was responsible for this withdrawal. The 
final list contained 82 names. 

Despite this decision, the Boycott Committee was 

1 Proceedings of the A. F. of L., 1905, pp. 200, 201. Italics arc 
author's. 



ii4 BOYCOTTS 

continued, and efforts were made at the succeeding 
convention to make the use of this weapon still more 
effective. In the proceedings of the 1909 Convention 
(p. 281) we note: 

"The boycott should only be resorted to after all 
efforts of adjustment have failed, but, when substi- 
tuted, it should be made so effective that speedy agree- 
ment .... will follow. If, in instances where the 
boycott is now necessary, the right kind of publicity 
could be had, the boycott would be unnecessary, for an 
aroused public conscience would speedily compel the 
manufacturer and the selling malefactor to put his 
establishment in industrial order or go out of busi- 



President Gompers, in the same convention, averred 
that the boycott would only be used as a last resort. 
He said: 

"The workers fully realize that the boycott and 
strike are means to be used to maintain their rights 
and to promote their welfare when seriously threat- 
ened by hostile, greedy and unfair employers when no 
other remedy seems available. With the boycott 
cleared of wrongful charges and misapprehension and 
recognized as a lawful right, we will find its use dimin- 
ishing. It will be a power held in reserve and used 
only when no other remedy is adequate." 2 

The 19 10 Boycott Committee approved the senti- 
ment of the 1909 convention, and proposed a few boy- 
cotts. The 191 1 convention also recommended this 
action to be taken against a number of firms. In 19 12 
but three firms were mentioned by the Boycott Com- 
mittee — the Ward and General Baking Company and 
the Atkins Saw Manufacturing Company. Organized 
labor was not called upon directly to boycott these 

1 Proc. A. F. of L., Conv., 1901, pp. 281-282. 

2 Ibid., p. 32. Italics are the author's. 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 115 

concerns, but simply to give the unions its support, 
and to do whatever lies within its power to bring about 
the desired results. 

It is thus seen that the history of the boycott in the 
American Federation of Labor has been the history of 
the attempt to restrain its indiscriminate and unjust 
use, and to apply it only as a reserve weapon, after 
the most thorough investigation and careful thought. 
When used in this manner it has been truly effective. 



The "We Don't Patronize" List 

Having considered in a broad way the general 
policy of the American Federation of Labor, relative 
to the use of boycotts, let us analyze more carefully 
the nature and results of the boycotts indorsed by 
them, as indicated in the "We Don't Patronize" list. 

About 437 firms appeared on the "We Don't Pat- 
ronize" list of the American Federationist during the 
period ^894 to 1908. Of the 360 firms whose loca- 
tions were given, nine-tenths were situated in the 
Middle Atlantic, North Central and New England 
States, and nearly one-half in the first two sections. 
The industrial States of New York, Illinois, Ohio, 
Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Michigan and Missouri 
led in number of firms on the "We Don't Patron- 
ize" list, in the order named. Chicago, New York 
City, St. Louis, Philadelphia and Boston were the most 
important centers of these firms. Massachusetts pos- 
sessed the largest number in the New England group, 
New York in the Middle Atlantic group, and Illinois 
and Ohio in the North Central States. Only nine of 
these firms appeared in the South Atlantic States, and 
•but a dozen in the far West. 

The firms boycotted in the Northern Central States 
and far West seemed to be most effectively attacked. 
and those in the South, the least so. The firms located 



n6 BOYCOTTS 

in Chicago and St. Louis apparently felt the boycott 
more keenly than those in the other centers of popu- 
lation. 

If we analyze the "We Don't Patronize" list to find 
out what industries were chiefly involved, we discover 
that the greatest number of boycotts appeared in those 
concerns which dealt with food and kindred products, 
as in the New York boycotts of the eighties and nine- 
ties. Boycotts against firms producing machinery were 
numerous, much more so than in the New York State 
figures. Clothing, household goods, printing and 
paper followed. 

It is impossible to state the exact results of the boy- 
cotts declared by the American Federation of Labor 
and given publicity through the "We Don't Patron- 
ize" list. Many of the firms appearing on this list 
were dropped without a word of comment. In Jan- 
uary, 1900, the entire 87 firms mentioned the preced- 
ing December had completely disappeared. No names 
were placed on this list until the following May, when 
23 concerns were mentioned. Some names were 
omitted doubtless because the boycott had in reality 
ceased through the inactivity of the international union 
first instituting it; some, because the Federation had 
failed to receive the proper reports from these unions, 
while others had been settled with the firms in a man- 
ner more or less agreeable to the Federation. 

When settlement occurred, a notice generally ap- 
peared in the Federationist on the same page as the 
"We Don't Patronize" list, which read: 

"Notice: The dispute with the firm is now 

satisfactorily settled. The same (firm) is removed 
from the 'We Don't Patronize' list. All unions and 
members are now respectfully notified to cease their 
antagonism to the products of this firm, and to give it 
that fair consideration and support to which it is now 
entitled." 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 117 

Presumably most of the firms so mentioned had 
conceded to the demands of the union. Some, after 
conceding, evidently broke the union regulations, as 
they were afterward replaced on the list. A few con- 
cerns declared to have satisfactorily settled stated to 
the writer that the boycott proved ineffective, and 
that their name was removed voluntarily by the union. 
A large printing house, for instance, wrote: "They 
took us off of their own volition because they con- 
sidered it (the boycott) a joke." 

It is thus seen that the number of firms reported as 
having settled is not an absolute indication of the num- 
ber of successful boycotts, although it is the best that 
can be obtained. It may also be said that many firms 
whose names remained on the list, or were removed 
without any stated settlement, suffered severely from 
the boycott, and were in all probability led to concede 
some, at least, of the workers' demands. 

During the existence of the "We Don't Patronize" 
list, from March, 1894 — when seven firms were men- 
tioned — to February, 1908, some 437 boycotts were 
reported against 426 firms. Of these 437, some 105, 
or 24.1% — practically one-fourth — were declared to 
have been concluded in a manner satisfactory to the 
unions. The percentage of successful boycotts was 
highest in the leather goods, printing and food indus- 
tries, while in the clothing and household-furnishing 
businesses settlement was reached in but 15% of the 
cases. 

On account of the resolution in the Scranton Con- 
vention of 1 90 1, that no international union could 
have more than three firms at one time on the list, it 
is impossible to find out with any great degree of 
accuracy, from a scrutiny of the list, the relative 
amount of boycotting practiced by the various unions. 

The list shows that among "Food and Kindred 
Products" the number of boycotts was greatest in the 



n8 BOYCOTTS 

cigar industry, while the flour mill and cereal, brewery, 
tobacco and meat industries were next in order. Com- 
paratively few boycotts were directed against bread, an 
industry which led in importance in the New York 
State boycotts. This can be explained in part on the 
ground that bread is made chiefly by local agencies, 
and that boycotts against bakeries, therefore, must be 
local and not national in their scope. Boycotts against 
flour mills, cereal concerns and breweries seem to have 
met with the largest degree of success, while those 
against the great tobacco combinations were less ef- 
fective. 

Iron and steel, hardware and bicycle were the chief 
industries boycotted in the "Machinery Group." In 
this group the ban against bicycles, which, for a while, 
were purchased rather extensively by organized labor, 
seemed the most successful. 

Shoes, clothing, collars and cuffs and hats were the 
special objects of attack in the "Clothing Group." The 
hatters' boycotts seem to have been the most successful, 
with clothing next. Apparently the boycott was used 
with little effect against the great collar and cuff con- 
cerns and shoe companies. 

Newspapers in the "Printing Group" and furniture 
and stoves in the "Household Goods" group were the 
most frequently selected for the application of this 
weapon. About one-third of the attacks on news- 
papers and furniture houses were reported to have ac- 
complished the desired results, while but 13.6% of the 
boycotts against stove firms resulted favorably to the 
workers. 

A decreasing number of settlements agreeable to the 
unions involved were apparently made during the last 
few years of the existence of the "We Don't Patron- 
ize" list. In fact, of the hundred-odd such settle- 
ments in the fourteen years between 1894 and 1908, 
but eleven, or a little over one-tenth of the entire num- 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 1 19 

ber, seem to have been made during the years 1904 
and 1908 inclusive. Thirty cases were said to have 
been settled in 1902 and 1903, and the remainder in 
previous years, the number varying from 6 to 1 1 each 
year. Five or more reported as so settled were con- 
tinued again after an interval, indicating that the firms 
later on disobeyed the mandates of the unions. 

To indicate the difficulty of waging a successful boy- 
cott against large combinations of capital, it might be 
stated that no boycott on the "We Don't Patronize" 
list, which was conducted against corporations men- 
tioned in Moody's Manual of Corporations, was re- 
ported settled after the year 1904. No boycott against 
a firm with a capitalization of $2,500,000 or over, ap- 
pearing in this manual, was settled satisfactorily to the 
union after 1903, nor against a firm with a $5,000,000 
capital after 1901. 

Of the sixteen firms of this caliber which were re- 
ported to have conceded the demands of the union, five 
sent letters to the writer. Two of these five admitted 
that the boycott interfered considerably with their 
business. One of these was a brewery and the other a 
bicycle company, both sellers of articles purchased to a 
considerable extent by the members of organized labor. 
Of the three remaining, two stated that they did not 
know of any injury which the boycott had done to 
them, and that they had ignored the boycott until it 
finally ceased. The last affirmed that the efforts of the 
workers did not result in serious injury. They did not 
mention any concessions to the unions. 

Of the eleven other corporations appearing in the 
manual, and said to have duly settled, one was boy- 
cotted again after a series of years, and this time no 
settlement was made. It is reported of another that, 
throughout the boycott period, 8% dividends were de- 
clared yearly, the rate, however, decreasing to 5 % the 
year of the settlement. During the three years of the 



120 BOYCOTTS 

boycott, another increased its capital $5,000,000, while 
still another corporation reported a dividend of 8% 
per annum until the middle of the duration of the 
boycott, when this amount was raised to 12%. No 
information was received from two packing firms or 
from a tobacco, aluminum, street railway, bicycle or 
cash register concern. 

To secure a more comprehensive idea of the actual 
effect produced on firms by their appearance on the 
"We Don't Patronize" list, and the accompanying 
boycott, the writer corresponded with all of the firms 
whose addresses were ascertainable. One hundred and 
thirty-three of these gave information more or less 
detailed. One, a manufacturer of wagons and agri- 
cultural implements, whose name had appeared on the 
list in practically every issue for five years and nine 
months, wrote : 

"We are not aware of our name appearing on the 
list you mention, and this is the first time we have ever 
heard of it." Eleven other replies were received of 
the same import from a proprietor of a hotel and from 
firms dealing in tobacco, picks, machinery, medicine, 
granite, saddlery, gold leaf, lumber, tanning, clothing. 
The names of these firms had been on the list any- 
where from four months to three and a half years. 
Seven of the firms appeared in the Federationist be- 
tween the years 1902 and 1908, and five between 
1897 and 1900. The correspondent in only one case 
intimated that his ignorance of the boycott might have 
been due to the use of this weapon prior to his con- 
nection with the firm. Twelve, then, as before men- 
tioned, were unaware of the existence of the boycott. 
Eleven firms maintained that the publicity given had 
helped them. Twenty-four declared their positive con- 
victions that no injury had resulted from the boycott; 
thirty-two, that they were unaware of any injury; thirty- 
five, that they were injured but slightly, and nineteen, 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 121 

or about one-seventh of those replying, that the boy- 
cott affected them considerably. 

Of the firms which admitted a loss, three were in the 
food group (cigar concerns, breweries, flour mills), 
three in the clothing group (shoe, hat and woolen con- 
cerns), and three in the furniture group (piano, fold- 
ing bed and sewing machine firms). Others dealt in 
bicycles, boilers, lime, brick, granite, gold leaf, cooper- 
age and wire cloth. In nearly all of these cases, the 
goods handled were either purchased quite extensively 
by members and friends of organized labor or by em- 
ployers in industries where strong unions existed. 

A dealer in hats appeared to be one of the chief 
sufferers. He stated that in one-half year his sales 
had decreased from $932,000 to $376,000. Of his 
80 customers in Minneapolis and St. Paul, he asserted 
that the unions induced all but one to cease their deal- 
ings. A cigar firm wrote that it was doubly boy- 
cotted by the "Tobacco Trust" and the unions, and 
that, at the time of the reorganization of the firm with 
Knights of Labor members, the Cigar Makers' Union 
so intimidated the jobbers at St. Paul that they can- 
celed the weekly orders of 50,000 cigars. The firm 
finally went into bankruptcy. A brick concern stated 
that the boycott cost it about $5,000. A milling com- 
pany acknowledged that it was still endeavoring to 
counteract the feeling created some fifteen years before 
against their flour, but that it was "slow work." A 
bicycle company affirmed that its chief loss came from 
the impossibility of filling orders — presumably on ac- 
count of the strike, and not of the boycott. Another 
bicycle company said it was the boast of the unions that 
they had caused the firm to fail. 

Of the 19 firms last mentioned, where the boycott 
was used with some effect, 7 were kept on the list until 
1908, 2 until 1907, 2 stopped in 1904, 1 in 1903, 1 in 
1902, 1 in 1901, and the remainder from 1S97 *° 



122 BOYCOTTS 

1900. Not one of the names of these firms appeared 
among the large corporations cited in Moody's 
Manual. 

Among the unions concerned in these effective boy- 
cotts were those of the metal polishers (3 cases), ma- 
chinists (2 cases), cigarmakers, brewery workers, flour 
mill employees, boiler makers, granite cutters, boot 
and shoe workers, garment workers, sheet and metal 
workers, piano and organ makers, gold beaters, coop- 
ers, wire weavers, and brickmakers. 

Various reasons were given for these losses, the 
chief being that the goods produced were purchased by 
union men, or by concerns in which strong unions oper- 
ated. A brewing concern thus wrote: "The boycott 
was injurious to our business, as the greater part of 
the product is consumed by working men who are or- 
ganized." A cooperage company stated: "No brew- 
ery is permitted to receive or use any cooperage not 
stamped with the union stamp. . . . This has re- 
sulted in unionizing all factories selling packages to 
the breweries." A boiler concern stated that the only 
orders that were canceled were those in breweries 
strongly organized. A granite concern was hampered 
because unionists refused to allow their members to 
work upon the rough stone. Still another firm averred 
that its loss was caused by the damaging of its goods 
by workers employed in its patrons' shops. 

Thirty-five of the companies replying stated that 
the boycott subjected them to very slight loss. These 
included five firms dealing in food and allied products, 
two in cigars, one in meat, one in preserves and one in 
oysters; eight in clothing, two in shoes, two in col- 
lars and cuffs, and one each in hats, corsets, elastic gor- 
ing, and clothing proper. Similar reports came from 
an officer of a street railway and from companies deal- 
ing in bicycles (2 cases), iron bolts, lockers, steel 
tubes, typewriters, rubber belting, stoves (2 cases), 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 123 

plate glass, cement, fountain pens, baskets, tin foil, 
burlap, indurated fiber, boxes, and gold leaf, ships, 
and lumber. 

Twenty-four firms were positive that the boycott 
did not affect their business in any way. These in- 
cluded a hotel proprietor and concerns trading in to- 
bacco, clothes, shoes, cotton, furniture, chairs (2 
cases), hardware, machinery (3 cases), lumber (2 
cases), cooperage (2 cases), wall paper, leather, cars, 
carriages (2 cases), steam specialties, billposting and 
packing. 

Some thirty-two firms stated that they had no knowl- 
edge of any injurious results. This group contained 
one flour firm and seven firms producing various kinds 
of machines and instruments — bicycles, cooperage ma- 
chines, tacks, cutlery, knives, thermometers, fire ap- 
paratus; also firms dealing in clothing — shoes, textiles, 
underware; household goods — trunks, brooms, sew- 
ing machines; pottery — lime, brick, flower pots, ce- 
ment; bags, boxes, lumber, leather (2 cases), print- 
ing, rubber, soap, bill posters. An insurance company 
was in this list as well. Forty-two additional firms 
averred that changes in the firm, fear of publicity or 
other reasons prevented them from giving the required 
information. 

Some ten firms wrote that the boycott had been 
a distinct advantage to them. Thus a concern dealing 
in machinery declared that they figured "union an- 
tagonism as a rather valuable asset" ; a dealer in show 
cases, that labor's opposition gained for them the 
sympathy of the larger merchants; collar and packing 
firms, that it gave them "gratuitous publicity," and 
stove and paper box concerns, that it increased the 
number of customers and the size of the orders. Cloth- 
ing and cigar firms were among others thus benefited. 

Still others, four in particular, stated that, while 
they may have lost a few customers, other methods 



i2 4 BOYCOTTS 

during the period of the boycott more than offset any 
loss. A packing company averred that its business 
increased two to three hundred per cent, during the 
boycotting period. A number of the employers ex- 
pressed the belief that the boycott did more harm 
than good to organized labor. A shoe concern de- 
clared that the boycotters spent $20,000 before they 
decided to call off the fight. 

Many admitted that under other circumstances the 
boycott might have been very effective. Those who 
know the almost universal method of business men to 
put their best foot forward, and refuse to admit losses 
unless they desire to make some special point in court 
or elsewhere of the loss sustained, will, no doubt, dis- 
count the optimism of some of these replies. 

Among the reasons given for the comparative inef- 
fectiveness of some of the foregoing boycotts were: 
the non-union character of the customers, the national 
scope of the firm's business, and the absence of any 
distinguishing label. The unsavory character of com- 
petitors and the weakness of labor were among the 
reasons suggested in some of the other answers. 

After declaring that his business did not suffer from 
the boycott, an officer of a car manufacturing con- 
cern cogently put the case : "We are not selling freight 
cars to the labor unions, and the sale of our product 
would not be affected by their threats as might be the 
case with hatters, clothing merchants and some others." 
Of the same import were the reasonings of heads of 
ship building, iron and bolt and other manufacturing 
concerns. Although their dealings were with the pub- 
lic at large, those prominent in a hat and a typewriting 
concern noted that "the class of merchandise we sell 
and the class of people to whom we cater" make it 
unlikely that any effort at boycotting would be suc- 
cessful. 

The difficulty of effectively injuring a business which 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 125 

had its sales in every part of the country was empha- 
sized by a soap and a tub concern, which affirmed that 
they regarded any attempts "to influence a business of 
wide scope like ours as purely a phantom. " 

That it was but a waste of energy and money to 
attempt to boycott a product which possessed no dis- 
tinguishing mark of the firm, was the opinion of a 
shoe concern. "The name which appears on our shoes 
is the name of the jobber, and very frequently the 
shoe is copyrighted, or carries the trade mark name 
belonging to the jobber. Buyers of our shoes would 
never know by whom they are made, so that you can 
readily see that the consumer could not in any way 
influence our sales." A textile concern wrote in the 
same vein. 

A Southern dealer stated that a boycott against him 
affected him but slightly, inasmuch as 30% to 35% of 
the chairs manufactured in his section were convict 
goods, and as customers had only the option either of 
purchasing his chairs or those manufactured in prison. 

International Unions and the Boycott 

While it is impossible to obtain a complete knowl- 
edge of the attitude of the various international unions 
toward the use of the boycott, a few indications may 
be noted. Our chief source of information is the 
American Federationist, where appeared, in connec- 
tion with the "We Don't Patronize" list, the names 
of the unions initiating the various boycotts in some 
three hundred odd cases — in somewhat less than three- 
fourths of the instances mentioned. 

In a number of cases the unions applying for the 
indorsement of the American Federation of Labor 
were central labor bodies; in some instances, federal 
unions; in a considerable number, international unions 
now defunct or independent of the Federation. Some 



126 BOYCOTTS 

fifty-four of the one hundred and fifteen national and 
international unions, cited by Secretary Morrison in his 
IQI2 report, 1 or nearly 4J°/o of the unions, were men- 
tioned as having been the originators of the boycotts 
cited on the list. 

The unions proposing the largest number of boy- 
cotts, and having between nine and a dozen firms to 
their credit, were the garment workers, boot and shoe 
workers, machinists, metal polishers and coopers. In 
the next group, with from six to eight boycotts, came 
the wood workers — now merged with the carpenters — 
the leather workers, molders, brewery workers and 
members of the typographical unions. 

Among the miscellaneous group with five to their 
credit, were the cigarmakers, printers and color mixers, 
blacksmiths and broom workers. The others were as 
follows: four boycotts — retail clerks, textile workers, 
elastic goring weavers, carriage and wagon workers, 
granite cutters; three boycotts — hatters, flour and 
mill employees, bookbinders, printing pressmen, brick, 
tile and terra cotta workers, stationary firemen, stove 
mounters, boiler makers, and street railway employees; 
two boycotts — railroad telegraphers, carpenters, 
painters, bakers, tobacco workers, quarrymen, wire 
weavers, shingle weavers, paper makers, bill posters, 
piano and organ workers and glove workers ; one boy- 
cott — musicians, tailors, upholsterers, jewelry work- 
ers, wood carvers, metal workers, potters, commercial 
telegraphers, print cutters, meat cutters, iron and steel 
workers, sawsmiths, pattern workers, sheet metal work- 
ers and foundry employees. 

We thus realize what a great variety of unions 
have used this weapon with more or less effect. The 
most active of the boycotting unions no longer affiliated 
with the A. F. of L. were the watch case engravers, 
the rubber workers and the gold beaters. The leather 

1 Report of Proceedings, A. F. of L. Convention, 1912, pp. 64-65. 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 127 

workers, coopers, brewers, cigarmakers and granite 
workers apparently had the best success among those 
unions waging several boycotts. About one-half of the 
unions, chiefly those engaged in but one or two boy- 
cotts, seemed to have no victories to their credit. 

Some further indication of the extent to which the 
various international unions have brought this weapon 
to bear in their disputes may also be gleaned from the 
court records. In addition to some thirty odd of the 
unions already mentioned, court proceedings have been 
noted against local unions of teamsters, plumbers 
and horseshoers. The carpenters, bricklayers and 
printers have been apparently embroiled in legal con- 
troversies more frequently than any of their companion 
organizations. 

To secure a still better idea of the extent to which 
the individual unions employ this weapon, the writer 
sent a questionnaire to their officers. Eleven of those 
replying stated that they did not practice boycotting; 
three, that they utilized this weapon but rarely; six, 
or less than one-half of those sending information, 
admitted its employment. 

Of the eleven who denied its use, two wrote that 
the nature of their trade prevented its successful oper- 
ation, and two others affirmed that, while not originat- 
ing boycotts, they assisted in the prosecution of boy- 
cotts inaugurated by other unions. One thus explained 
his negative answer: 

"We don't have to boycott any more. We control 
the skilled workers. Employers desiring skill must em- 
ploy our members." One remarked that the strikes 
in his trade required quick action, and that the boycott 
was, therefore, ineffective. 

Six unions admitted that they employed agents to 
visit and induce dealers to purchase only union-made 
goods. Fourteen denied the employment of such rep- 
resentatives. One officer averred that during one boy- 



128 BOYCOTTS 

cott the union's representative "visited every dealer to 
persuade them to cease business relations." Five in- 
stances of the employment of such representatives were 
mentioned by one union. 

In answer to the question whether their agents used 
coercion, one replied: "Our representatives point out 
the fact that the purchasing of unfair goods is not very 
profitable." Asked whether the agents used threats of 
boycotts should the dealers refuse to acquiesce in the 
demand of organized labor, one stated : "A boycott was 
not threatened, but the firm was given to understand 
that the patronage would cease. The effect in nearly 
every instance was successful." "In any boycott where 
w T e go to a merchant and ask him to cease buying from 
a particular firm there is always the implication that, 
if he fails to do so, we will carry our patronage else- 
where," declares a second. "We show that the pur- 
chasing of unfair goods is not very profitable," writes a 
third. 

Good results generally follow the employment of 
these traveling delegates'. A union with two boycotts 
reports success in one case and an agreement pending 
in another. 

"Such visits," says a member of one of the building 
trades, "induce the firm to telephone (the quickest 
means of communication) to their contractors and 
firms to settle immediately with the union or leave the 
contract. In one special case the contractor preferred 
to leave the contract and not deal with the union." 

The large majority of those answering, wrote that 
it is not their custom during labor disputes to circular- 
ize the labor unions or the general public. Nine wrote 
that no circulars whatsoever were distributed; one, that 
such printed matter was sent but rarely; four others, 
that none was mailed to unions, and three others, that 
circulars were not distributed among the general pub- 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 129 

lie. Four, however, acknowledged that the unions 
were circularized, and one, that the general public re- 
ceived notices. "We give all of our strikes, if they are 
of long duration or the number of men involved is 
sufficient, publicity among labor unions" is one of the 
acknowledgments. In the circular among the general 
public, one union stated that it only requested the pub- 
lic to patronize fair firms, not to boycott unfair con- 
cerns. The results of the questionnaire seem to indicate 
that but a minority of the unions use the boycott at 
present. However, but a small minority of the unions 
made any reply, and among those failing to answer 
were, doubtless, a considerable number not wishing to 
in any wise admit that they were indulging in a prac- 
tice which so many courts consider reprehensible. 

The I. W. W. and the Boycott 

While the Industrial Workers of the World favor 
the use of the boycott wherever it can be employed 
effectively, they have thus far resorted to this weapon 
but infrequently, largely because their members are 
employed primarily in the so-called basic industries, 
and are not the direct purchasers of goods produced. 

Their attitude may be gleaned from the following 
letter received from one of the organization's foremost 
officers: 

"The I. W. W. uses the boycott whenever they can 
do so effectively. We recognize it at times as an effi- 
cient weapon. We do not, however, believe in placing 
the boycott upon any concerns or products, and to al- 
low it to stay there, even though it is of no effect what- 
ever. There is also a difference between a boycott as 
practiced and advocated by the I. W. W. and that 
generally used by the A. F. of L. The difference arises 
from the fact that the I. W. W. devotes most of its 
energy toward organizing the basic industries, and, 



130 BOYCOTTS 

for that reason, does not use the boycott as consumers, 
except in rare cases, as the members of the organiza- 
tion are not the consumers of products turned out from 
the plants in the basic industries. 

"The organization, in conjunction with the Western 
Federation of Miners, boycotted the Goldfield 'Sun,' 
the daily paper of Goldfield, Nevada, and forced the 
proprietor of the same to sell out and leave town. We 
find the boycott effective where we are organized suffi- 
ciently strong to make it effective, but under no other 
circumstances. The organization has not taken any 
official stand upon the proposition of the boycott." 

In the Nevada controversy referred to, the members 
of the Miners' Unions of the I. W. W. boycotted news- 
paper proprietors because their employees failed to 
join the I. W. W. The papers declared that this at- 
tack cost them some $25,000. In court, they alleged 
that the miners visited advertisers and threatened to 
place them on the "unfair" list if they continued their 
advertisements ; that they induced newsboys to stop sell- 
ing the papers, posting on a blackboard in public view 
the names of those who continued their sales; that they 
persuaded the railroad employees to refuse to handle 
the papers, and imposed a fine of $15 on any member 
of the union purchasing a copy. Threats of physical 
violence were also charged. The union was held 
guilty. 1 

At Lawrence, Mass., during the strike of the textile 
workers, the I. W. W. organized a boycott following 
the flag demonstration, and forbade purchasing, for 
some time, from those merchants in Essex Street, Law- 
rence, who took a stand against the strikers. The boy- 
cott was said to have been attended with considerable 
success. The saloons, at Lawrence and in a number of 
the other strikes,' were effectively boycotted by this or- 
ganization. This taboo on saloons, however, was not 
1 See Branson v. I. W. W., Nevada, 1908. 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 131 

generally caused by any antagonism to individual sa- 
loon keepers, but by the necessity of keeping discipline. 
On account of this more or less official boycott of the 
saloons in the silk workers' strike in Paterson in 19 13, 
Mr. Haywood declared that for weeks after the be- 
ginning of the strike not one out of the twenty odd 
thousand strikers was seen intoxicated. 



Summary 

In the boycotts indorsed by the American Federation 
of Labor, and given publicity in its organ, we witness 
this weapon brought into play for the first time against 
modern industries, many of them highly centralized, 
doing business on a national scale, and with an exceed- 
ingly large capitalization. 

In endeavoring to interfere seriously with the sales 
of these concerns, the Federation has been forced to 
change its methods of attack. The experience of the 
last few years indicates that the very necessity of the 
case compels caution, careful thought and deliberation 
before any boycott is indorsed. It shows that the 
Federation can hope to succeed in forcing a settlement, 
after a boycott is declared, only in a minority of in- 
stances. The chances of success are especially small 
against firms possessing a more or less complete mo- 
nopoly of the field, against those doing business in 
every part of the country, and those selling their 
products largely to the employing class or to elements 
in the community out of touch with organized labor. 
Goods purchased chiefly by the employing class, may. 
however, be effectively boycotted where the boycott is 
forwarded by strong unions — such as those of the 
brewery workers — by means of a threatened or actual 
strike against employers who refuse to discontinue 
their dealings with the boycotted concern. 

The Federation's experience has also demonstrated 



132 BOYCOTTS 

that the non-appearance of distinguishing marks on 
the "unfair" product, the undesirable character of the 
competitors, and the weakness of a labor union initiat- 
ing the boycott make success extremely doubtful. On 
the other hand, the thorough organization of labor 
often renders boycotting unnecessary. 

Other lessons to be drawn are that a boycott will 
not run itself; that something is necessary in addition 
to the mere appearance of the name of the firm on the 
"We Don't Patronize" list; that the unfair character 
of the firm tabooed must be kept constantly before the 
eyes of unionists, and that much effort and money must 
be expended if the boycott is to be a success. 

The Federation's boycotts were waged, generally 
speaking, against the same classes of products as were 
the New York boycotts of the eighties and nineties. 
In each group, food products were boycotted most fre- 
quently, and with a very large degree of success. In 
the matter of numbers, clothing comes third, print- 
ing fifth and metals and wood among the last in each 
series. Iron and steel and machine products, which 
scarcely appear in the New York cases, are important 
members of the boycott group of the A. F. of L. Be- 
cause of their local nature, boycotts connected with the 
building trades were more prominent in the New York 
experiments. Boycotting of individual bakeries, which 
headed the list in the New York cases, were, of course, 
of little significance in the national attacks, although 
flour and cereal mills were frequently mentioned, and 
were fought with considerable success. Cigarmakers, 
breweries and suppliers of meat were mentioned promi- 
nently on both lists. Very little success seemed to at- 
tend the national boycotts, however, against such highly 
centralized industries as collar and cuff, tobacco, shoe 
and meat concerns. 

Perhaps one-half of the unions at present connected 
with the Federation may be said to have battled with 



AMERICAN FEDERATION OF LABOR 133 

the aid of this weapon. How large a proportion 
would be employing the boycott at present, were it not 
for legal interference, it is difficult to state. 

Again it is of importance to call attention to the 
growing conservatism of the unions in using this 
weapon. 



CHAPTER VIII 



THE BUCK'S STOVE AND RANGE CASE 



The Buck } s Stove Case 

The crowning attempt of the American Federation 
of Labor to put into operation its slowly formulated 
policy of concentrating attention on a few important 
concerns, was made in the Buck's Stove boycott of re- 
cent years, the most extensive and best organized of 
all of the boycotts waged through the active coopera- 
tion of that body. Ending as it did in the conviction of 
three of the most prominent of the labor leaders of 
America, Samuel Gompers, president of the A. F. of 
L., Frank Morrison, its secretary, and John Mitchell, 
one of its vice-presidents, the attack on this concern 
has attracted international notice. In its advanced 
stages it ceased to be a fight merely between the small 
international unions initiating it and the St. Louis 
Stove concern, and became a battle royal between the 
forces of labor, marshaled under the standard of the 
Federation, on the one hand, and the forces of capital, 
directed by the National Association of Manufacturers 
and the Anti-Boycott Association, on the other. 

This case illustrates so clearly the methods devel- 
oped during the past few years, and presents such im- 
portant legal aspects, that it merits a special treatment. 

The Buck's Stove and Range Company, the original 
employer concerned in the controversy, was an old and 
well established St. Louis firm, dating back to 1846. 

134 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 135 

Prior to the boycott, it claimed a business throughout 
the nation of some $1,250,000 annually, and employed 
on the average some 750 men, union and non-union. 
Its president was J. W. Van Cleave, about that time 
president of the National Association of Manufactur- 
ers and of the Citizens' Industrial Alliance. 

A few years before the struggle with organized 
labor, the Stove Founders' National Defense Associa- 
tion, of which the Buck's Stove Co. was a member, 
entered into an agreement with the Iron Molders' 
Union and the Metal Polishers', Buffers', Platers', 
Brass Molders' and Brass and Silver Workers' Inter- 
national Union of North America, providing for a 
settlement of all disputes between the associations and 
the unions by a conference committee, and stipulating 
furthermore, that the decision should be binding, and 
that, pending adjudication, neither party should discon- 
tinue operations. 

In the nickel department there were 36 metal polish- 
ers, earning, according to the company, from $4 to 
$5.25 a day. The company contended that the official 
working day of these polishers was ten hours, from 
7 A. M. until 6 P. M. The polishers averred that, for 
several months they had been working, without any 
objection from the company, under a nine hour day. 
They added that the nature of the work was such as to 
make a nine hour day necessary, if the health of the 
workers was to be properly conserved. Mr. E. G. 
Boyd, a metal polisher employed by the Quick Meal 
Stove and Range Co. of St. Louis, in an affidavit sub- 
mitted to the court, thus describes the conditions under 
which the metal polisher toils: 

"It takes a number of years to become skillful and 
efficient in the work of preparing the castings in their 
rough state for the plater. To prepare this work skill- 
fully and properly considerable physical force is re- 
quired, especially in the grinding of castings. The 



136 BOYCOTTS 

work causes the room in which the polisher is working 
to be filled with iron dust which he is forced to inhale 
constantly, which is a cause for consumption. The 
blower service used in the plant does not by any means 
carry off all this iron dust. . . . A very large per cent, 
of the men engaged as polishers die of consumption. 
A buffer is required to put a bright finish on nickel- 
plated work; in doing this he uses a canvas or felt 
wheel, and a composition which is composed of lime 
and grease, which substances are also very injurious 
to health. This canvas or felt wheel casts off a fine 
dust which is likewise injurious. / believe that a nine- 
hour day would be a very material benefit to their 
health and happiness. A very large number of firms, 
including one at which I am employed, recognize the 
justice of the nine-hour work day, and have practically 
adopted it." 1 

The Buck's Stove Company officers averred that they 
noticed the employees in the nickel department fre- 
quently quitting work, sometimes one, sometimes one 
and a half hours before the ten hours had expired. 
Shortly before closing the shop in the fall for repairs, 
they told the men that a notice would be posted three 
w r eeks before their reopening the shop in January, 
1906, calling attention to the ten hour day, and that the 
workers' return would indicate a willingness to continue 
under the ten hour schedule. 

The men went back to work, but on August 27 of 
the same year, on receipt of a letter from A. B. Groat, 
president of their international union, they left the 
shop at the expiration of nine hours. The leaders 
were discharged that day and the next, and on August 
29 the men struck because of the refusal of the com- 
pany to reinstate these discharged employees. The 
company claims that this action was in violation of an 
agreement with the Stove Founders' Association. 

1 Italics are the author's. 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 137 

But the issues involved were more fundamental than 
the foregoing. Mr. Van Cleave, president of the con- 
cern, as has been stated, had recently been elected 
president of the National Association of Manufactur- 
ers. He was also a prominent member of the Na- 
tional Founders' Association, and had openly boasted 
that he would pursue the same policy toward organ- 
ized labor which his predecessors in the National Asso- 
ciation of Manufacturers had commenced — a policy, 
for the most part, of bitter opposition. In his dealings 
with the International Molders' Union, it was alleged 
that he had employed spies to report union proceed- 
ings ; that he had refused to confer with the union agent 
and had ordered him off the premises; that he was 
secretly plotting to substitute non-union for union men 
in the concern, and to make his firm a hot bed of oppo- 
sition to organized labor; that he was watching his 
chances to break all conference agreements on the pre- 
text of an overt act committed by the union; and that, 
furthermore, he was encouraging other manufacturers 
to oppose labor organizations. Such, at least, are the 
inferences which may be drawn from the letters alleged 
to have been written by Mr. Van Cleave to Mr. K. J. 
Turner, president of the Manufacturers' Information 
Bureau Co., Cleveland, Ohio, May 28 and May 31, 
1906, and submitted by Mr. Gompers before the Judi- 
ciary Committee of the U. S. Senate, January 6, 1913. 1 

These letters read in part: 

"With reference to our trouble (with the molders) 
and the final ending, the enclosed notices, which were 
put up in our shop last Friday just prior to my order- 
ing off the premises one of the business agents of the 
I. M. U. (International Molders' Union) and giving 
him to understand that he must not enter these premi- 
ses again, are the very best evidences that I can give 

1 Hearings before a sub-committee of the Committee on the Judi 
ciary, etc., on H. R. 23635, 62 Cong.. 3rd Session, pp. 11-13. 



138 BOYCOTTS 

you that all that the molders have claimed is hot 
air. ... I gave Mr. Keough (the union agent) to 
understand thoroughly and without mincing words that 
this shop was an 'Open Shop,' whether he was pleased 
to so recognize the fact or not. / gave him to under- 
stand that we would not recognize the I. M. U. in the 
shop or any of its methods, and that we would treat 
only with the committee provided for in the conference 
agreements as a representative only of the molders em- 
ployed in our shop. . . . 

"I note that you say that the two men that you 
refer to are connected with the N. F. A. (National 
Founders' Association). ... I wish it had been pos- 
sible for us too to have helped the N. F. A. by remain- 
ing idle a month longer, and it behooves us to bolster 
up the N. F. A. in every way that may lie in our power, 
that I would suggest that you may have to stand by 
Mr. Briggs until this particular fight is over. When 
this comes about, it may be possible for us to begin in 
a qniet, unassuming and systematic way to put into our 
shop as many of the non-union molders as can be found 
in this country. I should like to do this, but not under 
any specially high-priced contract, but to put them in 
here as a sort of hot bed, and, if necessary, to hold 
them in line when war again breaks out. 

"I am particularly anxious to have the I. M. U. 
commit an overt act that will cancel and wipe out of 
existence all of the conference agreements now in exist- 
ence between the S. F. N. D. A. {Stove Founders' 
National Defense Association) and the I. M. U., in 
the same way that their strike act wiped out of exist- 
ence all of those obnoxious agreements that they tried 
to put upon us." 1 

Mr. Van Cleave is further quoted as acknowledging 
the support he had received from other organizations, 
and as stating that "Gompers will be frothing at the 
mouth" when he (Van Cleave) expresses the attitude 

1 Italics are the author's. 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 139 

of the N. A. M. toward the methods of organized 
labor. 

In his later letter Mr. Van Cleave, it is alleged, 
thanked Mr. Turner for his comments on the reports of 
A-2 (the detective reports), and urged him to visit and 
encourage a number of stove manufacturers, and to 
instil courage into them. He repeated a conversation 
of Mr. Keough in the union meeting, which the detec- 
tive, A-2, had reported to him, declared that it was 
going to be his business "to get the I. M. U. into a 
trap," urged Mr. Turner to show the detective reports 
to other manufacturers, and thus ended: "I was given 
a quiet tip that if I would just stop this detective busi- 
ness I would stop a great deal of my trouble. Right 
there I made up my mind that I would not stop it, 
and if I should make you a suggestion it would be that 
you want to use the reports, to use them raw." 

The unjustifiable action of the Founders' Associa- 
tion, in breaking their agreements with the union, was 
also referred to. If this was the attitude of Mr. 
Van Cleave toward the molders' union, was it incon- 
ceivable that the same spirit animated him in his deal- 
ings with the polishers' union, and was not such an 
attitude a sufficient menace to organized labor to jus- 
tify the use of all legitimate weapons at its command 
to win the battle which the polishers had started? 

The causes of the controversy have been entered 
into at some length because the opponents of the boy- 
cott are prone to point to the Buck's Stove case as a 
glaring example of abuse, and to picture Mr. Van 
Cleave as a true friend of labor victimized in a most 
unjustifiable manner by the employment of this weapon. 

Immediately following the strike of the polishers in 
August, a system of picketing and boycotting was in- 
augurated first by this union, and later by the St. Louis 
Trades and Labor Council. At the convention of the 
American Federation of Labor, October, 1906, the 



i 4 o BOYCOTTS 

question of boycotting the Buck's Stove and Range Co. 
was discussed. George Bechtold of the Foundry Work- 
ers' and others represented that the metal polishers 
had enjoyed the nine hour day for 18 months, and that 
the company was now endeavoring to restore the ten 
hour day; that Mr. Van Cleave had a "reputation like 
Parry and Post," and had refused to deal with the com- 
mittee composed of David Kreyling, business agent 
of the St. Louis Trade and Labor Council, Ed- 
ward Lucas, of the Metal Polishers' Union, and 
himself. 

The majority of the committee to whom the matter 
was referred, recommended that it be considered by 
the Executive Council in accordance with Article 9, 
Section 4, of the Constitution, while the minority rec- 
ommended immediate action, partly on the ground of 
Mr. Van Cleave's well known antagonism to organized 
labor. 

Joseph Valentine, vice-president of the A. F. of L., 
and president of the International Iron Workers' 
Union, was asked to adjust the matter if possible, but 
in March, 1907, reported that he had seen President 
McAfee of the Stove Founders' National Defense As- 
sociation, and had been told that Mr. Van Cleave was 
in no mood to consider an adjustment. Gompers was 
also advised by local leaders that the interview which 
they had had with Mr. Van Cleave indicated to them 
that it was impossible to reach an agreement, and that 
several unionists had been discharged because of their 
activity in their unions. 

On the receipt of this information, the name of the 
firm was placed on the "We Don't Patronize" list in 
May, 1907, with the usual salutation: 

"To Affiliated Unions : 

"At the request of the unions interested, and after 
due investigation and attempt at settlement, the follow- 
ing firm has been declared unfair: 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 141 

"Buck's Stove and Range Company. 

"Secretaries are requested to read this notice in 
union meetings, and labor and reform press please 
copy. 

"Fraternally yours, 

"Samuel Gompers." 

Circulars announcing the boycott were also sent, it is 
alleged, to the members of the union, patrons and the 
public. 

In the American Federationist of October, 1907, 
the members were admonished to keep the Buck's 
Stove and Range Company in mind, and to remember 
that it was on the "Unfair List" of organized labor of 
America. 

On November 26, after legal action had been 
brought against the Federation, an appeal was sent 
broadcast to organized labor, urging a more active 
boycott than ever before. 

This circular read: 

"To All Organized Labor and Friends: 
"You undoubtedly are aware of the fact that the 
interests of the Foundry Employees and Metal Polish- 
ers have been greatly injured on account of the hostile 
action of the Buck's Stove and Range Company of 
St. Louis, of which Mr. Van Cleave is president, and 
he is also president of the National Association of 
Manufacturers. 

"As you are well aware, so inimical to the welfare 
of labor was the Buck's Stove and Range Company's 
management that the organization concerned felt 
obliged to call the products of that company unfair. 
The workmen's organization appealed to the Ameri- 
can Federation of Labor to indorse its action. After 
due investigation that indorsement was given and is 
still further affirmed. The circumstances leading to 
this action are so widely known that they need not here 
be recounted. . . . 



142 BOYCOTTS 

"It would be well for you, as central bodies, local 
unions, and individual members of organized labor and 
sympathizers, to call on business men in your respective 
localities, urge their sympathetic cooperation and ask 
them to write to the Buck's Stove and Range Company 
of St. Louis, urging it to make an honorable adjust- 
ment of its relation with organized labor. Act ener- 
getically and at once. Report the result of your effort 
to the undersigned. 

"Samuel Gompers, 

"President American Federation of Labor. 
Attest : 

"Frank Morrison, Secretary. 

"By order of the Executive Council of the 
A. F. of L." 

A nation-wide boycott was entered upon. The pa- 
trons of the Buck's Stove received many letters inform- 
ing them that the firm was on the unfair list as a result 
of its effort to force the employees to return to a ten 
hour day. They were urged to return the goods 
shipped to their firms and to notify Mr. Van Cleave 
that they would refrain from making any further 
purchases until he treated his employees more fairly. 

Parades were organized by the Metal Polishers', 
St. Louis Central Union and other bodies in which boy- 
cott transparencies were prominent features. These 
parades were halted in front of stores selling Buck's 
stoves and denunciatory speeches were made. Stick- 
ers and posters were, in some instances, placed on the 
windows of patrons, and customers were urged to stay 
away from them. 

Central bodies in many cities sent delegations to 
Van Cleave's customers, who were asked to discontinue 
the sale of stoves. The St. Louis House Furnishing 
Company alleged, for instance, that a committee re- 
quested it aot to dispose of any more of Buck's wares. 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 143 

The company agreed to this, providing the committee 
purchased from it the $5,000 worth of stoves on hand. 
The unionists, of course, refused, and began to place 
a ban on the store. Other dealers alleged threats 
of boycott, unless they broke their contract with the 
Buck's Stove Company, and some testified to threats 
of violence. Still others asserted that labor delegates 
promised to allow them to sell the goods which they 
had on hand and to return, when the contracts had ex- 
pired. 

As a result of this persistent industrial warfare 
against the company, many large orders were lost, 
and the business of the company was seriously dam- 
aged. 

To restrain the continuance of these acts by the labor 
unions, an injunction against the American Federation 
of Labor, its officers and the remaining members of 
the council, and against the Electrotype Molders' and 
Finishers' Union Number 17, was asked for by the 
company, and on December 18, 1907, one of the most 
sweeping orders given in American jurisprudence was 
granted by Justice Ashley M. Gould of the Supreme 
Court of the District of Columbia. 

This injunction limited the activities of the officers 
of the union in a most astounding way, restraining 
them from "interfering in any manner with the sale of 
the products of the plaintiff, and from declaring or 
threatening any boycott against the complainant, or in 
any manner assisting such boycott, or printing or dis- 
tributing through the mails any paper which contained 
any reference to the name of the complainant, its busi- 
ness or product in connection with the term 'Unfair' 
or 'We Don't Patronize' list, or any other word of 
similar import, or from publishing or otherwise cir- 
culating, whether in writing or orally, any statement 
or notice of any kind or character whatsoever, calling 
attention to complainant' s customers, or of dealers or 
tradesmen, or the public, to any boycott against the 



144 BOYCOTTS 

complainant, or from coercing or inducing any dealer 
not to trade with complainant." 1 

The injunction, as one may surmise by looking over 
the original papers in Washington, D. C., was written 
by the complainant's lawyers, and signed with scarcely 
a change in its wording. The order was entered De- 
cember 1 8, 1907, and the next day the opinion was 
filed. The giving of the undertaking required by it 
was consummated December 23, 1907. The injunction 
was made permanent by Justice Clabaugh, March 26, 
1908. 

Thus, for the first time in the existence of the "We 
Don't Patronize" list, the Federation found itself pre- 
vented from placing a firm's name thereon. This 
portion relating to the unfair list was bitterly assailed 
by the union, but not so much so as those paragraphs 
which virtually prohibited the officers of the Federation 
from orally stating, writing, printing or distribut- 
ing any word which in any way referred to the 
fact that the unions had decided to leave Buck's 
stoves alone. 

The January edition of the American Federationist 
contained the name of the Buck's Stove firm in the 
"Unfair" list, and advertised the printed proceedings 
of the Norfolk Convention of the A. F. of L., in 
which the firm was referred to as under the ban of the 
boycott. Ten thousand copies of the proceedings were 
hurriedly printed and distributed a few days before the 
injunction was to go into effect, and some copies, it was 
alleged, were in the mails on their way to their destina- 
tion, on December 23, the day the injunction became 
effective. An urgent appeal for funds was also dis- 
tributed to all of the local unions in anticipation of the 
injunction. The name of the Buck's Stove and Range 
Company, however, was stricken from the February 

1 Italics are the author's. 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 145 

number of the "We Don't Patronize" list in obedience 
to the order. The court's mandate was also printed 
in the February issue, and, in a number of issues fol- 
lowing, Gompers edited statements declaring: 

u This injunction cannot compel union men or their 
friends to buy the Buck's stoves and ranges. For this 
reason the injunction will fail to bolster up the busi- 
ness of this firm, which it claims is so swiftly declin- 
ing." 

Speeches were also made by Gompers at Indian- 
apolis and Baltimore mentioning the Buck's Stove Com- 
pany, and criticising the injunction. It was for these 
remarkable reasons that Judge Wright declared Gomp- 
ers in contempt of court, December 23, 1908, one 
year after the order had been issued. For taking part 
in the preparation, publication and distribution of the 
appeal for funds, of the Norfolk proceedings and of 
the Federationist, Frank Morrison, secretary of the 
A. F. of L., was also pronounced guilty of contempt. 

John Mitchell presided at the convention of the 
United Mine Workers of America, January 25, 1908, 
at which a resolution was passed that "the U. M. W. of 
A. place the Buck's stoves and ranges on the unfair 
list, and any member of the U. M. W. of A. purchas- 
ing a stove of above may be fined $5.00, and, failing to 
pay the same, be expelled from the organization." 
This resolution was afterwards printed in the United 
Mine Workers' Journal. Mitchell did not remember 
hearing the resolution read, but could not deny that it 
was passed while he was chairman, so he, too, was 
sentenced for contempt. Gompers was sentenced to 
one year, Mitchell to nine months and Morrison to six 
months. 

Mr. Gompers thus explains the seemingly trivial 
reasons for the court's pronouncement: 



i 4 6 BOYCOTTS 

"Because, by authority of the convention and of the 
Executive Council, I sent to our fellow workers and 
friends an appeal for funds in order that we might be 
in a position to defend ourselves before the courts in 
the very injunction case involved; because in lectures 
and on the platform during the presidential campaign 
I made addresses to the people, giving reasons for my 
vote as a citizen I was to cast at the then pending presi- 
dential election, and because I dared write an editorial 
to discuss the fundamental principles involved not only 
in the injunction pending but the entire abuse of the 
injunction writ; aye, because I published in the Amer- 
ican Federationist the order of the court to show why 
we should not be punished for contempt of the injunc- 
tion, I was pronounced in contempt of court." 1 

During the contempt proceedings an appeal against 
Judge Gould's injunctive order had been made by the 
A. F. of L. at the behest of the delegates at their 
Norfolk Convention. On March n, 1909, nearly 
three months after the contempt sentences had been 
imposed, Judge Robb of the Court of Appeals of the 
District of Columbia greatly modified Judge Gould's 
injunction, stating that the court had power only to 
prevent the appearance of the firm's name on the "We 
Don't Patronize" list, and to restrain the actual boy- 
cott. 

The court held: 

"The printing of the unfair list was what the court 
sought to prevent, and what, in our opinion, the court 
had power to prevent. But the decree should have 
stopped there, and not attempted to regulate the pub- 
lication and distribution of other matter over which 
the court had no control. In other words, this branch 
of the decree should merely prohibit the printing of 
complainant, its business or product in the 'We Don't 
Patronize' or 'Unfair' list in the furtherance of the boy- 

1 Annals American Academy, v. 36, pp. 261, 262, September, 1910. 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 147 

cott. When the conspiracy is at an end the Federation 
will have the same right that any other association or 
individual now has to comment upon the relation of 
the complainant with the employees. " 

While the appeal was being made to tone down the 
injunction, the contempt case was also brought before 
the higher court, and on November 2, 1909, nearly 
eight months after the modification of the injunction — 
which practically pronounced legal all of the acts of 
Gompers and his associates — the defendants were 
again, to the surprise of many, declared guilty. Judge 
Van Arsdel rendered the decision. The court con- 
cluded that the decree of the lower court must be con- 
sidered conclusive as to facts. Chief Justice Shepard, 
however, gave a strong dissenting opinion, "convinced 
that the court was without authority to make the only 
order which the defendants Gompers and Morrison 
can be said to have disobeyed." 

A writ of certiorari was then asked for, so that the 
matter might be brought before the Supreme Court of 
the United States. Injunction and contempt cases were 
finally merged into one before the Supreme Court. 

The following year, July 19, 19 10, after the death 
of J. W. Van Cleave, president of the Buck's Stove 
and Range Co., this company came into the hands of 
new management, and the loss of custom, as a result 
of the boycott, had been so great, that those then in 
charge decided to compromise the matter, and make 
peace with the union. The Buck's Stove Company 
thereupon appealed for the support of organized labor, 
on account of the friendliness of the majority stock- 
holder, Frederic W. Gardner, and on account of the 
opposition which the company was encountering at the 
hands of the anti-trade union element, as a result of 
its concessions. The settlement was heralded in the 
trade union press, and all members of organized labor 



148 . BOYCOTTS 

were requested to support the company. The follow- 
ing, appearing in the American Flint, May, 191 1, is a 
sample of the changed attitude of labor: 

"For over twenty years Frederic W. Gardner, the 
majority stockholder, has been on friendly terms with 
the officers and members of the International Molders' 
Union, and his influence during his long connection 
with the stove manufacturers' industry has been toward 
the full recognition of the right of workmen to organ- 
ize for their self-protection and for the purpose of 
entering into collective bargains with their employers. 
For its friendly attitude toward organized labor the 
Buck's Stove and Range Company has now encount- 
ered the open opposition and antagonism of the anti- 
trade union association, who evidently are desirous of 
seeing its business diminish instead of prosper under its 
present policy of trade agreements with its organized 
workmen." 



Soon after the settlement, C. W. Post, the well 
known anti-trade union employer, and a stockholder 
in the Buck's Stove Company, tried to induce Judge 
McPherson to issue an injunction preventing the repre- 
sentatives of the firm and of labor from getting to- 
gether, but without avail. 

As employers and employees in this firm were again 
on friendly terms, the Buck's Stove Company was 
loth to continue its case in court, and on January 
27, 191 1, the injunction proceedings were dismissed at 
the request of the complainant. The contempt case, 
however, was continued, and on May 15, 191 1, the 
Supreme Court decided that, inasmuch as the main case 
— the injunction case — was settled, the contempt pro- 
ceedings depending upon it were also necessarily set- 
tled. These proceedings were therefore dismissed, 
but without prejudice to the power and right of the 
Supreme Court of the District of Columbia to punish 



THE BUCK'S STOVE CASE 149 

by a proper proceeding any contempt committed 
against it. 

It was thought at the time that this would be the 
last of this case, but Justice Wright felt that the court 
had suffered an indignity which it should not allow to 
remain unpunished. Much to the amazement of many 
of the public, the judge appointed a committee of at- 
torneys, consisting of J. J. Darlington, Daniel Daven- 
port and James Beck, three men who had been con- 
spicuous as attorneys for the Anti-Boycott and Na- 
tional Manufacturers' Associations in their support of 
the Buck's Stove case, to consider the question of con- 
tempt, and to recommend further prosecution or dis- 
missal of the charges. The committee, as was ex- 
pected, recommended that the court prosecute the offi- 
cers of the Federation. The court acted on the recom- 
mendation. The defendants urged that the case be 
dismissed, on the ground that the indictment in a crim- 
inal proceeding should be made within three years of 
its commission, but the motion was denied. The con- 
tempt proceeding, it was decided, was of a civil and 
not a criminal nature. 

On June 24, 19 12, Judge Wright again pronounced 
the defendants guilty, four of the judges concurring, 
Chief Justice Clabaugh being ill at the time. For a 
second time the case was appealed, and, on May 5, 
19 13, the Court of Appeals of the District of Colum- 
bia reduced the sentence of Samuel Gompers to 30 days 
in jail, and remitted the jail sentences of Mitchell and 
Morrison, imposing fines of $500. Chief Justice Shep- 
ard again dissented. On May 22 the mandate of the 
court was stayed to permit an appeal to the Supreme 
Court of the United States. In June, 19 13, the Su- 
preme Court decided to review the case. The final de- 
cision was postponed till the fall. 

The boycott against this concern indicates how effec- 
tive such a weapon can be made, even when wielded 



1 5 o BOYCOTTS 

against a firm selling commodities purchased by the 
workers at such irregular and long intervals, providing 
the forces of labor properly concentrate, and providing, 
also, adequate publicity is obtained. It is difficult to 
judge whether the workmen were, from a technical 
legal standpoint, justified in beginning the dispute. 
Considering the broader questions involved, however, 
one is inclined to the belief that they had sufficient 
justification for their activity. That occasionally they 
abused their power during the controversy, seems 
likely, but such abuse of power certainly had its counter- 
part in that of at least some of the eminent judges of 
our federal courts. As in the railroad cases, the court 
decisions gave an impetus to political action, although 
of a somewhat different nature from that taken in the 
former instance. 



CHAPTER IX 

DANBURY HATTERS' AND OTHER CASES 

One of the most conspicuous examples of boycotting 
in this country carried on primarily by an individual 
union, and one of fundamental importance from a legal 
standpoint, was the Danbury Hatters' boycott, orig- 
inating at Danbury, Connecticut. 

It was in this case that the Supreme Court of the 
United States declared, for the first time, that boycotts 
could be reached under the provisions of the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law, and that labor unions, found guilty 
of combining to limit the market of goods transported 
from one state to another, were liable for the payment 
of threefold damages. 

The hatters' boycott started in an effort to unionize 
the factory of D. E. Loewe and Company of Danbury, 
Conn. Mr. Loewe refused to grant the demands of 
the unions for a closed shop, and the Brotherhood of 
United Hatters of America immediately entered on a 
nation-wide campaign to reduce the number of Loewe's 
customers. 

The fight against this concern was a part of a na- 
tional struggle of the hatters' union for the closed shop. 
President John Moffitt of the International Union de- 
clared, in his convention report of 1903, that 187 hat- 
ters' concerns had the closed shop, while but 12 were 
opposed to them. The fight to produce these results 
was begun in 1897. According to the Hatters' Jour- 
nal of September, 1898, 16 firms were unionized as 

151 



152 BOYCOTTS 

a result of the use of the boycott, within a period of 
1 8 months. For eleven months a vigorous boycott 
was waged against Berg and Company of Orange, 
N. J., at the cost to the unions of $18,000. Berg's 
business was reduced from one of 2,400 dozen hats a 
week to one of from 450 to 500 dozen hats, according 
to President Moffitt, before he agreed to the closed 
shop. In April, 1901, Roelof and Company of Phila- 
delphia were especially subjected to the attention of 
the unionists, and $23,000 was spent by the union in 
an effort to diminish its sales. It was estimated that 
Roelof lost some $250,000 during the boycotting 
period. 

Then came Loewe. Unionists claimed that in many 
instances he gave his employees but one-half of that 
obtained in closed shops, and that, in some depart- 
ments, workers secured but $13 a week, toiling from 
12 to 15 hours a day, whereas, under closed shop con- 
ditions, the compensation was from $22 to $24 a week, 
for an eight hour day. This state of affairs was largely 
denied, however, by the firm. Whatever the actual 
conditions were, the unionists were intent on unionizing 
the shop. They proposed this to Loewe, referring to 
the fate of other hatters who had withstood their de- 
mands. Loewe, however, refused to concede. On 
July 25, 1902, two hundred and fifty employees were 
called out. The shipping clerk was employed by the 
union to discover the destination of the various assign- 
ments. He rode on the wagons, observed in the streets 
and at railroad stations, and reported the results to the 
union. Customers' names were immediately sent to the 
unions in whose towns the goods were to be delivered, 
and unionists were requested to write to, or call on, the 
dealers, and to persuade them to cease their dealings. 
Five organizers were routed among unions and dealers 
in different parts of the country. Boycott advertise- 
ments appeared in the trade and labor journals, and 



DANBURY HATTERS' CASE 153 

descriptions — false, according to the company — of 
labor conditions at Loewe's were sent broadcast. 

The company claimed that this warfare was most 
effective; that, during 1901, the firm made a net profit 
of $27,000, which decreased into a $17,000 net loss 
in 1902, after the boycott began, and into one of 
$15,000 during 1903. In 1903, the company claimed, 
the loss in gross business from seventeen New York 
firms alone was $84,700, from 26 other customers, 
$160,690, and from Triest, a California jobber, $80,- 
000, making a total of $325,390; that the loss of gross 
business in 1902 was much less, but still very substan- 
tial. The company concluded that the net damage 
caused by the boycott amounted to more than $88,000. 
These items, the company declared, did not take into 
consideration the normal increase in business during 
the years 1902 and 1903. 

Loewe and Company first filed a suit against the 
unions in the United States Circuit Court at Hartford, 
on August 31, 1903, charging them with violating the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law. Various postponements car- 
ried the case along until 1907, when Judge James P. 
Piatt of the Circuit Court asked the Supreme Court 
of the United States for a ruling on the damage clause 
of the Sherman Law, which reads : 

"Section 7 — Any person who shall be injured in his 
business by any other person or corporation by reason 
of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by 
this act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the 
United States in the district in which the defendant 
resides or is found, without respect to the amount in 
controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages 
by him sustained, and the costs of the suit, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee." 

Chief Justice Fuller, who delivered the opinion in 
this case, February 3, 1908, declared that the boycot- 



154 BOYCOTTS 

ting case came within the statute as a conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce among the several 
states. On October 13, 1909, the case was brought to 
trial. 

Over 200 witnesses testified for the defendants, and 
the trial lasted nearly five months. In his charge to 
the jury, Judge Piatt, overstepping his authority, made 
the astonishing declaration that he considered it his 
duty to direct the jury to bring in a verdict for Loewe, 
and he asked the jurymen to consider the question of 
damages as the "only question with which they could 
properly concern themselves,." "It is your duty to ac- 
cept as the law of this case," continued the judge, "that 
the defendants now on record are parties to a combi- 
nation that has been found by the Supreme Court to 
form a valid basis in this suit." 

The jury retired, and shortly afterwards brought in 
a verdict of $74,000 damages against the union. This 
amount was trebled under the triple damage provision 
in the Sherman Law. Adding the costs, the total dam- 
ages finally assessed were $232,240. 

The case, however, did not stop there. It was ap- 
pealed to the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Second 
Judicial District, on a writ of error, and on April 10, 
191 1, the judgment was reversed by Judge Lacombe, 
Judges Cox and Noyes concurring. The judges de-. 
clared that Judge Piatt had erred in taking upon him- 
self the function of the jury, and in leaving to the 
jury members only the question of the assessment of 
damages; also in his assuming that mere membership 
in the United Hatters' Association made a unionist re- 
sponsible as a principal for all illegal actions of agents 
of the officers. 

The court said in part: 

"The first assignment of error which challenges at- 
tention on this appeal, and which is discussed at the 



DANBURY HATTERS' CASE 155 

outset of defendant's brief, is the action of the trial 
judge in taking the case from the jury and himself 
deciding every question except the amount of damages. 
Defendants contend that in so doing the trial court 
assumed the function of the jury in passing upon the 
credibility of witnesses and weighing the conflicting 
testimony. We think the assignment of error is well 
taken for several reasons. 

"It is argued here that because an individual defend- 
ant was a member of and contributed money to the 
Treasury of the United Hatters' Association that made 
him a principal of any and all agents who might be em- 
ployed by its officers in carrying out the objects of 
the Association, and responsible as principals if such 
agents used illegal methods or caused illegal methods 
to be used in undertaking to carry out those objects. 

"We cannot assent to this proposition. The clause 
of the constitution of the United Hatters which pro- 
vides that certain of its officers shall use all the means 
in their power to bring such shops (i. e., non-union 
shops) into the trade, does not necessarily imply that 
these officers shall use other than lawful means to ac- 
complish such objects. Surely the fact that an indi- 
vidual joins an association having such a clause in its 
constitution cannot be taken as expressing assent by 
him to the perpetration of arson or murder. Some- 
thing more must be shown, as, for instance, with the 
knowledge of the members unlawful means had been 
so frequently used with the express tacit approval of 
the association that its agents were warranted in 
assuming that they might use such unlawful means in 
the future; that its association and its members would 
approve or tolerate such use whenever the end sought 
to be obtained might best be obtained thereby." 

An unsuccessful effort was then made to have the 
United States Supreme Court review the case, in Janu- 
ary, 191 2. On January 15 the court refused the 
application for a writ of certiorari. 

A retrial of the case was held in Connecticut, be- 



156 BOYCOTTS 

ginning August 4, and on October 11, 19 12, the jury 
delivered a verdict for $80,000 and costs. The total 
award was $240,000. The jury took the position that 
the minutes, resolutions, reports, proclamations and 
printed discussions which the officers and agents of the 
association publicly proclaimed and circulated among 
the membership were approved or warranted by the 
individual members of the association. 

The case was again appealed to the Circuit Court 
of Appeals, Second Circuit, and is scheduled to be 
reached for argument in the fall of 19 13. The deputy 
marshal was given an execution under the judgment 
against 197 members of the hatters' unions in Bethel, 
Danbury and South Norwalk. January 24, 19 13, he 
returned an execution to the court, with the indorse- 
ment that he had been unable to collect even a cent 
from the hatters. 

The question of the justification of the Danbury 
Hatters' boycott involves the larger question of the 
right and wrong of the closed shop. In this case, also, 
some abuses were probably noted, although no more 
than are generally connected with any extensive labor 
controversy. Here again the court decisions have un- 
doubtedly led the workers to emphasize, more than 
formerly, the advantages of political action. 

The typographical union, the building trades' organi- 
zations, particularly the carpenters' union and that of 
the miners, have, during the past few years, also fur- 
nished noteworthy examples of thoroughly planned and 
effective boycotts. The boycott of Butterick patterns, 
first carried on by Typographical Union Number Six, 
known as "The Big Six," and later by the International 
Typographical Union, was the most far-reaching of 
those initiated by that organization. "This boycott," 
affirmed Mr. Portenar, 1 "was, I verily believe, better 

1 Portenar, Problems of Organised Labor, p. 90. 



i 



DANBURY HATTERS' CASE 157 

organized, more determined, and more damaging to 
the parties it was aimed at than any other I have 
knowledge of, not excepting that against the Buck's 
Stove and Range Company." 

The fight was international, being maintained in 
Cuba, Germany and Austria, as well as in the United 
States and Canada. The printers distributed an im- 
mense quantity of circulars to stores, dressmakers, or- 
ganized labor, and the general public; sent out com- 
paratively expensive novelties calling attention to the 
boycott, routed numbers of organizers and elaborated 
many unique plans — spending thousands of dollars to 
this end. It is believed that the boycotting campaign 
cut considerably into the profits of the company, despite 
the fact that the patterns were bought for the most 
part by the women of the community. Some unionists 
claimed that the Butterick Company, in a single year, 
lost $360,000, and was compelled to reduce its divi- 
dends from 4% to 2% ; that, whereas it had a surplus 
before the agitation of from $750,000 to $1,000,000, 
soon after it reported one of only a quarter of a mil- 
lion. The pattern business, they averred, was greatly 
diminished. A competing concern reported an aston- 
ishing increase in its sales. The union finally won, and 
the ban was lifted. 

The boycotts of the carpenters and other members 
of the building trades consist primarily in threatened 
or actual withdrawal of labor power, instead of cus- 
tom, from those firms refusing to stop buying from cer- 
tain proscribed concerns. It is alleged that the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and their local councils 
have frequently and effectively prevented the sales of 
non-union trim and other building material, through 
threats to call strikes against those building contractors 
who handle supplies fashioned by "unfair" companies. 
Unfair lists, circulars, walking delegates are also used 
in their attacks. City carpenters have brought to their 



158 BOYCOTTS 

aid joint arbitration agreements with the Building 
Trades Employers' Association, the Master Carpen- 
ters' Association and the Manufacturing Woodwork- 
ers' Association. Through these agreements, the car- 
penters claim that they have succeeded in having nearly 
a million dollars of their trim made in union shops 
used in New York City alone. In their endeavor, dur- 
ing a period of 25 years, to secure the closed shop, and 
to work only on union material with union workmen, 
this brotherhood spent $1,179,776 prior to the year 
1906, according to Frank Duffy, its secretary. 1 

The carpenters' and the typographical unions have 
been interfered with by court proceedings for their 
alleged boycotting practices, more, perhaps, than any 
other organization. Among the latest of their legal 
controversies is that brought in a number of states by 
the Paine Lumber Company and others against the 
New York carpenters, before the United States Cir- 
cuit Court for the Southern District of New York. 
This case -is being fought vigorously by the Anti-Boy- 
cott Association. 

One of the best known of the labor boycotts in re- 
cent years occurred during the Anthracite Coal Strike 
of 1902. The miners here directed their chief atten- 
tion to the "scabs" who took their places. They threat- 
ened storekeepers, who sold goods to .these "scabs," 
with loss of the patronage of the strikers; compelled 
a school board to dismiss a school mistress because her 
brother, not living in her immediate family, went to 
work contrary to the wishes of the striking miners; 
caused the dismissal of a drug clerk because his father 
was a "scab," and performed many similar acts. These 
acts were vigorously condemned by Mr. John Mitchell, 
then president of the United Mine Workers of Amer- 
ica, and declared by the Strike Commission as "cruel 

1 Convention Proceedings, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 
1906, p. 159. 



DANBURY HATTERS' CASE 159 

and cowardly," and "outside the pale of civilized 
war." 1 -The boycotts among the miners were pri- 
marily labor boycotts — boycotts conducted by work- 
ers against fellow laborers. 

The foregoing boycotts prosecuted by the hatters, 
members of the building trade, printers and miners 
have proved, for the most part, effective means of 
cutting off the market or the employment of the boy- 
cotted. Some of the worst abuses were alleged in con- 
nection with the labor boycotts organized by the min- 
ers — abuses acknowledged and condemned by the re- 
sponsible heads of organized labor. 

1 Report of Anthracite Coal Strike Commission, pp. yy, 78. 



CHAPTER X 

ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS IN BOYCOTTS 

The success which attends the use of boycotts and 
the consequent frequency of such use in different indus- 
tries depend on many factors. A chief factor is the 
character of the market for the article — whether the 
market consists primarily of unionists and sympathizers 
or of the employing class. Bread, newspapers, hats, 
cigars, beer, stoves, shoes and other necessities and 
inexpensive luxuries have been very frequently and 
effectively boycotted. Thus, of the 196 boycotts de- 
scribed in Bradstreet's, 157, or 80%, center around 
necessities. 

The boycotting of food products held the most prom- 
inent place in the New York boycotts of the eighties 
and nineties and of the A. F. of L. indorsements. 
Bread, the most important of the foods, was subject 
to three times as many attacks as any other product in 
the New York boycotts. Cigars, beer, and meats 
were prominent in most of the investigated cases. In 
the early boycotts newspapers, another inexpensive 
necessity, were most frequently mentioned among the 
proscribed commodities. Articles of clothing held first 
place in frequency in the nation-wide boycotts of the 
eighties and third place in the New York boycotts and 
in those cited on the "We Don't Patronize" list. 

Success followed fairly closely along the same lines. 
Thus the most successful boycotts in New York, with 
the exception of the building trades, were connected 

160 



SUCCESS IN BOYCOTTS 161 

with the food boycotts, those against bread showing 
the largest per cent, of victories. Boycotts against 
articles of clothing were also generally attended with 
considerable success. In the instances noted by Brad- 
street's, the ban against cigars was attended by the 
greatest proportion of victories, while the use of this 
weapon against "unfair" newspapers, hats, beer, etc., 
resulted in many conspicuous gains. 

On the other hand, commodities which are sold pri- 
marily to the upper middle and the employing classes 
are generally let alone. Dealers in such articles certify 
that they have oftentimes been benefited by the boycott, 
as their well-to-do patrons have come to their rescue 
and have frequently increased their orders on account 
of union opposition. 

Furthermore, the success of boycotts depends some- 
what on whether the articles boycotted are purchased 
by men or by women. It is unusual for the women of 
the family to feel the keenness of the trade union strug- 
gle, and to recognize the utility of inconveniencing 
themselves in order that other workers might be as- 
sisted thereby. Allied associations now being formed 
among the women, however, are making them more 
interested than heretofore in the problems of organized 
labor, and more willing to sacrifice, if need be, in their 
purchasings. Typographical Union No. 6, of New 
York, recently stated that the women had waged quite 
an effective battle against Butterick patterns. 

If the articles boycotted are not sold directly to the 
mass of working people, but to employers, a strong 
organization among the employees of such purchasers 
may render a boycott successful. The threat of the 
solidly organized brewery workers to strike, should 
their employers continue to purchase non-union bar- 
rels and boilers, has time and again forced the unioniz- 
ing of a shop. The decision of the powerful building 
trades unions to refuse to work on materials bought 



1 62 BOYCOTTS 

from non-union mills, has been the means of boycotting 
effectively the opponents of organized labor. 

The frequency and regularity of the consumption of 
an article are also important. "If it is an article which 
enters into daily consumption," declares the report of 
the Bureau of Statistics of Labor in New York, 1 "and 
is of such a character that it can be made the subject of 
ordinary conversation, it will soon force the employer 
to spend money in advertising it, in order to counteract 
the silent influence of the boycott." Boycotts, how- 
ever, waged against such articles as stoves have some- 
times proved successful when all the forces of labor 
actively cooperate on a national scale. 

If the boycotts are of a local nature, and the trade 
of the boycotted firm is also for the most part in the 
surrounding neighborhood, the character of the popu- 
lation in the locality of the firm affects, to a consider- 
able extent, the result of the boycott. A bakery or 
meat market in a working class neighborhood, where 
goodly numbers of the population are either mem- 
bers of unions or sympathizers, will feel the efforts of 
the boycotters much more seriously than one situated 
in a middle class or well-to-do neighborhood. 

The strength and capital of the boycotted firm, and 
the nation-wide character of its sales, are further ele- 
ments. One soap firm with a business in every state 
declared that the idea of a boycott against his firm 
yielding large results was "a phantom of the imagina- 
tion." An effective boycott against such articles entails 
an extensive campaign, costing thousands of dollars. 
If the goods are sold in a few communities, however, 
it is possible for a small number of organizers, concen- 
trating attention thereon, to do most telling work. 
The ability of firms with a big capital to withstand a 
boycott has been pointed out. 

1 Third Annual Report, New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 
1885, p. 334- 



SUCCESS IN BOYCOTTS 163 

The extent to which the boycotted firm is a monopoly 
also vitally affects the success of the boycott, for if it is 
difficult or impossible for the public to obtain the dupli- 
cate of the goods manufactured by the boycotted con- 
cern, the purchasers are loath to join the crusade of 
boycotting, especially when the article is considered a 
necessity. If, for instance, the refusal to patronize the 
Standard Oil Company or the so-called "Meat Trust" 
makes it incumbent on one to give up the purchase of 
oil or meat, it is usually difficult to induce those regu- 
larly using such commodities to be enthusiastic about 
the "Cause." 

The unions have concluded that one of the greatest 
elements in the success of a boycott is the degree in 
which the efforts of the entire labor body are concen- 
trated on one or more important firms. A reading of 
the minutes of the Convention Proceedings of the A. 
F. of L. makes this most evident. The method of 
procedure in the Buck's Stove boycott was in line with 
the policy of concentration adopted by the unions. 

As in other lines, the amount of favorable publicity 
a boycott can secure counts for its success. One labor 
leader told the writer that it was doubtful whether the 
Buck's Stove Company would have suffered materially 
had it not been for the legal proceedings against the 
A. F. of L. and its officers, and the consequent publicity 
obtained by the unionists in the non-labor press. The 
unions endeavor to advertise their boycotts in the vari- 
ous national and international journals in the labor 
press through the secretaries of the trade unions and 
through circulars. Unless something of a particularly 
striking or unusual character occurs in the course of the 
boycott, the public at large, however, rarely hears of 
its existence through the medium of the daily press. 

Another important consideration is the character of 
the distinguishing mark on the goods. Where boy- 
cotted hats, for instance, fail to carry the name or 



1 64 BOYCOTTS 

any other mark of the maker inside, but bear the in- 
signia of the jobbers or the retailers, it is far more 
difficult to trace the goods, and to diminish sales. One 
of the reasons set forth for the failure of the miners 
to boycott coal is the extreme difficulty in tracing coals 
mined in certain sections. 

The character of the competition is still another 
factor. When competitors are contractors of prison 
made goods, for instance, and the customer is given 
the alternative of purchasing prison made or "unfair" 
goods, he is likely to choose the latter, despite the ban. 1 

The directness of the boycotting attacks vitally af- 
fects the result. At times citizens have been boycotted 
for purchasing goods from stores whose owners rode 
in trolley cars during a car strike. However, such 
boycotts soon subside. Tertiary boycotts do exist, but 
they generally become weaker in proportion as they 
become more remote. 

That the causes leading to the boycott have a con- 
siderable effect on its success is claimed by some. Thus 
the Commissioner of Labor in Illinois wrote: 

"Labor organizations sometimes recognize and in- 
sist upon the enforcement of moral and social laws not 
recognized by society at large, and boycotts based upon 
these reach no further than the organizations uphold- 
ing the assumed law. Boycotts based upon the em- 
ployment of non-union men rarely succeed, because 
society is not prepared to assist either in driving men 
into unions or out of employment. During the first 
street car strike in Chicago the strikers appealed to 
the public not to patronize the companies for reasons 
given. In this case the people recognized an infrac- 
tion of social laws, the maintenance of which was of 
more importance for the time than the social need of 
street cars, and consequently refused to ride upon them. 
On the occasion of a subsequent strike a similar appeal 

1 Report of Illinois Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 1886, pp. 447- 
448. 



SUCCESS IN BOYCOTTS 165 

was made by the strikers, based upon other grounds 
not considered valid by society at large, and the boycott 
failed." 

Thus all of the eight boycotts waged against prison 
made goods were wholly successful in that state; 99% 
of those engaged in disputes against the reduction of 
wages were successful, while proportionally fewer boy- 
cotts initiated for other purposes were won. When 
the boycotters depend for their support primarily 
on organized labor, the cause of the boycott be- 
comes less important. The appeal is usually made to 
the members of organized labor on the bare ground 
that the firm boycotted has been "unfair" to labor. 
Nothing more is said; nothing more is asked. It may 
be stated that the A. F. of L. has appealed to the 
members more directly, and has expended much less 
energy in endeavoring to reach the general public than 
did its forerunner in the labor field, the Knights of 
Labor. 

The vigor with which the boycott is pushed at the 
very outset, and the effectiveness of the methods em- 
ployed during the first few weeks, determine, to a very 
large extent, its ultimate outcome. It has been seen 
that a large proportion of those local boycotts which 
succeeded came to a termination within a few weeks. 
The longer they drag on, the more lukewarm become 
their supporters, and the more able are their victims 
to cope with them. 

The attitude of the law, of course, is of prime im- 
portance. Comparatively few of the unionists are 
enthusiastic about engaging in a boycotting campaign, 
if the law declares that their actions are illegal, and if 
they may, at any time, be brought face to face with 
civil or criminal procedure. 

Finally, it may be said that the more thorough the 
deliberation of the organization before employing this 



1 66 BOYCOTTS 

device, and the greater the discrimination used, the 
more powerful is the boycott likely to be when re- 
sorted to. 

We see then that among the factors determining 
the success of the boycott are the character of the 
market of the commodities boycotted, the strength of 
the organization boycotting, the frequency and regu- 
larity with which the article is purchased, the location 
of the firm boycotted, its capital, nation-wide extent of 
trade, and the degree of monopoly. The manner in 
which the unionist concentrates on one firm, the pub- 
licity secured, the ease with which the boycotted goods 
are distinguished, the character of the competition 
against the firm, the directness of boycotting attacks, 
the causes leading to the institution of the boycott, the 
vigor with which it is pushed at the very outset, the 
care used in its inauguration, and the attitude of the 
law are all factors. 

Thus far we have considered primarily the social 
and economic aspects of the boycott, and have seen 
that during the last generation it has played a no mean 
role in the labor movement, frequently proving most 
effective in obtaining more wholesome labor conditions. 
Let us now examine the legal status of this trade union 
activity. 



PART II 
LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE BOYCOTT 



CHAPTER XI 

SOME BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 

Having considered the extent to which boycotts have 
been resorted to in the United States, as well as their 
effectiveness, let us investigate the attitude of the law 
toward their various manifestations. 

Briefly it may be stated that negative boycotts, prose- 
cuted primarily by means of the union label, are un- 
questionably legal. Of the positive forms, primary 
boycotts have met with little opposition from courts. 
Secondary and compound boycotts, however, are, in 
this country, generally condemned by judicial decision 
and statute law. They have been pronounced legal in 
some of the foreign countries, however, and have re- 
cently secured the favor of a number of courts and 
state legislatures, while in the national government an 
increasing number of representatives each year are 
agitating for their legalization. 

Legality of Negative Boycotts 

The legality of the union label is no longer ques- 
tioned. In 1 89 1 Justice Williams of the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania, to be sure, declared that, as 
the unions did not own the product, they could not 
place a label on goods made by their members. 
The Minnesota Courts in a cigar maker's case 
also held 1 that the unions had no redress in cases 

1 Mitchell, Organised Labor, p. 296. 
169 



i 7 o BOYCOTTS 

of counterfeiting, as they had no property right 
in the results of their labor. These decisions were re- 
affirmed in other courts. The complete right to use 
and protect the label is, however, now universally rec- 
ognized. In fact, according to Dr. Ernest R. Spedden, 
"in 1908, laws for the registration and protection of 
trade union labels were in force in forty-one states and 
territories." x These laws provide for the registration 
of labels with one of the state officers on the payment 
of a small fee, and also make the counterfeiting of the 
labels a misdemeanor. 

The Interstate Commerce Law and the Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law 

While negative boycotting has been left free from 
legal interruption, the positive boycott has generally 
been declared illegal under both federal and state stat- 
utes. The two prominent statutes which have been in- 
terpreted as applying to boycotts are the Interstate 
Commerce and the Sherman Anti-Trust Laws. 

The first of these, passed February 2, 1887, and 
amended frequently since then, made it a misdemeanor 
(Sec. 10) for any person employed to interfere with 
interstate transportation. This act came to be applied 
more and more to railroad employees. The power 
bestowed upon the government over the railroads by 
this act gave countenance to the theory that the court 
of equity could step in at any time necessity required, 
and prevent, by the injunction process, any interference 
with the property right of the government in the 
transportation system. 

The second act, the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, has 
recently been applied with telling effect against this 
form of trade union activity. This law was passed 
July 2, 1890. Under it (Sec. 1) "every contract, 

1 Spedden, The Trade Union Label, p. 97. 



BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 171 

combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con- 
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce among the 
several states or with foreign nations" is declared il- 
legal, and the one inflicting injury on another through 
a violation of this act is made (Sec. 7) to pay three- 
fold damages. The power of injunction is thereby 
also greatly extended to judges of the circuit courts. 
That this law was framed primarily against indus- 
trial combinations, and that its authors did not mean 
to include labor unions within its scope was the belief 
of organized labor at the time of its passage. Samuel 
Gompers, president of the A. F. of L., declares : 

"We know the Sherman Law was intended by Con- 
gress to punish illegal trusts and not labor unions, for 
we had various conferences with the members of Con- 
gress while the Sherman act was pending, and remem- 
ber clearly that such a determination was stated again 
and again." 1 

He again contends that an amendment to the act, 
which specifically excluded labor unions and agricul- 
turists from its provisions, was approved at different 
times by large majorities of both the senate and the 
house, but owing to the senate committee's neglect to 
register the wish of these bodies, the amendment was 
not included in the original bill. 

President Gompers avers that on March 25, 1890, 2 
Sherman offered a proviso at the end of the first sec- 
tion of the bill reported by the committee on finance, 
exempting labor unions, stating, as he did so : 

"I take this provision from the amendment offered 
by the Senator from Mississippi. I do not think it 
necessary, but at the same time, to avoid any confusion, 
I submit it to come in at the end of the first section: 
Provided that this act shall not be construed to any 
arrangements, agreements or combinations between the 

1 American Federationist, March, 1910, p. 202. 

2 Ibid., 1908, p. 187. 



1 72 BOYCOTTS 

laborers made with a view of lessening the number of 
hours of labor or the increase of their wages. Nor 
any arrangements, agreements or combinations among 
persons engaged in horticulture or agriculture made 
with the view of enhancing the price of their own agri- 
cultural or horticultural products." 

This proposed amendment, Mr. Gompers declared, 
was discussed in a committee of the whole house by 
Senators Plumb, Sherman, Ingalls, Teller, Yurpee, and 
Blair, and agreed to by them. 

The discussion ended that day. The next day, 
March 26, 1890, Senator Stewart of Nevada, said: 

"The original bill has been very much improved, 
and one of the great objections has been removed from 
it by the amendments offered by Senator Sherman, 
which relieves the class of persons who would have 
been first prosecuted under the original bill without 
the amendment. I am very much gratified that the 
Senator offered the amendment, and that the Senate 
adopted it. The bill ought now in some respects to be 
satisfactory to every person who is opposed to the 
oppression of labor, and desires to see it properly re- 
warded." 

The following day, Senator Sherman, when the 
amendment was reached, mistaking this amendment for 
another one, called the attention of the senate to it. 
Discussion ensued, in which opposition on the part of 
one senator was evinced, and when the bill was next 
reported by the judiciary committee to which it was 
referred, the amendment did not appear. Mr. Gomp- 
ers said that he and others were doubtful as to whether 
they should allow the bill to pass without opposition, 
but, on being assured that it would not be used as a 
boomerang against labor, did nothing more concern- 
ing it. 

Those who believe that Congress intended to bring 



BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 173 

organized labor within the inclusion of the act make 
much of the fact that the Judiciary Committee of the 
Senate, in their reported bill, omitted any mention of 
labor unions. However, no conclusion can logically 
be adduced from this fact, inasmuch as the entire act 
which originally included any agreement to increase 
prices, was revised by the committee and greatly nar- 
rowed in its scope. Is it unreasonable to suppose, 
contends labor, that, after thus narrowing the scope of 
the act, the Committee were of the opinion that it 
would not be applied to any except organizations of 
capital, and for this reason omitted the exemption 
clause? 

Some time later, Mr. Gompers averred, a provision 
similar to the proposed amendment was passed in the 
House of Representatives by an overwhelming vote, 
but as the session closed shortly afterwards it did not 
become a law. The separate approval of this amend- 
ment by both houses, and the assurance by the senators 
and congressmen of the harmless nature of the bill, as 
far as labor was concerned, demonstrated, according 
to Mr. Gompers, that the legislators did not intend to 
include labor unions within the scope of the law. 

The declaration some ten years later on the floor 
of Congress of Senator Hoar, who claimed to be the 
real father of the bill, that he had no intention of bring- 
ing the law to bear against labor unions, is also cited as 
a proof of labor's contention. Other publicists take a 
similar position. Mr. F. J. Stimson declares that "it 
is probable that Congress, when it passed this statute, 
also had in mind only such combinations among em- 
ployers and purchasers." x However, he believed that, 
if an exemption clause had been placed therein, the act 
might not have been held constitutional. 

Two other federal statutes relating to conspiracies 
against the United States (Sec. 5440 of Rev. St., as 
1 Stimson, Handbook to the Labor Law of the United States, p. 357- 



i 7 4 BOYCOTTS 

amended, 1879), and against citizens of the country 
(Sec. 5508, Rev. St.), have also been applied to boy- 
cott cases. 

State Legislation and the Boycott 

While only five states, at present writing, prohibit 
the boycott by name, over two-thirds (33) of the states 
make illegal one or more forms, under statutes relating 
to "Conspiracy," "Coercion," "Intimidation," "Inter- 
ference with Employment," and "Enticing Employees." 
Two legislatures have rendered boycotts non-action- 
able, as far as criminal prosecution is concerned, while 
eight have apparently no statutes which can be con- 
strued as preventing boycotting. 

The five states of the union where boycotts are 
definitely prohibited by name are Alabama, Colorado, 
Illinois, Indiana and Texas. In Indiana, Colorado and 
Alabama boycotting is prohibited even though it is 
indulged in by but one person. In Indiana any ar- 
rangement to prevent a sale is considered illegal. Ala- 
bama and Colorado forbid the printing or circulating 
of any notice of boycott, while Alabama also prohibits 
a mere declaration that a boycott exists. The last 
named state also makes illegal the intimidation of any 
person in his occupation, and likewise a conspiracy of 
two or more to interfere with one in his business. 
Colorado adds a section preventing picketing for the 
purpose of inducing one not to work for or trade with 
another. 

Two states, Texas and Illinois, forbid boycotting 
only when it involves a combination. The former 
state does not allow a combination for the purpose 
of refusing to purchase goods, while the latter con- 
demns one whose object it is to issue or distribute cir- 
culars in furtherance of a boycott. Under other clauses, 
Texas prohibits a group from assembling for the pur- 



BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 175 

pose of interfering with the employment of another, 
while a combination to intimidate or interfere with 
business by unlawful means is forbidden by the Illinois 
law. 

On the other hand, two states, Maryland and Cali- 
fornia, have made it possible to boycott without fear 
of criminal proceedings, by declaring that a deed which 
is innocent if done by one shall not be indictable if the 
result of the agreement of two or more. California 
adds that such an act shall not be prohibited by an 
injunction, although it specifically legislates against 
the use of force, violence or threats. 

Nine of the states have passed laws against inter- 
ference with the property or business of another and 
against intimidation of another's employees by force, 
threats or violence. These are : Connecticut, Minne- 
sota, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Rhode Island, South Dakota and Wisconsin. In Min- 
nesota a conspiracy of two or more must be proved. 
Of the foregoing, New York, North Dakota and Wis- 
consin also have laws against "conspiracies" to injure 
business maliciously or by force, while certain injuries 
are also forbidden under other sections. "Intimida- 
tion of Employees," "Interference with Employment," 
"Intimidation of Employers and Employees," "Coer- 
cion," are among the headings of the laws which aim 
to prevent various kinds of boycotts in these states. 

Four states — Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky and Nevada 
— have provisions only against the injury of business 
by certain specified means. In three of the states, 
Iowa, Kansas and Nevada, a combination is essential 
to their illegality. The "illegal" conspiracy is con- 
demned in Nevada, and the "malicious" conspiracy, 
in Iowa. Kansas, furthermore, has a statute against 
obstructing business by intimidation. Kentucky's pro- 
hibitive law is under the general title of "Coercion." 

In eleven states it is primarily the intimidation of 



176 BOYCOTTS 

employees, the labor boycott, which the legislature has 
declared illegal. These states are: Florida, Georgia, 
Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Mis- 
souri, New Hampshire, Utah, Vermont and Washing- 
ton. In three of the foregoing states — Florida, Mis- 
sissippi and Washington — there must be a conspiracy 
of two or more to render the act illegal. These acts 
are entitled ''Conspiracy against Workingmen." 
Washington also has a separate statute against the 
"Coercion of Workmen" by depriving them of tools. 
In New Hampshire "to interfere in any way with the 
lawful business of another" is illegal. All of the 
other states under this division make threats, force or 
violence a necessary element in the crime. 

Except the provisions other than those against the 
enticing of a servant to break his contract, nothing that 
relates directly or indirectly to boycotting may be 
found in four states — Arkansas, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Tennessee. Delaware, Idaho, Louisiana, 
New Jersey and West Virginia have statutes forbidding 
the interference with or the intimidation of certain 
classes of workmen. Acts in Delaware and New Jer- 
sey relate to railroad employees; in Idaho and West 
Virginia, to miners, and in Louisiana to seamen. It 
is, however, doubtful whether labor disputes were con- 
templated in the Idaho act. New Jersey also has a 
general statute of doubtful application to any forms of 
boycotts. In addition to other laws, Kentucky pro- 
hibits particularly interference with the transportation 
workers; Maine, with the employees of the public util- 
ity corporations, such as the gas and railroad compa- 
nies, and Washington, with coal miners. 

Until November, 191 1, no laws on the subject had 
been passed by the legislatures of Arizona, Montana, 
Nebraska, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia 
and Wyoming. The Pennsylvania act legalizing 
strikes, however, specifically provided that the prose- 



BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 177 

cution of those interfering with a workman in his 
employment should not be prevented thereby. 

Primary Boycotts and the Courts 

Having observed the condemnatory character of the 
federal and state statutes, let us consider the manner 
in which these statutes, as well as the slowly evolving 
system of common law, have been applied by the courts 
to the use of this labor weapon. 

The primary boycott, that is the agreement of one 
or more to refrain from dealing with another without 
inducing third parties to stop their patronage, has 
generally received the sanction of the courts. Mr. 
Lindley D. Clark, of the U. S. Bureau of Labor, thus 
concludes : 

"The mere withholding of patronage or refusal to 
trade is not unlawful, and the announcement or pub- 
lication of such a purpose is within the rights of the 
persons agreeing together even though it results in the 
injury of the person against whom the acts are di- 
rected." 1 

Mr. Clark cites numerous instances in support of his 
contention. 

As far back as 1842, this right was upheld by a 
Massachusetts' Court. 2 In 1870, in another oft quoted 
Massachusetts' case, it was held that it was "no crime 
for any number of persons, without any unlawful object 
in view, to associate themselves together, and agree 
that they will not work for or deal with certain men 
or classes of men." 3 

Judges Scott and Farmer, in an Illinois case, take a 
similar position: 

1 Clark, Law of the Employment of Labor, pp. 256, 287. 

2 Commonwealth v. Hunt, Mass., 1842. 

3 Carew v. Rutherford, Mass., 1870, 106 Mass., 1, 14. 



i 7 8 BOYCOTTS 

"The law is that an individual may refrain from 
trading or dealing with any particular person, and that 
two or more individuals may agree among themselves 
that they will not trade or deal with a certain person 
and may give notice to others that they have made such 
an agreement." 2 

Judge Gould of the Supreme Court of the District 
of Columbia, a federal court, in the famous Buck's 
Stove and Range case, also admitted the boycott's 
legality. He declared that 

"Plaintiffs or defendants have a right, either indi- 
vidually or collectively, to sell their labor to whom 
they please, on such terms as they please, and to de- 
cline to buy plaintiff's stoves; they have also a right 
to decline to traffic with dealers who handle plaintiff's 
stoves." 2 

A Minnesota Court decides in the same tenor: 

"It is perfectly lawful for any man, unless under 
contract obligations, or unless his employment charges 
him with some public duty, to refuse to work for or 
deal with any man or class of men as he sees fit. . . . 
What one man may lawfully do singly, two or more 
may agree to do jointly." 3 

Further cases in Indiana, 4 Massachusetts, 5 New Jer- 
sey, 6 New York, 7 Oregon, 8 Pennsylvania, 9 Rhode 
Island, 10 and other states may be cited to the same 

1 Hey v. Wilson (111., 1908), 83 N. E. 928, 931. See also Ulery v. 
Chicago Stock Exchange (111., 1894). 
2 Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. A. F. of L., 35 Wash. Law Rep. 797. 
3 Bohn.v. Hollis, Minn., 1893, 55 N. W. 1119, 1121. 

4 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. L. U., Ind., 1905, 
Jackson v. Stanfield, 1895. 

5 Bowen v. Matheson, Mass., 1867. 

6 Barr v. Essex, N. J., 1894. 

7 Nat. Prot. Ass'n. v. Cummings, N. Y., 1902. 

8 Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, Ore., 1894. 

9 Cote v. Murphy, Pa., 1894. 

10 Macauley v. Tierney, R. I., 1895. 



BOYCOTT LAWS AND DECISIONS 179 

effect. Chief Justice Shepard and Justice Van Orsdel 
of the Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, have 
taken the same stand in the Buck's Stove case, the lat- 
ter even declaring that, in his opinion, the secondary 
boycott is legal. 

We see, therefore, that the negative and primary 
boycotts are generally considered legal. In the major- 
ity of states, laws have been passed which, directly or 
indirectly, prohibit the employment of the secondary 
or compound boycott. In the federal government, the 
Interstate Commerce Law and the Sherman Anti-Trust 
Law are the chief statutes thus far applied to the sup- 
pression of this form of labor activity. 

Let us next consider the attitude of the common 
law toward the use of the boycott. 



CHAPTER XII 

JUDICIAL REASONS FOR ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 

While the primary boycott has secured the sanction 
of most courts, secondary and compound boycotts have 
been vigorously condemned by the majority. The legal 
reasoning is often not well defined, and, in many in- 
stances, is obscured by legal verbiage which, to the 
layman, often seems unnecessary and confusing. 

Generally boycotting has been considered an out- 
lawed weapon on the ground that it constitutes a com- 
mon law conspiracy. A conspiracy has been defined 
as a combination of two or more organized to accom- 
plish an illegal end, or a legal end by illegal means. 

Some courts have decided that the boycott is repre- 
hensible because the end aimed at is an illegal one; 
others, because the means employed are illegal. The 
former position has generally been taken toward the 
secondary boycott; the latter, toward the compound 
boycott. The judges holding that the object of the 
boycott is illegal, declare that it proposes to do one of 
the following things, each of which is illegal : 

To injure another in his trade, business or prop- 
erty. 

To restrain or block the avenues of trade or com- 
merce. 

To induce another to break his contract. 

Others admit that the ultimate object of the boycott, 
that of improving the condition of labor, might be a 
legal one, but declare that its immediate object is that 

1 80 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 181 

of injury, and that the law can take cognizance only 
of this immediate object. Still other judges in this 
group pronounce the boycott illegal, not merely on the 
ground of injury, but because such injury is accompa- 
nied by malice or is without justifiable cause. 

The second general class of judges emphasizes the 
illegal means employed — threats, coercion, intimida- 
tion, violence, extortion, misrepresentation— and pro- 
claims the boycott's illegality because of the employ- 
ment of one or more of these means. The question of 
whether a suppression of boycotts interferes with free- 
dom of speech and of the press has brought forward 
special arguments. Let us analyze more closely the 
reasoning of the court. 

The Law of Combination 

Ignoring the charge that boycotting constitutes a 
nuisance, we will find that the early courts were prone 
to argue that all combinations formed to injure the 
business or property of another, to obstruct or inter- 
fere with another in the conduct of his lawful trade 
or employment, to induce another to break his con- 
tracts, or to block the avenues of trade and commerce, 
had an unlawful end in view, and should, therefore, 
be condemned as conspiracies. The judges admitted 
that each man individually had a right to refuse to deal 
with another, but contended that an agreement with 
others so to refuse introduced an illegal element. In 
justifying this contention they argued that a combina- 
tion of two or more greatly increased the power for 
evil and often rendered the members of the combina- 
tion subject to the arbitrary and malicious action of the 
majority thereof. Judge Harlan thus states the dis- 
tinction : 

"It is one thing for a single individual or for several 
individuals, each acting on his own responsibility and 



\ 



182 BOYCOTTS 

not in cooperation with others, to form the purpose 
of inflicting actual injury upon the property or rights 
of others. It is quite a different thing in the eye of the 
law for many persons to combine or conspire together 
with the intent not simply of asserting their rights or 
of accomplishing lawful ends by peaceable methods, 
but of employing their united energies to injure others 
or the public. An intent on the part of a single person 
to injure the rights of others or of the public is not 
in itself a wrong of which the law will take cognizance 
unless some injurious act be done in execution of the 
lawful intent. But a combination of two or more per- 
sons with such intent, and under circumstances that 
give them, when so combined, a power to do an injury 
they would not possess as individuals acting singly 
has always been recognized as in itself wrongful and 
illegal." 1 

Ex-President Taft, then Judge Taft, argued in a 
like vein : 

"A combination may make oppressive or dangerous 
that which, if proceeding from a single person, would 
be otherwise, and the very fact of the combination 
may show that the object is simply to do harm, and 
not to exercise one's own justifiable rights." 2 

Judge Carpenter, the first judge of a court of last 
resort declaring a boycott in America illegal, contended 
that separately men were powerless, but combined, 
formidable. 

The supposed surrender of the discretion of each 
individual to the direction of the combination is thought 
by Vice-Chancellor Green to be the chief evil of com- 
bination. He declared: 

"The whole strength of which (the combination) 
lies in the fact that each individual has surrendered 

1 Arthur v. Oakes, U. S. Circ. Ct. of Ap., 1894, 63 Fed. 310, 321, 
322. Italics are the author's. 

2 Moores v. Bricklayers, Ohio, 1890. Italics are the author's. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 183 

his own discretion and will to the direction of the 
accredited representatives of all the organizations. He 
no longer uses his own judgment, but by entering the 
combination agrees to be bound by its decree. A mem- 
ber asserts his independence of judgment and action 
at risk of all association with fellow members. They 
will not eat, drink, live or work in his company. 
Branded by the peculiarly offensive epithets adopted, 
he must exist ostracised, socially and industrially, so 
far as his former associations are concerned." 1 

Malicious and arbitrary actions are more likely to be 
found in combinations, contends Judge Robb in the 
Buck's stove case : 

"The loss of trade of a single individual ordinarily 
affects a given dealer very little. Being discriminating, 
the purchasing public, if left free to exercise its own 
judgment, will not act arbitrarily or maliciously, but 
will be controlled by natural considerations. But a 
powerful combination to boycott immediately deflects 
the natural course of trade, and ruin follows in its 
wake because of the unlawful design of the conspira- 
tors to coerce or destroy the object of their displeas- 
ure. In other words, it is the conspiracy, and not the 
natural causes, which is responsible for the result. 
From time immemorial the law has frowned upon com- 
binations formed for the purpose of doing harm." 2 

"A grain of gunpowder is harmless," observed Lord 
Brampton, in Quinn v. Leathern (1901), an English 
case, "but a pound may be highly destructive." 

In attempting in a somewhat scientific manner to de- 
scribe the difference between the acts of the combination 
and of the individual, Mr. Justice Gibson, nearly a 
century ago, said: 

"There is between the different parts of the body 

politic reciprocity of action on each other, which, like 

the action of antagonistic muscles in the natural body, 

'Barr v. Essex, Conn., 18Q4, 3» Atl. 881, 8S0. 
3 A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., Ct of Ap., D, of C, 
1909, 33 App. Cases, D. of C. 83, 107. 



1 84 BOYCOTTS 

not only prescribes to each other its appropriate state 
and condition, but regulates the motion of the whole. 
The efforts of an individual to disturb this equilibrium 
can never be perceptible, nor carry the operation of 
his interest on that or any other individual, beyond 
the limits of fair competition. But the increase of 
power of combination means, being in geometrical pro- 
portion to the numbers concerned, an association may 
be able to give an impulse not only oppressive to indi- 
viduals but mischievous to the public at large; and it 
is the employment of an instrument so powerful and 
dangerous that gives criminality to an act which would 
be perfectly innocent, at least, in a legal view, when 
done by an individual." 1 

The Boycott and Illegal Ends 

Injury to the property or business of another, inter- 
ference with the lawful conduct of business and the 
free employment of one's capital and labor power, and 
undue restraint of trade are among the so-called il- 
legal ends of a combination which have warranted the 
condemning of boycotts. These ends are condemned 
by some judges only when malice or coercive measures 
accompany them. 

"If it (the boycott) means, as some high in the con- 
fidence of the trade unions assert, absolute ruin to the 
business of the person boycotted unless he yields," 
states Judge Carpenter in the first of the boycott cases, 
"then it is criminal." 2 

"All the authorities hold that a combination to in- 
jure or destroy the trade or business of another by 
threatening to produce injury to the trade, business or 
occupation of those who have business relations with 
him is an unlawful conspiracy," is the principle laid 
down in a recent Missouri case. 3 

1 Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Pa., 1821. 

2 State v. Glidden, Conn., 1887, 8 Atl. 890, 897. 

3 Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuella, Mo., 1909, 114 S. W. 997, 1003. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 185 

Whether or not the business or the good will of one 
can reasonably be called a property right, and conse- 
quently whether the concerted agreement to discon- 
tinue such business relations and to induce others so 
to do may be considered an injury to such right, has 
been the bone of contention in a number of cases. 
Judge Wright in the Buck's Stove case contends that it 
is such a right. 1 

"A business, be it mercantile, manufacturing or 
other, which has, for a long time, been successfully 
operated and developed, possesses a greater value than 
a like business newly launched, although the latter be 
exactly equivalent in respect to stock, equipment, money 
and all other physical possessions; the basis of the ex- 
cess in value of the one over the other is termed the 
'good will' ; it is the advantage which exists in estab- 
lished trade relations with not only habitual customers, 
but with the trading public generally; the advantage of 
an established public repute for punctuality in dealing, 
or superior excellence in goods or product; finally, in 
last analysis, a good will, when it exists, is one's return 
for the expenditure of time, money, energy and effort 
in development; it is a thing of value in the sense that 
it is a subject of bargain and sale; oftentimes of a 
value that exceeds that of all physical assets taken to- 
gether; in that it may possess exchange value, it may 
be 'property' ; when it does possess 'exchange' value, 
property it is; and the combination for the purpose of 
destroying it is for an 'unlawful act', whether you call 
the combination a 'labor union' or a 'trust.' ' 



Judge Gould also took this position and cited numer- 
ous cases to prove "that business is property within the 
meaning of the law." 2 

1 Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. A. F. of L., Sup. Ct., D. of G, 
1908. 
3 Ibid., 1907, 70 Al. L. J. 8, 10, 11. 



186 BOYCOTTS 

The law also condemns, as illegal objects, the inter- 
ference with and restraining of trade or business and 
of the power to dispose of one's capital and labor 
power as one wishes. Many judges have pronounced 
this object illegal if carried out by individuals as well 
as combinations. In some courts the element of coer- 
cion, and, in others, that of malice, must be present to 
render the acts illegal. 

"No person or combination of persons can legally, 
by direct or indirect means, obstruct or interfere with 
another in the conduct of his lawful business," declares 
an Illinois court. 1 

Judge Robb in the Buck's Stove case 2 quotes with 
approval the views of Chief Justice Fuller regarding 
the illegality of a combination in restraint of trade. 

"The combination charged falls within the class of 
restraints of trade aimed at, compelling third parties 
and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course 
of trade except on conditions that the combination im- 
poses; and there is no doubt (to quote from the well- 
known work of Chief Justice Earle on Trade Unions) 
at common law every person has individually, and the 
public has collectively, a right to require that the course 
of trade should be kept free from unreasonable ob- 



The right to employ one's talents without interfer- 
ence is jeopardized by the boycott, according to some 
decisions. Thus a Vermont Court argues : 

"The principle upon which the cases, English and 
American, proceed is that every man has the right to 
employ his talents, industry and capital as he pleases, 
free from dictation of others, and if two or more per- 

1 Purington v. Hinchliff, 111., 1905. Italics are the author's. 

2 A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., Ct. of Ap., D. of C. 
1909. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 187 

sons combine to coerce his choice in this behalf it is a 
criminal conspiracy." 1 

"Every person," says the Michigan Court (Beck v. 
Railway), "has a right under the law as between him- 
self and his fellow subjects to dispose of his own labor 
or his own capital according to his own will. It fol- 
lows that every other person is subject to the correla- 
tive duty arising therefrom, and prohibited from any 
obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which 
can be made compatible with the exercise of similar 
rights by others." 

Of the same tenor are the decisions of the courts in 
Connecticut (State v. Glidden), Illinois (London Guar- 
antee Co. v. Horn), Indiana (Jackson v. Stanfield), 
New Jersey (State v. Donaldson), Maryland (Lucke 
v. Clothing Cutters), Massachusetts (Carew v. Ruth- 
erford), and others. 

Inasmuch as the strike had been declared legal, even 
though it resulted in injury to the business or property 
of another, and interfered with the free course of 
commerce, the many judges soon found that it would be 
necessary to modify their declarations of illegality in 
respect to combinations to injure the property of an- 
otker. They, therefore, sought to distinguish between 
combinations whose immediate purpose was to injure 
the business of another, placing boycotts in this categ- 
ory, and those whose immediate object was that of 
bettering the conditions of labor, although the inci- 
dental result of the latter might be injury. Strikes were 
placed in this class. Boycotts and other combinations 
whose immediate intent was said to be that of injury 
were condemned in spite of the fact that their ultimate 
purpose or motive was to benefit labor, while strikes 
were pronounced legal. 

Judge Gould of the Supreme Court, District of Co- 
1 State v. Stewart, Vt, 1887, 9 Atl. 559, 508. 



1 88 BOYCOTTS 

lumbia, thus refers to this distinction in the Buck's 
Stove case (1907) : 

"Defendants claim the motive of wishing to benefit 
their condition affords such legal justification; but this 
motive is too remote compared with their immediate 
motive, which is to show that punishment and disaster 
necessarily follow a defiance of their claims. As 
quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of Penn- 
sylvania, in Purvis v. Brotherhood: 'True, the de- 
fendants contend and testify that their purpose was to 
benefit their own members. This, doubtless, in a sense, 
is true, but the benefits sought were the remote pur- 
pose, which was to be secured through the more imme- 
diate purpose of coercing the plaintiffs into complying 
with their demands, or otherwise injuring them in their 
business, and the court cannot, in this proceeding, look 
beyond the immediate purpose to the remote results.' 
Such is the doctrine laid down in Eddy on Combina- 
tions, and quoted with approval in the case of Erdman 
v. Mitchell, 56 Atl., 327, as follows: 'The benefit of 
the members of the combination is so remote, as com- 
pared to the direct and immediate injury inflicted upon 
the non-union workmen (in this case non-union mill 
owners) that the law does not look beyond the imme- 
diate loss and damage to the innocent parties to the 
remote benefit that might result to the union." 1 

An Illinois Court follows the same line of reason- 
ing: 

"The law allows laborers to combine for the pur- 
pose of obtaining lawful benefits to themselves, but it 
gives no sanction to combinations either of employers 
or employed which have for their immediate purpose 
the injury of another." 2 

The same argument was suggested in State v. Glid- 
den and in numerous other cases. In making this dis- 

1 Buck's Stove, etc., v. A. F. of L., 1907. 

2 Barnes v. Typographical Union, 111., 1908, 83 N. E. 940, 945. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 189 

tinction between the immediate and the ultimate ob- 
ject, some have named the immediate object the "in- 
tent" and the remote, the "motive." Mr. Jeremiah 
Smith thus declares: 

"Intent is used to denote the immediate object aimed 
at by the doer of the act, the immediate result desired 
by the actor. Motive is used, not to signify the object 
or the result immediately aimed at, but the cause for 
entertaining that desire, the feeling that makes the 
actor desire to attain that result. . . . The defend- 
ant frequently intends immediate harm to the plaintiff, 
but generally as a means of attaining the end of bene- 
fiting himself. In 99 labor cases out of 100, the de- 
fendant's motive (or, in other words, his ultimate in- 
tent) is to promote his own advantage. A man may 
kill a king in order to benefit people. The intention is 
to kill the king, the motive, to benefit. A defendant 
denies intent to harm plaintiff when he really means 
only to deny a bad motive for the intent. Defendant 
means that he did not do harm as an end in itself, but 
merely as a means to some further end legitimately 
desired." 1 

The Boycott and the Doctrine of Malice 

Later many of the courts contended that no combi- 
nation employing lawful means could be considered il- 
legal, unless it contained the element of malice, or un- 
less it was formed without justifiable cause. After an 
examination of the facts of the case, the judges gener- 
ally concluded that malice could be found in connection 
with the use of the boycott, or that there was no legal 
justification for its employment. 

The essential elements of malice in most instances 
are not clearly set forth. In fact the judges are in 
hopeless disagreement as to what constitutes malice. 
Some argue that there must be a sole 'nit cut to injure ; 

1 Harvard Law Review, v. 20, pp. 451, 453. 



i 9 o BOYCOTTS 

others, that there must be no pecuniary advantage to 
the boycotters. Some are of the opinion that malice 
is shown if the benefit derived is at the expense of the 
boycotted, while intent to wrong without justifiable 
cause is the essential factor with others. Still another 
group argue that no legal malice is possible without an 
unlawful act. Following are some of the explanations : 

"If the persuasion be used for the indirect pur- 
pose of injuring the plaintiff or of benefiting the de- 
fendant at the expense of the plaintiff, it is a malicious 
act." 1 (Bowen v. Hall, an English case), quoted with 
approval by Barnes v. Typog. Union (111., 1908). 

"Practically it is better to remember the old defini- 
tion that malice in its legal sense means an unlawful 
act, done intentionally without just cause or excuse." 2 

"When we speak in this connection of an act done 
with a malicious motive it does not necessarily imply 
that the defendants were actuated in their proceedings 
by spite or malice against the complainant, Mr. Barr, 
in the sense that their motive was to injure him per- 
sonally, but that they desired to injure him in his busi- 
ness in order to force him not to do what he had a 
perfect right to do." 3 

"It is said that in each case (where malice is an ele- 
ment) the basis of the action is the doing of an act 
which the law already regards as illegal, but that the 
doer of the act is protected from its usual consequence 
in the event that he was actuated by an honest desire 
to perform a public or private duty." Allen v. Flood 
(English, 1898). 

Boycotts, time without number, have been con- 
demned on the ground that in their operation that 
vague, indefinable something known as malice was a 

x 83 N. E. 940, 944. 

2 Foster v. Retail Clerks' Association, N. Y., 78 N. Y. Supp. 865, 
866, 1902, and Joyce v. Gt. No. R'way, Minn., 1907. Italics are the 
author's. 

3 Barr v. Essex, N. J., 1894, 30 Atl. 881, 887. Italics are the 
author's. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 191 

prominent feature. Definitions that really define, how- 
ever, are, for the most part, absent. 

Most recently, judges in a number of states, con- 
cluding that the word "malice" introduced too uncer- 
tain a factor on which to base their decision, approved 
"justifiable cause" as the true criterion. What con- 
stitutes justifiable cause? This expression is used by 
some judges as indicative of the lack of maliciousness. 
Others, however, take a broader view. Generally it 
resolves itself into the question as to whether the pos- 
sible gain to the promoter will reasonably compensate 
for the possible injury inflicted. 

"In many cases," asserts Judge Hammond, "the law- 
fulness of an act which causes damage to another may 
depend upon whether an act is for justifiable cause; 
and this justification may be found sometimes in the 
circumstances under which it is done, irrespective of 
the motive, sometimes in the motive alone, and some- 
times in the circumstances and motive combined." 1 

Judge Hammond decided in this case, which involved 
the right to threaten a strike should certain workers 
refuse to join the union, that justifiable cause did not 
exist, and that the necessity that the plaintiff join the 
union was not so great, nor was "the relation to the 
rights of the defendants as compared with the rights 
of the plaintiffs to be free from molestation such as 
to bring the acts of the defendants under the shelter 
of the principle of trade competition." Mr. E. W. 
Huffcut clearly explains the position of compensating 
advantage held by some : 

"There is presumptively a privilege to employ any 
lawful means in social or industrial relations . . . and 
the general and common privilege to employ these can 
be overcome only by showing that they are employed 
for an unjustifiable end, that is, an end which inten- 

1 Plant v. Woods, Mass., iqoo, 57 N. E. ion, 1014. 



192 BOYCOTTS 

tionally inflicts a damage upon a particular individual 
without a corresponding and compensating advantage 
to the one who inflicts it, or to those whom he repre- 
sents. . . . The question of justification resolves it- 
self into this — do the desire and expectancy of ac- 
complishing this particular end warrant the interfer- 
ence with the contracts or business of one who stands 
in the way of the accomplishment? If that end be 
only the gratification of feeling, whether of ill will or 
good will, it is not of such substantial character which 
justifies inflicting pecuniary loss upon another. To 
gratify a feeling of malice toward the plaintiff will 
hardly be thought a justification for inducing third 
parties not to deal with him. To gratify a feeling of 
sympathy or good will toward X will hardly justify 
inducing third persons not to deal with the plaintiff 
unless there be some special relation between X and 
the defendant which warrants the defendant in acting 
for X. Even the remote advantage the defendant 
might derive as one of a large class, from the success 
of X in the competitive struggle with the plaintiff, 
would not be sufficient." 1 

The elements which are essential to justify injury 
are clearly stated by Mr. Jeremiah Smith: 2 

i. There must be a conflict of interest between plain- 
tiff and defendant as to the subject matter in regard to 
which the damage is done, or at least there must be a 
legitimate interest of defendant to be directly served 
as to that subject matter. 

2. The damaging act must be reasonably calculated 
to advance substantially the interests of the defend- 
ants. 

3. The damage resulting to the plaintiff or to the 
general public (including the employer) must not be 
excessive in proportion to the benefit to the defendant. 
In other words, there must be a reasonable proportion 

1 Harvard Law Review, v. 18, p. 439. 
"■Ibid., v. 20, p. 361. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 193 

between the benefit to the defendant and the damage 
to the plaintiff or to the public. 

4. Even where the propositions one, two and three 
are made out, the justification must be confined to 
those cases where defendant uses only his own conduct 
as a lever, and therewith operates directly upon the 
possible employer or customer of the plaintiff. De- 
fendant can never justify his right to work or not to 
work (or any other right) as a temporal inducement 
to influence an outsider or fourth person, to exert 
pressure upon the possible employer or customer of the 
plaintiff. 

A number of the decisions in the Massachusetts 
cases are based on this doctrine. 

"The crucial question is whether there is justifiable 
cause for the act," runs the decision in Martell v. 
White (Massachusetts, 1904). "If the injury be in- 
flicted without justifiable cause or excuse, then it is 
actionable." 

Justice Holmes contended in Vegelahn v. Guntner 
(Mass., 1896) that, "unless defendant prove some 
ground of excuse or justification," a combination to 
injure the business of another would be illegal. That 
such justification is a sufficient legal excuse is the be- 
lief expressed in the Parkinson case (California, 
1908). 

While the consideration of justifiable cause is a 
great advance over the early reasonings in boycott 
cases, some jurists have advanced still further, and 
have expressly based their decisions on what they con- 
sider to be the social advantage. Justice Holmes, for 
instance, contends that "the true grounds of decisions 
are considerations of policy and of social advantage, 
and it is vain to suppose that solutions can be at- 
tained merely by logic and the general propositions of 
law which nobody disputes." The part which public 



194 BOYCOTTS 

policy should play in the determination of legal ques- 
tions is stated by Judge Andrews : 

"It is a truism that there are many acts directly 
injuring the property of another, yet which do not 
give rise to a cause of action. The phrase, damnum 
absque injuria, was invented to meet such cases. A 
may make such erections upon his land as he chooses, 
notwithstanding the consequent injury to his neigh- 
bor. B may by fierce and continuous competition ruin 
a business rival. C may advise his friend to patron- 
ize one physician rather than another. Of course all 
these matters have their limits. If A goes too far he 
may create a nuisance. If B's competition is too 
strenuous, he may be guilty of fraud. If C says too 
much, he may become liable for slander. In the last 
analysis this freedom to commit injury and the bounds 
imposed upon it are regulated by what has been 
thought to be public policy. The injury itself is never 
good, but to suffer it may entail less injury than to at- 
tempt to check it by legal means." 1 

Boycotts and Illegal Means 

Still other courts prefer to look for the element 
of illegality in the means employed by the boycotters. 
If, to effect their purpose of injuring others, the com- 
bination used coercion, intimidation, force, violence, 
misrepresentation or fraud, or induced others to break 
their contracts, it is looked upon as illegal. Many 
a judicial controversy has been fought over the ques- 
tion as to what really constitutes coercive measures, 
threats, and other illegal means. Some judges have 
contended that any threat, direct or indirect, of loss 
of business, made against a third party, in order to 
induce such party to cease business relations with an- 
other, is coercive and intimidating in its nature and 

1 Foster v. Retail Clerks' etc., N. Y., 1902, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860, 864. 
Italics are the author's. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 195 

therefore illegal, if it forces a man against his will to 
grant the conditions demanded. Others have averred 
that the same reasoning which is applied to ordinary 
business dealings should also obtain in the discussion of 
labor combinations; and that, in the competitive strug- 
gle of the business world, parties are daily compelled 
to grant financial concessions through threats of which 
it is impossible for the law to take cognizance. 

To declare a boycott illegal because a threat is made 
to boycott another if he continues to trade with the 
boycotted firm is, furthermore, vicious reasoning in 
a circle. Some judges, therefore, argue that unless the 
means used are such as will be considered illegal if 
used by one individual, such as the application of 
physical violence, the use of fraud, the inducing of 
another to break his contract, the combination should 
be permitted. 

If we analyze the attitude of the judges as to what 
constitutes coercive measures, we will find that, gener- 
ally speaking, proof of physical violence is not neces- 
sary. 

"The clear weight of authority undoubtedly is that 
a man may be intimidated into doing or refraining 
from doing, by fear of loss of business, property or 
reputation, as well as by dread of loss of life, or 
injury to health or limb, and that the extent of this 
fear need not be abject, but only such as to overcome 
his judgment, or induce him to do or not to do that 
which otherwise he would have done or left undone/' 
declared Vice Chancellor Green. 1 

The Massachusetts, 2 Pennsylvania, and other courts 
take a similar view. Actual threats are not necessary, 3 
in the view of some. Judge Andrews declares on this 
point: 

1 Barr v. Essex, N. J, 1891. 30 Atl. 881, 889. 

2 Plant v. Woods, Mass., 1900. 

3 Purvis v. United Brotherhood, Pa., 1006. 



196 BOYCOTTS 

"It should be remembered . . . that to constitute 
intimidation it is not necessary that there should be any 
direct threat, still less any actual act of violence. It is 
enough that the mere attitude assumed by the defend- 
ants is intimidating. And this may be shown by all the 
circumstances in the case, by the methods of the de- 
fendants, their circulars, their numbers, their devices." 1 

That the imposition of fines on members of the labor 
organizations who refuse to boycott third parties con- 
stitutes coercion is held by some of the courts in Ver- 
mont, 2 Indiana, 3 and elsewhere. 

Not only the actual coercive or intimidating meas- 
ures, but threats to adopt such measures, are considered 
as illegal means by the majority of the judges, and 
"threats" also cover a multitude of deeds. The Cyclo- 
paedia of Law and Procedure concludes, citing Bout- 
well case : 

"It is clear that every one has a right to withdraw 
patronage when he pleases, but equally clear that he 
has no right to employ threats or intimidation to divert 
the patronage of another." 4 

A Michigan Court thus summarizes: 

"The boycott condemned by law is not alone that 
?ccompanied by violence and threats of violence, but 
that where the means used are threatening in their 
nature, and intended and naturally tend to overcome 
by fear of loss of property the will of others, and com- 
pel them to do things they would not otherwise do." 5 

The word "to boycott" itself is a threat, according 
to some. 

Foster v. Retail Clerks', etc., N. Y., 1902, 78 N. Y. Supp. 860, 
863. Italics are the author's. 
2 Boutwell v. Marr, Vt, 1899. 

3 Jackson v. Stanfield, Ind., 1893. 

4 Italics are the author's. 

5 Beck v. Teamsters' Union, Mich., 1898, 77 N. W. 13, 24. Italics 
are the author's. 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 197 

"The use of the word 'boycott' is in itself a threat" 
wrote the judge in an early Pennsylvania case (Brace 
v. Evans, Pa., 1888). "In popular acceptation it is 
an organized effort to exclude a person from business 
relations with others by persuasion, intimidation and 
other acts which tend to violence, and thereby coerce 
him, through fear of resulting injury, to submit to dic- 
tation in the management of his affairs." 1 

Threats will often be read into language which in 
form is mere persuasion. The kind of threat it is neces- 
sary to make in order to render the act illegal is not 
stated in many of the decisions. Some contend that 
the threat must be to do an unlawful act. A Tennessee 
Court concludes : 

"In law a threat is a declaration of an intention or 
determination to injure another by the commission of 
some unlawful act. ... If the act intended to be 
done is not unlawful, then the declaration is not a 
threat in law, and the effect thereof is not intimidation 
in a legal sense." 2 

Many of the courts, indeed, have shown great skill 
in reading into mere requests this illegal deed of threat- 
ening. In Plant v. Woods, for instance (Mass., 1900) , 
the workers on a strike visited the employers of other 
union men to inquire whether the former would use 
their good services in having the men reinstated. Dur- 
ing the conversation, the workers were asked whether 
it would mean trouble, if the request was not granted, 
and the men replied that it might. This was a threat, 
in the eyes of the court. 

Violence, of course, is considered an illegal means, 

"The labor and skill of the workmen; the equipment 
of the farmer; the investment of commerce are all, in 
equal sense, commerce. If men, by overt acts of vio- 
lence, destroy either, they are guilty of crime."" 

*5 Pa. Co. Ct. 163, 171. Italics are the author's. 

2 Payne v. R. R., Term., 1884, 49 Am. Rep. 666, 674. 

3 State v. Stewart, Vt, 1887. 



198 BOYCOTTS 

Freedom of Speech and Press 

Boycotters have often contended that to prevent 
them from publishing notices of the boycotts, and 
otherwise announcing them in print, is an infringement 
of the freedom of the press, granted by the Constitu- 
tion. The courts, however, have for the most part held 
that when such publication is one of the means em- 
ployed in carrying out an illegal purpose — that of boy- 
cotting — the free-speech argument is without merit. 
It is also contended that no right is absolute, and that, 
when its unbridled exercise infringes on the equal rights 
of others, and deprives them of such rights as that 
of acquiring, possessing and protecting property, the 
law can and should interfere. 

In granting the injunction against Mr. Gompers, 
Judge Gould examined the contention of the defend- 
ants that, if plaintiff had any redress for such publica- 
tion, it was for action for the libel, and that equity will 
not enjoin a libel. He added: 

"All this would have merit if the act of the defend- 
ants in making such publication stood alone, uncon- 
nected with other conduct both preceding and follow- 
ing it. But it is not an isolated fact; according to the 
allegations of the bill and the supporting affidavits, it is 
an act in a conspiracy to destroy plaintiff's business, an 
act which has a definite meaning and instruction to 
those associated with defendants and an act which is 
the basis of conduct on the part of defendant's asso- 
ciates which unlawfully interferes with plaintiff's right 
of freedom to trade with those whom he pleases. The 
argument of counsel is fully answered by the language 
of Mr. Justice Holmes in the case of Aikens v. Wis- 
consin, 195 U. S. 194: 'No conduct has such an abso- 
lute privilege as to justify all possible schemes of 
which it may be a part. The most innocent and con- 
stitutionally protected of acts or omissions may be 
made a step in a criminal plot, and, if it is a step in a 



ILLEGALITY OF BOYCOTTS 199 

plot, neither its innocence nor the Constitution is suffi- 
cient to prevent the punishment of the plot by law.' " x 

The same general principle, though not so stringent 
an application thereof, was held by Judge Robb of the 
Court of Appeals, in affirming a portion of the injunc- 
tion. 2 

"While the right of free speech is guaranteed to all 
citizens by the Constitution," holds a California judge 
(Jordahl v. Hayda, Cal., 1905), "there is also guar- 
anteed to them by the same Constitution the right 'of 
acquiring, possessing and protecting property and ob- 
taining safety and happiness' (see Art. 1, Sec. 1); . . . 
and it is a maxim of jurisprudence prescribed by the 
statute law of this State that one must use his rights 
so as not to infringe upon the rights of another (Civil 
Code, Sec. 3514)." 

"It would be strange indeed," wrote Judge Taft, 
"if that right (to assemble and free speech) could be 
used to sustain the carrying out of such an unlawful 
and criminal conspiracy as we have seen this to 
be. . . . If the obstruction to the operation of the 
road by the receiver was unlawful and malicious, it is 
not less contemptible because the instrument which he 
used to effect it was his tongue rather than his hand." 3 

1 Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. A. F. of L., Sup. Ct., D. of C, 1907, 
70 Al. L. J. 8, 10. Italics are the author's. 

2 A. F. of L. v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., Ct. of Ap., D. of C, 
1909. Italics are the author's. 

3 Thomas v. Cinn., N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct, Ohio, 
1894, 62 Fed. 803, 822. 



CHAPTER XIII 

JUDICIAL ARGUMENT FOR LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 

That the judicial reasoning just described, whereby 
secondary boycotts and at least a portion of the so- 
called compound boycotts have been pronounced illegal, 
is based upon an antiquated doctrine of conspiracy 
which even the English courts, its originators, have 
long since abandoned, and that it is poor law and worse 
logic is the claim of the insurgent wearers of the er- 
mine, of students of law and of social science, who 
have voiced their protest against the outlawing of 
this weapon. These critics contend that the right of 
one person to deal or not to deal with another is in- 
controvertible, and that the same should be true of a 
combination. They claim that the best legal and 
economic reasoning dictates that the same doctrine 
should be applied to a labor combination as to an in- 
dividual, and that the danger of such combination is 
not necessarily greater than the action of a single indi- 
vidual. 

They assert that the ends proclaimed to be illegal, 
those of injury of business, etc., are for the most part 
employed without interference by very large numbers 
of combinations in the business world; that the dis- 
tinction sometimes made between combinations whose 
immediate results and those whose ultimate results 
are beneficial cannot be applied in this case with any 
show of logic; that the doctrine of malice should be 
eliminated as meaningless, confusing, unreasonable; 
that a biased use is here made of the doctrine of justifi- 

200 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 201 

able cause; and finally that the introduction of the ele- 
ments of threat, coercion and intimidation presents, in 
very many instances, a splendid example of "reasoning 
in a circle," and unjustly discriminates against the 
worker in his struggles. The logic by which the use of 
the injunction against free speech and press is justified 
is also declared dangerous from a broader social stand- 
point. 

Law of Combination 

Many contending for the legality of boycotts argue 
that one individual has the right to refuse to have deal- 
ings with another, for any reason or for no reason, and 
that that which it is legal for one individual to do it 
is also legal for two or more individuals to combine 
to do. Judge Holloway, in the well-known decision of 
Lindsay and Co. v. The Montana Federation of Labor 
(1908), thus declares: 

"There can be found running through our legal liter- 
ature many remarkable statements that an act per- 
fectly lawful when done by one person becomes, by 
some sort of legerdemain, criminal when done by two 
or more persons acting in concert, and this upon the 
theory that the concerted action amounts to a con- 
spiracy. But with this doctrine we do not agree. // an 
individual is clothed with a right when acting alone, he 
does not lose such right merely by acting with others, 
each of whom is clothed with the same right. If the 
act done is lawful, the combination of several persons 
to commit it does not render it unlawful. In other 
words, the mere combination of action is not an ele- 
ment which gives character to the act. It is the illegal- 
ity of the purpose to be accomplished, or the legal 
means used in furtherance of the purpose, which makes 
the act illegal. (18 Ency. Law (2d Ed.), 82; Bohn 
Mfg. Co. v. Hollis). 'A conspiracy is a combination 
of two or more persons by some concerted action to 



202 BOYCOTTS 

accomplish a purpose not in itself criminal or unlawful, 
by criminal or unlawful means' (Anderson's Law Dic- 
tionary, 234) . . . . Chief Justice Parker, in speaking 
for the Court of Appeals in National Protective Asso- 
ciation v. Cumming, said : 'Whatever one man may do 
alone he may do in combination with others, provided 
they have no unlawful object in view. Mere numbers 
do not ordinarily affect the quality of the act.' " x 

A Texas decision (Delz v. Winfree, 1891) is of 
similar import: 

"An act which if done by one alone constitutes no 
ground of action cannot be made the ground of such 
action by alleging it to have been done by and through 
a conspiracy of several. The true test as to whether 
such action will lie is whether or not the act accom- 
plished after the conspiracy has been formed is itself 
actionable." 2 

"Whatever one man may do," an Indiana decision 
reads, "all men may do, and what all may do singly 
they may do in concert if the sole purpose of the com- 
bination is to advance the proper interests of the mem- 
bers, and it is conducted in a lawful manner." 3 

The decision of Macauley v. Tierney (Rhode 
Island, 1895) is of the same tenor. The opposite 
view, many jurists argue, is illogical. 

It is stated that a combination is more dangerous 
than is a unit, and therefore should be regarded dif- 
ferently by the law under modern economic conditions. 
A single individual, however, may well be more power- 
ful than any combination. Mr. Robt. L. McWilliams 
thus puts it: 

"Some other courts have held that the mere act of 
combining constituted 'illegal means,' probably on the 

1 96 Pac. 127, 130. Italics are the author's. 

2 16 S. W. in. 

3 Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated W. U. L., Ind., 1905, 75 
N. E. 877, 880. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 203 

grounds stated in the old criminal cases that the com- 
bination was the 'gist of the conspiracy.' It is cer- 
tainly true that the commission of acts by a combina- 
tion of persons may change their character to the ex- 
tent of making them more offensive and harder to 
resist. But it is also true that under modern economic 
conditions one person may, because of his situation, be 
able to inflict far more loss on his competitors or on 
the public than any number of persons combined for 
that purpose. In neither case the legal coercion or 
intimidation is necessarily present. Hence there is no 
justification for holding that the presence of combina- 
tion, ipso facto, changes the character of what would 
without the existence of the combination be unques- 
tionably lawful acts, and makes them unlawful." 1 

Even though the acts are more effective when done 
in combination, Justice Jenks of the New York Appel- 
late Division sees no reason for their changed char- 
acter. He declares : 

"Mere numbers do not ordinarily affect the quality 
of the act. . . . A's attitude may be trivial as to B, 
when that of a combination might enforce B's conces- 
sions, but this affords no legal reason against such a 
combination. It is not in the breast of the court to 
stamp as illegal a combination for the betterment of 
the interest of the members thereof or of some of 
them, and which, without incidental violation or intimi- 
dation, severs all business dealings with an outsider 
until it may secure it. If this be illegal, where can 
we draw the line so as to countenance associations to 
secure united and therefore effective action to right 
what seems wrong, or to correct what seems an abuse, 
or to mark disapproval of some policy in everyday 
affairs of our social life?" 2 

1 American Law Review, v. 41, p. 22>7- Italics are the author's. 
Chief Justice Shepard, of Ct. of Appeals, D. of C, in Buck's Stove 
Case, takes a similar position. 

2 Mills v. U. S. Printing Co., N. Y., 1904, 99 App. Div. 606, 010. 



20 4 BOYCOTTS 

In fact the necessity of such combinations is admitted 
by enlightened judges. Justice Holmes, now of the 
United States Supreme Court, succinctly argued: 

"It is plain . . . that free competition means com- 
bination and that the organization of the world now 
going on so fast means an ever-increasing might and 
scope of combination. . . . One of the eternal con- 
flicts out of which life is made up is that between the 
effort of every man to get the most he can for his 
services, and that of society, disguised under the name 
of capital, to get his services for the least possible re- 
turn. Combination upon the one hand is potent and 
powerful. Combination on the other is the necessary 
and desirable counterpart if the battle is to be carried 
on in a fair and equal manner." 1 

Many are also realizing that a unit of capital may 
be far more powerful than a unit of labor — a million- 
dollar corporation, than the labor power of one man. 
When a law places different rules on the action of the 
individual and that of the combination, it puts labor at 
a great disadvantage in its battles with capital. 

To the suggestion made by some judges that combi- 
nation ought to be regarded in a different light from 
individual endeavor, because it leads to a restriction of 
individual liberty, it may be said that the laborer can 
only win some degree of independence through such 
combination, and that his dependence on others is far 
greater when, as an unorganized worker, he tries to 
obtain better conditions than when he strives for such 
conditions with a strong organization to support his 
demands. Furthermore, such a ruling interferes with 
his liberty to contract. 

"If . . . the law forbids X, Y and Z to combine 
for a purpose which they each might lawfully pursue if 
acting without concert, then the contracting power of 

^egelahn v. Guntner, Mass., 1896, 44 N. E. 1077, 1081. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 205 

X, Y and Z, or, in other words, their liberty of action, 
suffers a serious curtailment," observes Professor A. V. 
Dicey. 1 

Mr. Jeremiah Smith is of a like opinion. 

"It is answered 'any one may exercise choice as 
to whom he may sell his goods, but he cannot enter 
into a contract whereby he binds himself not to sell, 
for in such an instance he barters away his right of 
choice, and destroys the very right he claims the privi- 
lege of exercising. After entering upon such an agree- 
ment he is no longer a free agent.' . . . 

" 'It is an argument that would be pertinent against 
the organization of society into government. . . . The 
will of the individual must consent to yield to the will 
of the majority, or no organization, either of society 
into government, capital into combination, or labor 
into coalition, can ever be effected. The individual 
must yield in order that he may receive the greater 
benefit.' " 2 

To condemn boycotts on the ground that they are 
conspiracies is furthermore to take as a fundamental 
element that which is merely incidental. The boycott 
is not necessarily the result of a combination, and when 
initiated by a combination it is carried on by individ- 
uals. Mr. E. P. Cheyney thus argues : 

"The propriety should be called into question of 
choosing the comparatively unessential element of the 
boycott, the combination which initiates it, as the es- 
pecially criminal element. Combination initiates the 
coercion, but cannot consummate it. It is therefore a 
matter of fair question whether the boycott has been 
properly treated as a conspiracy, and this irrespective 
of the question of its criminality." 3 

1 Dicey, Law and P. 0., p. 155. 

2 Harvard Law Review, v. 20, p. 347, quoting J. Ellison in Ford 
Heim Brewing Co. v. Belinder, 07 Mo. App. 64, 69. 

8 E. P. Cheyney, Pol. Sc. Ctrl v., v. 4, p. 276. 



2o6 BOYCOTTS 

Finally, it is contended that those who declare that 
combination brings into play an illegal element not 
found in individual action are superimposing on our 
present economic structure the old doctrine of con- 
spiracy which has done yeoman service in suppressing 
all combinations of labor; that England, from which 
the common law doctrine of conspiracy was taken bod- 
ily, has long since thrown this doctrine onto the scrap 
heap, as unsuited to the present day, and that this coun- 
try should follow in its wake, if it is to keep abreast of 
the times. 

"This proposition, that it is unlawful for men to do 
collectively what they may do, without wrong, indi- 
vidually, was enunciated more than a century and a 
half ago, when all manner of association and coopera- 
tion among men offensive to the king or not in the in- 
terest of despotic power or of the ruling classes or not 
approved by the judges were declared by the courts 
to be criminal conspiracy," affirmed Judge Caldwell. 1 

The origin of this doctrine and the caution with 
which it should be used are described by counsel in an 
early Connecticut case : 

"No branch of the law has gone through so many 
transformations as that relating to conspiracy. In its 
present form it had its origin and the impulse to its 
growth in the Star Chamber (see Poulterer's Case, 
9 Co. Rep. 55) — a court which legislated as well as 
judged, and which, as Lord Clarendon says in his his- 
tory of the Great Rebellion, 'held for honorable that 
which pleased, and for just that which profited.' He 
adds that the foundations of right were never more 
in danger of being destroyed. At first used to bring 
popular leaders to the block, the law of conspiracy 
has in later times been invoked to suppress combina- 
tions among workmen to better their condition. Many 
of the most eminent judges in the country have looked 
1 Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins, 1897, §3 Fed. 9 12 , 93°- 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 207 

upon it with disapproval, and expressed determination 
to restrict rather than extend it." 1 

Mr. Allen P. Hallett indicates the manner in which 
this doctrine was used in the past to pronounce illegal 
almost every form of labor activity: 2 

"It was upon this general ground (that of illegal 
conspiracy) that labor combinations were once ad- 
judged to be criminal. It was held that the liberty of 
a man's mind and will to say how he should employ 
his time, his talents and industry, for whom he should 
work, or whom he should employ, was as much the 
subject of the law's protection as that of his body, and 
that any combination formed for the purpose of coerc- 
ing this liberty of mind and freedom was criminal, be- 
cause formed for the accomplishment of an unlawful 
purpose." 

Thus in England, in numerous decisions, combina- 
tions to raise wages were pronounced illegal on the 
ground of conspiracy. Said Judge Grose in Rex v. 
Mawley (6 T. R. 636) : 

"In many cases an agreement to do a certain thing 
has been considered as a subject of an indictment for 
a conspiracy, though the same act, if done separately 
by each individual without any agreement among them- 
selves, would not have been illegal. As the case of 
journeymen conspiring to raise their wages: each may 
insist on raising his wages if he can, but if several meet 
for the same purpose it is illegal, and the parties may 
be indicted for conspiracy." 

Oftentimes the same arguments of the coercive ef- 
fect of a combination, both upon the outsider and the 
members, were employed in the past in declaring strikes 
and other combinations illegal. 

1 Quoted in State v. Gliddcn, Conn., 1887, 55 Conn., 46, 60. 

2 Hallett, American Encyclopedia, v. 18, p. 82. 



208 BOYCOTTS 

"What is the case now before us?" asks Recorder 
Levy in the Philadelphia Cordwainer's Case of 
1806. . . . "A combination of workmen to raise 
their wages may be considered in a twofold point of 
view; one is to benefit themselves . . .the other is 
to injure those who do not join their society. The rule 
of law condemns both. If the rule be clear, we are 
bound to conform to it, even though we do not com- 
prehend the principle upon which it is founded 

Hawkins, the greatest authority on the criminal law, 
has laid it down that a combination to maintain one 
another, carrying a particular object, whether true or 
false, is criminal. . . . One man determines not to 
work under a certain price, and it may be individually 
the opinion of all. In such a case it would be lawful 
in each to refuse to do so, for, if each stands alone, 
either may retract from his determination when he 
pleases. In the turnout of last fall if each man of 
the body had stood alone, fettered by no promise to 
the rest, many of them might have changed their opin- 
ion as to the price of wages and gone to work; but it 
has been given to you in evidence that they were bound 
down by their agreement, and pledged by mutual en- 
gagements to persist in it, however contrary to their 
own judgment. The continuance of improper conduct 
may ... be attributed to the combination." The 
jury, after hearing the charge, brought in the verdict: 
"We find defendants guilty of a combination to raise 
their wages." Defendants were fined eight dollars 
with costs. 1 

Such combinations to raise wages were also declared 
illegal on the ground that they would produce baneful 
results, that they interfered with the freedom of con- 
tract of employers and were against public policy. 
Said Recorder Levy again: 

"Is there any man who can calculate (if this is 
tolerated) at what price he may safely contract to de- 

x Doc. Hist. Am. Indus. Soc, v. 3, pp. 233, 234. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 209 

liver articles for which he may receive orders, if he is 
to be regulated by the journeymen in an arbitrary 
jump from one price to another? It renders it im- 
possible for a man making a contract for a large quan- 
tity of such goods to know whether he shall lose or 
gain by it. If he makes a large contract for goods 
to-day, for delivery at 3, 6 or 9 months hence, can he 
calculate what the prices will be then if the journey- 
men in the intermediate time are permitted to meet and 
raise their prices, according to their caprice or pleas- 
ure? Can he fix the price of his commodity for a 
future day? It is impossible that any man can carry on 
commerce in this way. . . . What, then, is the opera- 
tion of this kind of conduct upon the commerce of the 
city? It exposes it to inconvenience, if not to ruin, 
therefore it is against public welfare." 1 

In view of the origin and history of the law of con- 
spiracy, and the many combinations, formerly con- 
demned, now found to be for the general welfare, one 
is loath to accept this law as an infallible guide in de- 
termining the legality or illegality of organized effort. 

Injury of Business 

The boycott has been condemned on the ground that 
it is a combination to injure the business or property 
of another. Many deny, on the other hand, that the 
mere concerted refusal to have business dealings with 
another violates a property right or injures another in 
his property, in the legal acceptance of the term. Thus 
Judge Holloway, in the case of Lindsay and Co., again 
says: 

"Certainly it cannot be said that Lindsay £s? Co. had 
a property right in the trade of any particular person. 
In this country patronage depends upon good will, 
and we do not think that it will be contended by any 

1 Ibid., p. 229. 



210 BOYCOTTS 

one that it was wrongful or unlawful, or violated any 
rights of the plaintiff company, for any particular in- 
dividual in Billings to withdraw his patronage from 
Lindsay & Co. or from any other concern that might 
be doing business with that company, and that, too, 
without regard to his reason for doing so." x 

After stating that the same rule, in his opinion, 
should hold true of combinations, Judge Holloway 
continues : 

"It may be true that, generally speaking, no one has 
the right intentionally to do an act for the purpose of 
injuring another's business; but injury, however, in its 
legal significance, means damage resulting from the 
violation of a legal right, and it is a violation of a 
legal right which renders an act wrongful in the eye of 
the law, and makes it actionable. If, then, these de- 
fendants and their associates did not violate any legal 
right of the plaintiff in withdrawing their patronage 
from the company, or in agreeing to withdraw their 
patronage from any one who might patronize Lindsay 
& Co., they cannot be enjoined from continuing the 
boycott in force, so long as the means employed to 
make the boycott effective are not illegal." 

Professor George Gorham Groat 2 is emphatic in 
his belief that no business or property right is inter- 
fered with, nor is any loss occasioned for which the 
one refusing the relation can be held responsible, when 
one or more abstains from buying from or selling to 
another. 

"That they refrain from the relation cannot be inter- 
preted as a loss to the other party to the relation. It 
is true that such relations are entered into for mutual 
gain. If one desires the relation for his gain and the 
other refrains because he does not see it to his interest 
to assume the relation, it does not mean that there is a 

1 Italics are the author's. 

2 Groat's Attitude of American Courts in Labor Disputes, p. 113. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 211 

loss. It is true that an opportunity for gain cannot be 
taken advantage of, but that is not a loss. One can- 
not be said to have suffered a loss of a thousand dollars 
because he has never found a thousand dollars. 

"But further, so long as buying and selling are two 
views of the same act, an act of voluntary business 
relation, and so long as the relation must be one of 
mutual agreement, it is difficult to see where the prop- 
erty right enters in. One's business is of course his 
property. So in a sense may one's labor be called his 
property. When one offers for sale, and another re- 
fuses to buy, there is simply a refusal to exchange 
property for property. When one points out to an- 
other, or to many others, that it is to his interest not to 
buy, there is again simply the refusal to exchange. 
When many meet and decide together or agree not to 
buy, there is a concerted refusal to exchange. To in- 
terpret this as a malicious destruction of one's business, 
which is property, and even to interpret it as an in- 
fringement of a property right, is a manifestation for 
solicitude for one form of property (a business) at the 
expense of another form (labor) that is not easy to 
justify. A man who goes into business assumes the 
risk of failure together with the chances of success. 
If failure comes, it is his risk, so long as it comes from 
the refusal of others to buy, and is his loss, but it is 
not a loss for which those who refuse to be purchasers 
can be held responsible." 

Professor Groat believes that the doctrine of com- 
bination and motive should not make any difference in 
the conclusion reached. Nor, it is averred, should the 
boycott be counted among the illegal acts only because 
it results in restraint of trade, or interferes with the 
freedom of others to conduct their business or employ 
their talents as they see fit, as this is contrary to legal 
precedents. 

"No case can be found," writes Judge Mitchell, "in 
which it was ever held that at common law a con- 



212 BOYCOTTS 

tract or agreement in general restraint of trade was 
actionable at the instance of third parties, or could 
constitute the foundation for such an action. The 
courts sometimes call such contracts 'unlawful' or 'ille- 
gal,' but in every instance it will be found that these 
terms were used in the sense merely of 'void' or unen- 
forceable as between the parties; the law considering 
the disadvantage so imposed upon the contract as a 
sufficient protection to the public." 1 



Doctrine of Immediate and Ultimate Results 

The theory of immediate and ultimate results has 
generally been used by judges in justifying their ap- 
proval of strikes while at the same time condemning 
boycotts. They have contended that the immediate 
object of the strike is to better the conditions of labor; 
that of boycott to injure the business of another. 

If we face the facts as they are, say the advocates 
of the boycott, we will fail to find this distinction. 
Both strikes and boycotts immediately injure the busi- 
ness of the employer; strikes, by depriving the em- 
ployer of his labor force; boycotts by depriving him 
of his market. The ultimate object of each form of 
activity is that of improving the lot of the worker. 
It is doubtless true that in the secondary boycott some- 
what more indirect methods to induce others to aid in 
limiting the employer's market are employed than 
are found in some strikes. When picketing is brought 
into play, however, and third parties are induced to 
abstain from offering their labor power to the em- 
ployer, the methods of the strike and the boycott show 
a marked similarity. When strikers bring to their aid 
the sympathetic strike, all distinctions between the 
boycott and strike on the ground of immediate and ulti- 
mate effects are found to be without merit. 

^ohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, Minn., 1893, 55 N. W. 1119, 1121. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 213 

Granting that this distinction really existed in fact, 
many judges have contended that the law should not 
take cognizance of the difference, and that unions 
should be able to use in their preparations the same 
means which they use in their final contests, in order 
to perform their function effectively. Justice Holmes 
thus states: 

"The immediate object and motive (in this case) 
was to strengthen the defendants' society as a prelimi- 
nary and means to enable it to make a better fight 
on questions of wages or other matters of clashing 
interests. I differ from my brethren, in thinking that 
the threats were as lawful for this preliminary purpose 
as for the final one to which strengthening the union 
was a means. I think that unity of organization is 
necessary to make the contest of labor effectual, and 
that societies of laborers may employ in their prepara- 
tions the means which they might use in the final con- 
test." 1 



Doctrine of Malice 

Boycotts are often condemned in law on the ground 
of their alleged malicious character. They are de- 
clared to be organized attempts to injure the business 
of another maliciously. Advocates of the boycott, on 
the other hand, contend that the causes giving rise to 
boycotts are very similar to those of strikes, and that 
no more actual malice is shown in the organization of 
the one than of the other. The truth of this conten- 
tion is conclusively proved in the reports of the boy- 
cotts waged in New York State during the eighties and 
nineties. Others contend that if the doctrine of malice 
were applied to the competitive struggle on the busi- 
ness field in the same manner as it has been applied 
to boycotts in labor disputes, a large part of the activity 
1 Plant v. Woods, Mass., 1900, 57 N. E. ion, 1016. 



2i 4 BOYCOTTS 

of modern business would be considered actionable. If 
it is not legally malicious and therefore actionable for 
business rivals to attempt to divert trade from their 
competitors, in order to secure larger profits, even 
though their efforts cause a loss to others, it should not 
be actionable for trade unionists so to do, in order to 
obtain more wholesome working conditions. Nor 
should the fact that the rivalry is between two classes 
in society deprive the actions of their competitive char- 
acter. The injury which one organization on the busi- 
ness field causes to another, in its quest for a larger 
market, and its non-actionable character, are thus cog- 
ently expressed by a West Virginia judge : 

"In these days of sharp, ruinous competition some 
punishment is inevitable. The dead are found strewn 
all along the highways of business and commerce. Has 
it not always been so? Will it always be so? The 
evolution of the future must answer. What its evo- 
lution will be in this regard we do not yet know, but 
we do know that thus far the law of the survival of the 
fittest has been inexorable. Human intellect, human 
laws, cannot prevent these disasters. The dead and 
wounded have no right of action from the working of 
this imperious law. This is a free country. Liberty 
must exist. It is for all. This is a land of equality, so 
far as the law goes, though some men do, in lust of 
gain, get the advantage. Who can help it?" 1 

Circuit Judge Caldwell thus vividly contrasted the 
legal attitude toward business and that toward labor 
combinations : 

"Corporations and trusts and other combinations of 
individuals and aggregations of capital extend them- 
selves right and left through the entire community, 
boycott and inflict irreparable damage upon and crush 
out all small dealers and producers, stifling compe- 
tition, establishing monopoly, reducing the wages of 

1 West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil, W. Va., 1901. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 215 

labor, raising the price of food on every man's table, 
and of clothes on his back and of the house that shel- 
ters him, and inflicting on the wage earners the pains 
and penalties of the lockout and the blacklist and deny- 
ing to them the right of association and combined 
action by refusing employment to those who are mem- 
bers of labor organizations, and all these things are 
justifiable as a legitimate result of the evolution of 
industry resulting from new social and economic con- 
ditions and of the right of every man to carry on his 
business as he sees fit, and of lawful competition." 1 

No injury to business of another inflicted by lawful 
means and for the advantage of the one causing the 
injury can, according to Justice Holmes, be considered 
malicious or actionable. He states: 

"The policy of allowing free competition justifies the 
intentional infliction of temporal damages, including 
the damage of interfering with a man's business by 
some means, when the damage is done, not for its own 
sake, but as an instrument in reaching the end of vic- 
tory in the battle of trade. The only debatable ground 
is the nature of the means by which such damage may 
be inflicted. It may be done by the refusal or with- 
drawal of various pecuniary advantages, which, apart 
from this consequence, are within the defendant's law- 
ful control. It may be done by the withdrawal or 
threat to withdraw such advantages from third persons 
who have a right to deal or not to deal with the plain- 
tiff as a means of inducing them not to deal with him 
either as customers or servants. . . . I have seen the 
suggestion made that the conflict between employers 
and employed is not competition. Certainly the policy 
is not limited to struggles between persons of the same 
class competing for the same end. It applies to all 
conflicts of temporal interests/' 2 

*Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins, 1897. 83 Fed. 912, 932. 

2 Vegelahn v. Guntner, Mass., 1890. Italics are the author's. 



216 BOYCOTTS 

Justice Holmes' contention that the same principle 
should apply in the competitive struggle between 
classes as in that between business rivals, is affirmed by 
Mr. Jeremiah Smith. He declares : 

"In a controversy between employer and work- 
men in respect to wages, hours, etc., both parties have 
the rights of business competitors in the broad sense. 
There is a conflict of temporal interests between buyers 
and sellers of labor; in general, 'whatever one party 
gains, the other loses.' ni 

The similarity of the two forms of competition is 
also pointed out in a North Carolina case. 2 

"A carpenter or joiner has, by his apprenticeship, 
study and experience, acquired skill and knowledge in 
his trade. His capital consists in his physical strength 
and his intellect, trained and directed by his skill and 
experience. It is the use of this which, in a sense, he 
offers for sale. In what respect, for the purpose of 
securing the prices for his labor on the best terms, do 
his rights differ from the man who has cotton for sale, 
the product of his capital — land and labor — or the man 
who has money to invest in mercantile or manufactur- 
ing enterprise? Each of them enters into the field of 
competition. Each finds that organization with others 
engaged in the same field of labor or investment will 
secure better results and fairer treatment from those 
with whom he deals." 

Judge Caldwell in the Oxley Stave case takes a 
similar position. 

Mr. Jeremiah Smith insists on the application of the 
same principles to both business and labor struggles: 

"If the issue of bad motive can be thus raised in 
labor conflicts, it must also be allowed in cases of or- 

1 Harvard Law Review, v. 20, pp. 357, 358. Italics are the au- 
thor's. 
3 State v. Van Pelt, No. Car., 1904, 49 S. E. 177, 184. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 217 

dinary trade competition, a very wide field. We think 
that the rarely occurring punishment of a personal 
enemy, who has masked his hostility under the guise of 
competition, would not offset the harm caused honest 
competitors by their being compelled to litigate the 
question of the fairness of their motives whenever as- 
sailed by a disappointed rival." 1 

In the waging of labor disputes, he avers, there are 
so many mixed motives involved — the motives of one 
boycotter being markedly different from those of his 
fellow — that it is exceedingly dangerous to labor to 
have the legality of their actions tested on the ground 
of malicious or legitimate motives. Mr. Darling 
writes : 

"Least of all should the law, in cases of mixed mo- 
tives, allow an issue as to which was the dominant mo- 
tive. In the struggle between labor and capital, each 
striving for the advantage, as in the struggle between 
capital and capital, passions are engendered that doubt- 
less lead contestants at times to think more of injuring 
their opponents than of benefiting themselves, but the 
legality of their conduct must surely be tested by gen- 
eral considerations, arising from the relations of the 
parties, and like matters, and not by the quality of the 
motives in any particular instance. In a contest in- 
volving strikes and boycotts, one man, who is of lower 
instincts, may act principally from motives of revenge ; 
another, who is high minded, from a desire to elevate 
himself and his fellow workmen." 2 

It is again maintained that this doctrine leads to 
speculations by juries regarding internal standards of 
conduct which end in great injustice. Lord Mac- 
Naughten thus states, in Allen v. Flood: 

"Against spite and malice the best safeguards are 
to be found in self interest and public opinion. Much 

1 Harvard Law Review, v. 20, p. 454. Italics are the author's. 

2 Am. Law Reg., v. 43 N. S., p. 110. 



218 BOYCOTTS 

more harm than good would be done by encouraging or 
permitting inquiries into motives, when the immediate 
act alleged to have caused the loss for which redress 
is sought is in itself innocent or neutral in character, 
and one which anybody may do or leave undone with- 
out fear of legal consequences. Such an inquisition 
would, I think, be intolerable, to say nothing of the 
probability of injustice being done by juries in a class 
of cases in which there would be ample room for specu- 
lation and wide scope for prejudice 



»i 



Mr. Justice Holmes declares it "a dangerous prin- 
ciple to leave his liability to be determined by a jury 
upon the question of his malice or want of malice, ex- 
cept in those cases where the words spoken were 
false," 2 while Mr. Darling is of the belief that the con- 
sideration of motives leads to "uncertainty and would 
make the same act under the same circumstances legal 
in one person and illegal in another." 3 

That the natural consequence of the consideration of 
motive is a discrimination against labor unions, be- 
cause of the failure of the court to see the justification 
of certain forms of labor union activities, is the belief 
of Mr. G. R. Askwith, one of the most prominent of 
the English attorneys. Mr. Askwith stated that within 
his memory there was not one case in which, upon the 
grounds of advance of the interest of labor, the men 
had won. 4 Sidney Webb at the same inquiry main- 
tained that the judges had never admitted, as far as 
he knew, that the maintenance of a standard rate of 
wages was a valid object of public policy, although this 
had long since been admitted by the world of political 
economy. He averred that the judges were for the 

1 Allen v. Flood, 67 L. J. Q. B. 119, 199. 
2 Vegelahn v. Guntner, Mass., 1890. 

3 American Law Register, v. 43, p. 115. 

4 Report of minutes of evidence taken before Royal Commission, 
p. 42. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 219 

most part still expounding the political economy of 
the eighteenth century. 

In discussing the English law of conspiracy before 
1906, under which boycotting had been condemned on 
account of the presence of so-called malicious mo- 
tives, Sir Godfrey Lushington of the Royal Commis- 
sion vividly portrayed the unfavorable position of the 
worker. He declared: 

"That by this law workmen engaged in a trade dis- 
pute are placed at a special disadvantage cannot be 
doubted. It is only necessary to realize the course of 
an action of conspiracy to injure brought against work- 
men for their conduct with reference to a strike. . . . 
A strike, being an industrial war, there are present of 
necessity all the elements of conspiracy to injure, viz. : 
harm, intention to do harm, combination to do harm. 
For justification the defendants have nothing to offer 
but the plea of self interest. To rebut this . . . the 
plaintiff alleges bad motive. This, too, can never be 
wanting. For every strike, every act of every strike, 
is necessarily a hostile operation, the employees have 
always the object to force the employer to change his 
mode of business — just as the employer's object is to 
force upon the workmen terms of their employment — 
and this is regarded by the law as an evil motive. 

"Then the question is put to the jury : 'Did the defend- 
ants act from the motive to do harm to others or from 
the motive to benefit themselves? Or did they act more 
from the one motive than the other?' A question as 
difficult to answer as would be a question concerning a 
soldier who, after taking aim, fired off his rifle in time 
of battle, whether his predominant motive was to help 
his country or to hurt his enemy. But the jury have to 
answer and this answer can hardly fail to be unfavor- 
able. Not to speak of their probably not including in 
their number any workingman, nor to impute to them 
the common bias of assuming all strikers to be distur- 
bers of industry and insurgents against lawful authority, 
nor to suppose that in matters of political economy they 



220 BOYCOTTS 

are prejudiced in favor of the theory of individualism 
and opposed to that of collective action, the jury will 
have presented to them the picture of strikers angry 
and excited, and of the loss and distress which are the 
visible and immediate consequences of a strike and 
have been intentionally caused by the strikers; and 
when the question is thus put to them it would be 
strange indeed if they did not attribute the intentional 
acts of the strikers rather to a desire to inflict these 
evils than to the hope of advantages to be obtained if 
the strike is successful — advantages unseen, remote, 
and a matter of indifference to the jury. The truth, 
nevertheless, trade unionists would urge, is the con- 
trary. 

"In a strike, as in trade competition, there may be, 
in most cases there probably is, ill feeling on both 
sides, at all events after the strike has gone on for 
some time, but no strike was ever either commenced or 
maintained out of spite to master or man, any more 
than a lockout was ever declared by employers to spite 
the employed. . . . Moreover, in every organized 
trade a strike is simply a matter of policy for the trade 
union." 1 

The utter lack of agreement as to the meaning of 
malice, and the confusion to which the use of such a 
word inevitably leads, are put forward as still another 
reason why it should not be considered in deciding on 
the legality or illegality of boycotts. The many mean- 
ings of the word are thus instanced by Professor J. B. 
Ames: 

"Malice as used in the books means sometimes 
malevolence, sometimes absence of excuse, and some- 
times absence of motive for the public good. If so 
'slippery' a word, to borrow Lord Bowen's adjective, 
were eliminated from legal arguments and opinions, 
only good would result." 2 Sir Frederick Pollock calls 

1 Report of Royal Commission on Trade Disputes, etc., p. 88. 

2 Harvard Law Review, v. 18, p. 422. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 221 

it "that perplexed and perplexing word." 1 "It seldom 
has any meaning except a misleading one," affirmed Sir 
James Fitzjames Stephen, in Allen v. Flood. 

Dr. Bishop wrote of "wilfully" and "maliciously": 

"Their appropriate place is in criminal pleading. In 
discussions of the law itself they are sometimes neces- 
sarily employed; but their principal uses are found to 
be to overcloud and bewilder the mind of the reader, 
and to convey away from the writer's mind ideas too 
misty for distinct utterance." 2 

The London Times, expressing the lay conception, 
spoke of malice as "that word which means so much 
and so little, and the learning about which is half the 
stock in trade of an English lawyer." 3 

"Sometimes, indeed, I rather doubt whether I quite 
understand that unhappy expression myself," admitted 
Lord MacNaughten in Allen v. Flood. Sir William 
Markly declared that the refusal to consider this 
"phantom," "malice at law," would save endless con- 
fusion. 4 

Many affirm that this confusion in the word itself 
leads to a confusion in the whole law of civil liability, 
and to injurious results. The unwisdom of allowing 
the consideration of this principle was vigorously 
enunciated by Mr. Arthur Cohen, in his memorandum 
before the Royal Commission of Great Britain : 

"To introduce such a fundamental principle (the 
theory that intentionally to cause damage to another 
person in the absence of reasonable cause is an action- 
able tort) would be in the highest degree unwise and 
inexpedient, inasmuch as it would make the whole law 
of torts vague and uncertain, until a great quantity of 

1 14 Law Quarterly Review, p. 132. 

2 1 Bishop Criminal Law, Section 261. Italics are the author's. 

3 London Times Editorial, July 27, 1895. 

4 Elements of Law, 5 Ed., Sec. 687; Cooley, Torts, 2 Ed., p. 692, 



222 BOYCOTTS 

new judge-made law had determined in what cases 
there are and in what cases there are not reasonable 
cause and justification." 1 

In fact, it is stated, the use of the word is entirely 
unnecessary and futile. Mr. Krauthoff again states : 

"The scope of these definitions, when closely an- 
alyzed, is that 'malice consists in doing a wrongful act 
to the damage of another.' And, self-evidently, that 
word is wholly unnecessary to explain that thought." 2 

In the discussion of the civil remedy for boycotts, 
much controversy has occurred in American courts as 
to whether malice or motive is in truth an element that 
can be considered in an action for damages. Many 
jurisdictions have answered that question in the nega- 
tive. Even though it can be proved that unionists 
combine maliciously to injure the trade of another, 
there can be no legal redress, they affirm. The incon- 
sistency of making motive an element in civil liability is 
thus stated by Mr. John H. Wigmore : 

"There is no more persistent and yet unfounded 
notion than that motive, I do not say intention, can 
become the turning point of civil liability, no notion 
more fitted to reverse legal relations and to make chaos 
out of definite principles." 3 

Mr. Darling is of the opinion that, "generally 
speaking, malice does not give a cause of action, except 
by legislation, and in the few instances of defamation, 
etc., which has a special explanation." 4 

That malice, at least "in its popular sense, namely, 
as meaning hatred, ill will, or other morally bad mo- 
tive, can no more transform an otherwise lawful act 
into a wrong than the best of motives can justify the in- 

1 Report of Royal Com., etc., p. 30. 

2 Krauthoff, Am. Bar Assoc., Proceedings of, 1898, p. 350. 
3 American Law Rev., v. 21. p. 520. 

4 American Law Register, v. 43, p. 115. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 223 

vasion of another's right" is the belief of Mr. L. C. 
Krauthoff. 1 Judge Mitchell of Minnesota is of like 
opinion : 

"If the act be lawful, — one which the party has a 
legal right to do, — the fact that he may be actuated by 
an improper motive does not render it unlawful. As 
said in one case, 'the exercise by one man of a legal 
right cannot be a legal wrong to another,' or, as ex- 
pressed in another case, 'malicious motives make a bad 
cause worse, but they cannot make that wrong which 
in its own essence is lawful! " 2 Many are the Ameri- 
can and English decisions almost identical in wording. 

The word was invented in legal procedure, accord- 
ing to Mr. L. C. Krauthoff, as a result of the recog- 
nition of the errors underlying the notions of mediaeval 
days, that the civil remedy was available only for such 
torts as involved the elements or essence of criminal 
acts, and, at the other extreme, that the law gave a 
remedy for every act causing loss to another. An 
intermediate ground was naturally sought for. 

"Conservatism prompted the tendency to adopt a 
portion of each of two theories," he declared, "at least 
in spirit; and it is believed that in this way an expres- 
sion has crept into the reports, precedents and treatises 
which has done more to confuse and obscure legal 
principles than perhaps all other verbiage combined — 
the word 'malice' and its derivatives." 3 

In the few instances in which malice is used in tort 
proceedings, it is employed in a different manner from 
its use in conspiracies in labor disputes. In most other 
instances malice does not render a legal act illegal, but 
operates only in those cases where the act is, without 
the element of malice, considered a wrongful one. It 

1 Krauthoff, op. cit., p. 339. 

2 Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, Minn., 1893, 55 N. W. 1119, II2I. 

3 Krauthoff, op. cit., p. 338. 



224 BOYCOTTS 

deals with external, not internal, standards of conduct. 
Mr. Krauthoff declares on this point: 

"The measure of damage apart, there is no phase 
of the law of torts in which malice, in the sense of an 
active intention to harm, is an essential ingredient. 
The only intent, so called, which enters into a cause 
of action for tort is that which the law attaches to and 
deduces from the doing of an act in question — the ex- 
ternal standard. . . . L A wrongful act done intention- 
ally and without justifiable cause or excuse has no refer- 
ence to a mental state or to a motive which impelled 
the action, but merely defines the illegal inference from 
the unlawful act done." 1 

In tort the doctrine is used in malicious prosecution 
and in privileged communications in libel. In both 
these cases, before one can be convicted, there must be 
proof of a wrongful act. They relate to a liability for 
false statements, and the question arises as to what 
degree of fault is necessary to create liability there- 
for. 

In slander of title, another case in which malice is 
supposed to operate, the action is said to be a species 
of deceit in which scienter, a sense of knowledge but 
not of motive, is in issue. Special damage must here 
be shown. According to Krauthoff, the action for en- 
ticing a servant from his master originated when the 
status of the servant was akin to property, and when 
the accepted rule was that "every master has, by his 
contract, purchased for a valid consideration the serv- 
ices of his domestics." (Based on Statutes 23, Edw. 
III.) Persuasion here can only be actionable where 
illegal means are used. In this action malice means 
nothing more than notice, according to Judge Cromp- 
ton (Lumley v. Gye, 2 E. and B., 216). 2 Many, 

1 Krauthoff, op. cit., p. 343. 

2 For fuller discussion of meaning of malice in various actions, see 
ibid., pp. 345-349- 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 225 

therefore, argue that malice should not be considered 
in boycott cases. Already an exceedingly large num- 
ber of judges have come to the conclusion that it 
should not be considered an element in tort, and many, 
indeed, that it should not be applied in criminal or 
equitable procedure involving the boycott or general 
conspiracy cases. The word is not understood. Its 
use leads to confusion of thought, to uncertainty as to 
the rights of individuals, to too great power on the 
part of judge and jury, and to a discrimination against 
labor in its struggles. If it can be considered only in 
cases where a wrong has been committed, its use is 
unnecessary. 

It is considered an element in but few torts, and not 
in the sense that it is used in boycott cases. The doc- 
trine, furthermore, is not employed in the same man- 
ner in cases of trade competition. If it were, a very 
large proportion of the business of the country would 
constantly be interfered with by the law of conspiracy. 

To the argument that boycotts are waged without 
justifiable cause and are against public policy, the de- 
fender of the boycott declares that that contention can 
only be proved by a close examination of the conditions 
of labor, the relation of its condition to the well being 
of society, the weapons at labor's command, the effec- 
tiveness of the boycott in obtaining better conditions, 
the weapons used by the employing class necessitating 
the use of the boycott, and many other problems con- 
nected with social and economic progress. This ex- 
amination, he contends, has not been made by the 
judiciary. If made impartially it is his belief that boy- 
cotting would prove to be a justifiable activity. 



Doctrine of Interest 

In many instances where the doctrine of malice or 
of justifiable cause has been applied by the courts in 



226 BOYCOTTS 

cases of boycotting and blacklisting by business men, it 
has been decided that these boycotts did not contain 
the element of malice, or were justified because the de- 
fendant had a legitimate interest to uphold. Their 
interest in increasing their business or in obtaining 
good help was sufficient to eliminate all questions of 
malice. Not so, however, when boycotts in labor dis- 
putes were concerned. Where, asked the courts, could 
be found the interest which the striker or unionist had 
to safeguard by means of his boycotting campaign? 
Because the contract relation between the striker and 
employer had ceased they failed to recognize that the 
men still had a considerable interest in the conduct of 
the firm. Referring especially to labor boycotts, Mr. 
Darling explains i 1 

"Supposing a case of inducing is made, that is, sup- 
posing the defendants ask to have the plaintiffs dis- 
charged, the defendants, if they are fellow workmen 
with the plaintiffs, or represent fellow workmen, are 
acting within their rights, because they have an interest 
in who shall be their fellows; their safety, comfort, 
convenience and personal pleasure are concerned." 

The same is true with attempts on the part of work- 
ers to induce others to cease to patronize their former 
employers. The boycotters cannot be placed in the 
same category with the outside public who have no 
interest to subserve. The success of their struggle will 
mean better hours, wages and other conditions for 
large numbers of them. The same is the case, though 
perhaps to a less extent, with other members of organ- 
ized labor who assist in the boycotting. In the modern 
complex industrial world it is becoming more and more 
true that the interest of one worker is the interest of 
all, and the outcome of one struggle may vitally affect 
the conditions of employment in other lines which seem 
to be but remotely related. 

1 Am. Law Register, v. 43, p. 95. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 227 

The argument that the workers have no such in- 
terest is on a par with that formerly so prevalent 
among employers — "I am going to run my business as 
I see fit, and will brook no dictation from my hands." 

j 

Doctrine of Free Speech and Press 

That the right of free speech and free press is denied 
when unionists are enjoined from stating their stories 
to the public and asking for its support is the firm 
belief of many well-known jurists. These claim that 
if a wrong has been done to the employers through the 
issuance of false statements the latter can call into play 
the law of libel. They contend that the possibility of 
not being able to recover damages in a suit at law 
does not warrant the injunctive process, as such a 
holding would prejudice the poor man. One of the 
most vigorous arguments against the use of the injunc- 
tion to prevent the publication of a boycott, on the 
ground that such use would seriously interfere with 
the right of free speech and free press appears in the 
well-known Missouri case, as follows: 

"The security of individual rights . . . cannot be 
too frequently declared, nor in too many forms of 
words," writes Judge Sherwood, quoting Cooley, "nor 
is it possible to guard too vigilantly against the en- 
croachment of power, nor to watch with too lively a 
suspicion the propensity of persons in authority to 
break through the cobweb chains of paper constitu- 
tions." (2 Story, Const., Sec. 1938.) 

"Wherever the authority of injunction begins, there 
the right of free speech, free writing or free publication 
ends. No halfway house stands on the highway be- 
tween absolute prevention and absolute freedom. . . . 
Nor does it . . . change the complexion of this case 
by reason of its being alleged . . . that the defend- 
ants and each of them are without means. . . The 
Constitution is no respecter of persons. The impecuni- 



228 BOYCOTTS 

ous man 'who hath not where to lay his head' has as 
good right to free speech, etc., as the wealthiest man in 
the community. ... In short, the exercise of the 
right of free speech, etc., is as free from outside inter- 
ference or restriction as if no civil recovery could be 
had or punishment inflicted because of its unwarranted 
exercise. . . . 

"If these defendants are not permitted to tell the 
story of their wrongs, or, if you please, their supposed 
wrongs, by word of mouth or with pen or print, and to 
endeavor to persuade others to aid them by all peace- 
able means in securing redress of such wrongs, what 
becomes of free speech, and what of personal liberty? 1 
The fact that in exercising that freedom they thereby 
do plaintiff an actionable injury does not go a hair 
toward a diminution of their right of free speech, etc., 
for the exercise of which, if resulting in such injury, the 
Constitution makes them expressly responsible. But 
such responsibility is utterly incompatible with author- 
ity in a court of equity to prevent such responsibility 
from occurring." 

Judge Sherwood mentioned the existence of the Bill 
of Rights in Missouri, and quoted Judge Cooley as 
declaring that while these provisions continued in force 
"they are to remain absolute and unchangeable rules 
of action and decision . . . and all laws contrary 
thereto are void." 

Judge Garoutte of California takes the position that 
free speech is unlimited, and cannot be enjoined on the 
mere ground that it might injure another. 

"The right of the citizen to freely speak, write and 
publish his sentiments is unlimited, but he is responsible 
at the hands of the law for an abuse of that right. He 
shall have no censor over him to whom he must apply 
for permission to speak, write or publish. ... It is 
patent that this right to speak, write and publish cannot 

1 Marx & Haas v. Watson, Missouri, 1902, 67 S. W. 391, 394, 395, 
396. Italics are the author's. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 229 

be abused until it is exercised, and before it is exercised 
there can be no responsibility. The purpose of this 
provision of the Constitution was the abolishment of 
the censorship, and for the court to act as censor is 
directly violative of that purpose." 1 

Referring to Story's Equity of Jurisprudence, Sec. 
948a, he continues: 

"But the utmost extent to which courts of equity 
have gone, in restraining any publication by injunction, 
has been upon the principle of protecting the rights of 
property in the books or letters sought to be published. 
They have never assumed, at least since the destruction 
of the Court of »Star Chamber, to restrain any publi- 
cation which purports to be literary work upon the 
mere ground that it is of a libelous character and tends 
to the degrading or injuring of the reputation or busi- 
ness of the plaintiff who seeks relief against such pub- 
lication." 

"The right of free speech," states Darling, "implies 
the right to influence persons as to how they shall exer- 
cise their legal rights. . . . When one has the right 
to choose one of two courses, another has the right to 
address him, to argue the matter and to request him to 
choose one course rather than the other. . . . The 
law does not put a ban on the communication of ideas 
between responsible human beings." 2 

Referring to the clause in the constitution of the 
State of Montana: "No law shall be passed impairing 
the freedom of speech; every person shall be free to 
speak, write or publish whatever he will on any sub- 
ject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty," 
Judge Holloway, in the Lindsay case (1908), declares 
that "the individual citizen cannot be prevented from 
speaking, writing or publishing whatever he will on any 
subject." He maintains that the insolvency of the 

1 Daily v. Supreme Court, Calif., 1896, 44 Pac. 458, 450. 

2 American Lazv Register, v. 43, N. S., pp. 107, 108. 



2 3 o BOYCOTTS 

defendants made no difference in the carrying out of 
these constitutional provisions, and concludes: 

"To declare that a court may say that an individual 
shall not publish a particular item is to say that the 
court may determine in advance just what the citizen 
may or may not speak or write upon a given subject — 
is, in fact, to say that such court is a censor of speech 
as well as the press." 

Chief Justice Shepard quotes with approval Justice 
Fenner of Louisiana in his belief that the press, under 
the reactionary decisions given by some courts, "might 
be completely muzzled, and its just influence upon the 
public opinion completely paralyzed." 1 

Threats mid Coercion 

Boycotts have frequently been condemned by the 
courts on the ground that such illegal means as threats, 
intimidation and coercion were employed in their con- 
duct. In many cases, it is avowed, the reasoning of 
these judges often indicates an argument in a circle, 
and involves the wrong application of the word 
"threat," an application that cannot be found in trade 
competition or in other classes of cases. 

The following argument against a compound boy- 
cott is often heard: "A compound boycott is illegal 
because it involves a threat, and to threaten another is 
to use illegal means." If one asks what is the nature 
of the threat involved in this boycott, the reply is : 
"It is a threat to boycott a third person, unless he 
ceases dealings with (or boycotts) the boycotted 
firm." Thus an attempt is made to declare the ille- 
gality of a boycott on the ground that it involves a 
threat to boycott. 

However, to threaten to do a thing is not unlawful 
unless the threat is to do an illegal act. There is 

1 33 App. Cases, D. of C, 130, 132. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 231 

nothing illegal, for instance, in threatening not to pur- 
chase a box of candy. 

"Threats and intimidation," declared a Tennessee 
judge, "must be taken in their legal sense. In law a 
threat is a declaration of an intention or determination 
to injure another by the commission of some unlawful 
act, and an intimidation is the act of making one timid 
or fearful by such declaration. // the act intended to 
be done is not unlawful, then the declaration is not a 
threat in law, and the effect thereof is not intimidation 
in a legal sense." 1 

"As a general rule, even if subject to some excep- 
tions," declared Judge Holmes, 2 "what you may do in 
a certain event you may threaten to do — that is, give 
warning of your intent to do in that event, and thus 
allow the other person the chance of avoiding the con- 
sequences." 

Thus Judge Alton B. Parker, in the same vein, de- 
clares that, "when a man proposes to do that which he 
has a legal right to do, there is no law which prevents 
him from telling another, who will be affected by his 
act, of his intention." 

It thus appears that there is no threat in a legal 
sense unless there is an expressed intention to do an 
unlawful act. The only threat implied in the second- 
ary boycott against a third party is a threat to boycott. 
If one begins with the assumption that "to boycott" is 
illegal, then a threat to boycott is a threat to do an 
illegal act, and is also illegal. If, on the other hand, 
one assumes that "to boycott" is legal, then a threat 
to boycott is an expressed intention to do a legal act, 
and is legal. It is only possible, therefore, to reach 
the conclusion that a boycott, involving a threat to boy- 
cott a third party, is illegal if one begins with the as- 

1 Payne v. Railroad Co., Term., 1884, 49 Am. Rep. 666, 674. Ital- 
ics are the author's. 

2 Vegelahn v. Guntncr, Mass., 1896, 44 N. E. 1077, 10S1. 



2 3 2 BOYCOTTS 

sumption that to boycott is illegal, and, if one argues 
from that premise, why is it necessary to introduce the 
doctrine of threats? The whole reasoning is in a 
circle. 

Mr. Gompers thus sums up the legal contention : 

"It was said . . . 'The word in itself implies a 
threat.' Granted, but what kind of a threat? A threat 
to boycott. To say that boycotting is criminal be- 
cause the word boycott implies a threat to boycott is 
truly extraordinary reasoning. ... It is an attempt 
at proving a less doubtful proposition by assuming a 
more doubtful one to be indisputably true." x 

"When, for 'conspiracy,' we substitute 'agreement,' 
and for 'threats,' 'a notice,' the whole fabric of the 
plaintiff's case falls to the ground," declared Judge 
Caldwell. 2 

The doctrine of coercion and intimidation in boy- 
cott disputes, in many instances, depends on the fore- 
going reasoning as to what constitutes threats. To 
force a dealer to cease relations with the boycotted 
firm through threats constitutes coercion and intimida- 
tion, it is claimed. However, if the threat is one to 
do a lawful thing, it cannot result in coercion as ap- 
plied in law. "A man may threaten to do that which 
the law says he may do, provided that ... his mo- 
tive is to help himself," declares a New York judge. 3 

The coercion generally used simply gives a merchant 
a choice as to whether he desires to continue his 
dealings with the boycotted firm, thus losing the cus- 
tom of unionists and their friends, or whether he pre- 
fers to cease his profitable relations with the firm and 
retain a certain patronage. Every day merchants are 
forced to just such choices by their competitors. When- 

1 Industrial Commission Report, v. 7, p. 636. 

2 Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins, 1897, 83 Fed. 912, 924. 

3 Park & Sons Co. v. National Drug Assoc., N. Y., 1903, 175 N. Y. 
1, 20. 



LEGALITY OF THE BOYCOTT 233 

ever a competitor lowers his prices, the merchant must 
either do likewise, thus losing a certain profit on his 
sales, or continue his former prices and lose a part of 
his patronage. Yet the lowering of prices is not con- 
sidered a coercive measure. The man has to choose 
between two evils, but his choice is left free. 

In justifying a trade boycott and denying the exist- 
ence of coercion, a Minnesota judge declares : 

"If it (plaintiff company) valued the trade of the 
members of the association higher than that of the 
non-dealers at the same points, it would probably con- 
clude to pay (the commission exacted by the associa- 
tion) ; otherwise not. ... By the provision of the 
by-laws, if they (the members of the association) 
traded with the plaintiff, they were liable to be ex- 
pelled, but this simply meant to cease to be members. 
It was wholly a matter of their own free choice, which 
they preferred." 1 

In view of the inadequate and illogical application 
of the doctrines of combination, of illegal object, of 
immediate and ultimate results, of malice, of justifiable 
cause and of threats and coercion to the boycott, claim 
the advocates of this weapon, the secondary, and that 
form of the compound boycott not involving violence, 
should be held legal by the courts of the land. 

1 American Law Register, v. 43, p. 96. 



- CHAPTER XIV 

ATTITUDE OF COURTS TOWARD BOYCOTTING AND 
REMEDIES APPLIED 

Attitude of Our Courts Toward Boycotting 

In spite of the many reasons urged for the legaliza- 
tion of the boycott, it must be confessed that at the 
present time the great weight of authority both in 
federal and state courts has been against the secondary 
and compound boycott. 

If we first consider the decisions in the federal courts, 
we will find the boycott opposed at practically every 
point. Twice has the question been brought before the 
Supreme Court of the United States. In both of these 
cases, however, United States statutes have been in- 
volved, and the court has decided nothing as to the 
application of the common law doctrine of conspiracy 
applied by the state courts to this problem. In the 
recent Danbury Hatters' decision, made in 1908, it 
was held that boycotting, if interstate in its nature, 
could be reached by the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. 
Prior to this decision came the Debs case of 1895, in 
which the boycotting indulged in during the Pullman 
strike was declared to have been in violation of the 
Interstate Commerce Law and to have interfered with 
the United States mails. While the contempt case con- 
nected with the boycott of the Buck's Stove Company 
also came before this tribunal, the question decided 
was largely a technical one as to whether the boycotted 

234 



ATTITUDE OF COURTS 235 

company or the state could bring a suit for contempt. 
The court, however, took occasion to state that, in its 
belief, the restraining of publications, etc., whereby a 
boycott was unlawfully continued, did not constitute 
an abridgment of liberty of speech or of the press. 
In the last named case, the Supreme Court of the Dis- 
trict of Columbia and the Court of Appeals of that 
district had already decided that the "We Don't 
Patronize" list could be enjoined, as well as other 
forms of secondary and compound boycotting. 

The states in which some of the boycotts considered 
by the federal courts have originated are: California, 
Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Missouri, New 
York, South Dakota and Wisconsin. Prior to the rail- 
road boycott cases of 1893 to 1895, one federal court 
held that the Sherman law was applicable and one that 
it was inapplicable to boycotting. A typographical 
union of Ohio was also condemned for using this 
weapon. The railroad boycotts of the nineties have 
already been described. In the last few years, ex- 
cepting the Buck's Stove and Hatters' cases, the courts 
have given chief attention to the labor boycotts in the 
building trades. In one instance the courts have gone 
so far as to hold that it was lawful for unionists to per- 
suade fellow unionists in other factories to refuse to 
work, if their employer continued to manufacture goods 
for the boycotted firm. 

On the other hand, the United States Supreme Court 
has delivered an opinion in the Adair case which many 
unionists claim has virtually legalized the blacklist. 
Forms of trade boycotts have also been pronounced 
legal in South Dakota and Alabama, though illegal in 
some of the other jurisdictions. 

While there is not such general agreement regarding 
the illegality of the boycott in the state courts, and 
while several recent decisions have gone a long way 
toward legalizing it, the vast majority of state courts 



236 BOYCOTTS 

have, up to the present time, vigorously condemned it. 

As nearly as can be ascertained at the present writ- 
ing, the highest courts have flatly decided against boy- 
cotting of various kinds in some fourteen states. In 
three states, California, Montana and New York, the 
secondary boycott has been pronounced legal. In the 
first two named, that form of the compound boycott 
involving threats to boycott a third party, if he con- 
tinues to deal with the boycotted firm, is also con- 
sidered legal. 

In some twenty-five states of the union the courts 
of last appeal have not as yet passed upon the legality 
of boycotts in labor disputes. In four of these, how- 
ever, there are statutes specifically condemning boy- 
cotts, and in six others the decisions on trade boycotts, 
blacklists, etc., indicate that, if malice, threats or lack 
of legitimate interest are shown in the conduct of the 
boycott, the use of this weapon will probably be pro- 
nounced illegal. One of the lower courts in another 
of these states has decided against boycotting, so that 
it might be stated with some degree of accuracy that 
some twenty-jive states have definitely disapproved of 
the use of this device. 

In two of the twenty-five states, Rhode Island and 
Maine, the liberality of the courts regarding trade 
boycotts would indicate that, if the same line of reason- 
ing was applied, the legality of boycotts in labor dis- 
putes would be affirmed. The lower court in still an- 
other state, Oklahoma, has permitted a secondary boy- 
cott. Perhaps a total of five or six states can there- 
fore he classed as favoring the employment of the sec- 
ondary or mild forms of the compound boycott. 

More specifically, the twelve states in which the 
courts have flatly decided against secondary or com- 
pound boycotts of various kinds are : Connecticut, 
Massachusetts and Vermont in New England; Mary- 
land, New Jersey and Pennsylvania in the Middle At- 



ATTITUDE OF COURTS 237 

lantic States; Virginia in the South, and Illinois, Michi- 
gan, Minnesota, Missouri and Washington in the 
West. Those where labor boycotts only have been 
condemned are Louisiana and Wisconsin. In most of 
the states cited threats were proved, although threats 
to deprive third parties of patronage should they not 
accede to the demands are sufficient to spell out illegal- 
ity. Persuasion, providing malice can be worked out, 
might be sufficient in some of the states to secure the 
condemnation of this weapon, among them New Jersey, 
Illinois and Washington. 

The secondary boycotts have been pronounced legal 
in New York, Montana and California. The most 
noteworthy of the cases in point were Lindsay and 
Company v. Montana Federation of Labor (Montana, 
1908), Parkinson and Company v. Building Trades 
Council (California, 1908), Pierce v. Stablemen's 
Union (California, 1909), National Protective Asso- 
ciation v. Cummings (New York, 1902), and Mills v. 
United States Printing Company (New York, Appel- 
late Division, 1904). These are described elsewhere. 

The courts in Montana, Missouri and California 
have held that circulars advertising the boycott cannot 
be enjoined. A lower court in Ohio has decided like- 
wise. In New York there is considerable liberality 
about sending circulars. In Maryland and Pennsyl- 
vania, if boycott circulars state only the truth con- 
cerning the labor struggle, their publication will not 
be enjoined, nor will it be in Minnesota if no threats 
are expressed or implied. Such publication cannot 
be the cause of a criminal prosecution in North Caro- 
lina. In Oregon irreparable injury must be proved 
before an injunction is issued against the publication 
of circulars or against the unfair list. In Illinois and 
Minnesota unfair lists have been enjoined. In Ar- 
kansas a labor boycott, if unofficial, is not considered 
illegal. As previously stated, laws in Maryland and 



238 BOYCOTTS 

California have made it possible to boycott by peaceful 
means, without being subject to criminal prosecution. 

On the other hand, the courts of last resort in the 
following states have not passed upon the legality of 
boycotts in labor disputes: New Hampshire, Maine 
and Rhode Island in New England; Delaware in the 
Middle Atlantic States; Iowa, Indiana, Kansas, Ne- 
braska and Ohio of the North Central group : Ala- 
bama, Florida, Kentucky, Mississippi, Oklahoma, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and West Virginia 
in the South Central States, and Arizona, Colorado, 
Idaho, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, 
Utah and Wyoming in the West. 

The lower courts in Ohio have pronounced various 
forms illegal, however; while in Oklahoma and Colo- 
rado they are credited with having declared certain 
forms legal. In Indiana these lower courts have pro- 
nounced a labor boycott legal when not attended by 
threats. 

Among the aforementioned states where the highest 
courts have not directly decided on the legality of boy- 
cotts as applied to labor disputes, it might be gathered 
from other decisions that the New Hampshire, South 
Carolina and West Virginia courts would declare 
them illegal, should they be considered to contain the 
element of malice; Kentucky, if threats could be 
shown; Tennessee and Texas, should the court decide 
that the boycotters had no legitimate interest to pro- 
tect; and Mississippi, if either malice or threats was 
evidenced. In Maine and Rhode Island, where trade 
boycotts have been favorably treated, certain forms 
might be considered legal. 

The state and federal courts have applied criminal, 
civil and equitable remedies to boycotting. 1 

1 The courts have shown a somewhat more favorable attitude 
toward trade boycotts than toward boycotts in labor disputes. Trade 
boycotts which have possessed some elements of coercion have been 
declared legal by the highest courts of Rhode Island, Pennsylvania, 



ATTITUDE OF COURTS 239 

Legal Remedies 

Boycotters may be prosecuted by the state in the 
criminal courts; they may be sued by the party injured 
in civil courts; they may be enjoined by the courts of 
equity from continuing their boycotting activities. 

In criminal procedure boycotters are arrested, 
charged with violating those statutes which prohibit 
criminal conspiracy and other crimes. On conviction 
they are subject to imprisonment or fine. 

In the application of the civil remedy, individually 
or as a union, they are sued in a civil court for damages 
resulting to the business of plaintiff. The common law 
principles chiefly are applied in these cases. Actions 
giving rise to such cases are known as torts. 

Boycotters are also subject to the equitable remedy 
of injunction. The plaintiff, in this case, is required to 
show that the injunction is necessary in order to pre- 
vent an irreparable or unascertainable loss; and that 
there is no adequate remedy at law — that the resort to 
the law court would necessitate a multiplicity of suits 
or would not lead to a recovery of damages on account 
of the irresponsible character of defendants. If the 
injunction is not obeyed, contempt proceedings can be 
resorted to. 

Recently the boycott has been brought under the 
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust law. If found 

Tennessee, Maine and West Virginia. In about fifteen states they 
have been pronounced illegal. A number of the lower courts have 
also declared their legality. In Pennsylvania and Minnesota, where 
trade boycotts have received the approval of the courts, boycotts by 
laborers have been frowned upon. Courts in Massachusetts, New 
Jersey, Illinois, Indiana, Texas and Kentucky have also refused to 
declare certain forms of blacklists illegal. In Illinois, of the afore- 
mentioned states, a lower court has, however, pronounced blacklist- 
ing illegal. 

Inasmuch as the facts in the cases involving boycotts in labor 
disputes and in the . trade boycott and blacklisting cases are so 
widely different, however, it is difficult to draw any broad gen- 
eralizations regarding the application of legal principles to these 
groups. 



240 BOYCOTTS 

guilty, under this act, the defendants are liable for 
treble the amount of damages. An interference with 
interstate commerce must be shown in this case. 

It may again be noted, in conclusion, that the great 
majority of courts, federal and state, deciding on boy- 
cott cases, have expressed their disapproval of the use 
of the secondary and compound boycott, although a 
few courts have proclaimed the practice a legitimate 
one. In those states where the courts have pronounced 
boycotts illegal, the boycotter may be subject to a suit 
for damages, to a criminal prosecution or to an in- 
junction order. 



CHAPTER XV 

STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 

The English Law of Conspiracy 

The recent history of the changes in the English 
law of conspiracy is most enlightening. It indicates 
how confusing a guide in labor disputes is the common 
law doctrine of conspiracy, and how greatly it favors 
employer over employee. 

For many generations the law of conspiracy had 
been a serious impediment to the workers in their 
battle to organize. After much agitation a long step 
forward was taken in 1875, when a law of criminal 
conspiracy was passed in which it was declared that 
"an agreement or combination of two or more per- 
sons to do or procure to be done any act in contem- 
plation or furtherance of a trade dispute between em- 
ployers and workmen shall not be indictable as a con- 
spiracy if such act, committed by one person, would 
not be punishable as a crime." 

The act then proceeded to state definitely what deeds 
were illegal, all others not named in a labor dispute 
being permissible. 

The section (Section 7) imposing limits to trade 
union activity reads: 

Every person who, with a view to compel any other 
person to abstain from doing or to do any act which 
such other person has a legal right to do or abstain 
from doing, wrongfully and without legal authority, 

241 



242 BOYCOTTS 

( i ) Uses violence to or intimidates such other per- 
son or his wife or children, or injures his property; or 

(2) Persistently follows such other person about 
from place to place; or 

(3) Hides any tools, clothes or other property 
owned or used by such other person, or deprives him 
or hinders him in the use thereof; or 

(4) Watches or besets the house or other place 
where such other person resides, or works, or carries 
on business, or happens to be, or the approach to such 
house or place; or 

(5) Follows such other person with two or more 
other persons in a disorderly manner in or through any 
street or road, 

shall be liable to the same punishment provided by 
the other sections. 

As a result of this legislation trade unionists were 
free to act within wide limits without being subject to 
criminal action. However, the act did not relieve 
unionists from civil liability. A number of cases deal- 
ing with such liability in civil cases were decided in 
the nineties. 

Of those involving a trade boycott, the earliest was 
the Mogul case (1891). 1 Here a group of ship- 
owners, in an endeavor to monopolize the carrying 
trade between Hankow and the European ports, offered 
a rebate of 5% to all shippers who would ship only 
through them, and threatened to dismiss shipping 
agents who had anything to do with competing ship- 
owners. In some instances this threat was carried 
out. Plaintiffs, competing shipowners, as a result, 
were seriously injured. An action was brought against 
the boycotters, but was dismissed by the House of 
Lords. The court, maintaining that no legal right 
had been interfered with, concluded: 

"If no legal right has been interfered with, and no 
legal injury inflicted, it is vain to say that a thing might 
x 23 Q. B. O. 614, 1892. 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 243 

have been done by an individual, but cannot be done 
by a combination of persons." 

A few years after, in 1898, another example of a 
legalized trade boycott rose into prominence in con- 
nection with the Scottish Cooperative Wholesale So- 
ciety. 1 In this case the trading society induced sales- 
men not to supply the wholesale company, threatening 
to withdraw the Society's custom if they had any rela- 
tions with the stores. The court held that the object, 
that of preventing the plaintiffs from purchasing from 
a rival trading society, was legal, and that legal means 
were used. 

Soon after the beginning of the present century, in 
1902, an employer's blacklist was pronounced legal. 2 
Here, a secretary of a local trade union who ceased 
working for one member of a master builders' asso- 
ciation and obtained employment with another member, 
was discharged through the efforts of the federation. 
The court held that there was no evidence of any act 
done with the intention of injuring the worker. The 
King's Bench affirmed the decision. 

While these decisions, favorable to capital, were 
being handed down, others of a far different charac- 
ter, involving laborers, were being enunciated. In 
1893, f° r instance, in the now famous case of Temper- 
ton v. Russell, 3 a boycott by trade unionists was pro- 
nounced illegal. Here certain workmen advised three 
trade union societies to refuse to work for a certain 
builder named Brentano, because he bought supplies 
from the plaintiff. Hearing of this order and fearing 
a strike, Brentano withdrew his future custom. The 
unionists were held liable for damages. This is prob- 

1 Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow Flesher's 
Trade Defence Ass'n and others. 

3 Bulcock v. St. Anne's Master Builders' Federation and others. 
19 Times L. R., 27. 

3 1 Q. B.,715. 



244 BOYCOTTS 

ably the first case on record in England of the suc- 
cessful outcome of a civil suit for a conspiracy to 
injure. 

In Allen v. Flood, however, the courts adopted a 
more liberal attitude toward combinations of work- 
men. Certain trade unionists in this case objected to 
the employment of Messrs. Flood & Taylor on the 
wood work of a vessel, on the ground that they had 
previously been employed on the iron work of a ship, 
and that such dual employment was contrary to trade 
union rules. Allen, a delegate of the unions, was sent 
for by the objectors, and urged the firm to discharge 
the two men. The firm granted the request, where- 
upon Allen was sued. The jury brought in a verdict 
of guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict, 
but the House of Lords reversed it, and decided that 
Allen had violated no legal right of the shipwrights, 
and that it was immaterial whether or not the motives 
were malicious. 

This remarkable decision, however, was soon fol- 
lowed by another in the case of Quinn v. Leathern, 1 
which greatly modified, if it did not actually reverse, 
the shipwright case. This case originated in Belfast, 
Ireland, where the Journeymen Butchers' Association 
of that city, in an endeavor to unionize the meat shops 
of the land, called a master butcher in the north of 
Ireland to their meeting to have him explain why he 
employed two non-unionists. The butcher offered to 
pay a fine and have the men admitted to the trade 
union, but the union refused so to admit until a twelve 
months' period had expired. The butcher declined to 
discharge the men and a boycott followed. Some of 
the judges, in deciding against the defendants, took 
the ground that motive was material in combinations, 
though, according to Allen v. Flood, this was not the 
case when individuals only were concerned. They 

1 Appeal Cases for 1901, p. 495. 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 245 

also maintained that a right of the plaintiffs had been 
infringed. The two decisions introduced a legal situa- 
tion full of contradiction. Numerous other decisions 
on boycotts adverse to the workers were also re- 
ported. 1 

The policy which had been pursued in civil cases, 
therefore, of leaving the interpretation of the law of 
conspiracy solely to the judiciary led to endless con- 
fusion and to a discrimination against the laborer. Re- 
garding this confusion, Sir Godfrey Lushington of the 
Royal Commission declared: 

"The indefiniteness of the law of conspiracy to in- 
jure prevents it from being a practical guide of conduct 
to workmen as to what they may do in times of strike 
and what they must avoid. The mere fact that two 
make a conspiracy is enough in the case of unwritten 
law to produce confusion, where unspecified acts, lawful 
for individuals, are to be made unlawful when done in 
combination. But the law itself is unintelligible to 
workmen. The defendants in Quinn v. Leathern, after 
judgment had been given against them, must presum- 
ably have been at a loss to understand which in par- 
ticular of the acts done by them it was that, though not 
unlawful for individuals, was condemned as unlawful 
to be done in combination, or in what respect their 
strike differed from an ordinary strike against individ- 
ual non-unionists. They could only know that, review- 
ing their conduct as a whole, the House of Lords had 
pronounced their combination to be an oppressive com- 
bination, a conspiracy to injure. 

"The perplexity as to the scope of the law is not 
confined to workmen. / believe that it is no exaggera- 
tion to say that a lawyer is unable to advise a trade 

1 Carr v. National Amalgamated Society of House and Ship Paint- 
ers and Decorators, tried at Manchester Assizes, July 21 and 22, 
1903 (account in Labour Gazette, August. 1903, p. 215) : Trollope 
and Brothers v. The London Building- Trades Federation and others. 
1895 (72 Law Times New Series, p. 342) ; Huttley v. Simmons. 
1898; Boots v. Grundy, 1900 (82 Law Times, 769). 



246 BOYCOTTS 

union with any confidence on elementary points con- 
nected with a strike and with public order/' 1 

Mr. R. B. Haldane adds : 

"For myself, I should be very sorry to be called on 
to tell a trade union secretary how he could conduct a 
strike lawfully. The only safe answer I could give 
would be that, having regard to the divergent opinions 
of the judges, I did not know." 2 

The discrimination against the trade unionists which 
appears from a perusal of the various decisions is well 
brought out by Mr. Haldane. 

"By the constitution of a trade union a number of 
workmen agree to follow the decisions of the managing 
committee, just as the combination of steamship com- 
panies did, and their purpose, just as was the case with 
the steamship companies, is the furtherance of their 
own interests. To this end they delegated the power 
of guiding their actions to the committee and the sec- 
retary, but while the shipping companies may say to 
the port agents and small steamship companies: 'You 
shall not earn your livelihood, for we will not work 
with those who deal with you} a trade union secretary 
apparently may not say so. It seems that the distinc- 
tion between these two lay not in legal principle, but in 
the different complexion which the facts wear for the 
persons regarding them." 3 

Mr. Askwith also declared that the various deci- 
sions, commencing with the Mogul case, seemed to have 
given rise on many sides to the view that the law is 
"much more to the advantage of the employers than 
it can possibly be to that of the workmen, and that, 
in fact, it puts the workman in a position of having 

1 Quoted from Mass. Report of Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1907, 
p. 149, and Report of Royal Com., etc., p. 89. 

2 R. B. Haldane, Contemporary Review, v. 83, pp. 368, 369. 

3 Ibid., p. 368. Italics are the author's. 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 247 

continually to be coming to the law courts for the pur- 
pose of finding out what justification, according to the 
legal dicta, will enable him to escape from civil liabil- 
ity as a conspiracy, and from damages in paying for 
that civil liability." Sir Godfrey Lushington of the 
Royal Commission also expressed the same belief. 1 

It was with these criticisms of the law in mind that, 
in September, 1902, the Trade Union Congress de- 
manded "that legislation be enacted which shall clearly 
define the law of conspiracy so that what is legal for 
one man to do shall not be either a criminal offense or 
an act wrongful if done by many in combination." In 
a letter submitted to the members of Parliament by 
the Trade Union Congress Parliamentary Committee, 
on May 5, 1903, the unionists declared: 

"Acts when done by one person are legal, when done 
by a combination with others are actionable at common 
law as a conspiracy. . . . We respectfully desire on 
behalf of trade unions that under the Conspiracy Act 
the same rights shall be extended to actions done by 
persons in combination as to acts done by single oer- 



Partly as a result of this agitation, as well as that 
arising from the Taff Vale decision, a Commission on 
Trades Disputes and Combinations was appointed by 
King Edward on June 6, 1903, composed of The Right 
Honorable Andrew Graham Murray, Secretary for 
Scotland, Sir William Thomas Lewis, the recognized 
English authority on trade unions, Sir Godfrey Lush- 
ington, Mr. Arthur Cohen, and Lord Dunedin, three 
well-known jurists, and Mr. Sidney Webb. On Jan- 
uary 16, 1906, it made its report. In its hearings some 
fifty representatives of employers testified, besides 
fifteen miscellaneous witnesses. Because of a resolu- 

1 Royal Commission, etc., p. 88. 

- Report of minutes of evidence taken before Royal Commission, 
p. 13, question 138. 



248 BOYCOTTS 

tion of the General Congress of Trade Unions, no 
trade unionist testified before this body. The com- 
mittee did not have a single trade unionist among its 
members, most of the appointees being lawyers. In 
view of its membership and witnesses, a report preju- 
diced on labor's side would not have been expected. 

In January, 1906, the commission made a number 
of recommendations tending toward the legalizing of 
peaceful boycotts. They were among others : 

(Section 2) To declare strikes from whatever mo- 
tive, or for whatever purposes 1 (including sympathetic 
or secondary strikes), apart from crime or breach of 
contract, legal, and to make the act of 1875 to extend 
to sympathetic or secondary strikes. (Thus strikes in 
furtherance of a boycott would be legal.) 

(Section 4) To declare that an individual shall not 
be liable for doing an act not in itself an actionable 
tort only on the ground that it is an interference with 
another person's trade, business or employment. 

(Section 9) To enact to the effect that an agreement 
or combination by two or more persons to do or pro- 
cure to be done any act in contemplation or furtherance 
of a trade dispute shall not be the ground of a civil ac- 
tion, unless the agreement or combination is indictable 
as a conspiracy, notwithstanding the terms of the Con- 
spiracy and Protection of Property Act, 1875. 

These recommendations, coming, as they did, dur- 
ing the general elections, were sent in too late to have 
great weight in shaping the legislation of that year. 
The presence of the large number of Laborites in 
Parliament as a result of these elections, however, not 
only assured the passage of legislation as liberal from 
the standpoint of labor as had been recommended by 
the Commission, but, in some instances, as in the liabil- 
ity of the unions to be sued, of a much more advanced 
character. 

1 Italics are the author's. 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 249 

The Trades Disputes Act, following the report of 
the commission, became a law December 21, 1906. It 
contained five sections. The recommendation of the 
Commission in Section 9, practically declaring the le- 
gality of a boycott, was embodied in the Trades Dis- 
putes Act, although in different phrasing, as follows : 

"An act done in pursuance of an agreement or com- 
bination by two or more persons shall, if done in con- 
templation or furtherance of a trade dispute, not be 
actionable unless the act, if done without any such 
agreement or combination, would be actionable." 

This section was to follow the first paragraph of 
Section 3 of the Conspiracy law of 1875. The law 
also provided that 

"An act done by a person in contemplation or fur- 
therance of a trade dispute shall not be actionable on 
the ground only that it induces some other person to 
break a contract of employment, or that it is an inter- 
ference with the trade, business or employment of some 
other person, or with the right of some other person to 
dispose of his capital or of his labor as he wills." In 
this, Parliament went further than the committee's 
recommendation. 

It also declared that no suit for damages against a 
trade union or its members, for an injury committed in 
behalf of the union, shall be entertained by a court. 
The position of the commission was much more con- 
servative on this last point. Subsection 4 of Section 7 
of the 1875 Conspiracy Act was virtually repealed by 
the enactment of the following: 

"It shall be lawful for one or more persons, acting 
on their own behalf or on behalf of a trade union or of 
an individual employer or firm in .contemplation or 
furtherance of a trade dispute, to attend at or near a 
house or place where the person resides or works or 



250 BOYCOTTS 

carries on business or happens to be, if they so attend 
merely for the purpose of peacefully obtaining or com- 
municating information, or of peacefully persuading 
any person to work or abstain from working." 

While there is no mention here of the boycott, it is 
clearly seen that a trade union shall not be held civilly 
liable for any boycott prosecuted by them, and that a 
boycott, so long as it does not involve the doing of 
certain specially proscribed acts, is actionable neither 
civilly nor criminally. The question of the lack of rea- 
sonable cause, of maliciousness, of the remoteness of 
the benefit, of the coercive power contained in threats 
to injure the business of another, does not enter into 
the problem. 1 

The boycott, as it exists in America, however, has 
never made itself felt in England to any great extent. 
"The usual British boycott," wrote John Burnett in 
1 89 1, 2 "aims only at preventing the employer from 
obtaining other men, or from getting his work done at 
other places, but we are almost entirely strangers to 
that form of trade interdict which aims at compelling 
the surrender or ruin of an obstinate employer by 
stopping the sale of his goods." 

Mr. Burnett speaks of the attempts of the London 
Bakers and the London Boot and Shoe Makers to 
boycott in the American style a few years prior, which 
boycotts were attended with no great success. 

Mr. Gompers claims that the Trades Disputes Act 
has not had the effect of legalizing the boycott, 3 and 
cites an instance where it was considered actionable for 
an agent of a musicians' union to issue handbills ask- 
ing the public to patronize a theater competing against 
one, the employees of which were on strike. The 

1 For a thorough discussion of the English situation, see Seager, 
The Legal Status of Trade Unions in the United Kingdom, etc., 
Pol. Sc. Qtrly., v. 22, 'No. 4. 

"John Burnett, Economic Journal, v. 1, pp. 172 et seq. 

3 Gompers, Labor in England and America, p. 31. 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 251 

court, however, took the ground that the strike was 
over when the circularizing occurred, inasmuch as the 
manager had by that time procured other musicians to 
take the places of the strikers. 

Germany 

While the law of 1869 in Germany imposed penal- 
ties upon those who "coerced others by violence, threat 
and interdiction, or otherwise," 1 a form of boycotting, 
involving the persuading of the general public to cease 
their dealings with a third party, and the threatening 
of fellow members of a labor union, has been declared 
by the German Imperial Court not actionable in dam- 
ages. 2 The decision on this question was rendered 
July 12, 1906. As the court is divided into a number 
of senates, it does not follow that the decision would 
meet with the approval of each group of judges. 

A dispute arose in March, 1904, between master 
bakers and their employees, in which the employees 
demanded that they be paid additional cash instead of 
food and lodging, and asked for a minimum wage. A 
strike followed, and the leaders, through the Social 
Democratic papers and pamphlets, gave an exposition 
of the workers' claims, and asked that those residing 
near the seat of trouble patronize those bakers who 
yielded, publishing a list of fair dealers. The labor 
federation resolved to boycott the recalcitrant employ- 
ers, and issued a manifesto to organized labor, urging 
them to take part in the boycott, and threatening to 
have the members called to account should they refuse. 

The master bakers thereupon brought an action to 
restrain the future publication of the boycott, and to 
secure damages based on Trade Code No. 153, which 
forbids the use of coercion in joining a combination, 

J Law of June 21, 1869, Art. 153. 

2 Freund, Journal of Political Economy, v. 14. pp. 573, 574: 
"Deutsche Juristenzeitung, September 15, 1506. 



2 5 2 BOYCOTTS 

and Civil Code No. 823, 6. The court refused the 
request of the plaintiffs. It said in part: 

"It is true that the imperial court has held repeatedly 
that a going concern is property, the injury for which 
may give rise to an action for damages. But not every 
action of another that causes damages is an unlawful 
injury, especially not an action which is merely an exer- 
cise of general and of economic liberty. Among lawful 
acts must be counted the formation of labor unions for 
the purpose of obtaining better conditions of work and 
of payment, and measures taken by such unions and 
their friends and adherents for this purpose are not 
illegal simply because they injure existing concerns. 
The only question is whether the measure taken in the 
present case goes beyond what is lawful in the wage 
and labor struggle. The boycott of tradespeople by 
labor unions is not unlawful per se. Boycotting and 
strikes alike are weapons, the former seeking to cur- 
tail the sale of goods, the latter seeking to hinder their 
production. One is neither more nor less permissible 
than the other. Both find their counterpart in the 
weapons used by employers — the strike in the lockout, 
the boycott in the blacklist. 

"The law prohibits the use of menace and coercion 
for the purpose of procuring and retaining adherents 
in the wage conflict, and it also protects the adversary 
against undue measures taken to force him to grant 
new terms of employment. 

"But by the threat that organized workmen not join- 
ing in the boycott would be called to account, it must 
be assumed that it was only meant that they would be 
expelled from their union in accordance with its by- 
laws. Such a threat is not unlawful, since the right to 
hold out certain coercive measures rests upon a special 
relation. 

"If the measure threatened is not punishable, the 
threat is not punishable. Neither in their purposes nor 
in the measures they used did the defendants violate the 
general rules of fair and proper conduct. It does not 



STATUS OF BOYCOTTS ABROAD 253 

matter whether their demands were justifiable or not. 
It is sufficient that they regarded them as justifiable. 
In their publicity they avoided personal recriminations, 
and in the main confined themselves to a request for 
aid by giving preference in dealing to concerns acced- 
ing to the workmen's demands. 

"Nor does it offend against the law of fair conduct 
to apply for aid to others not immediately concerned in 
the struggle. In similar manner there have been re- 
quests to avoid department stores in order to favor 
small concerns or to give preference to Christian trades- 
men. Through such means, the removal of real or 
alleged evils is frequently sought. The publication of 
circulars of this kind cannot be regarded as violating 
the rules of fair dealing." 1 

The nation-wide boycotts against beer have been 
among the most conspicuous in Germany during the 
past few years. 

Other Countries 

According to Grover G. Huebner, 2 the laws on the 
statute books of some of the more important countries 
of Europe in 1906 were as follows: 

Austria: The law of April 7, 1870, Art. 3, penal- 
izes violence, threats, and the forcing of others to 
enter combinations, or to retire from such combina- 
tions. There are no special laws against boycotts. 

Belgium: The law of May 31, 1866, modified the 
law of conspiracy, but the law of May 30, 1892, levies 
severe penalties against intimidation, mob rule and the 
breaking of tools. There is no special statute against 
boycotts. 

France: The Penal Code of France suspends the 
common law and regulates strikes and the use of in- 
timidation, threats, violence and similar acts. There 

1 Italics are the author's. 

2 Huebner, Boycotting, pp. 9-10. 



254 BOYCOTTS 

is no statute especially applicable to boycotts. If a 
strike is begun maliciously to injure the employer 
rather than to benefit the strikers, it calls for damages. 
Cass, 9 June, 1896, Mounier C. Renaud. Interfer- 
ence with employment by threats is prohibited. Cass. 
Ap., Caen., Oct. 21, 1897. 

Holland: The law of April 11, 1903, reinforces 
the penalties against violence and threats which were 
already provided for in the common law. There is 
no specific law against boycotts. 

Italy: Penal Code, Art. 155, etc. Similar to the 
French law. 

We see, therefore, that in none of these countries 
is there any specific law against boycotting, although in 
all of them there are statutes against intimidation 
which would probably be interpreted as applying to 
certain forms of boycotts. 

It is seen that in England there has been a growing 
liberality in the law of conspiracy, and that, by the 
statute of 1906, the boycott is virtually legalized, as 
is the boycott in Germany. In other countries of Eu- 
rope the status of the law is less definite, although their 
statutes against intimidation would probably be used 
in many instances against the employment of this de- 
vice. 



CHAPTER XVI 

EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE BOYCOTTS AND TENDENCIES 
TOWARD LEGALIZATION 

Many have been the endeavors to legalize boycotts 
in the United States by the introduction of anti-con- 
spiracy and anti-injunction bills, by amendments to the 
Sherman Anti-Trust law and by means of exempting 
clauses in the Sundry Civil bills. Contempt bills have 
also been aimed at the preventing of judicial abuse in 
boycott cases. 

One of the first efforts to pass pro-boycott legisla- 
tion was made in 1902 and 1903 through the intro- 
duction of the Hoar-Grosvenor Anti-Injunction and 
Anti-Conspiracy bills. The Pearre Anti-Injunction bill 
of 1908, the Wilson Anti-Injunction bill and proposed 
amendment to the Sherman law in 191 1, the Bartlett 
Anti-Injunction bill of 19 12, the Bartlett and Stan- 
ley Contempt bills of 19 13, the Clayton Anti-Injunc- 
tion and Contempt bills of 191 2 and 19 13, and 
the Sundry Civil bills of the last few years are among 
the most important of those thus far introduced. 

The Wilson bills, introduced by Secretary of Labor 
W. B. Wilson of Pennsylvania, had the solid support 
of the American Federation of Labor, and repre- 
sented, perhaps as few other bills did, the attitude of 
that organization. 

The anti-injunction and anti-conspiracy bills intro- 
duced by Mr. Wilson, then chairman of the Labor 
Committee of the House, June 2, 191 1, prohibited 

255 



25 6 BOYCOTTS 

the courts of the United States from issuing injunc- 
tions unless necessary to prevent an irreparable in- 
jury to property, and provided that the so-called rights 
of patronage and of employing others should not be 
construed into property rights. It also stipulated, 
following the legislation of England, that no act be 
considered a conspiracy or a civil or criminal offense, 
unless unlawful if done by a single individual. By its 
provisions secondary and certain forms of compound 
boycotts would be legalized. 

The amendment to the Sherman Anti-Trust law, in- 
troduced the same day by Mr. Wilson, provided that 
this law should not be made to apply to any organiza- 
tions not for profit or without capital stock. 

The Wilson Anti-Injunction Bill, H. R., 11,032, 
62nd Congress, was as follows: 

"A bill to regulate the issuance of restraining or- 
ders and procedure thereon, and to limit the meaning 
of 'conspiracy' in certain cases. 

"Be it enacted by the House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

"That no restraining order or injunction shall be 
granted by any court of the United States, or a judge 
or the judges thereof, in any case between an employer 
and employee, or between employers and employees, or 
between employees, or between persons employed and 
persons seeking employment, or involving or growing 
out of a dispute concerning terms or conditions of em- 
ployment, unless necessary to prevent irreparable in- 
jury to property or to a property right of the party 
making the application, for which injury there is no 
adequate remedy at law, and such property and prop- 
erty right must be particularly described in the appli- 
cation, which must be in writing and sworn to by the 
applicant or by his, her, or its agent or attorney. And 
for the purposes of this act no right to continue the 
relation of employer and employee, or to assume or 
create such relation with any particidar person or per- 



EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE BOYCOTTS 257 

sons, or at all, or patronage or good will in business, 
or buying or selling commodities, of any particular kind 
or at any particular place, or at all, shall be construed, 
held, considered, or treated as property or as constitut- 
ing a property right. 

"See. 2. That in cases arising in the courts of the 
United States or coming before said courts, or before 
any judge or judges thereof, no agreement between two 
or more persons concerning the terms or conditions of 
employment, or the assumption or creation or termina- 
tion of relation between employer and employee, or 
concerning any act or thing to be done or not to be 
done with reference to or involving or growing out of 
a labor dispute, shall constitute a conspiracy or other 
civil or criminal offense, or be punished or prosecuted, 
or damages recovered upon as such, unless the act or 
thing agreed to be done or not to be done would be 
unlawful if done by a single individual; nor shall the 
entering into or the carrying out of any such agree- 
ment be restrained or enjoined 1 unless such act or thing 
agreed to be done would be subject to be restrained or 
enjoined under the provisions, limitation, and defini- 
tions contained in the first section of this Act. 

"Sec. 3. That all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict 
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." 

The amendment to the Sherman Act proposed by 
Mr. Wilson, H. R. 11033, 62d Congress, read: 

U A bill to more clearly define the Act of July 2, 
1890, entitled 'An Act to protect trade and commerce 
against any unlawful restraints and monopolies.' 

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre- 
sentatives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That nothing in the act of Jidy 2, i8go, 
entitled, 'An Act to protect trade and commerce 
against any unlawful restraints and monopolies/ is in- 
tended, nor shall any provision thereof hereafter be en- 
forced, so as to apply to organizations or associations 
not for profit and without capital stock, nor to the 
1 Italics are the author's* 



258 BOYCOTTS 

members of such organizations or associations as such, 
except where such organization or association not for 
profit and without capital stock, or the members of 
such organizations or associations, shall become direc- 
tors or managers of corporations which are organized 
for profit and which have capital stock. 1 

"Sec. 2. That nothing in said Act of July 2, 1 890, is 
intended, nor shall any provision thereof hereafter be 
enforced, so as to apply to any arrangements, agree- 
ments, or combinations among persons engaged in agri- 
culture or horticulture made with a view of enhancing 
the price of their own agricultural or horticultural 
products when sold or offered for sale by themselves. 

"Sec. 3. That all Acts and parts of Acts in conflict 
with the provisions of this Act are hereby repealed." 

The last vigorous efforts to obtain the passage of 
the anti-injunction and contempt bills were those made 
in 191 2 by Congressman Clayton and his supporters. 
The Clayton Anti-Injunction Bill (H. R., 23,635), 
which prevented the use of the injunction against sec- 
ondary boycotts and which had the approval of organ- 
ized labor, was passed by the House on May 14, 19 12, 
by an overwhelming vote of 244 ayes to 31 nays, and 
was referred by the Judiciary Committee of the Sen- 
ate to a subcommittee of five, Senator Root, chairman, 
and there died, despite the protests of the A. F. of L. 
and others. 

The Clayton Contempt bill (H. R., 22,591), pro- 
viding for trial by jury for contempts occurring out- 
side the court, passed the house on July 11, 19 12, by 
a vote of 233 ayes to 18 nays, but died in the Senate 
Committee on Judiciary, without its having been re- 
ferred to the subcommittee for a hearing. 

In 1912 also the Bartlett Anti-Trust bill (H. R., 
23,189), which was favorably reported by the House 
Committee on Labor, April 22, 19 12, died on the 

1 Italics are the author's. 



EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE BOYCOTTS 259 

House calendar. The Bacon bill, S., 6,266, an iden- 
tical bill in the Senate, was never reported out of 
committee. 

In order to prevent the use of any appropriations 
made by Congress in prosecuting labor unions, amend- 
ments from time to time have been made to sundry 
civil bills. In 1909 Representative Hughes made such 
an amendment, but President Taft vetoed it. On 
February 20, 19 13, Congressman Hammill offered the 
following amendment to that portion of the bill ap- 
propriating $300,000 for the enforcement of the Anti- 
Trust laws : 

"Provided, however, that no part of this money shall 
be spent in the prosecution of any organization or indi- 
vidual for entering into any combination or agreement 
having in view the increasing of wages, shortening of 
hours or bettering the conditions of labor, or for any 
act done in furtherance thereof, not in itself unlawful." 

Representative Roddenbery added to the amend- 
ment an exemption to farmers' associations. 

"Provided, further, that no part of this appropria- 
tion shall be expended for the prosecution of producers 
of farm products or associations of farmers who co- 
operate or organize in the effort to obtain and main- 
tain a fair and reasonable price for their products." 

The amendments were passed by the House and the 
Senate, and were submitted, together with the many 
other provisions, to President Taft, March 4. Dis- 
approving these exemptions, President Taft returned 
the bill to Congress. The House of Representatives 
thereupon passed the bill over his objections by a vote 
of 264 ayes to 48 nays. The hour of adjournment ar- 
rived in the Senate before action could be taken, and 
the measure thus died. 

The same bill was repassed by the new Congress 



2 6o BOYCOTTS 

which was called together in special session by Presi- 
dent Wilson, and on June 23rd he signed it, at the 
same time expressing his disapproval of the practice 
of attaching riders to appropriation bills and his re- 
gret that he could not veto the riders without vetoing 
the whole bill. On the real point at issue he expressed 
no opinion. 

Several other bills were also presented in the Spring 
of 1 9 13, but with little likelihood of passage. Repre- 
sentative Henry introduced an amendment to the Sher- 
man law, exempting labor unions and agricultural as- 
sociations; 1 Representative Clayton, two Anti-Injunc- 
tion bills, 2 and Representatives Stanley, Clayton and 
Bartlett, contempt bills, 3 all of which were referred to 
the committee on the Judiciary. 

In affirming that there should be no law limiting 
combinations of labor, although certain forms of com- 
binations of capital are prohibited, trade unionists 
argue that the existence of such a law places labor at 
a great disadvantage. One worker is regarded as a 
unit of labor. A combination of two or more workers 
constitutes a combination. Their activities, if they 
are found guilty of boycotting, may be declared in 
restraint of trade, under the provisions of the present 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law. A unit of capital, on the 
other hand, may be a million-dollar corporation, thou- 
sands of times as powerful as a unit of labor, or even 
as most combinations thereof. Yet no attempt has 
been made to reach such a corporation under the Sher- 
man Law unless it has seemed likely to constitute more 
or less of a monopoly. 

Unionists, therefore, state that, while the oft-re- 
peated argument that the Sherman law treats capital 
and labor combinations alike seems most plausible, 

1 H. R. 2958, 63d Cong., 1 st Ses. 

2 Ibid., 4659, 5484, 63d Cong., 1st Ses. 

3 Ibid. , 5798, 571 1, 4660, 1871, 63d Cong., 1st Ses. 



EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE BOYCOTTS 261 

the equal enforcement of the law is, in reality, far from 
equitable in its results. 

Other reasons put forward for exempting labor 
from the provisions of the anti-trust law are that 
unions are organized not for profit, but for the mutual 
assistance of the laborers, and that labor is insep- 
arably connected with a human being, while capital 
is inanimate. 

Mr. Samuel Gompers thus differentiates the two 
forms of combinations : 

"The labor union is not a trust. None of its achieve- 
ments in behalf of its members — and society at large — 
can properly be confounded with the pernicious and 
selfish activities of the illegal trust. A trust, even at 
its best, is an organization of a few to monopolize the 
production and control the distribution of a material 
product of some kind. The voluntary association of 
the workers for mutual benefit and assistance is essen- 
tially different. Even if they seek to control the dis- 
position of their labor power, it must be remembered 
that the power to labor is not a material commodity. 

"There cannot be a trust in something that is not 
produced. The human power to produce is the an- 
tithesis of the material commodities which become the 
subject of trust control. . . . 

"Our unions aim to improve the standard of life, 
to uproot ignorance, and foster education; to instil 
character, manhood and independent spirit among our 
people; to bring about a recognition of the interdepend- 
ence of man upon his fellowman. We aim to establish 
a normal workday, to take the children from the family 
and workshop and give them the opportunity of the 
school, the home and the playground. In a word, our 
unions strive to lighten toil, educate our members, make 
their homes more cheerful, and in every way con- 
tribute an earnest effort toward making life the 
better worth living. To achieve these praiseworthy 
ends, we believe that all honorable and lawful means 
are both justifiable and commendable and should re- 



262 BOYCOTTS 

ceive the sympathetic support of every right-thinking 
American." 1 

"What is labor?" asked Mr. Gompers again. 2 "Is 
it an inanimate thing? . . . Labor is the effort of a 
human breathing man and woman. You can take capi- 
tal and transport it to the other end of the world. 
You cannot do that with labor. You cannot differen- 
tiate the labor of the man or the woman with the 
breathing, respiring body and heart and brain. . . . 
It is an abuse of the very essence of essential principles 
to place in the same category labor and capital. You 
can make regulations for capital and the owner of capi- 
tal may leave. You may not deprive even him of his 
own personal liberty, though you make all the regula- 
tions you may as far as concerns capital ; but you cannot 
make one regulation in so far as labor is concerned, in 
the ordinary acceptance of that term, without its affect- 
ing the laborer — his heart, his body, his brain." 

Tendencies Toward Legalization 

If we take a broad view of the evolution of the law 
of conspiracy, we are impelled to feel that that evolu- 
tion will continue until many forms of the boycott are 
legalized. All strikes were at one time declared illegal. 
Now many states hold that laborers can strike for any 
and all reasons. One by one the arguments which 
were used against the legality of strikes — practically 
the same as those now employed against boycotts — 
have been discarded. Strikes were declared to be un- 
lawful conspiracies. They injured the property of an- 
other, they coerced others against their will, they were 
malicious, their immediate effect was harmful. 

The arguments no longer obtain. Even strikes for 
the maintenance of the closed shop, which in many 
instances involve the boycotting of non-union men, are 

1 American Federationist, November, 1907. Italics are the au- 
thor's. 

2 Ibid., May, 1908. 



EFFORTS TO LEGALIZE BOYCOTTS 263 

frequently held legal. That the same evolution is 
likely to occur in the case of the boycott seems logical. 
England has legalized boycotting by statute. The 
German courts have recently taken an advanced posi- 
tion. Statutes in Maryland and California, following 
the English law, declare that it is not indictable for 
two or more to do that which it is lawful for one to 
do. The Montana, California and New York courts 
have decided in favor of the legality of secondary 
boycotts, while the former two states approve some 
forms of compound boycotts. State and national legis- 
lators are clamoring for their legality. Indications 
point to a considerable degree of success within the 
not distant future. If boycotts are legalized, however, 
such legalization will probably come largely through 
legislation, rather than through the judiciary. 



PART III 

BOYCOTTS IN THE LIGHT OF SOCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS 



CHAPTER XVII 

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS AGAINST THE 
BOYCOTT 

In view of the manner in which boycotts have been 
used and abused by unionists in labor struggles, the 
question arises as to whether, from the larger social 
and economic viewpoint, they should be legalized, or 
whether more stringent efforts should be made toward 
their suppression. 

Employers have, in the vast majority of cases, taken 
the latter view. They claim that boycotts, at least, 
the secondary and compound forms, are detrimental 
to the interests of the general public, since they fre- 
quently lead to mob violence and to the suppression of 
liberty of action; that they are unjust to the employ- 
ing class, placing it at a disadvantage in its struggles 
with labor and rendering it a victim to the tyranny and 
extortion of union leaders; and, finally, that they are 
injurious to the workers themselves. Their employ- 
ment alienates the sympathy of the public from the 
unionists' cause, diminishes the employment of many 
of their members, vitiates the unions with the disin- 
tegrating influences of corruption, diverts attention 
from saner and more effective methods of progress and 
maliciously interferes with the rights of the non-union 
worker. 

Many employers and conservatives, however, con- 
fine their disapproval to denunciatory utterances. Thus 

267 



263 BOYCOTTS 

the Brooklyn Daily Eagle a short time ago 1 charac- 
terized this instrument as a "dragon, slimy and re- 
pulsive, which had, for more than a quarter of a cen- 
tury, been a vague terror to independent workers and 
to large employers, at all times, materializing now and 
then as a concrete foe, insidious, treacherous, often 
triumphant." The Grand Jury in the Theiss Case 2 
described the particular kind of boycott before them 
as an accursed exotic, a "hydra-headed monster, 
dragging its loathsome length across the continent, 
sucking the very life blood from our trade and com- 
merce, equally harmful to employees and employers. " 
Another paper declared: 

"As frequently applied it is one of the most heartless 
and brutal manifestations of private revenge recorded 
in history and is calculated to call forth the abhorrence 
and just reprehension of all men who respect law and 
love liberty." 3 

In citing his reasons for the prohibition of the boy- 
cott from the social viewpoint, a Virginia judge de- 
clared that he saw in the boycott the beginnings of 
anarchy. He said: 

"The acts alleged and proved in this case are unlaw- 
ful and incompatible with the prosperity, peace and 
civilization of the country, and, if they can be per- 
petrated with impunity by a combination of irresponsi- 
ble cabals and cliques, there will be an end of govern- 
ment and of society itself"* 

The judge described the acts of the defendants as 
"constituting a reign of terror, which, if not checked 
and punished in the beginning by the law, will speedily 

1 May 16, 1910. 

2 Bureau of Statistics of Labor, New York, 1886, p. 747. 

3 American Bar Association, 1894, P- 3°7> quoting Mr. Charles C. 
Allen. 

4 Crump v. Commonwealth, Va., 1887. Italics are the author's. 



REASONS AGAINST THE BOYCOTT 269 

and inevitably run into violence, anarchy and mob 
tyranny." Again he affirms that it is "oppressive to 
the individual, injurious to the prosperity of the com- 
munity and subversive of the peace and good order of 
society." 

While commending the direct boycott, Prof. John 
B. Clark believes that the indirect boycott is an un- 
warranted interference with freedom: 1 

"To refuse to buy anything whatsoever from a mer- 
chant because he keeps in his stock a prohibited article, 
and sells it to a different set of customers, is interfer- 
ing, in an unwarranted way, with the freedom of a 
merchant and of the other customers." 

Many cases may be cited where the boycott has 
been injurious to parties having nothing whatever to 
do with the original dispute. Retailers, under con- 
tract relations with the boycotted firm, have been os- 
tracised financially because they failed to break their 
contracts; citizens have been boycotted because they 
purchased goods from stores whose owners rode in 
trolleys on which there was a strike; barbers, because 
they shaved strike-breakers. Competitors have fre- 
quently duped a trade union into boycotting a concern, 
and employers have been boycotted by one labor or- 
ganization because they acceded to the demands of a 
rival. The number of such instances may be multi- 
plied. Such activities, claim the opponents of the boy- 
cott, should not be tolerated. 

The use of the boycott, it is argued, is unjust to the 
employing class, as it permits laborers to become vir- 
tually the dictators of industry. The presiding judge, 
in an early New Jersey boycott case, thus views the 
danger: 

"Freedom of business action is at the foundation of 
all industrial and commercial enterprises. . . . If this 

1 Clark, Essentials of Economic Theory, p. 507. 



2 7 o BOYCOTTS 

privilege is denied them (the employers), if the man- 
agement of the^business is to be taken from the owner 
and assumed by, it may be, irresponsible strangers, 
then we will have come to a time when capital will seek 
other than industrial channels, when enterprise and de- 
velopment will be crippled, when interstate railroads, 
canals and means of transportation will become de- 
pendent on the paternalism of the national government, 
and the factory and workshop, subject to the uncertain 
chances of the cooperative system." 1 



The blacklist, which is to the employer what the 
boycott is to the laborer — the former being the con- 
certed refusal to patronize labor, the latter, the con- 
certed refusal to patronize the goods of the employer 
— has been pronounced illegal by the courts. Why 
should not the boycott, it is asked, also be considered 
illegal? To legalize a weapon of labor and to pro- 
hibit the use of the corresponding weapon of capital 
gives the former an undue advantage. 

Many cases are recorded in which great injustice 
has been done the individual employers. Often, ac- 
cording to the claims of these employers, they have 
been boycotted for trivial causes. The alleged op- 
pressive conditions have been greatly exaggerated in 
the labor press, and, as a result of these misrepresen- 
tations, the firms have lost thousands of dollars. They 
have often been compelled to pay extortion money to 
escape a threatened boycott. 

It is also claimed that the use of the boycott is in- 
jurious to the unions themselves. Referring to the 
''compound" boycott, in which third persons are 
coerced into refusing business relations with the boy- 
cotted firm, the Industrial Commission makes this con- 
tention : 2 



1 Barr v. Essex, N. J., 1891. 
3 Ind. Com. Rept, v. 19, p. 885. 



REASONS AGAINST THE BOYCOTT 271 

"As a matter of fact, the cause of workers is un- 
doubtedly injured much more than it is benefited by 
attempts to compel others against their will to help in 
their disputes. A large proportion of the community 
objects to such coercive measures, and will be more 
apt to take sides against the workers where they are 
resorted to." 

The Commission, however, considers the boycott, 
where no coercion is used, legitimate. 

In many instances the more indirect boycotts are 
likely to throw out of employment large numbers of 
the working class, including union men, thus proving a 
boomerang against labor. This occurs when a union 
employer is boycotted because he directly or indirectly 
deals with another who has incurred the animosity of 
organized labor. 

It is claimed, furthermore, that the use of t u: ~ 
weapon is detrimental to the interests of labor, becau 
it concentrates the attention of labor on an inferL: 
weapon, and keeps labor from endeavoring to solve its 
various problems by the employment of the union label, 
the label shop, political action, the trade agreement, 
the industrial form of organization, etc. After years 
of experience in boycotting, Mr. A. J. Portenar, fol- 
lowing his description of the extensive movement 
against the Butterick firm, concludes i 1 

"I was very active in this matter, and from the ex- 
perience then gained I have reached definite conclu- 
sions. We expended a large amount of money; how 
large I do not know. So far as money could compass 
our object, we were not niggardly. But money is but 
one of the essential factors a union needs in the con- 
duct of an affair of this kind. Far more than money, 
it must have the enthusiastic devotion of its members 
to the continuous, laborious and unpleasant work need- 

1 Portenar, Problems of Organized Labor, p. 92. Italics are the 
author's. 



272 BOYCOTTS 

ful to make the expenditure of money effective. This, 
with a few exceptions, I found it impossible to get. 
And even these few, in the course of time, finding 
themselves unsupported by the great majority, began 
to get lukewarm and at last ceased to labor in a field 
so vast and so deserted. 

"There can be no doubt whatever that if the 
bulk of the membership had been as devoted as 
our self-sacrificing band of a few hundreds, who 
for nearly four years gave time and energy to the 
work, the results would have been tremendously 
greater. But, this apathy being so widespread among 
our membership, it can easily be imagined what sort 
of inertia we encountered when appealing to the mem- 
bership of other unions and to the general public. It 
was not that we had no success. The Butterick Com- 
pany is the best witness to the contrary. But it is 
scarcely believable how unremittingly we had to labor 
'iat we had done one day from becoming use- 
lext. And this fact eventually led to the 
abandonment of the boycott and the slow recovery by 
the Butterick Company of the ground lost. 

"Therefore my opinion is that no boycott can com- 
pletely and permanently accomplish the result sought, 
and very few will do nearly as much in that direction 
as the one here spoken of, which finally became a fail- 
ure." Mr. Portenar, as formerly stated, proposed a 
"great cooperative society controlled and directed by 
international unions." 

Mr. Herman Lee, secretary of the Anti-Boycott As- 
sociation, claimed that the employment of the boycott 
in the building trades often leads to corruption and 
extortion. Mr. Lee cites an alleged instance in which 
a union foreman compelled a builder to pay him 
$2,000 — the cost entailed in his tearing down non- 
union frames to doors and windows and putting union 
frames in their stead. He stated that the foreman 
disbursed $15 a day to himself and to each of the ten 



REASONS AGAINST THE BOYCOTT 273 

men under him for this particular job. In some in- 
stances, Mr. Lee asserted, the union foremen or walk- 
ing delegates threaten to boycott a firm on account of 
some alleged infringement of union rules, in order to 
exact a considerable bribe from the employer. 

The policy of the building trades, be it said, is to 
enforce a boycott against any mill supplying non-union 
material, by threatening to strike, and actually striking 
against any builder who purchases such non-union 
goods. Such corruption, it is claimed, has an injurious 
reflex action against labor organizations. 

It is also charged that the labor boycott which is 
directed against the employment of non-union men 
works great injustice to unorganized labor. Many 
non-unionists find it impossible to secure membership 
in certain trade unions, it is alleged, either on account 
of the high initiation fees, the arbitrary limitation of 
membership, or some personal discrimination. If the 
union begins a boycott against these men, and threat- 
ens to boycott those who employ them or who deal 
with the employers, the worker often finds that he is 
deprived of his means of livelihood, not only in one 
city, but in various parts of the country. No less is 
this a hardship to those who, for one reason or an- 
other, do not apply for membership in the union. 

The opponents of the boycott therefore urge that 
in justice to the general public, to the employers, and 
to the workers themselves, its use in labor disputes be 
absolutely prohibited by law. 



CHAPTER XVIII 

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 
THE BOYCOTT 

While, on the one hand, we hear those who bitterly 
denounce the boycott in its various forms, on the other, 
we discover just as enthusiastic supporters who favor 
the legalization of every form of boycott, primary, 
secondary and compound, except, perhaps, that form in 
which threats of actual violence are involved. The 
argument for the legalization of the boycott from a 
social and economic standpoint is based primarily upon 
the hypotheses that the well-being of society is inti- 
mately connected with the condition of the working 
class; that that condition at the present time is greatly 
in need of improvement; that such improvement de- 
pends to a very large extent upon the strength of 
labor's organizations; that that strength is contingent 
upon the weapons of defense and offense permitted to 
it; that the employing class is now in possession of 
certain powerful weapons denied to the laborer, and 
that justice demands that organized labor be placed 
in possession of such weapons as tend to place it on a 
more equal footing with the employing class, in its 
struggles for a larger part of the social product. 

While acknowledging the possibilities of occasional 
abuse, the advocate of the boycott believes that the 
tendency to abuse it becomes less marked and that the 
good accomplished far outweighs the evil. He also 
points to the danger of the secret use of the boycott 
and to the injurious results which follow when a group 

274 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 275 

in society continues a practice in defiance of law. He 
declares that there is also the possibility that the 
worker will use more iniquitous weapons, should he be 
totally deprived of the use of the boycott. Finally he 
argues for the legalization of the boycott on the ground 
that its prohibition would deprive the workers of a 
fundamental human right. 



Present Condition of Labor 

The statement that the welfare of society is indis- 
solubly connected with the welfare of the great mass 
of intellectual and manual producers is perhaps axio- 
matic in this day and generation. It is also freely 
admitted that the condition of the working class is in 
need of improvement, and that wages are far too small. 

"It is reasonable to believe," declares Dr. Frank 
Streightoff, in his excellent treatise on 'The Distribu- 
tion of Incomes in the United States' (pp. 139-140), 
"that in 1904 something over sixty per cent, of males 
at least sixteen years of age, employed in manufac- 
turing, mining, trade, transportation, and a few other 
occupations associated with industrial life, were earn- 
ing less than $626 per annum (about $12 a week) ; 
about thirty per cent, were receiving some $626, but 
under $1,044; an d perhaps 10% enjoyed incomes of 
at least $1,000. If to these the agriculturists are 
added, sixty-five per cent, fall in the low-earnings 
group, twenty-seven in the medium, and eight in the 
higher." 

Similar conclusions are reached by others. Prof. 
T. S. Adams calculated that, in 1900, 49.68 per cent. 
of the male adult workers in the large factory indus- 
tries received less than $10 a week; 34.12 per cent., be- 
tween $10 and $15; and only 16.2 per cent, $15 or 
more; that the median wage was about $10.05 a week, 



276 BOYCOTTS 

and that the average yearly earnings were something 
like $480. 1 The wages of the women and children, of 
course, are smaller. In some occupations, such as the 
textile industry, the income is exceedingly low. 

In the latter industry a recent report of the Com- 
missioner of Labor declares that of the male opera- 
tives, 16 years and over, in the New England mills 
investigated: 

"Thirteen and four-tenths per cent, earned less than 
$4 in the representative week, for which wages were 
taken, while 32% earned under $6, 54.3% under $8, 
and 71.8% under $10, leaving 28.2% earning $10 or 
more. Of the female operatives in this age group in 
the New England mills investigated, 13.2% earned 
under $4, 38% under $6.67, 4% under $8, and 86.4% 
under $10, leaving 13.6% earning $10 or more in the 
representative week. 

"Of the male operatives 16 years of age and over 
in the Southern mills investigated, 26.6% earned less 
than $4.48, 4% under $6.75, 2% under $8, while 
90.1% earned under $10, and of the female opera- 
tives, 32.6% earned under $4, 68% under $6.92, 5% 
under $8, while only 1.9% earned as much as $10." 
In all except the last group, the largest single group 
of workers earned between $6 and $8 a week. 

The table thus shows that nearly one-third of the 
men, and nearly two-fifths of the women, in the New 
England mills, and nearly one-half of the men and 
over two-thirds of the women in the Southern mills, 
earn less than $6 a week; while over one-half of the 
men and over two-thirds of the women in New Eng- 
land — nearly three-fourths of the men and over nine- 
tenths of the women of the South — earn less than $8 
a week, in this industry. 2 

1 Adams and Sumner, Labor Problems, p. 156. 

2 Report on Condition of Women and Child Wage-earners in the 
United States, v. 1, pp. 310, 311, 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 277 

A conservative New York 1 newspaper recently fig- 
ured that, in New York, a family, consisting usually 
of a woman and 4 children, earns from $4.71 to $5.71 
a week, making doll's clothing; from $2 to $3, pick- 
ing nuts from shells; and from $3.30 to $4.25, in the 
preparation of artificial flowers. 

In the face of the actual earnings of so large a part 
of the working class, we hear from Dr. Devine, Prof. 
Ryan, John Mitchell and others that $600 a year for a 
family is a minimum normal standard necessary to 
provide for the family the necessities of life. Prof. 
Albion W. Small places this amount at $i,ooo. 2 Mrs, 
Louise Bolard More concludes that in New York 
City the physical wants of a normal family cannot 
be properly supplied by an income of less than $800 
a year. 

Of conditions in New York, the Committee on Con- 
gestion of Population, in their report of April 3, 19 10, 
contended that, while a few wage-earners were making 
enough to support their families in decency, $800 a 
year being taken as a minimum, the average wage of 
330,221 wage-earners in Manhattan and the Bronx, in 
1905 was $543.17 ; of 104,995 in Brooklyn, $519.42. 
The wage-earners in the former boroughs thus secured 
$257 less, and in the latter, $280 less than the neces- 
sary minimum.. 3 

If we were to investigate the hours of employment, 
the sanitation of the factories, the condition of the 
safety appliances, the unsteadiness of employment, and 
the many other conditions surrounding the lives of the 
working class, we would find that they were equally 
unsatisfactory. That labor must be well organized if 
it is to improve its conditions adequately, in view of the 
big business combinations against which it is pitted, is 

1 Brooklyn Daily Eagle, March 24, 1912. 

2 Charities and Commons, v. 17, p. 300. 

3 New York Times, April 4, 1910. 



278 BOYCOTTS 

now conceded by all economists. On this question the 
Industrial Commission concludes: 

"It is quite well recognized that the growth of great 
aggregations of capital under the control of single 
groups of men, which is so prominent a feature of the 
economic development of recent years, necessitates a 
corresponding aggregation of workingmen into unions, 
which may be able also to act as units. It is readily 
perceived that a single workman, face to face with one 
of our great modern combinations, such as the United 
States Steel Corporation, is in a position of great weak- 
ness." 1 

It is also recognized that such organizations have 
materially assisted the workers in obtaining better con- 
ditions. Quoting again the Industrial Commission as, 
perhaps, the most authoritative of our public investiga- 
tions, we learn: 2 

"An overwhelming preponderance of testimony be- 
fore the Industrial Commission indicates that the or- 
ganization of labor has resulted in a marked improve- 
ment of the economic conditions of the workers." 

The commission then gives a large number of in- 
stances where wages have been raised on account of 
organization. In referring to the accomplishments of 
labor in reducing hours, the Commission affirms : 3 

"In the absence of legislation, the only effective 
means of securing a reduction of hours is through 
labor organization. This is, of course, the method 
by which the most significant and important reductions 
in recent years, in the United States, have been se- 
cured. . . . The general effort of the A. F. of L. to 
secure shorter hours, beginning in 1886, is believed to 
have reduced the day's labor of the working people of 
the United States by fully one hour." 

1 Final Report of the Industrial Commission, v. 19, p. 800. 

2 Ibid., p. 802. 

3 Ibid., p. 77& 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 279 

A glance through the foregoing pages will readily 
indicate that the boycott in many trades, if used wisely, 
can be and frequently has been of much value in 
strengthening the unions in their contests. The fre- 
quent use of this weapon, the belief in its potency which 
is held by labor leaders and official investigators, as 
well as the bitter opposition which its use has aroused 
among the employing class, are indicative of its efficacy. 

We will now glance at some of the advantages pos- 
sessed, as well as some of the weapons used, by the em- 
ployers in their contest against their employees. 



The Wealth and Position of Employing Class 

In the industrial struggle the workers are essentially 
at a disadvantage. They have no share in the owner- 
ship of the machines, but must have access to them if 
they wish to earn their daily bread. There are gen- 
erally more men than there are jobs available, and this 
often leads to a fierce struggle. Labor, the most per- 
ishable of all commodities, is the only commodity which 
the worker has to offer. The worker is usually but a 
few weeks from destitution. He lacks the education 
in the art of bargaining which the employer has ac- 
quired, and he is far less acquainted with the condition 
of his employer's exchequer than the employer is with 
his employee's financial status. 

When the worker strikes he finds that these handi- 
caps weigh heavily. A cessation of work may seriously 
cut into the profits of the owner of the industry, but it 
rarely means actual physical privation for himself and 
his family. The opposite is true of the worker. In 
every strike he must face a bitter struggle, and often he 
and his family find themselves facing starvation and 
eviction. He is financially much weaker than his 
employer. 



280 BOYCOTTS 

In summing up some of the advantages possessed by- 
capital, the Industrial Commission declares : 

"The control of the means of production gives 
power to dictate to the workingmen upon what terms 
he (the employer) shall make use of them. . . . The 
tendency toward unified control of capital and business 
has only intensified, without essentially changing, the 
disadvantage of the wage worker in his dealings with 
employers. . . . The competition for work is nor- 
mally far sharper than the competition for work- 
men. . . . The commodity of labor is in the highest 
degree perishable. That which is not sold to-day dis- 
appears absolutely. . . . Considered merely as a bar- 
gainer, as an actual participant in the operations of the 
market, the workingman is almost always under grave 
disadvantages as compared with the employer. . . . 
But aside from all questions of mental dexterity and 
acquired skill, the workingman is at a disadvantage in 
that his economic weakness is well known to his em- 
ployer. . . . The workingman cannot conceal his need 
of work, and cannot know how much his employer 
needs men." 1 

One needs only to watch the unequal contest which 
even such a strong organization as the American Fed- 
eration of Labor has been waging during the last few 
years, merely to organize the workers in the steel in- 
dustry, to realize the tremendous disadvantages under 
which labor is struggling. 

Not only does capital possess these advantages, but 
it has at its disposal certain weapons which are used 
with terrific force against labor. Among these weap- 
ons may be mentioned the employers' organizations, 
blacklists, the "spy" system, the private detective agen- 
cies, and the strike-breaking bureaus. The employer, 
furthermore, often finds the molders of public opinion 
— press, lecture platform and pulpit — pliable instru- 

1 Final Report of the Industrial Commission, v. 19, pp. 800, 801. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 281 

ments in his hands, as well as many of the agencies of 
government, such as the police, constabulary, militia 
and courts. Let us first turn our attention to the power 
of the employers' organizations. 

Employers 7 Organizations 

To one who has not closely followed the growing 
organizations among the employers during the past 
few years, the formidable character of the various 
associations now in existence, and their political and 
strike-breaking activities, will be truly astonishing. 

Of first importance is the National Association of 
Manufacturers, with splendidly equipped headquarters 
in New York City and St. Louis. This organization is 
said to have a membership of 225 manufacturers' or- 
ganizations, embracing 4,000 individual members who 
employ more than 5,000,000 persons, and represent an 
approximate capital of $10,000,000,000. Five years 
ago the association reported a salaried staff of over 
fifty persons. 

Since the convention of April, 1903, held at New 
Orleans, when, under David M. Parry's leadership, the 
association proclaimed its "unalterable antagonism to 
the closed shop," the labor problem has been one of 
the leading issues before it. 1 In 1905 it commenced its 
opposition to the eight-hour bill, and "to any and all 
anti-injunction bills of whatever kind." 

At the 1907 convention a campaign was inaugurated 
for the raising of $500,000 annually for the next three 
years, to be spent for "educational purposes." "There 
can be little doubt that the main part of the associa- 
tion's education program was to destroy the closed 
shop, to combat the sympathetic strike, to check the 
use of the union label, and to prevent the publication 
of the unfair list by trade union journals" 2 

1 William M. Benney, American Industries, May 15, 1908. 

2 Kennedy, Journal of Political Economy, v. 16, p. IQ2, 



282 BOYCOTTS 

Among the purposes for which this fund was to be 
used, according to Atherton Brownell in the official 
organ of the Association, were: 1 "To establish a fed- 
eration of all of the associations of citizens, merchants 
and employers of labor, ... to maintain a great coun- 
cil of this federation; . . . to create labor bureaus, 
operate a labor clearing house, to aid members of con- 
gress and of the state legislatures against the attacks of 
organized labor." Literature, legal, educational and 
speakers' bureaus were also contemplated. How much 
of this proposed fund was actually raised is problem- 
atical. Mr. James A. Emery recently testified before 
a Senate committee that "none of them 'came over.' " 2 

The following year the members of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, either directly through 
this association or through the National Council for 
Industrial Defense, organized by the Association's offi- 
cers for the purpose of influencing legislation, gave 
much attention to the blocking of labor bills. Pres- 
ident Van Cleave of the Association, in his report be- 
fore the 1908 convention, describes the work done in 
this line : 

"Ten days ago in Washington, within forty-eight 
hours we had over 10,000 telegrams and letters sent, 
a demonstration the like of which had never before 
been made, and which had an instantaneous effect. . . . 
The result was that it seemed, up to last Saturday, that 
it would be impossible for any influence or power to 
break down that effect far enough to enact any labor 
legislation." 3 

A few months earlier he wrote, in commenting upon 
the defeat of a number of proposed labor bills: 

1 American Industries, September 15, 1907, p. 5. 

2 Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, hearings 63d 
Cong., 1st Ses., p. 4296 (August 28, 1913). 

3 Proceedings of Convention, N. A. M., p. 107. Italics are the 
author's. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 283 

"Much of the credit for the defeat of these measures 
in the recent Congress (the anti-injunction law, etc.) 
belongs to the National Association of Manufactur- 
ers. . . . Members of the Association's committees, 
regular or special, appear before committees of Con- 
gress in support of or in opposition to measures which 
are to come up for action. Sometimes the Association 
is represented in this work by well-known lawyers or 
publicists. A similar course of procedure is followed 
by the Association in the legislatures." 1 

In 1907 a National Council for Industrial Defense 
was established to harmonize and federate the various 
national, state and local organizations, and within a 
year more than 130 of such employers' organizations 
were brought together, including practically all of the 
important bodies in every state. At present writing, it 
is said to contain no less than 250 organizations. 2 Of 
this body the late President Van Cleave said: 

"In the number of members, in the capital which 
they control, and in the social, industrial and political 
influence which they exert, this is by far the largest 
and most powerful league of conservative and public- 
spirited citizens ever formed in any country of the 
world." 3 

The exact status of this organization is hard to de- 
termine. Some claim that, inasmuch as the charter of 
the National Association of Manufacturers did not per- 
mit it to solicit or disburse funds for political purposes, 
the National Council for Industrial Defense, an unin- 
corporated body, was organized to assist in this work. 
Mr. J. Philip Bird, General Manager of the former 
Association and secretary-treasurer of the latter, stated 
that the officers of the National Council for Industrial 
Defense were selected by themselves from among the 

'American Industries, September 15, 1907. 

2 Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, op. cit., p. 2736, 

8 American Industries, May, 1008. p. 27. 



284 BOYCOTTS 

officers of the National Association of Manufacturers, 
and that the Council paid a salary of $1,000 a month 
to Mr. Emery, the chief lobbyist. He also admitted 
that this Council never held a general meeting during 
its six years of existence. 1 

Colonel M. Mulhall, for many years in the employ 
of this association as confidential man, alleged recently 
in statements in the New York World, and before the 
Senate Investigating Committee, that the National 
Association of Manufacturers, with the assistance of 
the National Council for Industrial Defense, was in- 
strumental in defeating many Congressmen who fa- 
vored labor legislation, including Representatives 
George E. Pearre, author of the Anti-Injunction Bill, 
W. B. Wilson, now Secretary of Labor, James Hughes 
of New Jersey 2 and others. The Association or the 
Council, directly or indirectly, at the same time assisted 
in financing the campaigns of Representatives Charles 
E. Littlefield of Maine, James E. Watson of Indiana, 
James T. McDermott of Illinois, a "friend of labor," 
John J. Jenkins of Wisconsin, sometime chairman of 
the Judiciary Committee of the House, Kittridge Has- 
kins of Vermont, Harry M. Bannon of Ohio, and Rep- 
resentatives Coudry, Garner, Cole and others who had 
proved true to the business interests. 

In the Littlefield campaign of 1906 alone, Colonel 
Mulhall declared, many thousands of dollars were 
spent in reaching the voters, a goodly sum being de- 
voted to the purchase of whiskey. 3 During some of 
the campaigns, especially that of James E. Watson of 
Indiana, a number of labor leaders were paid a con- 

1 New York World, July 17, 1913 ; Maintenance of a Lobby to In- 
fluence Legislation; note: op. cit., pp. 2737, 2738, 2742. 

2 In the Hughes' campaign the Colonel averred that he paid 
$1,800, sent by Mr. Cushing, secretary of the N. A. M., to labor men 
to turn over to the Republican headquarters some 75,000 circulars 
sent them by the A. F. of L. in behalf of Hughes, a Democrat; 
op. cit., pp. 2487, 2488. 

3 Ibid., pp. 2582 et seq. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 285 

siderable sum of money for their work in reaching 
labor. In some instances the voters were bought out- 
right. Thousands of confidential communications were 
sent in each case to the business men of the community, 
urging that the Association's friends be indorsed. One 
of the letters sent by Colonel Mulhall to Congressman 
Haskins of Vermont, June 16, 1908, is illustrative of 
the methods : 

"I had Mr. Schwedtman (assistant to the presi- 
dent of the Association) at the St. Louis office send 
you $300 yesterday by wire. In addition to this we 
have written to every man in your district, and I am 
told that we are given some very nice letters in re- 
turn." 

Colonel Mulhall urgently requested $3,000 for Con- 
gressman Jenkins in his campaign. Individually the 
Association's members raised a considerable sum of 
money. 

In a further endeavor to win favorable legislation 
for the business interests, efforts were constantly made 
to control the Judiciary and Labor Committees of the 
House and the Senate. 1 Mr. Mulhall also claimed 
that the chief page of Congress, in charge of seventy- 
five pages, was employed at a salary of $50 a month 
to assist in the work. While certain statements of 
Colonel Mulhall were challenged before the Senate 
committee, the activities described above were in the 
main admitted. 

That he had been sent at the expense of the asso- 
ciation to help break numerous strikes, and that he had 
several times bribed labor leaders to spy on the labor 
unions and to bring the strikes to an end, were other 
of the allegations of the colonel. In describing his ac- 
tivities in 1905 and 1906, in crushing the strike of the 
printers in Philadelphia, Mr. Mulhall declares: 

1 Ncw York World, June 29, 1913. 



286 BOYCOTTS 

"My principal duties were to keep track of the union 
printers through hired agents furnished me by Cushing 
and others. Through these agents we, in a large meas- 
ure, got control of the Central Labor Union of Phila- 
delphia and kept the other union not associated with 
the printers from contributing to the support of the 
strike." 1 



Mr. Mulhall declared that the machinists' strike in 
Cleveland in June of 1907 was settled "by using almost 
the identical tactics as far as money matters were con- 
cerned." 2 Again in the strike of 23,000 shoemakers 
of St. Louis, he declared that "all kinds of bribery were 
used," and that an official of the Manufacturers' Asso- 
ciation placed in his hands "the sum of $3,000 as an 
inducement to be paid to the man who was heading 
the strike, if he would have it called off at a certain 
time." It required somewhat longer than the strike 
leader had anticipated to settle the strike, and the 
money was withdrawn. One of the letters submitted 
to Mr. Schwedtman showed that $293.50 had been 
promised to labor men for their services in returning 
to the shops and inducing others to do likewise. 3 

At Danbury, Connecticut, where he had been sent by 
the association, Mr. Mulhall claimed that he had been 
successful in getting into the good graces of one of the 
arbitrators, a Congregationalist minister, whom he had 
entertained lavishly in New York. 

That wholesale bribery was used in the Portsmouth, 
Ohio, shoe workers' strike was also alleged. Mr. 
Mulhall pitted the A. F. of L. against the Knights of 
Labor; employed some of the leaders of the Knights of 
Labor by the week, and gave others from $25 to $100 

1 New York World, June 29, 1913. Italics are the author's. See 
also Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, op. cit., pp. 
2522 et seq. 

I New York World, June 29, 1913. 

3 Ibid., July 2, 1902. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 287 

to settle. 1 He also asserted that an effort was made 
by an officer of the Association to bribe Samuel Gom- 
pers and to assure him a life position, if he betrayed 
organized labor. 2 That many of the political and 
strike-breaking manipulations of Colonel Mulhall had 
the approbation of at least some of the officers of the 
organization which he served was the contention of 
Louis Siebold, of the New York World, after reading 
the correspondence between Mr. Mulhall and the or- 
ganization. Mr. Siebold declares: 

u For each successful venture in the line of political 
chicanery, strike breaking and subterranean lobby work 
described by the reports and letters identified by Col. 
Mulhall, there were prompt recognition and praise 
for his services in the communications from high offi- 
cials of the N. A. M. that followed." 3 

The Association's officers, however, claim that no 
such authorization was given for many of the acts cited. 
They, however, admitted the authenticity of practically 
all of the letters submitted by Colonel Mulhall, on 
which the foregoing allegations were chiefly based. 4 

The association also maintained an extensive pub- 
licity bureau known as the Century Syndicate. 

With the growing strength of this general body of 
employers, the country has also witnessed the closer 
affiliation of the manufacturers in allied trades. The 
National Metal Trades' Association is one of the most 
active. This organization has been instrumental in 
forming a number of employment agencies which at 
times have had the virtual effect of blacklisting union 
mechanics. They are also well equipped to assist in 
the breaking of strikes. 

The bureaus of this trade are established in a dozen 

1 Ibid. 

2 Ibid., June 29, 1913. 
z Ibid., July 17, 1913. 

4 Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation, op cit., p. 4300. 



288 BOYCOTTS 

large cities. 1 In Chicago the local agency requires 
each applicant to give a complete record of himself, 
which is placed on a card index. His activities are 
thoroughly investigated, and, if he is found desirable 
from the standpoint of the Association, an effort is 
made to place him. "In this way," runs a most signifi- 
cant statement, "employers find out who the disturbers 
are, and they are kept out of the shops." Many of the 
firms have cards in their places of business bearing the 
sign : "Preference is given to people having cards from 
the Employers' Association Bureau." 

The various metal trades' bureaus in different cities 
keep in close touch with each other, and have founded 
a Labor Bureau's Secretarial League. If an applicant 
gives a false statement the error can frequently be 
made known by communication with the bureau of an- 
other city. In describing the splendid strike-breaking 
possibilities of this bureau, Mr. Marcosson declares: 

"If a strike is threatened, for instance, in the New 
York metal trades, Mr. Hunter (the secretary) can 
send telegrams to every labor bureau secretary, asking 
him to rush men to New York. In twenty-four hours 
hundreds of boiler makers would be on their way from 
Kansas City, St. Louis, Chicago, Cincinnati, Philadel- 
phia and a dozen other places. These labor bureaus 
all have competent men at their disposal." 

The Anti-Boycott Association, which has been fight- 
ing the labor unions tooth and nail, in various legal 
proceedings, such as the Buck's Stove & Range Co. 
case, the Danbury Hatters' case and the building trades 
cases, is also worthy of mention. 

The actual part which the trade associations play in 
labor struggles is seen more clearly when we analyze 
the workings of the local bodies. In Chicago, an Em- 

1 1. F. Marcosson, in World's Work, December, 1905. Italics are 
the author's. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 289 

ployers' Association was formed in 1901, consisting of 
sub-associations of employers in the laundry, printing, 
building and other trades. Just prior to a demand 
of the workers in the laundry industry, the Laundry 
Owners' Association, one of the sub-associations of the 
general body, was informed by the latter body of the 
proposed demands of the employees of certain firms. 
Forewarned, the companies were ready with a blank 
refusal when the demands were made, and the em- 
ployees, the day following the submission of these 
demands, found that they were not only locked out 
from their own concerns, but from every other laundry 
belonging to the association. 

During the ensuing strike, the parent body sent 
checks to the Laundry Owners' Association when the 
funds ran low, and saw that the notes of the poorer 
members were carried by the banks. 1 This body also 
helped the firms to man their wagons, to secure police 
guards, to have their freight properly handled, and to 
carry through legal proceedings against the unions. It 
is needless to say the employers won the strike. 

The Blacklist 

Another weapon used by the employers against the 
workers is the blacklist, described in Chapter II. This 
weapon has frequently been called the employers' boy- 
cott, being, as it is, a concerted effort to deprive labor 
of a market for the only commodity the worker has to 
sell, his labor power. Although it is considered ille- 
gal, it can be used effectively with such great secrecy 
that unionists find it well-nigh impossible to obtain 
legal proof of its existence. The court decisions on 
the subject, furthermore, in a number of instances, 
have virtually legalized the use of at least some forms 
of blacklisting. 

1 World's Work, January, 1904. 



290 BOYCOTTS 

"Spies" in Labor Unions 

The past few years have also seen the creation of 
many auxiliary organizations formed to assist employ- 
ers during or prior to labor disputes, by means of 
"spies," strike breakers, special guards and detectives. 

Several organizations, formed primarily to supply 
manufacturers with workers who will ferret out the 
secrets of labor organizations and give the results of 
their findings to employers, have been brought to 
light in labor circles during the past few years. 

The Corporations' Auxiliary Company of Cleveland, 
Ohio, was alleged by the labor world to be one of the 
most conspicuous suppliers of "spies" in 1903 and 
1904. The following frank letter sent to manufactur- 
ers gives a fairly good idea of the workings of this 
organization: 

"There is no question but that our system would be 
of great benefit to you, inasmuch as you employ the 
very class of men who are the cause of a great deal 
of annoyance and trouble to the employers, and who 
create all manner of disturbances in the running of a 
plant successfully. . . . We can either furnish you a 
union or a non-union machinist, or a union or a non- 
union laborer or general utility man who can get into 
your factory and can work on the inside and be what 
we term the < inside > man, and get and report all the 
information about what the men do arid say in the 
plant, who are union men, who are the radical ones 
and the agitators in the shop, so that their work can 
be killed by dispensing with their services the minute 
you learn who they are; and which operatives can also 
become a member of the union, if necessary . . . and 
in this way furnish the client with all information and 
complete, detailed reports regarding the action and 
proceedings of the union 

"We have another operative whom we term an 
f outside man/ who would not work in the shop or plant 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 291 

of the client, if the shop is to be kept strictly non-union, 
but who would work at some other place and join the 
union and get all union information for the client and 
all information on the street of interest. This man 
would also work his way up into an official position in 
the union for the purpose of assisting in breaking it 
up. . . . 

"Either one of these operatives we would furnish 
you at the rate of $150.00 per month and his railroad 
fare. . ., and out of the above sum of $150.00 are to 
be deducted all the wages which the operative earns 
while working in your interest." 1 

Lucius E. Whiton, secretary of the D. E. Whiton 
Machine Co. of New London, Connecticut, who had 
correspondence with this corporation in July of 1903, 
has published letters of similar import, and gives the 
result of an interview with one Mr. J. H. Smith, man- 
ager of the company at that time. According to Mr. 
Whiton, Mr. Smith declared that he had been in that 
business for the last seventeen years; that the Auxiliary 
Corporations Company, a $25,000 corporation organ- 
ized in 1902, had a force of several hundred men, 
directed from Cleveland; that its men were delegates 
to most of the trade union state and national conven- 
tions and in some instances national officers of these 
unions; that its first business had been with big rail- 
roads and mines, but that latterly it had been con- 
nected with large corporations and street railways. In 
many instances the manufacturers of a town combined 
to secure the services of one of the agents. 2 

Just how the company's agent, called the operative, 
works on arriving at a town Mr. Smith is quoted as 
stating to Mr. A. W. Ricker 3 in the spacious office of 
the concern : 

1 Italics are the author's. 

2 From Machine Politics and Organized Labor, L. E. Whiton, 
1903. published at New London, Conn. 

3 Spies in Trade Unions, p. 13. 



292 BOYCOTTS 

"Our man will come to your factory and get ac- 
quainted. He will be a machinist, as most of our men 
belong to the machinists' union. If he finds little dis- 
position to organize, he will not encourage organiza- 
tion, but will engineer things so as to keep organization 
out. If, however, there seems a disposition to organ- 
ize he will become the leading spirit and pick out just 
the right men to join. Once the union is in the field 
its members can keep it from growing if they know 
how, and our man knows how. Meetings can be set 
far apart. A contract can at once be entered into with 
the employer, covering a long period, and made very 
easy in its terms. However, these tactics may not be 
good, and the union spirit may he so strong that a big 
organization cannot be prevented. In this case our 
man turns extremely radical. He asks for unreason- 
able things and keeps the union embroiled in trouble. 
If a strike comes, he will be the loudest man in the 
bunch, and will counsel violence and get somebody in 
trouble. The result will be that the union will be 
broken up." 

That this spy system was used extensively during 
the labor disturbances in Colorado was the claim of 
the Western Federation of Miners. The United States 
Labor Commission reports the case of one alleged 
spy: 1 

"One A. K. Crane, who assisted in the formation of 
the union at Colorado City, was expelled therefrom on 
the alleged ground that he was a detective employed 
by the managers to report to them the proceedings of 
the union and the names of the men who joined it. 
Afterward he was forced by members of the Federa- 
tion and their sympathizers to leave Colorado City." 

It was charged that Crane was employed by the 

manager of the United States Reduction and Refining 

Company, ostensibly as a smelterman, but in reality 

under the direction of a detectives' agency as a spy; that 

1 Labor Disturbances in Colorado, p. 112. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 293 

he joined the newly formed Mill and Smeltermen's 
Union, No. 125, and soon after, toward the end of 
1905, was elected the union's secretary and given 
charge of the organization's books and papers. He 
supplied names of the members and officers to the firm, 
it was declared, and, as a result, in February, 1903, 
twenty-three union employees were forced to resign. 
His frequent communications over the telephone, pre- 
sumably with the superintendent of the mill, proved his 
downfall. Union men became suspicious, examined his 
room, secured, they alleged, convicting evidence, and 
compelled him to leave town. 1 Numerous other in- 
stances are cited by the miners, including that of Harry 
Orchard. 

In March, 19 12, a prominent official of the Order 
of Railway Telegraphers accused the Pennsylvania 
Railroad of employing spies. He asserted that union 
officials are often bribed by serving in positions which 
prove sinecures, and that frequently they do effective 
work by organizing a dual union. 2 

In the Colorado strike, it was alleged that these 
"spies" were furnished by the Pinkerton Detective 
Agency. The agency, however, denied engaging in 
this work. 3 

The unions claim that a number of detective agen- 
cies have, as one of their functions, the employment of 
such spies as well as the breaking of strikes. The ad- 
vertisements and letters of such bureaus seem to give 
credence to this belief. The following advertisement 
appearing in American Industries, the official organ of 
the National Association of Manufacturers, is sugges- 
tive: 

"We break strikes — also handle labor troubles in all 
their phases. We are prepared to place secret opera- 

1 Friedman, The Pinkerton Labor Spy (Wilshire Pub. Co.), p. 37- 

2 New York Call, March 3, 1912. 

3 Friedman, The Pinkerton Labor Spy. 



294 BOYCOTTS 

tives who are skilled mechanics in any shop, mill or 
factory, to discover whether organization is being done, 
material wasted or stolen, negligence on the part of 
employees, etc., etc. . . . We guard property during 
strikes, employ non-union men to fill places of strikers, 
fit up and maintain boarding houses for them, etc. 
Branches in all parts of the country; write us for refer- 
ences and terms. The Joy Detective Agency, Cleve- 
land, Ohio, Incorporated." 1 

The letter quoted below, purporting to come from 
the Employers' Information Service, also speaks vol- 
umes concerning anti-union activities: 

"Dear Sir: Are there any leaks in your plant? Of 
course — but you may not know it. And how are you 
going to find out? It is the small leaks, the loss of 
dollars here and there, which help to eat up the large 
profits. Our business is to find the leaks in your busi- 
ness, and observe what it is not for the eyes and ears 
of the boss to see or hear. 

"We protect you against loss of time, labor or ma- 
terial, eliminate graft of any description, theft, and all 
irregularities that exist in both large and small con- 
cerns; also prevent the efforts of labor union agitators 
and organizers from becoming effective, and disrupting 
strikes when necessary. 

"Our system of inspection and checking of employees 
must necessarily appeal to every business man who de- 
sires to secure the most efficient service from them, and 
to know whether they are honest, loyal, and work 
together as one without friction, finally obtaining 
profits." 2 

The letter also pledges to protect the firm against 
unfair competitors, guarantees secrecy and urges a 

1 American Industries, August 15, 1907. Italics are the author's. 

2 The address of the service was 301-305 Cuyahoga Building, 
Cleveland, Ohio. The letter is dated May 8, 191 1, and marked 
"Personal and Confidential." A copy appeared in the American 
Flint, in June, 191 1. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 295 

conference. It is signed by F. J. Heine, General Man- 
ager. 

The following letter is said to have been recently 
mailed to manufacturers and employers generally by 
the William J. Burns detective agency, and suggests 
some interesting activities on the part of this well- 
known bureau. 

"Secret service properly applied with the right men 
correctly placed can be made extremely profitable when 
conditions are studied and cooperation given. Such 
service is our specialty, and for that reason we main- 
tain practical men of all trades and occupations, both 
union and non-union. In their daily reports they sug- 
gest improvements and new ideas; also detail the agi- 
tating, dishonest, non-producing and retarding con- 
ditions. 

"Our operative, when engaged by you, is, to every- 
one but yourself, merely an employee in your establish- 
ment, and whatever he receives as wages is credited as 
part payment for his detective service. Daily type- 
written reports are mailed to our clients. These oper- 
atives are continually under direct supervision of the 
management of this agency. 

"Within the heart of your business is where we 
operate, down in the dark corners, and in out-of-the- 
way places that cannot be seen from your office or 
through your superintendent or foreman. 

"If it is of interest to you to know to-day what 
occurred in your plant yesterday, and be in a position 
to correct these faults to-morrow, we would be pleased 
to take the matter up with you further, and respect- 
fully ask an interview for one of our representatives. 
"Yours very truly, 
"The Wm. J. Burns National Detective Agency. 
"R. A. Wilson, Manager." 

The alleged activity of this detective bureau in the 
Cleveland Garment Makers' strike of 191 1 has just 
been brought to public notice through the confession 
and conviction of Morris Lubin, sentenced by Judge 



296 BOYCOTTS 

Vickery, June 23, 19 13. According to Miss Gertrude 
Barnum, one of the leaders of the strike, Morris Lubin, 
a young man supposedly a garment worker of Cleve- 
land, was hired by the cloak manufacturers of that city, 
through the William J. Burns agency, soon after the 
breaking out of the strike, at a salary of $10 a day, 
and was required to make daily reports to the manu- 
facturers' association. He was a clever talker, was 
elected into the union, volunteered as a leader on the 
picket line, and, by means of his energy, versatility and 
daring, soon became the idol of some of the younger 
element. His position in the union secure, he began 
to urge the strikers to less peaceful action on the picket 
line, arguing that the strike was the beginning of the 
industrial revolution and that mild actions were totally 
ineffective. His leadership resulted in many deeds of 
violence which greatly discredited the union. Some of 
his activities are thus described by Miss Barnum: 

"Lubin led secret raids upon the homes of the strike 
breakers. He plotted unsuccessfully to blow up the 
hotel occupied by the 'scabs.' . . . He looted and 
wrecked other places. He was lavish in distributing 
lead pipe, blackjack and even revolvers to the hotheads 
of the union who were committing the outrages unbe- 
known to the officers. As a grand climax of his pro- 
gram of violence and bloodshed, Lubin planned an 
attack on a train bringing strike breakers into 
town. . . . Revolvers were furnished from his home. 
. . . They (Lubin and his followers) opened fire with 
their guns, shooting into the air, but didn't do any 
damage." 1 

Finally a strike-breaker was slugged by Lubin and 
three strikers. The man afterward died. The vio- 
lence reported in connection with the strike aroused 
public opinion against the strikers, who finally lost, 
Miss Barnum believes, as a result of these deeds. At 
1 New York Globe, July 16, 1913. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 297 

one time, in fact, the strikers were about to settle with 
a manufacturer when Lubin, Miss Barnum alleged, 
broke up the conference by throwing an ink bottle at 
the employer. On the trial for assaulting the strike- 
breaker, the "spy" broke down, confessed all, and was 
sentenced to six months' imprisonment. 

The use of the spy system in connection with the 
Buck's Stove Co. 1 and the activities of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, have already been sug- 
gested. In the recent Paterson strike, a member of 
the strike committee admitted in court that he was 
employed by a detective agency to spy on the workers. 
It is difficult, because of the secrecy surrounding its 
employment, to tell just how extensively it operates, 
but, from the evidence available, we may conclude that 
the use made of it by unscrupulous employers is a con- 
siderable one. 

Private Detectives 

In order to protect their property, and at the same 
time intimidate the strikers, employers frequently hire 
armed guards, who are accused of many outrages in 
behalf of the bosses. In the recent West Virginia 
labor disturbances, much testimony was adduced indi- 
cating the manner in which such guards were employed 
by the mine companies to break strikes. Mr. Harold 
E. West of the Baltimore Sun, an eye witness to the 
controversies, thus describes the activities of these 
hired detectives: 

"These mine guards are an institution all along the 
creek in the non-union sections of the State. They are 
as a rule supplied by the Baldwin-Felts Detective 
Agency of Roanoke and Bluefield. It is said the total 
number in the mining districts of West Virginia reaches 
well up to 2,500. . . . These Baldwin guards who are 

1 See supra, p. 138. 



298 BOYCOTTS 

engaged by the mining companies to do their 'rough 
work' take the place of Pinkertons, who formerly were 
used for such work by the mining companies. Since 
the Homestead strike in the steel mills years ago, when 
the Pinkertons fired into the strikers and killed a num- 
ber of them, this class of business has gradually drifted 
away from the Pinkertons and much of it is held by the 
Baldwin-Felts agency. . . . Before the State troops 
went into the region and took their rifles away from 
them, the mine guards went about everywhere, gun in 
hand, searching trains, halting strangers, ejecting un- 
desirables, turning miners out of their houses and doing 
whatever 'rough work' the companies felt they needed 
to have done. Stories of their brutalities are heard on 
every hand along the creeks. Some are unquestionably 
exaggerated, but the truth of many can be proved and 
has been proved. . . . Whenever possible they are 
clothed with some semblance of the authority of the 
law, either by being sworn in as railroad detectives, as 
constables or deputy sheriffs. But for all that, a num- 
ber have been indicted for offenses ranging from com- 
mon assault to murder. . . . Yet rarely has any 
trouble resulted for the guards." 1 

The commission appointed in 191 2 by Governor 
Glasscock, to investigate conditions, summarized the 
activities of the guards. 

"From the cloud of witnesses and mass of testimony 
figuring in the hearings there emerges clearly and un- 
mistakably the fact that these guards recklessly and 
flagrantly violated, in respect to the miners on Paint 
Creek and Cabin Creek, the rights guaranteed by natu- 
ral justice and the Constitution to every citizen, how- 
soever lowly his condition and state. . . . Many 
crimes and outrages laid to their charge were found, 
upon careful sifting, to have no foundation in fact, but 
the denial of the right of peaceable assembly and of 

1 Harold E. West, Civil War in the West Virginia Coal Mines, 
Survey, April 5, 1913. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 299 

freedom of speech, many and grievous assaults on 
unarmed miners show that their main purpose was to 
overawe the miners and their adherents, and, if neces- 
sary, to beat and cudgel them into submission." 1 

Former Governor Dawson of West Virginia char- 
acterized them as "vicious and dare-devil men who 
seem to aim to add to their viciousness by bulldozing 
and terrorizing the people." 2 

Senator James E. Martine of New Jersey, on 
his return from the hearings of the West Virginia In- 
vestigating Committee in Charleston, June 20, 19 13, 
verified the foregoing reports. He is quoted as say- 
ing: 

"Quinn Morton (a mine operator) admitted on the 
stand that he had bought rifles for the guards and 
told them how to use them. . . . Women and chil- 
dren were maltreated by the operatives and their hired 
thugs. Men were killed and buried like dogs, and no 
arrests were made. . . . 

"Then we heard the stories, not from one witness, 
but a hundred, of how galling guns were loaded upon 
flat cars and freight cars, and these trains were run at 
night through the mining villages where the strikers 
were with their families. . . . Former Governor 
Glasscock told us there were sixteen of these machine 
guns sent into the district. These trains would run up 
to a village, usually a single street along the railroad 
track, the mine guards would fire a couple of rifle shots 
from the cars to incite the strikers to return the fire, 
and then the machine guns would be brought into 
action, and the train would move the length of the 
village at a snail's pace, spitting bullets at the rate of 
250 a minute, perforating the tents and shacks, and 
mowing down and maiming and killing men and women 
and defenseless children." 3 

1 Quoted by West, ibid., p. 48. Italics are the author's. 

3 Ibid., p. 49. 

3 Quoted, New York Call, June 21, 1913. Italics are the author's. 



300 BOYCOTTS 

The descriptions of Mr. Michaelson in Everybody's 
Magazine are even more ghastly than the foregoing. 1 

It is undoubtedly true that this is a most unusual 
case of guard brutality, if the statement of events is an 
accurate one. Yet many other similar instances are 
recorded in big strikes, especially those in the basic 
industries — coal, steel, copper, lumber, etc. 

It is doubtful if, even in West Virginia, this perni- 
cious guard system will be continued. 

An historic example of the lawless activities of de- 
tectives, operating with the business element in the com- 
munity, is given in the Colorado strike of 1903 and 
1904. Their deportation of "undesirables" from the 
strike district is thus picturesquely described in the 
report prepared under the direction of the Commis- 
sioner of Labor: 2 

"On the night of March 14, 1904, about 100 mem- 
bers of the Citizens' Alliance (an organization con- 
sisting of business men, mine owners, managers, etc.) 
held a meeting in Red Men's Hall, after which they 
armed themselves, searched the town, and took into 
custody about 60 union men and sympathizers. In 
some instances the doors of residences were forced 
open. The men who were captured were brought to 
a vacant store and about 1.30 o'clock in the morning 
were marched to the depot and loaded into two 
coaches. As the special train bearing them departed, 
a fusillade of shots was fired into the air by the mob. 
Among the leaders of the mob were Bulkeley Wells, 
manager of the Smuggler Union mine, and John Her- 
ron, manager of the Tom Boy mine. One of those 
deported was Stewart B. Forbes, secretary-treasurer of 
the Telluride Miners' Union. Another was Antone 
Matti, local agent for a brewery. Another was A. H. 
Floaten, the local leader of the Socialist Party and 

1 Everybody's, May, 1913. Also read hearings before U. S. Senate 
Com. on "Education and Labor," 63d Cong., 1st Ses., pursuant to 
S. Res. 37- 

2 Labor Disturbances hi Colorado, p. 249. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 301 

manager of the People's Supply Company, the largest 
store in town. The door of his residence was broken 
open and he was found partly undressed, his wife 
having retired. A revolver was pointed at him, and 
he was wounded in the head by being struck with the 
butt of the weapon. He was marched from home 
without being allowed to put on his shoes or hat. Fif- 
teen members of the mob accompanied the train to 
Ridgway, where the prisoners were ordered to get off, 
and further ordered never to return to Telluride." 

Following the explosion at Victor, the manner in 
which officials were unceremoniously compelled to re- 
sign from office and the way in which property was 
destroyed by this lawless element are thus portrayed 
by the Commission i 1 

U A meeting of mine managers was held at the Mili- 
tary Club at the Army Building at Victor, and they 
decided upon drastic measures. A committee of mine 
owners left the club rooms, found Sheriff Robertson (a 
union sympathizer), and informed him that the mine 
owners desired to have a meeting with him. Robert- 
son accompanied them, and when he was inside the 
club rooms his resignation as sheriff was demanded. 
He refused to tender it, whereupon guns were pro- 
duced, a coiled rope was dangled before him, and on 
the outside several shots were fired. He was told that 
unless he resigned the mob outside the building would 
be admitted, and he would be taken out and hanged! 1 
He then resigned. A new sheriff was appointed. "The 
newly appointed sheriff appointed his own undersheriff 
and about 100 deputies. . . . Squads of soldiers, 
deputy sheriffs and armed citizens scattered over the 
district and arrested union members. About 175 were 
captured and taken to the 'bull pens' at Victor, Inde- 
pendence and Goldfield. . . . All of the union stores 
were closed and many of the goods in the stores at 
Victor and Cripple Creek and all goods in the smaller 
1 Italics are the author's. 



302 BOYCOTTS 

stores at Goldfield and Anaconda were taken or de- 
stroyed." 

The report then records the arrest of the whole force 
of the union paper, the Victor Record, the forced resig- 
nation of many other civil officers in the Cripple Creek 
district who were in sympathy with the miners, the 
subsequent wrecking of the Record office, 1 the deporta- 
tion of scores of miners, 2 the severe thugging of many 
of the well-known labor organizers, including James 
Mooney and W. R. Fairley, members of the National 
Executive Board of the Western Federation of Labor, 3 
Chris. Evans, financial manager of District No. 15 
during the strike, and personal representative in Colo- 
rado of President John Mitchell, 4 W. M. Wardjon, 
National Organizer of the United Mine Workers, 5 
and others. 



Private Detectives Armed with State Authority 

The strikers declare that at times many officers of 
the peace, ostensibly employed by the state to preserve 
order, are actually hired by the employers, and faith- 
fully serve them, though clothed in all the authority 
of the state. Such were the conditions in a recent coal 
strike in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, accord- 
ing to Mr. Richard L. Jones. He declared: 

"The employers got the county sheriff to hire a lot 
of deputies to act as county policemen. They paid the 
sheriff $185,000. He charged the companies $5 a day 
for each deputy. He paid each deputy $3 a day. . . . 
For the coal companies, he hired a lot of husky thugs 
and decorated them with a club and gun and a police- 

1 Labor Disturbances in Colorado, p. 263. 

2 Ibid., pp. 260, 288, 309. 

3 Ibid., p. 342. 
*Ibid., p. 344. 
5 Ibid., p. 354- 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 303 

man's star. Miners thereafter were not allowed to 
gather in groups on any of the companies' grounds, and 
they were not allowed to walk in more than pairs and 
in closer file than ten feet apart." 1 

Charges of the employment of private detectives and 
of the indirect hiring of special deputies were also made 
in the 19 12 fight of the Brotherhood of Timber Work- 
ers against the big lumber interests in Louisiana, 2 in 
the fight of the miners against the Utah Copper Com- 
pany and its allies, 3 in the 1909 struggle of the steel 
workers in McKees Rocks, 4 West Virginia, Home- 
stead, and in numerous other battles of labor. The 
conservative Industrial Commission thus admitted and 
condemned the employment of such detectives: 

u The chief objection, aside from the doubt as to its 
technical legality, which is made to the practice some- 
times resorted to by employers of hiring special police 
detectives, Pinkerton men, and other armed guards to 
protect their property in labor disputes, is that such 
hired officers are likely to be extreme in their measures. 
Being often from other localities or States, they have 
no understanding of the affairs at issue in the dispute, 
no sympathy for the workmen, and are therefore dis- 
posed to go as far as the law allows, or even further, 
in resisting the acts of the men. The reply made by 
employers is that local authorities are often improperly 
biased, and therefore unwilling or, perhaps, unable 
to enforce law effectively." 5 

While the practice of importing armed men for the 
protection of private property has been prohibited in a 
number of states, the employers will undoubtedly di- 
rectly or indirectly employ such men in many future 

1 Collier's Weekly, April i, 1911. 

2 The Southern Oligarchy, by Covington Hall, Coming Nation: 
August 24, 1912. 
*New York Call, October 6, 1912. 
* International Socialist Review, October, 1009. 
5 Final Report of Industrial Commission, v. 19, p. 899. 



304 BOYCOTTS 

disputes, and these will probably serve in many in- 
stances to intimidate strikers in their efforts to raise 
their standard of living. It is of course true that many 
of the acts which have been enumerated were not com- 
mitted entirely without provocation. 

Organizations Supplying Strike Breakers 

The importation of strike breakers in large quan- 
tities, in districts where the strike occurs, is also a com- 
mon practice of the employing class. Numerous de- 
tective and strike-breaking agencies, such as the Far- 
ley agency, devote much of their time to rounding up 
the unemployed, and having them transported to the 
strike district. The various employers' organizations, 
j as previously told, are often ready to assist in trans- 
porting men and women from one part of the country 
to another to take the places of the strikers. 

Some place the beginning of the extensive practice 
of strike-breaking in the year 1891, when Jack White- 
head, a former union man, brought 40 negroes called 
the "40 thieves" from Birmington, Alabama, to break 
the strike of the Amalgamated Association against the 
Clinton steel mills near Pittsburgh. Whitehead, who 
also assisted in the Homestead strike of 1892, was 
supposed to have been given $10,000 for his successful 
efforts. 1 

Many avow that the persons transported to strike 
regions are often deceived into the belief that no strike 
exists and frequently are held against their will, after 
arriving on the scene of the disturbance. The Indus- 
trial Commission thus comments on this practice : 2 

"The importation of workingmen from foreign 
countries to take the place of strikers was quite a com- 
mon practice. Considerable numbers of foreigners 

*F. B. McQuiston, Independent, October 17, 1901. 

2 Final Report of Industrial Commission, v. 19, pp. 890, 891. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 305 

were brought to the coal mines in this way. The alien 
contract labor law has largely done away with this 
practice. In a large number of strikes, however, em- 
ployers have sent agents to other States to collect 
bodies of men and to 'import' them. In some instances 
the men thus imported are of much lower skill and 
standard of living than the strikers. Evidence before 
the Industrial Commission shows that negro laborers 
have, in several instances, been brought from long dis- 
tances for this purpose. This occurred in Pana and 
Virden, 111., and in recent Colorado mining strikes. 
The opposition of the workingmen to the importation 
of lower classes of labor is so strong that it has at 
times resulted in physical violence. ... It is doubt- 
less true at times that such imported laborers are influ- 
enced by unduly glowing accounts of the conditions 
under which they will work, and are not always in- 
formed of the existence of the strike. In some cases 
it is the intention of the employer who hires men of this 
class to keep them only long enough to break the strike, 
and to permit the gradual employment of more compe- 
tent hands, possibly of the strikers themselves." 

That these methods are not wholly extinct at the 
present day may be concluded from the following para- 
graphs of Mr. Allan L. Benson: 

"Men were told that they were wanted for work in 
California . . . that they were needed to build cities 
in West Virginia . . . that they were wanted to build 
railroads. Men were told almost everything except the 
truth. They were told they would be taken to and 
from their place of destination without expense to 
themselves . . . that they would be paid wages of ex- 
ceptional richness and fatness. Once snared, they were 
imprisoned in rooms near railroad stations, marched 
under guard to the trains, locked in the cars, com- 
pelled to make trips requiring as many as thirty hours 
without eating, and at last dumped off at the mines in 
West Virginia and told to go to work. Some refused 



306 BOYCOTTS 

and were forced to go to work at the point of the pistol. 
Some worked a few days and demanded their wages, 
only to be told that they still owed the company the 
difference between their earnings and their railway 
fare. . . . All of these statements have been made, 
most of them under oath." 1 

Senator Martine of New Jersey, on returning from 
West Virginia, confirmed most of these statements, 2 
as did other writers. 3 The possibilities of strike-break- 
ing residing in the various employers' organizations 
have already been dwelt upon. The letters of the vari- 
ous detective bureaus printed elsewhere suggest some- 
thing of their strike-breaking activities. 

It may be stated that the endeavor to bring large 
numbers of strike-breakers from various parts of the 
country to take the places of strikers has become a 
more extensive and a better organized business, 
within the past few years. It was common rumor 
in Boston, during a recent strike of the telephone oper- 
ators, that large numbers of young women were im- 
ported from New York to Boston, and kept for some 
days in the hotels of the city, so as to force the opera- 
tives to agree to the employers' terms. During a re- 
cent waiters' strike in New York, many hundreds of 
workers were in turn imported from Boston to take 
the places of the striking men. 

1 Metropolitan Magazine, June, 1913. See also hearings before 
Senate Com., pursuant to S. Res. 37, p. 194 and elsewhere. 

2 Quoted, New York Call, July, 1913. 

3 See Mr. Michaelson's article in Everybody's Magazine, May, 
I9I3- 



CHAPTER XIX 

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC REASON'S FOR LEGALIZING 

the boycott — Continued 
The Control of the Press 

It is frequently possible for the employers to mar- 
shall against the strikers various organs of public 
opinion — the press, the lecture platform and the pulpit. 
The chief organ is the press. Through its columns, 
especially in the smaller towns, the employers can gen- 
erally have their side of the labor question adequately 
represented, while the public frequently receives most 
unfair accounts of the reasons for the strike and the 
conduct of the strikers. 

The reasons for this discrimination are manifold. 
The modern newspaper is run chiefly for dividends, 
as is the case with every other business. Its chief 
source of income is advertising. Mr. Will Irwin 1 cal- 
culates that the advertisers pay into the average 
metropolitan paper from S3. 3 5 to $4 for every Si 
brought in by subscribers and newsstand sales. In one 
New York paper, the ratio of income was Si from 
sales to S9 from advertising. It is imperative that the 
heads of the newspapers take good care of their chief 
sources of supply. The advertisers know their advan- 
tage, and, in many instances, are not slow to utilize it. 
If a strike is being carried on against their concern, 
they can threaten to discontinue their "ad," should ad- 
verse criticism appear, and this the newspaper knows. 

1 Irwin, "The American Newspaper," Collier's Weekly, Ma] 
1912. 

307 



3 o8 BOYCOTTS 

Advertisers are often interested financially or otherwise 
in many other concerns not advertising. Their request 
to "go easy" on a story relating to such other concerns 
is often heeded. 

The owners of the papers, as well, are frequently in- 
terested in other enterprises, and pressure may be 
brought to bear from them to "color a story" in the 
most acceptable way. The owner's associates and those 
of his family are likely to be among the more conser- 
vative of the population, and the desire for approba- 
tion among his friends often influences the manner in 
which the news of the paper is handled. A great 
newspaper is frequently in need of credit; the owner 
is often a large borrower. The working class does not 
directly extend credit or provide loans. 

The publicity bureaus which are being established 
by so many of the large corporations and conservative 
interests furnish news in easy shape to print, and often 
accompany the news items with a request to charge the 
expense of the insertion to themselves. The employers 
are generally more accessible when news is desired, and 
accessibility is a great factor in these days of hourly 
editions. The reporters are constantly on the lookout 
for "good copy." Only the strange, the startling, is 
the best copy. If reporters can write a story of a riot 
or an unusual disturbance during a strike, it is sure to 
be published. If they are "space" men, they thrive on 
such disturbances. If they are paid a regular salary, 
they are fully as eager for the "display" which the 
good "story" wins. And the story helps to sell the 
papers. It often happens that strikers and their meth- 
ods are utterly misrepresented because of this American 
standard of what constitutes news. The chief fear of 
the paper is the fear of a libel suit. The more im- 
pecunious the one libeled, the less the fear. The im- 
pecunious striker is not handled so carefully, there- 
fore, as his well-to-do brother. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 309 

If a disturbance is actually followed by arrests, the 
reporter, in almost every instance, when the story is 
new, must needs be content with the report given by 
the police. The side of the arrested man is not gen- 
erally obtainable at the time. These are among the 
causes which often prevent the daily newspapers from 
being an impartial agency through which the world 
may be informed of the rights of the worker. This 
condition frequently leads to the necessity on the part 
of the worker to issue circulars depicting conditions 
and urging customers to abstain from purchasing the 
goods of the "unfair" concern, as the only method 
by which he can present his side to the public. Of 
course, where labor and Socialist journals are issued, 
he has these papers as his mouthpieces. In large 
cities, where the labor movement is strong and there 
are many papers, he is often treated with fairness. 

In commenting upon the attitude of the modern 
press, Dr. Walter E. Weyl 1 says : 

"It is a matter of common knowledge, reinforced by 
much indirect evidence, that many journals will not 
print news adverse to local department stores. Rather 
the loss of a thousand subscriptions than the slightest 
animadversion upon these Atlases of city journalism. 
Public franchise corporations, banks, railroads and 
other great undertakings enjoy lesser, though still con- 
siderable, immunity. . . . Of greater importance is 
an influence which the plutocracy learns to exert upon 
the general tone of newspapers. ... In a choice be- 
tween approximately equal mediums of publicity a 
great advertiser often favors journals which more 
closely approximate his views. A trust pays directly 
or indirectly for the printing of news or comments 
valuable to it indirectly and to big business generally. 
It furnishes free copy, together with paid advertising. 
It subsidizes the furnishing of boiler plate matter to 
county papers. As the great journalistic enterprises 

1 Weyl, The New Democracy, p. 124. 



3 io BOYCOTTS 

grow, as the margin of loss on each copy is spread 
over a larger circulation, as the necessity for credit 
facilities increases, the plutocracy, through its control 
of a hierarchy of banks, sets its seal upon the policy 
of an increasing number of journals. The owner of a 
paper, usually a man of wealth and debts, is subject to 
financial pressure upon his newspaper and outside ven- 
tures, as well as to social and political pressure." 

The willingness of the big interest to pay for news 
is illustrated by the following letter, received by the 
Springfield Republican, and published in their editorial 
columns of April 18, 1905. The letter was signed 
by J. Harvey White, for the Boston Elevated Rail- 
road Company, during a fight for a franchise. It 
reads: 

"Enclosed you will find copy for reading matter to 
be used in your paper Tuesday, April 18. It is under- 
stood that this will be set as news matter in news type, 
with a head line at the top of the column and without 
advertising marks of any sort. First page position is 
desired, unless your rules debar that position. Please 
send your bill at the lowest net cash rates to the under- 
signed at the above address." 1 The news item fol- 
lows, predicting that the Boston gas contract is satis- 
factory to all concerned. Many of the other papers in 
Massachusetts printed the story. 

A New York legislator and part owner of a news- 
paper, a few years ago, declared that a big public util- 
ity corporation had just begun to advertise extensively 
in the press of the state, including his own paper, in 
anticipation of the report of a legislative committee 
regarding the character of the corporation. 

That pressure during strikes has often been exerted 
against those papers which lean on the side of the 
strikers, is alleged. The boycotting of Senator Pat- 

1 Italics are the author's. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 311 

terson's Rocky Mountain News by the Citizens' Alli- 
ance, because it favored the miners during the Colo- 
rado labor war, is an instance in point. 

"Though one of the declared objects of the Citizens' 
Alliance was to discourage boycotts as well as strikes 
and lockouts," declared the United States Labor Com- 
missions, 1 "the Citizens' Alliance of Denver, in the 
autumn of 1903, adopted the following resolution, 
which was openly printed: 

"Resolved, that we, as a body, urge upon the Denver 
Advertisers' Association the importance of cooperating 
with us in this effort, and request such association to 
so place its advertising matter as to assist in upbuild- 
ing, instead of tearing down, business interests, to the 
end that a just and conservative policy may be adopted 
and advocated by the daily press." 

Mr. J. C. Craig, state president of the Alliance, 
who was active in instituting the boycott, is quoted as 
saying at that time, "We don't propose to have any 
of our advertisers furnish ammunition to a paper that 
sympathizes with trade unions, like Senator Patter- 
son's Rocky Mountain News." According to Will Ir- 
win, 2 this boycott would probably have meant bank- 
ruptcy had not Patterson gone into the market and 
snatched up some $40,000 of stock of one of the 
stores, which he afterward induced to advertise again 
in the news. The others followed. 

A militia man's characterization of the fairness of 
the reports in the press, regarding the situation at 
Lawrence, is of interest: 3 

"We went to Lawrence during what was expected 
to be a critical week of the strike, during the week the 
newspapers reported riots and prospective riots. We 
saw nearly everything which happened and there was 

[Labor Disturbances in Colorado, p. 266. 

2 "The American Newspaper," Will Irwin, Collier's, June 1;. ion. 

3 "A Militia Man's Experience/' The Surrey, April 6, 1912. 



3 i2 BOYCOTTS 

nothing of a serious nature. Newspaper reports were 
absolutely false. One occurrence which was featured 
as a 'riot' in extras was the largest demonstration 
which occurred and was entirely peacefid. 1 The north 
side of Essex Street was crowded with strikers who 
walked along in groups. The police decided that there 
were too many and turned the head of the procession 
up a side street. A few resisted this and were ar- 
rested." 

That the control of the papers by the department 
stores leads at times to the total suppression of damag- 
ing news, even to the extent of ignoring the killing of 
a striker, is apparently borne out by the following in- 
stances cited by Prof. E. A. Ross: 

"During the strike of the elevator men in the large 
stores the business agent of the elevator starters' union 
was beaten to death in an alley behind a certain em- 
porium by a 'strong arm' man hired by that firm. The 
story, supported by affidavits, was given by a responsi- 
ble lawyer to three newspaper men, each of whom ac- 
cepted it as true, and promised to print it. The ac- 
count never appeared. 

"In another city the sales girls in the big shops had 
an exceedingly mean and oppressive contract, which, if 
generally known, would have made the firms odious to 
the public. A prominent social worker brought these 
contracts and evidence as to the bad conditions which 
had been established under them to every newspaper 
in the city. Not one would print a line on the subject. 

"On the outbreak of a justifiable street car strike 
the newspapers were disposed to treat it in a sympa- 
thetic way. Suddenly they veered and became unani- 
mously hostile to the strikers. Inquiry showed that 
the big merchants had threatened to withdraw their ad- 
vertising unless the newspapers changed their atti- 
tude." 2 

1 Italics are the author's. 

3 Review of Reviews, April, 1910. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 313 

On a paper in which the writer was employed for 
some time, an accident occurring in the store of a large 
advertiser would appear in print as happening in a 
"downtown" department store. No mention of a par- 
ticular department store, adverse in its nature, was 
possible, unless the article first secured the special 
O. K. of the business manager. 

Mr. Richard Lloyd Jones declared that the story 
of the struggle, in the strike of the miners of West- 
moreland County, Pennsylvania, had been "as effec- 
tively suppressed in Pennsylvania's 'little Russia' as it 
ever could have been under the Czar's twin-headed 
black eagle. Not a daily newspaper in Westmore- 
land County has reported it." 1 

The Associated Press, the most powerful of the 
news agencies in this country, has often been accused 
of partiality. Among the communications recently 
presented by Senator Owen of Oklahoma, to the Sen- 
ate, in his petition to investigate the conditions of the 
strikers in the Bethlehem Steel Works, was the fol- 
lowing from the chairman and secretary of the strik- 
ers' committee: 

"The Associated Press has refused to print prac- 
tically everything relating to the strike. Either Mr. 
Schwab or Mr. Melville E. Stone can tell you the rea- 



In substantiating this charge, the strikers alleged 
that this agency refused to transmit over its wires the 
written charges made to President Taft by the strik- 
ers, in which it was stated that the Bethlehem com- 
pany supplied the government with defective steel. 3 
This agency, however, usually denies indignantly any 
unjust discrimination. Many charges are, in all prob- 
ability, ill founded. 

1 "Pennsylvania's Russia," Jones, Collier's, April I, 1911. 

2 Presented April 21, 1910. Italics are the author's. 

3 Nezv York Call, April 22, 1910. 



314 BOYCOTTS 

During the strike of the marble workers in New 
York in the fall of 191 1, it was charged by the strikers 
that the New York World and New York American 
had refused, after the first few days, to carry their 
advertisement, in which they requested marble workers 
to stay away from the city. 

Samuel Gompers recently thus summed up his con- 
ception of the press's present hostility to labor: 

"With all means of collecting and disseminating in- 
formation in the hands of the 'interests,' how can the 
workers get a square deal? The press, the telegraph, 
the telephone, the cable — all are under corporation 
control and are used against the workers in their 
struggle for industrial betterment." 1 

A prominent organizer of the New York typo- 
graphical union declared to the writer, a short time 
ago, that practically all of the non-labor press in New 
York had, during a recent strike, refused to print any- 
thing about this strike, even as advertisements for 
which the regular charge was offered. A standard 
weekly recently lost an advertisement worth several 
thousand dollars a year, it is stated on good authority, 
for printing an article favorable to the workers, dur- 
ing the Lawrence strike. 

Charges of a similar character, some well founded 
and others without sufficient basis, are heard constantly 
in labor circles, especially in connection with the re- 
cent West Virginia and Paterson strikes, where the 
authorities went so far as to confiscate issues of the 
labor press. In the later disturbance a labor editor, 
Alex. Scott, was arrested for criticizing the police ad- 
ministration. 

This suppression of news is likely to be especially 
marked during the reign of martial law in a community, 

1 Hearings before Sub-committee on Judiciary, U. S. Senate, H. R. 
23635, P- 15- 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 315 

as a result of the press censorship which is frequently 
established. Such a censorship was observed during 
a part of the Colorado disturbances, when the com- 
manding officer announced that no reports could be 
sent by such means as telegraph and telephone without 
his sanction. 1 "By Major Hill's order the office of 
II Lavatore Italiano was seized, and a week's edition 
of the paper was confiscated. This edition contained 
a report of the proceedings of the recent district con- 
vention," etc. 

The miners declared that the reports were doctored 
in very many instances, and there was probably much 
justification for this accusation. 

While there are these tendencies toward ignoring 
or misrepresenting the worker, it must also be stated 
that in the final analysis a newspaper succeeds in pro- 
portion as it interests large numbers of the public in 
its columns, and that, if a paper has the reputation of 
being absolutely unfair, its circulation is likely to de- 
crease, and, with this decrease, its value as an adver- 
tising medium becomes less. There are undoubtedly 
tendencies at work which make for fairness as well as 
for unfairness. At the present time, however, the 
anti-labor forces seem, in very many instances, to have 
the stronger pull. 



Free Speech 

In quite a number of cases, the workers have ex- 
perienced difficulty in reaching their fellow workers 
and the public with oral messages. Frequently open- 
air speaking has been suppressed, while the strikers 
have been denied halls in which to air their griev- 
ances. The fight of the American Federation of Labor 
organizers at Vandergrift, Pa., is illustrative: 

1 Labor Disturbances in Colorado, pp. 199, 200, 35a 



3 i6 BOYCOTTS 

"The A. F. of L. organizer, A. E. Holder, and 
Robert Edwards, of the Amalgamated Association of 
Iron and Steel Workers, made persistent endeavors to 
obtain rooms or halls in which to hold meetings in Van- 
dergrift, Pa., but were unsuccessful. Landlords and 
agents invariably used this reply: 'I should be glad to 
rent to you, but I do not dare.' One man, Mr. S. J. 
Poole, a painter and decorator, was willing to allow 
the use of a part of his storeroom, but was prevented 
by his landlord, who held him to the strict letter of 
the law on sub-tenants." 1 

The organizers furthermore declared that they were 
driven out of town by a mob controlled by the offi- 
cers of the mills, and threatened with direful injuries 
should they refuse. 

Less consideration than usual is likely to be 
paid to the right of free speech, as far as the worker 
is concerned, during a military regime. Mr. Owen 
R. Lovejoy, secretary of the National Child Labor 
Association, vividly describes the denial of such free- 
dom during the Lawrence strike. After watching the 
running of a picket out of the mill section, "a poorly 
clad, shivering little man," by the militia, Mr. Love- 
joy asked the soldiers what was the crime of which the 
man was guilty. 

"Asking some one not to work, I suppose, or call- 
ing him a scab. He's a picket," was the response. 

" 'But,' I ventured, 'asking a man not to work and 
calling him a scab are not the same, are they?' 

" 'Get to hell out of here. I ain't got no time to 
chew the rag with you fellows,' the soldier said, with 
an ominous gesture that indicated that the resources of 
the great state of Massachusetts were backing him in 
quelling my riot. 

"I asked another lad in uniform, 'Don't you allow 

1 Report of A. F. of L. on the Steel Trust, presented to the Presi- 
dent of the U. S. (1910), p. 25. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 317 

any picketing if they are quiet and orderly and peace- 
able?' 

"He appeared to think me feeble minded, as he 
sneeringly replied, 'Not a damned one, not if we see 
'em.' "* 

Mr. Lovejoy condemned the restriction placed on 
the strikers as a form of intimidation the effect of 
which was to u whip them into submission." 

The fights for free speech in Little Falls, New York, 
when Mayor Lunn and Rev. Robert A. Bakeman were 
arrested in Clinton Park, while quoting Lincoln and 
the Bible, in Spokane, Washington, 2 in the brutal San 
Diego fight, 3 in New Castle, Pennsylvania, 4 in Pater- 
son and West Virginia and in numerous other in- 
stances, may be mentioned. 

These instances, it is true, are somewhat unusual, 
and, excepting in the mine and steel disputes, have of 
late been noted chiefly in connection with the strikes 
conducted by the I. W. W. This fact, however, by no 
means mitigates the evil. 

The Pulpit 

The church, another strong agent for the forming 
of public opinion, has often been accused of throwing 
its weight too much upon the side of the employers. 
Especially is this said to be true in towns which are 
completely dominated by one or two industrial in- 
terests. The same sort of influences which have 
too often surrounded the editors and the judges 
envelop the clergy. The church is directly supported, 
in most instances, by the well-to-do among the popu- 
lation. The salary of the minister is often directly 
dependent upon the contributions of the employers of 

1 "Right of Free Speech at Lawrence," Survey, March o. iou. 

2 International Socialist Review, December, 1909, February, 1910. 

3 New York Call, May 18, 1912. 

4 Ibid., May 14, 1910. 



318 BOYCOTTS 

labor, the largeness of these contributions depends 
upon their good will, and their good will is influenced 
tremendously by the kind of economic teachings which 
they hear expounded from the pulpit. Naturally dur- 
ing a strike it ill pleases the employer to have his pol- 
icies denounced and the demands of the workers ap- 
proved. The writer has spoken to more than one min- 
ister who has suffered much financially because of their 
too open advocacy of the workers. 

The following, describing conditions in Pennsylvania 
among the steel mills, is illustrative : * 

"September 16, 1909. The speaker at the Apollo 
labor meeting on this date was the Rev. C. Johnson, a 
free Methodist minister from Leechburg, who con- 
sented to address the meeting on the invitation of A. E. 
Holder, A. F. of L. organizer. 

"September 17, 1909. The Rev. Johnson's relations 
in the Leechburg's mills and his church members in the 
Leechburg and Vandergrift mills were threatened with 
discharge if the pastor again dared to speak on the 
labor movement or attended meetings." 

Again the social relations of the average minister 
are such as unconsciously to influence his opinions in 
favor of the privileged classes. It may be added, in 
justice to the clergy, however, that a growing number 
throughout the nation are leaning strongly toward the 
side of labor, and are expressing their labor sympa- 
thies more and more freely. 

Governmental Forces and the Worker — The Police 

Workers often find that not only the forces of pub- 
lic opinion, but also the governmental forces, includ- 
ing the police, constabulary, militia and courts, are fre- 
quently used against them in their struggles, in a most 

1 Statement and Evidence against the U. S. Steel Corporation by 
American Federation of Labor, p. 26. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 319 

unjust manner. The police of the city, aided often by 
special policemen, have many times been brought into 
the dispute, in order to browbeat the workers. Espe- 
cially is this the case when the strikers are foreigners. 
The menacing and intimidating attitude of the spe- 
cial police, many of whom were illegally brought into 
service, during the strike at Little Falls, N. Y., was 
recently depicted by John A. Fitch, associate editor of 
the Survey, in an open letter to Commissioner of La- 
bor John Williams. 

"I found large numbers of special policemen and 
deputy sheriffs patroling the streets in the neighbor- 
hood where the working people live. The regular 
police force of Little Falls consists of six officers. The 
number of such officers now patroling the streets is 
variously estimated at from six to ninety. They walk 
about in groups, carrying the clubs in their hands, and 
their attitude toward strikers and strangers upon the 
city streets is constantly menacing and evidently de- 
signed to intimidate. It is alleged that most of the 
special policemen and deputy sheriffs have been fur- 
nished by the Humphrey Detective Agency of Albany, 
and that a majority of such officers have been procured 
not only from outside of Herkimer County, but from 
points outside of the State of New York. This, if 
true, is in violation of section 1845 °f tne penal law." 

Mr. Fitch tells about the arrest of one man against 
whom no charge had been made, and the refusal of 
the authorities to allow his lawyer to have any access 
to him. He continues : 

". . . At noon of the day of arrest a policeman 
assaulted a workingman upon the street, striking him 
with his club. This workman was not a striker. He 
at once appealed to the city authorities to issue a war- 
rant for the arrest of the policeman who struck him, 
but was able neither to procure a warrant nor redress 
of any kind. On the same evening a report, which I 



320 BOYCOTTS 

have no reason to disbelieve, came to me to the effect 
that two strike leaders and a boy were assaulted by 
special policemen who jumped upon them from a dark 
passage where they had been in waiting. According to 
the report, all three were beaten by the policemen with 
their clubs." 1 

Undue police interference against the strikers has 
also been alleged in the fights against the Cleveland 
garment manufacturers, 2 the Great Southern Lumber 
Co., 3 the silk mill owners of Paterson, 4 the mine own- 
ers of Colorado, the mill owners of Lawrence, 5 and a 
host of other employers. 

On the other hand, when the strikers are of the 
same nationality as the police, and strike-breakers are 
of another nationality, the strikers often have a freer 
rein. 

Certain excuses will undoubtedly be forthcoming for 
the conduct of the police in these conflicts. While the 
excuses may mitigate the offenses of the authorities, 
they can not, in the opinion of the author, exonerate 
them. 

The State Constabulary 

During the past few years there has been created in 
Pennsylvania what is known as the state constabulary. 
Workmen declare that this body was organized at the 
behest of the "coal barons," in order to assist in the 
breaking of strikes. The constabulary is a cross be- 
tween the local police and the state militia. Its mem- 
bers are generally mounted on horseback and do duty 
throughout the state. They are to be found wherever 
there is an industrial conflict. Many are the testi- 

1 Italics are the author's. 

2 International Socialist Review, September, 1911. 

3 Coming Nation, November 23, 1912. 

4 Survey, April 19, 1913. 

5 Ibid., December 7, 1912. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 321 

monies that they have done effective work for the em- 
ployers. 

The following almost unbelievable tale of assault 
and murder was told a few years ago by Mr. Hugh 
Kelley, chief of police of So. Bethlehem, Pa., before 
the United States Investigating Committee : 1 

"When the constabulary arrived here, February 26, 
19 10, neither the burgess nor myself, as chief of police, 
was informed of their arrival. They were in charge 
of the sheriff. . . . They started out on our streets, 
beat down our people without any reason whatever, 
and they shot down an innocent man, Joseph Zambo, 
who . . . was in the Majestic Hotel. One of the 
troopers rode up on the pavement at the hotel door 
and fired two shots into the barroom, shooting one man 
in the mouth and another (Zambo) through the head, 
who died that afternoon. . . . There was no disturb- 
ance of any kind at this hotel, which was the head- 
quarters for those who were conducting the strike. . . . 
Troopers went into the houses of people without war- 
rant and searched the inmates and drove people from 
their doorsteps. They beat an old man at least sixty 
years of age. Struck him with a riot stick, knocked 
him down, and left him in a very bad condition. This 
is only one of a dozen similar cases." 

Michael Lynch, chief of police from March 15, 
19 10, submitted similar evidence. A number of min- 
ers who signed themselves "Citizens of Madison" 
sent a letter to State Representative James H. Maurer, 
February 22, 191 1, in which, among other things, they 
charged the constabulary with ruthlessly destroying on 
April 1, 1 9 10, the homes of some of the strikers. 
They averred: 

"The coal companies got a lot of deputies into the 
field, loaded them up with rifles, revolvers and clubs, 

1 Abstract from U. S. Senate Document, No. 521, Quoted in The 
Constabulary of P ennsylvania, by Charles A. Maurer. Italics are the 
author's. 



322 BOYCOTTS 

made them drunk, and set them loose on the people's 
houses, and they got orders to go ahead and do their 
worst. . . . They started by smashing the furniture 
out on the street, and God help the man or woman 
who protested against them." 1 Much more is recited 
of similar import. 

Many advocates of the constabulary have, on the 
other hand, expressed the opinion that the timely ac- 
tion of this body has often prevented more serious 
trouble. While this is sometimes true, its anti-labor 
tendencies have been marked. 

The Militia 

In a few labor struggles militia men have proved 
the bugbear of the strikers. In many cases where 
they have appeared on the scene, it is charged that 
law and order was being maintained without them, and 
that the primary reason for urging their presence was 
to break the strike. The workmen, it is claimed, are 
rarely consulted before the troops are called out. A 
typical example is that of the Colorado strike of 
1904: 2 

"The commission appointed by the governor ar- 
rived in Victor on the night of September 3, and held 
a conference in the Bank of Victor with Mayor F. D. 
French, Postmaster F. M. Reardon, and other leading 
citizens. On the same night the commission went to 
Cripple Creek, and held a session at the National 
Hotel, which was attended by Mayor W. L. Shockey, 
of Cripple Creek, Sheriff H. M. Robertson, by mem- 
bers of the Mine Owners' Association, and by members 
of the Citizens' Alliance, but no representatives of the 
miners y union were examined by the commission. 
Mayor Shockey refused to sign a telegraphic request 

1 The Constabulary of Pennsylvania, by Charles A. Maurer, p. 8. 

2 Labor Disturbances in Colorado, pp. 175-178. Italics are the 
author's. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 323 

for troops, on the ground that no violence had been 
committed within the limits of Cripple Creek, but he 
told the commissioners that he believed that 75% of 
the miners in the district were ready to return to work 
if they should be assured protection, and therefore he 
favored having troops." 

The troops were thereupon ordered. The county 
commissioners of Teller County soon issued a state- 
ment alleging that there was no excuse for sending 
the militia, and asserting that in their belief the com- 
mission "was not sent for an honest purpose, but as a 
cloak, to cause the people of the state of Colorado to 
believe that the law officers of Teller County were 
unable to handle the strike situation." 

The sheriff afterward testified that he told the com- 
mission that he "had the situation in hand, and that 
there was no occasion for the militia." 

Even Attorney General N. C. Miller, who was in 
favor of the ordering of troops, when asked by the 
Denver Republican reporter if there was much dis- 
turbance in the district, is quoted as saying: 

"Disturbance? I should say not. In fact it was the 
greatest exhibition of peace I ever saw. Everybody 
must have been 'under cover,' for the streets were as 
quiet as on Sunday in Denver. But this is not the point. 
There was likely to be trouble, from what we gathered 
from those summoned before us, and that is why the 
troops were sent." 

Of Pullman, to which federal troops were sent, 
July 4, 1894, during the American Railway strike, the 
government commission states: 1 

"It is evidence, and uncontradicted, that no violence 
or destruction of property by strikers or sympathizers 
took place at Pullman, and that until July 3 no ex- 



324 BOYCOTTS 

traordinary protection was had from the police or mili- 
tary against even anticipated disorder." 

The same testimony is given in a number of other 
cases. 

After the troops are finally landed on the scenes of 
the strike, their influence, labor leaders declare, is ex- 
erted in favor of the employing class. Even the mili- 
tia at times realize the role they are playing. Of 
Lawrence, one of them writes i 1 

"There was too much of the feeling that we were 
fighting on the side of the mill owners. Our orders were 
to guard the mill and the mill property and to keep 
strikers who were known to us or were wearing badges 
from approaching within two streets of the mills. . . . 
We were quartered at a mill, and were fighting on the 
side of the mill men to protect them from the violence 
of the enemy. We had excellent accommodations at 
the mill, and were constantly receiving favors from the 
mill men. 

"The orders to allow no parades or gatherings were 
rather indefinite and were interpreted to forbid two 
men from standing together on a street corner. . . . 
Had the strikers been better acquainted with their 
rights as American citizens, they would undoubtedly 
have struggled with us when we calmly overrode their 
rights on the theory that the strike was similar to a 
war. ... I doubt whether any officer of the militia 
was particularly interested in protecting the strikers. 
Nothing was said to us about their rights, and no sug- 
gestion was handed down that we should treat both 
sides fairly." 

The statement of Owen R. Lovejoy, previously 
quoted, is of a like nature. 

The denial of the right of trial by jury, the im- 
prisonment of those who exercised the right of free 
speech and free press, the confiscation of labor papers, 
1 "A Militia Man's Experiences," Survey, April 6, 1912. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 325 

the withdrawal of the right of habeas corpus, and the 
subversion of other liberties were the concomitants of 
the sending in of the militia to West Virginia, 1 as well 
as to Colorado. The ruthless deportation of miners 
in the latter state was another result of the use of the 
armed forces of the government. 2 

The Courts 

There is practically a unanimity of opinion in labor 
circles that the courts have, for the most part, been 
pitted against labor in its struggles. Labor injunc- 
tions, binding the workers hand and foot, have been 
issued, strikers have been fined and jailed on frivolous 
and fictitious charges, juries have been charged in a 
biased manner, and jurymen themselves often selected 
from the non-labor groups. These are some of the 
charges brought against the legal procedure of the 
present day, in times of labor troubles. 

It is true that the judges, by the very nature of their 
profession, are inclined to the conservative side. They 
seek precedents, and many of the principles of law 
which they apply, following the doctrine of stare 
decisis, are principles enunciated years ago in Eng- 
land and America, before the beginning of the indus- 
trial revolution. Although England has discarded 
many of these principles long since, they are still ap- 
plied by the courts in this country. 

Many of the judges are under obligation to politi- 
cal bosses, who, in turn, represent financial interests 
perhaps more or less involved in the labor disturb- 
ance. Frequently judges have, before appointment, 

1 "Sweet Land of Liberty," Michaelson, Everybody's Magazine, 
May, 1913. 

2 Labor Disturbances in Colorado. See also Conditions in the 
Paint Creek District, West Virginia- Hearings before Com. on 
Education and Labor, U. S. Senate, 63d Cong., 1st Session, pursuant 
to S. Res. 37. 



326 BOYCOTTS 

been attorneys for large corporate interests, or are 
desirous, after leaving the bench, of securing lucrative 
employment from such interests. Some judges are on 
the bench as a result of the influence of these interests. 
Letters similar to the following, dated December 5, 
1902, and addressed to Governor Wm. A. Stone of 
Pennsylvania, explain the reason for the appointment 
of some judges : 1 

"My Dear Governor: I am sure you will pardon 
any seeming presumption on my part in writing you on 
a subject in which both personally and on behalf of my 
company I am greatly interested. It is to urge the 
appointment, if at all consistent, of Judge Morrison, 
of McKean, to the Supreme Court bench, vice Mitchell, 
deceased. Judge Morrison's character for ability and 
integrity needs no words at my hands, aside from these 
great considerations, his familiarity with all that per- 
tains to the great industries of oil and gas in the impor- 
tant relations they bear to the interests of the western 
part of the State make him especially desirable as a 
member of the court from that section. 

"Hoping that it may prove possible for you to favor- 
ably consider Judge Morrison's appointment, I am, 
with very high regard, 

"Sincerely yours, 

"Jno. D. Archbold." 
"Hon. Wm. A. Stone, 
Harrisburg, Pa." 

The social environment of the judge, like that of 
the preacher and the editor, also tends to make him 
more conscious of the rights of capital than of those 
of labor. The desire of support at the polls may, at 
times, however, have a counteracting influence. 

The life of the judge, furthermore, is likely to be a 
busy one, at least during his hours in court. In the 
rush of business a typewritten injunction order pre- 

1 Hearst's Magazine, September, 1912. 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 327 

pared in the office of a friendly fellow lawyer, attor- 
ney for a large business concern, is frequently signed 
without much reflection, even though its terms are 
sweeping, and though it might be the means of break- 
ing the strike. The preparation of the Buck's Stove 
injunction order in the office of the plaintiff's attor- 
neys has elsewhere been referred to. At times judges 
publicly admit such facts. 

Judges Scott and Farmer in the Barnes case (Illi- 
nois, 1908), for instance, declared that the injunction 
writ was "usually drawn in the words of the solicitor 
for the complainant." "It is fair to the trial judge to 
say, however," asserted the judge in a Minnesota 
case (Gray v. The Building Trades Council, 1903), 
"that the order was drawn by plaintiff's attorney, as 
was usual in such cases." 

The intimate relations between the employers and 
the judges, the district attorneys, etc., are often a mat- 
ter of justifiable criticism. The following observation 
of John A. Fitch, who alleged that he discovered an 
employee of the National Erectors' Association in 
virtual charge of the entire correspondence of the 
union it was fighting, during the trial of the dyna- 
miters, is in point: 

"It must be remembered that the Erectors' Associa- 
tion has been active for years in another direction than 
that of apprehending criminals. It exists for the pur- 
pose of smashing a labor union. In the steel industry 
proper for men even to meet together means discharge. 
The structural trade has not swung that far toward 
domination by the employer . . . But the impro- 
priety of permitting an agent of the Erectors' Associa- 
tion to have access to the 60,000 or so letters, of which 
evidently the vast majority had to do with the legiti- 
mate activities of the union, since only a few hundred 
were used in the trial, ought to be obvious to any one" 1 

1 Survey, v. 29, p. 616, February t, 1913, Italics arc the author's. 



328 BOYCOTTS 

The employers' ability in most cases to hire the more 
astute attorneys, and the better and more authoritative 
presence of the employers in court, often place the em- 
ployees at a distinct disadvantage in their attempt, dur- 
ing labor disputes, to obtain justice from courts. 

With the forces of public opinion fighting the battles 
of the employers, with the press and pulpit too often 
muzzled, and the powers of government — the police, 
constabulary, militia, courts — used at the behest of 
the master class, the workers claim that they are often 
placed at a grave disadvantage, and should surely be 
equipped with effective weapons if they are to win 
against the forces of their adversaries. 



Boycotting as a Fundamental Human Right 

Still an additional argument which labor uses in its 
endeavor to legalize the boycott is that boycotting is 
a fundamental human right and that society suffers 
whenever a fundamental right is suppressed. A has 
the right to deal or to refuse to deal with B for any 
or for no reason. B has no property right in A's 
patronage, and therefore cannot be wronged when that 
patronage is withheld from him. If this is true, it is 
also true that A has a right to approach C and to per- 
suade C to withhold his patronage from B, since B 
has no greater property right in the patronage of C 
than he has in that of A. A has also the right to 
cease dealing with C, if he continues his patronage with 
B, and he has likewise the right to state to C that he 
will cease dealings should he refuse to sever his rela- 
tions with B — since a man has a right to threaten to 
do that which he has a right to do. From this follows 
the right to join with others in such threats. By this 
course of reasoning, the primary, the secondary, and 
that form of the compound boycott which involves a 



REASONS FOR LEGALIZING 329 

threat to boycott are all declared fundamental rights. 
Mr. Gompers thus states the case i 1 

"Just as men may strike for any reason, or without 
any reason at all, so may they suspend dealings with 
merchants or others for any reason or no reason at 
all. . . . You may threaten to take your custom away 
from them and assign any reason you choose. They 
are not entitled to your custom as a matter of moral 
or legal right, and you are at liberty to withdraw and 
transfer it at any time and for any conceivable reason. 
It follows beyond all question that you have a perfect 
right to threaten to withdraw your custom. The prin- 
ciple is the same whether you threaten one man or a 
hundred men, whether you are alone in threatening 
the withdrawal of your custom or a member of a vast 
combination of people acting together in the prem- 
ises. . . . 

"Men have a right to do business, but this is one 
half of the truth. The men with whom business is done 
have a right to withdraw and transfer their custom. 
This is the other half, which is always ignored in the 
anti-boycott arguments. . . . Labor has a right to 
suspend dealings with any and all who refuse to sup- 
port what it considers its legitimate demands. . . . 
Workmen have a right to say that they will not patron- 
ize those who are unfriendly to them and those who 
support their adversaries. This is all that boycotting 
implies." 

1 Gompers, "The Boycott as a Legitimate Weapon," in paper writ- 
ten October, 1899. 



CHAPTER XX 

POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR IF PERMANENTLY 
DEPRIVED OF THE BOYCOTT 

Another important element which should be con- 
sidered by those opposing, as well as those bespeaking 
the legality of the boycott, is the possible weapons to 
which labor will resort, if permanently deprived by 
law of the opportunity to organize their purchasing 
power. 

Many unionists declare that they will not be de- 
prived of the use of this labor device, that, openly 
or secretly, they will employ it whenever it promises 
success. The negative boycott — expressed through 
the union label — is advocated as a substitute by some, 
political action presents the remedy to another group, 
while more radical tactics, such as sabotage and vio- 
lence, as well as fundamental changes in the forms of 
trade organizations — industrial unionism and its ac- 
companying principles — are urged by others. The at- 
titude of the courts toward the boycott has undoubtedly 
turned greater attention to each of these substitutes. 
Concentration on some of these weapons is undoubt- 
edly an auspicious sign for labor, while greater em- 
phasis on other devices presents a warning which 
should be heeded. Are those who are opposing the 
boycotts, in their endeavor to suppress what to them 
seems one evil, giving an undue impetus to a greater 
evil? 

330 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 331 

Secret Practice 

In some cases attempts to deprive labor of the boy- 
cott have brought forth a shout of defiance from the 
workers. "This fundamental right will not be 
snatched from out our grasp," many labor leaders 
declared after the decision in the Danbury Hatters' 
case and the injunctions in the Buck's Stove case. "We 
will singly and in combination exercise our God-given 
privilege of refusing to patronize 'unfair' goods." A 
well-known organizer of one of the international 
unions said a while ago to the writer: 

"The law might prevent the most timid from exer- 
cising the boycott, but the more militant will go ahead, 
law or no law." 

A secretary of another strong international union 
wrote : 

"The question of what the unionists will resort to 
if deprived permanently of the right to boycott is 
difficult to answer, because free men will boycott in 
future as they have done in the past." "I don't think 
that labor can be deprived of the right to withhold its 
patronage from any firm," writes another. 

Mr. John Mitchell is of the opinion that this weapon 
will still be used, though secretly and maliciously. He 
declared: 

"// an attempt is made to render the boycott illegal, 
as has already been done, the result will really be that 
the boycott or the concerted refusal to purchase goods 
at a certain place will become secret, instead of open. 
The only safeguards against the occasional abuses of 
the boycott are openness and publicity, and if the law 
forces the boycott to become irregular and secret, it 
will undoubtedly be used to serve the purpose of malice 
and spite, and unscrupulous employers or manufactur- 



332 BOYCOTTS 

ers will endeavor to use secretly this formidable 
weapon against their rivals and competitors. The en- 
deavor should be to mitigate any possible evils with- 
out striking at the roots of a privilege of great im- 
portance and value to society." 1 

Mr. Gompers also pronounced it a fundamental 
right of which labor would not be deprived. The evil 
social effect of the presence on the statute books of 
unenforceable and, to great masses of the population, 
unjust laws, is widely acknowledged. 

The Union Label and Trade Union Cooperatives 

Some claim that ultimately the union label will prove 
an adequate substitute for the boycott. This is the 
belief of Mr. Thomas Tracy, secretary of the Label 
Trades Department, as well as of some eight of the 
secretaries of the international unions and some of the 
state secretaries. 

The following are a few statements made to the 
author : 

"The union label is gradually taking the place of the 
boycott. If union men were of the true union spirit, 
there would be a greater demand for the label, and 
this would be a better system than the boycott." 

"When the union label comes into general use it 
will obviate the necessity of a boycott." 

Others are of a different opinion. This is from a 
state secretary of the A. F. of L. : 

"The union label cannot replace other lines of 
activity. Each would have its own effect." 

"The union label, in my opinion, would prove a poor 
substitute." "It is not a substitute — it is an advertise- 
ment." "When compared to independent political 
action, the union label would prove a poor substitute." 

1 Mitchell, Organised Labor, pp. 288, 289. 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 333 

Mr. Gompers also believes that each form of trade 
union activity has its own particular function to per- 
form, and that no weapon can take the place of an- 
other of which labor has been deprived. It is doubt- 
less true, nevertheless, that, since the unfavorable 
Buck's Stove and Danbury Hatters' decisions, much 
greater emphasis has been laid on the use of the label 
than heretofore. Yet it is extremely doubtful whether 
the admonition to trade unionists and their sympa- 
thizers to purchase only union goods will have such 
an immediate and vital effect on the sales of an unfair 
firm as will the admonition not to purchase the goods 
of the particular firm. 

Another interesting substitute suggested to take the 
place of the boycott, though one which, as yet, has not 
obtained any large degree of trade union support, is a 
trade union cooperative society, by means of which the 
label may be properly utilized. 1 Trade unions only 
would be allowed to hold stock and the society would 
be governed by directors representing these unions. 
The establishment of the society would, according to 
its originator, lead to lower prices through the elimi- 
nation of profits and the waste of the middlemen, and 
would also insure the purchase of goods made by 
union men. His plan would be preferable to boycot- 
ting and to the use of the union label, as at present, he 
declared, because union men could purchase union 
goods without "the physical weariness and vexation of 
spirit now attending the search for such articles," be- 
cause the establishment of the society would infringe 
no law, would necessitate no large expenditure of 
money, would divert to the unions the profits now 
pouring into the coffers of the middlemen, would guar- 
antee the trade of outsiders desirous of obtaining a 



1 The idea is an elaboration of the label shop, and is proposed by 
Mr. Portenar. Portenar, Problems of Organized Labor, pp. o; 
et seq. 



334 BOYCOTTS 

share of the profits, would make it possible to sell the 
best goods, on account of the extensiveness of the pur- 
chasing market, and would "bring men tumbling into 
the union fold," as their employers "must have union 
men to make things for this tremendous market." 

Political Action 

Deprived of the use of the boycott, many men have 
recently turned to political action, through which to 
secure legislation legalizing the boycott, as well as to 
reduce the hours of employment, to establish a min- 
imum wage and in general to give the workers a more 
complete control of their industrial life. "Boycott at 
the Polls" has been a shibboleth on many a lip. The 
following jingle expresses the sentiment of many: * 

"For the betterment of labor 

Party lines should be erased; 
On election day is when the 

Open-shoppers should be chased. 
Injunction judges who are wont 

To place you on the coals 
Will have their fangs extracted 

When you boycott at the polls. 

It's a simple proposition 

And it takes but little time; 
You need levy no assessment, 

It needn't cost a single dime. 
Cast away j^our heavy burdens 

And obliterate the tolls 
Which from you have been extracted — 

Learn to boycott at the polls. 

You can make the workday shorter 
And increase the daily wage 

1 Thomas H. West, quoted in International Woodcarver, July, 
1911. 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 335 

For the army of producers 

Who in honest toil engage. 
From the greed of sweatshop herders 

You can save unnumbered souls. 
Real prosperity will be here 

When you boycott at the polls." 

The noteworthy character of the present tendency 
warrants a rapid survey of labor's position on this 
subject. For many years after the formation of the 
American Federation of Labor, warned by the unfor- 
tunate example of the Knights of Labor, this organi- 
zation prohibited the discussion of politics in the 
unions. In 1895 a clause was placed in the constitu- 
tion, to the effect that "party politics, whether they be 
Democratic, Republican, Socialist, Populist, Prohibi- 
tionist or any other, shall have no place in the conven- 
tions of the American Federation of Labor." 

In 1896 it was voted that "no officer of the A. F. 
of L. shall be allowed to use his official position in the 
interest of either political party." Mr. Gompers 
stated, in defense of his position, in the 1896 con- 
vention, that his single purpose was "to try and steer 
our craft of trade unionism clear from the shoals and 
the rocks upon which so many of labor's previous 
efforts were wrecked." 

Conditions, however, changed. The lobbyists of 
the Federation, without representation in Congress, 
found that they were, in many cases, powerless. De- 
cisions of the various state and federal courts, uphold- 
ing injunctions, declaring labor laws unconstitutional, 
came thick and fast. In 1906 the Federation decided 
to make a stand against the reelection of Congressman 
Charles E. Littlefield of Maine. The congressman, 
after a hard fight, was reelected by a small plurality 
of 1,000, his previous plurality being 5,419. He 
afterward resigned. The Federation was encouraged. 
In November, 1906, six union men were elected to 



33 6 BOYCOTTS 

Congress. The courts continued their so-called reac- 
tionary work. On January 6, 1908, the clause of the 
Erdman Law of 1898, which was aimed to prevent 
discrimination against union members, was declared 
unconstitutional. On January 23, the Employers' Li- 
ability Law of 1906, making employers responsible 
for accidents to employees, regardless of carelessness, 
etc., suffered the same fate. 

The next month, on February 3, 1908, came the 
famous Danbury Hatters' decision, in the boycott case 
against Loewe & Co., in which the Supreme Court de- 
clared that boycotting could be punished under the 
provisions of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law. A short 
time prior to these decisions, the Supreme Court of the 
District of Columbia issued the remarkable injunction 
in the Buck's Stove case (December 18, 1907). This 
was made permanent in March, and immediately there- 
after contempt proceedings were brought against the 
officers of the American Federation. Then it was that 
the Federation began its political campaign in earnest, 
to abolish "government by injunction," to secure the 
repeal or amendment of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 
and other legislation. The new shibboleth was no 
longer "keep politics out of the union," but rather the 
following: 

"We now call upon all the workers of our common 
country to stand faithfully by our friends, oppose and 
defeat our enemies, whether they be candidates for 
President, for Congress, or other offices, whether ex- 
ecutive, legislative or judicial." 

In the ensuing presidential campaign of 1908, on 
account of the more favorable anti-injunction plank, 
President Gompers and others decided to throw their 
weight nationally with the Democratic party, de- 
claring it to be their belief "that the whole mass 
of workers of the country will respond in hearty sym- 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 337 

pathy with the Democratic party in the coming cam- 
paign, as a result of its action in the labor plank of 
the platform." Column after column appeared in the 
American Federationist and other labor papers in sup- 
port of this course, and, in the fall of 1908, some ten 
union card men were elected to the House of Repre- 
sentatives. In 19 10 this number was increased to 
fifteen. 1 

That the deprivation of the boycott has been one 
of the causes of this trend, and that such political ac- 
tivity has but only just begun, is the opinion of many. 
A secretary of one of the international unions de- 
clared to the writer: 

"These crushing court decisions, depriving labor of 
the right to boycott, simply mean that labor will it- 
self administer government affairs. . . . To deprive 
labor altogether of the right to boycott scab goods will 
but hasten the day when political action is the only 
source of relief." 

Another international secretary writes: 

"To my mind, political action on the part of organ- 
ized labor will come, and, as we are deprived of rights, 
each one will hasten the day of political action." 

A third states : 

"The fight against the boycott has resulted now in 
increasing the belief that the ballot, properly used, is 
the surest way to correct all ills." 

Other replies from international secretaries in the 
same vein were: 

"Personally I believe that concerted political action 
would be the only effective weapon at our command. 
I believe that 90% of the organized wage earners 

1 The awakening is, in some respects, similar to that in Eng- 
land following the adverse Taff Vale decision. In that country, 
however, labor turned to independent political action. 



33% BOYCOTTS 

would support it." "Labor will enter politics, either 
to elect one of the political parties or become social- 
istic." "Political action is coming." "I believe that 
the only outcome of the organized labor movement is 
certain to be political action. It is the only road left 
open at the present time. ... It is almost impossible 
to fight a vast corporation, for the reason that it is so 
strong financially." "Political power is the coming 
weapon. We will make our political master give us a 
bigger crumb, but we are going after the whole 
loaf. . . ." "If hampered in other lawful pursuits, it 
will ' force political action, even though it may en- 
danger our form of government." "The worker will 
go into politics until he makes all laws and appoint- 
ments, because this is the workingman's country, and 
he is going to control his own." 

The declarations of a number of secretaries of state 
federations are: 

"The other weapons act only as immediate 
weapons and relief. For solution, all labor will 
eventually resort to concerted political action." "The 
result of the failures of the boycott in various in- 
stances is helping the Socialist party here in Texas, 
so is the Hatters' decision; in fact, that party is gain- 
ing rapidly here in union labor circles. Political action 
is the next step." "Labor will resort to the ballot in 
the hands of an intelligent labor party." "The illegal- 
ity of the boycott would hasten concerted political 
action." 

Whether labor will continue to pursue the policy 
of rewarding its friends and punishing its enemies, 
or will form an independent political party, or join 
hands with the Socialist party, is a question which is 
evoking lively discussion. At the present time there 
is little talk of forming an independent labor party. 
The two contending proposals are the first and the 
third. There has been a marked tendency toward the 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 339 

Socialist movement on the part of many members of 
the A. F. of L., though by no means the majority of 
the members, during the past few years. 

"The local federations of the unions in many of our 
leading cities have declared for the party," writes Mr. 
Walling. 1 He asserts that, among the national or- 
ganizations, the Western Federation of Miners, the 
Brewers, the Hat and Cap Makers, the Bakers, and a 
few others, numbering about a quarter of a million, 
have definitely indorsed Socialism, while the coal min- 
ers, numbering 300,000, have indorsed collective own- 
ership, but not the Socialist party. 

A few years ago Mr. John C. Kennedy declared 2 
that collective ownership and operation had been offi- 
cially indorsed by a number of the international 
unions, including the machinists, patternmakers, metal 
workers, boilermakers and iron shipbuilders, engi- 
neers, brewery workers, bakers and confectionery work- 
ers, textile workers, ladies' garment workers, boot and 
shoe workers, cloth, hat and cap makers, woodwork- 
ers, flint glass workers, amalgamated glass workers, 
carriage and wagon workers, and a number of the 
western unions, including the miners, totaling in mem- 
bership over 330,000. He estimated that about one- 
third of the cigarmakers and large numbers of the 
printers and carpenters, switchmen, painters, brick- 
layers, etc., were Socialists, and named over a dozen 
labor papers which were definitely pledged to Social- 
ism, and a number of others which tended strongly that 
way. The president of the International Machinists' 
Union, the vice-president of the United Mine Workers, 
and numerous other leaders are ardent advocates of 
industrial democracy. 

The growth of Socialist sentiment among unionists 

1 Walling, Socialism as It Is, p. 351. 

2 "Socialistic Tendencies in American Trade Unions," Journal of 
Political Economy, v. 15, pp. 470 et scq. 



34o BOYCOTTS 

is acknowledged freely by both supporters and op- 
posers of the Socialist movement. "There is no de- 
nying the fact," declared Secretary of Labor Wilson, 
"that there is a great and growing tendency toward 
the Socialist party among the rank and file, although 
the A. F. of L. has officially held the policy of re- 
warding its friends and using the balance of power." 
At the 19 1 2 election the insurgents in the Federa- 
tion cast 5,073 votes for Max Hayes for president of 
the body, against 11,974 votes for Samuel Gompers. 
The questions of Socialism, industrial unionism and 
Civic Federationism were involved in the election. But 
whether or not the tendency is toward Socialism, it 
surely is toward a greater participation in politics, due, 
in part, at least, to the anti-boycott decisions. 

Sabotage and the I. W . W. Tactics 

Another form of union activity which some laborers 
are resorting to, and which bids fair to gain in popu- 
larity as less radical measures are denied them, is 
sabotage. Some have defined this word as an "unfair 
day's work for an unfair day's pay," a necessary corol- 
lary of the trade union motto of a "fair day's work 
for a fair day's pay." It has also been defined as the 
"chloroforming of machinery." These definitions in- 
dicate two varieties of sabotage. When the workers 
are still employed, the first form mentioned operates 
to reduce the industrial output, with a view of cutting 
down the employer's profits. During a strike the sec- 
ond variety is brought into play, and consists chiefly 
in the temporary derangement of machinery so as 
more effectively to stop production. Misdirection of 
orders is also sometimes included in the definition of 
this word. Arturo Giovannitti has described sabotage 
as follows '} 

1 Sabotage, by Emile Pouget, with introduction by Arturo Gio- 
vannitti, pp. 13-14. 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 341 

"Any conscious or wilful act on the part of one or 
more workers intended to slacken and reduce the out- 
put of production in the industrial field, or to restrict 
trade and reduce the profits in the commercial field, in 
order to secure from their employers better conditions 
or to enforce those promised or maintain those already 
prevailing, when no other way of redress is open. 

"Any skilful operation on the machinery of pro- 
duction intended not to destroy it or permanently 
render it defective, but only to disable it temporarily 
and to put it out of running condition in order to make 
impossible the work of scabs and thus to secure the 
complete and real stoppage of work during a strike." 

In emphasizing the necessity of employing this 
weapon, Giovannitti dwells on the fact that boycotts 
and other devices formerly resorted to are no longer 
permitted the worker. He says: 

"Now that the bosses have succeeded in dealing an 
almost mortal blow 1 to the boycott, now that picket duty 
is practically outlawed, free speech throttled, free as- 
semblage prohibited, and injunctions against labor are 
becoming epidemic — Sabotage, this dark, invincible, 
terrible Damocles' sword that hangs over the head of 
the master class, will replace all the confiscated weap- 
ons and ammunition of the army of the toilers. And it 
will win, for it is the most redoubtable of all, except 
the general strike. In vain may the bosses get an in- 
junction against the strikers' funds — Sabotage will get 
a more powerful one against their machinery. In vain 
may they invoke old laws and make new ones against 
it — they will never discover it, never track it in its lair, 
never run it to the ground, for no laws will ever make 
a crime of the 'clumsiness and lack of skill' of a 'scab' 
who bungles his work or 'puts on the bum' a machine 
he 'does not know how to run.' 

"There can be no injunction against it. No police- 
man's club. No rifle. No prison bars. It cannot be 

1 Italics are the author's. 



342 BOYCOTTS 

starved into submission. It cannot be discharged. It 
cannot be blacklisted. It is present everywhere, and 
everywhere invisible, like the airship that soars high 
above the clouds in the dead of night, beyond the reach 
of the cannon and the searchlight, and drops the dead- 
liest bombs into the enemy's own encampment." 

The other militant tactics advocated by the Indus- 
trial Workers of the World, on the ground that 
milder forms of activity have proved ineffective, 
or are not allowed the worker, are the general strike, 
mass picketing, the misdirection of orders, the refusal 
to make or enforce time contracts, the violation of op- 
pressive governmental orders, etc. Vincent St. John, 
the secretary of the organization, thus describes these 
tactics in part: 1 

"The organization does not allow any part to enter 
into time contracts with the employers. It aims, where 
strikes are used, to paralyze all branches of the in- 
dustry involved, when the employers can least afford a 
cessation of work — during the busy season and when 
there are rush orders to be filled. 

"The Industrial Workers of the World maintain 
that nothing will be conceded by the employers except 
that which we have power to take and hold by the' 
strength of our organization. Therefore we seek no 
agreements with the employers. 

"Failing to force concessions from the employers by 
the strike, work is resumed and 'sabotage' is used to 
force the employers to concede the demands of the 
workers. 

"During the strikes the works are closely picketed, 
and every effort made to keep the employers from 
getting workers into the shops. All supplies are cut 
off from strike-bound shops. All shipments are re- 
fused or missent, delayed and lost if possible. Strike 

1 The I. W. W., by Vincent St. John, p. 17. A fuller discussion of 
this subject is contained in Spargo's Syndicalism. Industrial Union- 
ism, and Sabotage, Brooks' American Syndicalism, Tridon's The 
New Unionism, etc. 



POSSIBLE RECOURSE OF LABOR 343 

breakers are also isolated to the full extent of the 
power of the organization. Interference by the gov- 
ernment is resented by open violation of the govern- 
ment's orders, going to jail en masse, causing expense 
to the tax payers — which are but another name for the 
employing class. In short, the I. W. W. advocates the 
use of militant 'direct action' tactics to the full extent 
of our power to make good." 

It is also frequently charged that the violence re- 
cently uncovered in some unions — notably the Bridge 
and Structural Iron Workers— is, in part, due to the 
hounding of their union by court injunctions and pro- 
ceedings, when their members indulged in the use of 
milder weapons than dynamiting. 

It is seen, therefore, that the suppression of the boy- 
cott has already led, in some instances, to its secret 
use, and that it has given an impetus on the eco- 
nomic field to such milder activities as the negative 
boycott and cooperative efforts, as well as the more 
radical proposals of sabotage and the other tactics 
advocated by the I. W. W. It has also turned the 
attention of labor to the political field. 



CHAPTER XXI 

PROBABLE OUTCOME IF THE BOYCOTT IS LEGALIZED 

What will be the outcome if the boycott is legal- 
ized? Will the use of this weapon be subject to seri- 
ous abuse? Will such abuse, if any, increase or de- 
crease with time? Finally, what will be the relative 
strength of the forces leading to its legitimate and to 
its wrongful employment? The answers to these ques- 
tions are of vital importance to one wishing to form a 
correct opinion as to whether or not the evils arising 
from the boycott's employment, unrestricted by statute 
and common law, will counteract the possible good. 

That there is some danger of abuse in this practice 
is admitted by many of the leaders of labor, though 
denied by others. Mr. Gompers is of the former 
group. 

"Everything is subject to abuse," he said to the 
writer some time ago, "including the boycott. The 
vote is subject to abuse, and yet that is no reason why 
it should be taken away. The boycott is more and 
more being safeguarded from such abuse. But, even if 
the use of this weapon was attended by more abuse 
than good, I still would claim that the workers had the 
right to use it." 

Mr. John Mitchell seconds this statement: 

"The .right to boycott, like the right to strike or 
lockout, the right to vote, the right to bear arms, the 
liberty of speech, or the right to devise one's property 
as one wills, is subject to misuse," he declared. "There 

344 



PROBABLE OUTCOME IF LEGALIZED 345 

can be no personal liberty that does not, at some time 
or other, lead to abuse, and cause individual hard- 
ship." 1 

Most of the labor leaders interviewed, however, re- 
fused to acknowledge that they knew of any individual 
cases of abuse. Secretary of Labor W. P. Wilson 
averred that he had never yet come across any cases 
of misuse. He denied that the Danbury Hatters' boy- 
cott was an illustrative example of abuse, declaring 
that the strikers' object to obtain a closed shop and 
thereby maintain good labor conditions was legitimate. 
Other leaders maintained that but few, if any, in- 
stances of abuse were shown in the other great boycott 
case, against the Buck's Stove and Range Co., and 
that, for the most part, the retailers approached were 
treated most courteously by the unions. These re- 
tailers usually knew of the trouble nearly a year be- 
fore they were seen, it was avowed. The causes tend- 
ing to justify these boycotts have been dwelt upon 
elsewhere. 

If the boycott should be legalized, it is undoubtedly 
true that there would be cases of abuse, and yet the ex- 
periences of the past few years have indicated that 
this abuse would probably grow less and less. The 
convention proceedings of the American Federation 
of Labor strongly support this assumption. Here a 
progressive tendency to put a stop to abuses and to 
surround the employment of the boycott with more 
effective safeguards is plainly shown. Complaints of 
extortion and violence which were concomitants of the 
early use of this weapon have appeared very infre- 
quently during the past few years. 

The leaders of the unions are constantly endeavor- 
ing to prevent the abuse of this weapon, both on 
grounds of morality and those of utility. Mr. John 

1 Mitchell, Organized Labor, p. 286, 



346 BOYCOTTS 

Mitchell thus defines what he considers to be the best 
policy i 1 

"The same rules that apply to the strike should 
apply to a boycott, it should be enforced only when a 
real necessity exists and under conditions which will 
promote the welfare of the working classes and of 
society in general. The morality as well as the effi- 
ciency of the boycott can be secured only by limiting 
its application to important cases, and by preventing 
its abuse. ... As a general rule, the further the boy- 
cott is removed from the original offender the less 
effective it becomes. It should be the aim of the union 
to seek and not to force the alliance of the public, and 
to render the boycott as direct and personal as pos- 
sible. . . . Especial care . . . should be used in the 
laying of a secondary boycott. A boycott of this sort, 
that is extended and extended from a central point like 
the waves made by a pebble thrown into a still pond, 
becomes of so little force and arouses so much just 
antagonism that discredit is thrown upon the original 
boycott, which in itself may have been perfectly just 
and reasonable." 

Mr. Gompers thinks that the legality of the boycott 
will not result to any great extent in the enlargement 
of its use, but rather in the diminution. 

"In my opinion," he declared before the Industrial 
Commission, 2 "as these legal rights are recognized, 
. . . the less often will they be resorted to. But if 
they try to outlaw me for exercising that which I have a 
legal right to do, to exercise my function and duty, it 
seems that it's a man's nature then to be perverse and 
to say that that is the time that I am going to do it." 

The unionists are generally of the opinion that this 
weapon should be applied only when "every other 
remedy has been employed without result." 3 "It is a 

1 Mitchell, Labor Problems, pp. 288, 290. 

2 Report of Industrial Commission, v. 7, p. 638. 

3 A. F. of L. Convention Proceedings, 1909, p. 282. 



PROBABLE OUTCOME IF LEGALIZED 347 

drastic remedy and should only be resorted to when 
gentler and milder means have failed," declared The 
Boy cotter as early as 1885. 

Nor do we notice the tyrannical use of the boycott 
in those states, such as Montana, California, New 
York, where boycotting has been pronounced legal in 
many of its forms. "I do not think there has been 
any trouble in regard to this matter in this state," 
wrote the Commission of Labor of Montana, June, 
19 13, referring to this weapon. In this state, as is 
known, a most advanced position has been taken. In 
England the 1906 legislation virtually legalized the 
boycott. J. Keir Hardie, one of the leaders of the 
Labor Party in Parliament, declared that no cases of 
abuse had come to his notice. He said in a letter to 
the writer: 

"There has been no effect one way or the other aris- 
ing from the Trades Dispute Act in regard to the boy- 
cott, that is to say, the Trades Unions have gone on 
since 1906 exactly as they have been doing before. If 
there had been any abuse of the powers conferred by 
the Act on Trades Unions the matter would have been 
sure to have been brought to the notice of Parliament, 
but the fact that even not one question has been put 
upon the subject affords strong proof that there have 
been no abuses." 

For the diminution of these abuses we need not de- 
pend entirely upon the growing sense of justice on the 
part of the workers, but rather upon the selfish in- 
terest of the unionists. In fact, the main reason ad- 
vanced in the conventions of the A. F. of L. against 
the indorsement of boycotts, without thorough inves- 
tigation, was that their indiscriminate use would de- 
feat the ends of unionists themselves. 

Such a use often seriously injures the union 
men employed in lines of work dependent for their 
continuation upon the sale of the boycotted article. 



348 BOYCOTTS 

The recognition of this fact led the 1898 convention 
to vote that a hearing be given to all such workers 
before the boycott was indorsed. 1 In case the injured 
body of unionists can prove that the employment of 
this weapon is unjustifiable, they can generally be de- 
pended upon to issue an effective protest. Thought- 
less boycotting, furthermore, leads to ineffectiveness. 
So true is this that labor has more and more concen- 
trated its efforts on a few cases where most glaring 
injustices on the part of the employers were evidenced, 
ignoring those cases where the rights of labor were 
less clear. Unionists have come to agree with the 
New York Commissioner of Labor that 

"When the pretended leaders of the movement as- 
sume to apply the boycott indiscriminately, foolishly 
and maliciously, it will result in complete disaster to 
the movement itself," and that "the success of the boy- 
cott depends upon the question whether or not its ad- 
vocates represent the opinions of a majority of our 
citizens and thus reflect public opinion." 2 

As the commissioner states, the boycott is more suc- 
cessful, generally speaking, if it can gain the good 
will of those outside of the organized labor move- 
ment, and to use it foolishly often alienates the sym- 
pathy and support of the outside group. In fact, it 
may happen, as in the case of Mrs. Gray's bakery in 
New York in the eighties, and as in the case of numer- 
ous firms on the "We Don't Patronize" list, that a 
boycott may bring greatly increased business to the 
firm attacked, if waged without what non-unionists con- 
sider justification. 

Furthermore, with the growth of our industrial life, 
and the wide distribution of the products of our in- 
dustries, in different parts of the United States, boy- 

1 See supra, p. in. 

2 New York Report of Statistics of Labor, 1885, p. 352. 



PROBABLE OUTCOME IF LEGALIZED 349 

cotting, with its circularizing, sending of delegates, 
purchasing of novelties, etc., is becoming more and 
more expensive. On this account the trade unions are 
becoming ever more cautious about beginning a na- 
tional campaign, and are realizing that they must have 
a cause which will bring to its standard enthusiastic 
support, and that they must wage their battle in a 
way that will not alienate large numbers of their fel- 
lows, if the results obtained are to justify the energy 
and money expended. 

The workers are acknowledging also, with Mr. John 
Mitchell, that the more indirect the use of the boycott 
the less effective it is. It is thus to the interest of 
labor to limit boycotting to the more direct attacks, 
thus decreasing the amount of injury meted out to 
those far removed from the original dispute. The 
disappearance of the less direct forms also eliminates 
the objection frequently raised to boycotting that it 
interferes unduly with the liberty of third parties. 

It may finally be stated that many of the abuses 
cited as following in the wake of the boycott may be 
reached by other laws. Threats of physical violence, 
fraud, misrepresentation, extortion, inducing others to 
break contracts under certain conditions, all are ille- 
gal, irrespective of the fact that they are connected 
with boycotting, and the legalization of the right to 
boycott would not legalize these methods. False state- 
ments issued in circulars would also be subject to the 
law of libel. Most of the corruption complained of, 
as well as the injustice to the workman, is alleged in 
connection with the enforcing of the principle of the 
closed shop, a subject with which this book deals only 
incidentally. 1 

1 For fuller discussion of this objection, see Stockton, The Closed 
Shop in American Trade Unions, pp. 175 et seq. Dr. Stockton main- 
tains that most of the injustice complained of by non-unionists is 
in evidence only when the union is a closed union, and that such 
unions are but rarely found, except in decaying trades. 



350 BOYCOTTS 

Instead of opening wide the gates to greater brutal- 
ity, in the conduct of the labor war, the legalization of 
the boycott is likely to reduce the number of strikes 
and to lead to a larger number of trade agreements. 
If the employer knows that the employees can cut off 
his sales, by the use of this weapon, he is more likely 
carefully to consider their demands. Mr. Gompers 
declared before the Industrial Commission that prior 
to placing the names of firms on the "We Don't Pat- 
ronize" list, the A. F. of L. endeavored to settle griev- 
ances between firms and employees, and that, to avoid 
the proposed proscription, one-third of the firms 
settled. Many others have expressed their opinion to 
the writer that the fear of the boycott would undoubt- 
edly lead, in many instances, to trade agreements. 

It is thus believed that, if the boycott is legalized, 
abuse will continuously decrease. The fact that abuse 
leads to the injury of fellow unionists, to ineffective- 
ness in the use of this weapon, to the alienation of 
public sympathy, to the depletion of union funds — all 
make it to the advantage of union men to employ the 
boycott with the utmost care. That these facts are 
recognized has been proved many times. It is also 
recognized that many evils occasionally accompanying 
the abusive employment of the boycott may be reached 
in other ways. 

In view of the effectiveness of the boycott in many 
trades, in strengthening the hands of labor, and thus, 
indirectly, in advancing social welfare; in view of the 
weapons which are constantly being brought into play 
against the laborer in his struggles, necessitating the 
use of weapons additional to the strike and the picket- 
ing; in view of some of the substitutes which may be 
resorted to if the boycott is not available; in view of 
the decreasing likelihood of any great abuse in the 
employment of the boycott, and the laws on the statute 
book which take due care of many of the perversions 



PROBABLE OUTCOME IF LEGALIZED 351 

complained of; and in view of the greater number of 
peaceful settlements which would probably result from 
its potential use, the writer is in favor of legalizing 
this weapon. By this he means that neither the injunc- 
tion nor the civil nor criminal process should be em- 
ployed against the primary or the secondary boycott, 
nor against that form of the compound boycott which 
involves only the threat to injure the business of an- 
other by the withdrawal of patronage or labor. He, 
of course, would not include in this exemption the 
threat of actual violence to person and property. 

In advocating this legalization, he believes that 
there will probably be some abuses in the employment 
of the boycott, as there are in the exercise of every 
right; that at times the use of this weapon is less 
effective than that of others at the disposal of labor; 
but that such abuse and such occasional ineffectiveness 
do not constitute any sufficient argument for rendering 
the boycott illegal. 



APPENDIX 



APPENDIX 

SUMMARY AND DIGEST OF DECISIONS IN 
BOYCOTT AND ALLIED CASES 
Note : 

Following is a list of boycott, blacklist and trade boycott 
decisions in the courts of last appeal and a few of the lower 
courts in the various states, as well as in the federal courts. 
A number of decisions relating to picketing and to the closed 
shop, involving as they do the same principles, have also been 
cited. 

The reader is referred to Chapter III for an analysis of 
the various kinds of boycott. It may here be noted that 
persuasion only is used in the secondary boycotts, while the 
compound boycott is accompanied by threats or coercion, the 
threats, at times, however, being mere threats to boycott. 

When a case is headed, "Secondary or Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage," it signifies that third parties are here 
induced or coerced to withdraw their patronage or business 
dealings from the boycotted firm. When a case is headed, 
"Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving Workmen," it 
signifies that an attempt is here made to prevent employees 
or other workmen from seeking or continuing employment 
in the boycotted concern. 

When the case is headed "Labor Boycott," it signifies that 
an attempt is made to boycott another workman for which 
action is brought by such workman. The nature of the Trade 
boycott and blacklist is explained in Chapter II. As a gen- 
eral rule, when the name of the state court is omitted, the 
decision is that of the court of last appeal in the state. 

A number of abbreviations have been made, as follows: pi- 

355 



356 BOYCOTTS 

for plaintiff; def. for defendant; rev. for revised; st. for 
statutes; sec. for sections; gen. for general; chap, for chap- 
ter, etc. 

NEW ENGLAND STATES 

In Connecticut, Massachusetts and Vermont various forms 
of boycotting have been pronounced illegal, when accompanied 
by intimidation, moral or otherwise. No decisions bearing 
directly on boycotts in labor disputes have been given in the 
highest courts of New Hampshire, Maine and Rhode Island. 
Judging from the decision on the blacklist, New Hampshire 
would probably declare boycotts actionable, especially if malice 
was present. There is a possibility that boycotts in Maine and 
Rhode Island would be considered legal, if unaccompanied by 
recognized illegal means. 

Connecticut 

Statutes declare labor and employers' boycotts illegal, al- 
though the word is not used. Courts have pronounced both 
kinds illegal where intimidation is used. Threat of loss of 
business will constitute intimidation. 

Statutes: Chap. 202, Sec. 1, Laws of 1909, act entitled, 
"Intimidation of Employees," amending Sec. 1296, Gen. St. 
1902. Boycotts, when accompanied by intimidation, illegal 
(word "boycott" not used). Persons threatening, or using 
means calculated to intimidate any one to do or abstain from 
doing any legal act, or injuring or threatening to injure prop- 
erty with intent to intimidate, shall be fined max. of $100 or 
imprisoned max. of 6 mos. 

State v. Glidden (1887). Criminal. Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Extortion. Illegal. Boycott of news- 
paper concern to compel discharge of non-union men. Defs. 
in typographical union threatened subscribers with withdrawal 
of patronage if continued purchasing paper. It was also 
alleged that they demanded of pi. $500 to defray expenses, 
and distributed boycotting circulars. Acts held illegal under 
statute against intimidation and prima facie malicious. Pri- 



APPENDIX 357 

mary object to injure property, though ultimate, good; also 
interference with liberty to carry on business in company's 
own way. Court conceded the right to request company to 
discharge workmen and employ others and to use all proper 
argument in support of request. 

State v. Stockford (1904). Criminal action. Compound 
Boycott. Illegal. I. U. of New Haven and Car Drivers' 
Union, defs. Held such combination to ruin business illegal 
under common law and statutes; words or acts calculated to 
cause ordinary person to fear an injury to his person, business 
or property are equivalent to threats. 

March v. Bricklayers and Plasterers' Union, etc. (1906). 
Compound Boycott Involving Employees. Extortion. Illegal. 
Threats made to union boss to withdraw labor because he 
secured supplies from pi., unless pi. paid to union $100. PL 
had sold supplies to unfair boss. Suit for recovery of fine 
successful. 

Wyeman v. Deady (1906) Civil Action. Compound Labor 
Boycott. Illegal. PL, a painter, sued defs., Painters' Union 
of Hartford and walking delegates, for securing their dis- 
charge through threats against employer. PL was awarded 
$423, in lieu of salary lost. Held malice need not be proved; 
gist of action not conspiracy, but injury; proof that union 
directed or approved actions would warrant exaction of puni- 
tive damages. 

Maine 

Labor boycotts involving intimidation, and general boycotts 
during disputes with public utility corporations, are forbidden 
by statutes (word "boycott" not used). No boycott cases in 
labor disputes have as yet been decided by highest court. 
Trade boycott held legal, though another, involving slander, 
illegal. 

Statutes: Rev. St. 1903, Chap. 124, Sec. 9. Against in- 
timidation of person to do or abstain from doing legal act in dis- 
pute between gas, telephone, telegraph, electric light, electric 
power or railroad and employees. Max. punishment, $300 or 



35% BOYCOTTS 

3 mos. Chap. 127, Sec. 21. Against intimidation of employees 
while entering, continuing in, or leaving employment. Max. 
punishment, $500, or 2 yrs. 

Heywood v. Tillson (1883). Civil Action. Boycott of 
Landlord by Employer. Legal. Def. threatened to discharge 
workmen renting house of pi. Held no contract relations 
interfered with; employer could employ whom he chose; 
threat to commit injury not actionable, malicious motive not 
making act illegal. 

Davis v. Starrett (1903). Action for Slander. Illegal. 
Def. accused of slandering pi. by declaring that latter was the 
greatest rumseller in Warren, Me. In one count pi. charged 
he had been boycotted as a result of report. Held boycotting 
does not necessarilv involve combination. 

Massachusetts 

Interference with employment through force, etc., prohib- 
ited by statute. Most of the boycott cases decided by courts 
dealt with the withdraw T al or coercion of labor. Courts have 
granted injunctions against coercing employees to quit employ- 
ment, and the use even of persuasion, if the strike is over. In 
one case, however, an injunction was denied on the ground 
that there was no presumption that defendant would, in the fu- 
ture, join in similar wrongful acts. 

Courts have enjoined unfair lists, and declared actionable 
efforts to secure discharge of employees under contract. Trade 
boycott has been declared actionable and a certain form of 
blacklist, not enjoinable. Doctrine of justifiable cause has 
latterly been applied. 

Statutes: Rev. Laws, 1902, Chap. 106, Sec. 11, entitled 
"Intimidation." Act makes illegal interference with a person's 
employment by force and intimidation. 

Commonwealth v. Hunt (1842). Criminal Conspiracy. 
Involving Labor Boycott. Legal. Bootmakers combined and 
agreed not to work for any except those employing members 
of the club. They furthermore agreed to fine those who 



APPENDIX 359 

would not join organization, and compelled employer to dis- 
charge an employee who would not pay the fine imposed. Court 
held legal; that persons may combine to adopt measures hav- 
ing a tendency to impoverish another, and such combination 
may yet be legal and meritorious. 

Carew v. Rutherford (1870). To Recover Money. Ex- 
tortion. Illegal. Journeymen Freestone Cutters threatened 
to induce workers to leave employment if pi. refused to pay to 
the association $500 for privilege of sending work to be done 
outside of the state. Held extortion and illegal. Court, how- 
ever, pronounced primary boycott legal, declaring it no crime 
for a combination without any unlawful object to agree not 
to work for or deal with certain men or classes. 

Walker v. Cronin (1871). Civil Action. Secondary Boy- 
cott Involving Patronage and Workmen. Illegal. Defs., 
among other things, induced manufacturer of shoes, who 
agreed to make shoes from material supplied, to send back 
material to pi. They induced breaking of contract, and em- 
ployees to leave. Held combination maliciously to cause a 
loss to another is illegal; that inducement to leave employ- 
ment is illegal, if there exists valid contract known to def. 

Sherry v. Perkins (1888). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Lasters, after strike 
disturbances, displayed banners reading, "Lasters are required 
to keep away from Sherry's." Held this was a continuing 
intimidation to workers, a private nuisance, and could be en- 
joined. 

Worthington v. Waring (1892). For Injunction. Black- 
list. Not Enjoinable. Owners of Narragansett Mills in 
Fall River placed strikers on blacklist, agreed not to employ 
those belonging to a trade union, and sent list to others. Held, 
as rights involved were not property but personal rights, no 
injunction would issue to enjoin continuing conspiracy not to 
employ complainants, although action for damages might be 
brought by each one separately. 

Vegelahn v. Guntner (1896). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. (Picketing.) Illegal. Two 



360 BOYCOTTS 

persons in front of a business establishment with whom work- 
ers were on strike were charged with intimidating and con- 
straining workers and prospective workers. Held, that injunc- 
tion would issue as against combination to injure another by in- 
timidation, acts not constituting lawful competition. Judge 
Holmes delivered a strong dissenting opinion, quoted else- 
where. 

May v. Wood (1898). Civil Action. Induce Master to 
Discharge Servant. (Not in labor dispute.) Insufficient 
Averments. Held that when it is alleged that false and 
malicious statements were made to discharge servant, it is 
essential that these should be substantially set out in declara- 
tion. Judge Holmes, in dissenting opinion, declared combina- 
tion illegal if injury was inflicted through malevolence, and 
without justifiable cause, even though only means was per- 
suasion. 

Plant v. Woods (1900). For Injunction. Secondary or 
Compound Labor Boycott. Illegal. Painters, in order to 
induce pis. to join their union rather than to remain in another 
organization, requested employer to discharge pis., and did 
not deny that trouble would follow in case of failure to do so. 
Held illegal to threaten interference to dispose of labor with- 
out justifiable cause. Judge Holmes, dissenting, stated the 
immediate object here — to strengthen workers' organization — 
was justifiable, and that it was lawful to combine to secure 
better conditions, although at the expense of others, and 
through boycott and strike. 

Weston v. Barnicoat (1900). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 
cott. Illegal. PL declined to pay an alleged debt, whereupon 
his name was sent to association, which placed it on record, 
and began boycott. Case decided on technicalities. Defs. 
held responsible for action of association. 

Martell v. White (1904). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. 
Illegal. Def. granite manufacturers of Quincy formed asso- 
ciation, one of whose regulations was that any member dealing 
with non-member manufacturer should be subject to a fine 
of from $1 to $500. Held object unjustifiable and that the 






APPENDIX 361 

imposition of fines constituted coercion, and prevented free 
competition. 

Berry v. Donovan (1905). Civil Action. Secondary or 
Compound Labor Boycott. Illegal. Members of Shoemakers' 
Union of Haverhill demanded of employer to discharge non- 
union men. Held same as in Plant v. Woods, supra. 

Picket v. Walsh (1906). Injunction. Involving Compound 
Labor Boycott. Illegal. Members of Bricklayers' and Stone- 
masons' Un-'on employed by a contractor aiding in the con- 
struction of the Federal Building, Boston, struck against con- 
tractor to secure his influence in compelling owner of building 
to discharge jointer of mortar, and employ union men. Court 
held such jointer could obtain injunction restraining such 
strike, and preventing workers from refusing to work on other 
building, in pursuance of such purpose, such strike not being 
a justifiable interference with right of pis. to pursue calling 
as they saw fit, as action was not limited to strikes against 
persons with whom organization had trade dispute. 

Reynolds v. Davis (1908). Strike Involving Unfair List. 
Illegal. Here Building Trades' Council declared strike. Held 
grievance was between employer and individual employees, and 
that it was illegal for an outside body not under contract to 
call strike, and thus that any acts in pursuance of said illegal 
strike, including putting of pi. on unfair list, were also illegal. 

Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevolent and Pro- 
tective Union (1908). For Injunction. Compound Boycott 
Involving Workmen. Illegal. Bricklayers on strike at Fair- 
haven and Andover endeavored to prevent members of union 
from entering and continuing in pl.'s employment through 
fines and threats. Held means coercive, and injunction would 
issue. Judges Sheldon and Knowlton dissented. 

M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagan (1911). Secondary Boy- 
cott Involving Employees. Illegal. Teamsters drove 
through streets of Boston with wagon bearing placard an- 
nouncing strike of piano and furniture movers four months 
after contest was apparently over. Held that while action 
would be legal during strike, in view of the Statute passed 



362 BOYCOTTS 

1910, Chap. 445, imposing duty on employer to give informa- 
tion about a strike to prospective employees, such action, after 
strike, was malicious. 

Davis v. N. E. Railway Co. (1909). For Injunction. 
Blacklist. (Not in labor dispute.) Illegal. Defs., publishers 
of a directory purporting to contain a full list of reputable 
express companies, refused to list pis. Held to be an inten- 
tional act of injury without justifiable excuse. 

Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron (1907). For In- 
junction. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Not En- 
joinable. No injunction will be granted to prevent defs. from 
compelling discharge of non-union workmen through a viola- 
tion of the contract, if pi., in performance of contract, chooses 
to employ non-union men. No presumption that def. will 
engage in similar wrongful acts in future, and, if he does so, 
must be pleaded and proved. 

New Hampshire 

Sweeping statute against boycotts (word "boycott" not 
used). No case in labor disputes decided on by highest court. 
Decision in case involving a form of blacklist would indicate 
that boycotts would be considered actionable if court concluded 
malice was shown. 

Statutes: Pub. St. (1891), Chap. 266, Sec. 12. "Inter- 
ference with Employment." Act makes it unlawful for any 
person to interfere in any way whatever to injure or damage 
another in property or lawful business. Max. punishment 
$500 or 1 yr. Covers boycott. 

Bixby v. Dunlap (1876). Civil Action. Held illegal 
knowingly and wilfully to induce servant to break his con- 
tract. 

Huskie v. Griffin (1909). Civil Action. Nature of Black- 
list. Left to Jury. Former employer induced another to 
refuse to employ pi. Held any injury to a lawful business 
was prima facie actionable, but might be justified on ground 
that it was a lawful effort to promote one's own welfare, to 



APPENDIX 363 

defeat whfch plea express malice or purpose to injure others 
and not to benefit oneself must be shown. 

Rhode Island 

Labor boycott accompanied by intimidation, and general boy- 
cotts accompanied by malice, illegal by statute (word "boycott" 
not used). No case of boycott in labor disputes decided by 
highest court. Application to labor disputes of principles laid 
down in trade boycott case would legalize latter boycotts, if 
so-called coercive measures were confined to notification of 
third party that loss would follow refusal to cease relations 
with boycotted firm. 

Statute: Gen. Law T s, 1896, Chap. 278, Sec. 8, "Intimida- 
tion of Employees.'' Intimidating employees, singly or by 
combination, from entering on or pursuing employment illegal. 
Max. punishment, $100 or 90 days. Chap. 279, Sec. 45, "In- 
terference with Employment." Unlawful for any one, mali- 
ciously, wilfully, or mischievously, to injure or destroy prop- 
erty, or obstruct lawful business. Max. punishment, $20 or 
3 mos. 

Macauley v. Tierney (1895). For Injunction. Compound 
Trade Boycott. Legal. Master Plumbers' Ass'n of Provi- 
dence, affiliated with national body, agreed not to purchase 
supplies from any wholesalers who sold to plumbers not mem- 
bers of association, and notified certain wholesalers, as well as 
members of the association, to that effect. Held sending of 
notices is no ground for injunction; that members' desire to free 
themselves from competition is a legal excuse for the sending 
of notices and that combination to do act which one person 
may lawfully do is legal, if no illegal means used, such as 
fraud, misrepresentation, intimidation, coercion, obstruction, 
molestation, or procuring violation of contract. 

Vermont 

Labor boycotts when accompanied by intimidation illegal 
by statute (word "boycott" not used). Labor boycotts, where 



364 BOYCOTTS 

employees use intimidating measures, moral or otherwise, have 
been three times declared criminal. However, where employer 
used coercive measures against employee of employee, court 
held it was not actionable. Court also held trade union funds 
liable for acts of agents in boycott against employees and those 
dealing with them, as well as a trade boycott, where members 
of boycotting association were coerced by means of fines. 

Statutes: Pub. St. 1906, Sec. 5868 and 5869, "Intimida- 
tion of Employees." Sec. 5868 makes it illegal to prevent 
employment by threatening violence. Max. punishment, $100 
or 3 mos. Sec. 5869 makes illegal stopping by force, etc., one 
already at work. Max. punishment, $500 or 5 yrs. Covers 
boycotts by means of coercing emplo3 r ees. 

State v. Stewart (1887). Criminal Conspiracy. Com- 
pound Labor Boycott. Illegal. Defs., granite cutters, charged 
with using threats to drive employees from positions, and with 
threatening to publish names as scabs. Held that acts deprived 
employees of the right to use their talents as they saw fit, and 
that threats working on the mind are as illegal as actual vio- 
lence. 

State v. Dyer (1894). Criminal Conspiracy. Compound 
Labor Boycott Illegal. Facts and decision similar to State v. 
Stewart. Defs., granite cutters of Montpelier and Barre; ob- 
ject of boycott to compel member to join union. 

Boutwell et al. v. Marr et al. (1899). Civil Action. Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. Granite Manufacturers' Ass'n of New 
England, embracing 95 per cent, of granite manufacturers in 
that vicinity, refused to furnish granite to any firm not a mem- 
ber. PL's business decreased from $1,000 to nothing a month. 
Held that when the concerted action to withdraw patronage is 
brought about by coercion, such as the imposition of fines, the 
combination will be considered illegal, and that acts legal 
when done by individuals are not always legal when in com- 
bination. 

Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, etc. (1905). Civil 
Action. Compound Boycott Involving Employees and Patron- 
age. Illegal. Machinists in Rutland, on strike, threatened to 



APPENDIX 365 

boycott any one boarding or selling necessities to any servant 
employed by pi., and distributed circulars to machine shops. 
Jury awarded $25,000 damages. One of first instances where 
members of trade union were held liable in boycott case. 

Raycroft v. Tainter (1896). Civil Action. Form of Black- 
list. Legal. Employer of servant threatened servant with 
discharge if he did not discharge third person employed by ser- 
vant against whom employer had a grudge. Held def. was 
exercising a legal right, and that malicious motive was imma- 
terial. 

State v. Duncan (1906). Criminal Conspiracy. Com- 
pound Labor Boycott. Held conspiracy to prevent persons by 
violence, etc., from engaging in a lawful business illegal at 
common law and under statutes. Decision chiefly on techni- 
cality. 

THE MIDDLE ATLANTIC STATES 

The highest court in Delaware has not passed on the ques- 
tion of boycotts in labor disputes. In Maryland, New Jersey 
and Pennsylvania, boycotts, accompanied by threats of loss of 
business or labor made against third parties, have been held 
illegal. In New Jersey, mere persuasion, when used to force 
another to conduct his business in a different way, had been 
held illegal. In Maryland and Pennsylvania, however, circu- 
lars publishing a truthful account of grievances have not been 
enjoined. 

New York is the most liberal of this group of states, and 
the courts here consider a secondary boycott, unaccompanied 
by force, etc., legal; allow issuance of boycott circulars, t\ r en 
when loss of business by third parties is implied; and declare 
labor boycotts legal when enforced by strikes or threatened 
strikes, and when they do not result in the exclusion of the 
boycotted laborer from all positions in the community. 

Delaivare 

No boycott decision noted in highest court. Statutes: Rev. 
Code, 1893, Chap. 127, Sec. 3, entitled "Interfering with 



366 BOYCOTTS 

Employee." Act makes misdemeanor the interference with, 
molesting or obstructing any railroad employee in pursuance 
of a strike. Max. fine, $500 and 6 mos. 



Maryland 

Statute legalizes boycott when unattended by coercion or 
other illegal means. Court has declared illegal coercion of 
patrons by means of threats to withdraw customers, and has 
issued an injunction. It has, however, pronounced legal the 
issuance of circulars presenting the claims of the workers. A 
trade boycott, accompanied by threats, in inducing others to 
break a contract, was also held to be illegal, while in an early 
case, even threats to notify others of "unfairness" of shop, were 
pronounced actionable. An attempt at blacklisting, involving 
false statement, also illegal. 

Statutes: Pub. Laws, 1903, Art. 27, Sec. 33, act entitled 
"Labor Combinations not Unlawful." Agreement to do act 
in furtherance of a trade dispute between employer and em- 
ployee not indictable as conspiracy if such act, committed by 
one person, not punishable. 

Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly (1893). Civil 
Action. Labor Boycott. Illegal. Members of the Knights 
of Labor notified Baltimore clothing cutter that labor unions 
would be informed that shop was non-union if pi. was not dis- 
charged. This action held malicious interference with right of 
employment. 

My Maryland Lodge No. 186, Intern'l Ass'n. Machinists, 
et al.j v. Adt. (1905). For injunction. Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Illegal. Defs. struck for 10 per cent, 
increase in wages. They followed wagons of pi. to discover 
customers; threatened customers, boycotted beer and ice of 
those hiring pi., issued circulars, and caused dwindling of 
business from $18,000 to $3,500. A temporary injunction 
was issued by the lower court forbidding defs. from continu- 
ing these practices and from in any manner boycotting pi. or 
any one giving him work. Injunction upheld; and declara- 



APPENDIX 367 

tion made that, while defs. had a right to present cause to the 
public in a peaceful way through the newspapers or circulars, 
they could not use coercion, and that acts were not lawful 
competition in trade. 

Sumwalt Ice Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. of Baltimore 
(191 1 ). Civil Action. Compound. Trade Boycott. Illegal. 
PL, dealer in ice, was threatened by def. with withdrawal of 
further supplies if he continued to supply third party with 
whom pi. had contract. Held actionable to employ illegal 
means to induce breach of contract. 

Willner v. Silverman (1909). Civil Action. Blacklist. 
Illegal. Where employee of members of association of cloth- 
iers organized principally to discipline employees, circulated 
through the association a letter falsely reciting that cutter in 
the employ of member had been discharged because of his at- 
tempts to disorganize employment, and that the association 
should support member in this matter, and refuse cutter em- 
ployment, the cutter, being damaged by letter, has a right of 
action against employer. A malicious interference by indi- 
vidual or by combination with the business or occupation of 
another, followed by damage, is actionable. 

New Jersey 

General application of the statutes is doubtful. The courts 
have repeatedly issued injunctions against compound boycot- 
ting of various kinds, against issuing appeals or circulars tend- 
ing to interfere with the business of another, and even against 
merely persuading customers to withdraw their patronage, in 
order to force complainant to adopt a particular mode of 
doing business. They have also sustained actions for damages 
in cases of labor boycotts. On the other hand, the courts have 
refused to grant an injunction to protect pickets in their work, 
and have declared legal agreement of workers not to work 
for any person employing non-union men. 

Statutes: Acts of 1903, Chap. 257, Sec. 63, entitled "In- 
terference by Strikers." Prohibits interference with railroad 



368 BOYCOTTS 

employees by strikers. Max. punishment, $500, and 1 yr. 
Chap. 235, Sec. 37, Gen. Conspiracy Act. Application Doubt- 
ful. 

Mayer v. Stonecutters' Association (1890). For Injunction. 
Labor Boycott. Not Enjoinable. Members of union agreed 
not to work with any but members of union or for any em- 
ployer who insisted on their doing so. Held legal, so long as 
peaceful means used. 

Van Horn v. Van Horn (1890). Civil Action. Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. PI., who owned millinery store, accused 
def. of endeavoring to ruin business by trying to induce whole- 
salers not to sell goods to him and stating that goods did not 
belong to him. Held malicious. 

Barr v. Essex Trades Council (1894). For Injunction. 
Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. Typo- 
graphical Union members went on strike against the Newark 
Times because it started the use of plate matter. During 
strike they, in conjunction with the Trade Council of Essex 
County, issued circulars and booklets calling on laborers, pub- 
lic and advertisers to cease patronizing Times. As a result, 
several advertisers withdrew. Held that combination was ma- 
licious interference with freedom to carry on business; that 
intimidation was used toward advertisers and members of the 
unions, and that combination often changes the character of 
an act. 

Frank v. Herold (1901). Injunction. Compound Boycott 
Involving Workmen. (Form of Picketing). Illegal. Union 
on strike, enjoined from intimidating and annoying others 
while picketing. Held unlawful for third parties to interfere 
with employees against latter's consent and to endeavor to in- 
duce them to quit by lawful means. 

Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy (1902). For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. (Involv- 
ing Picketing.) Illegal. Similar to Frank v. Herold, supra. 
Also declared illegal to endeavor by coercion to get employees 
to break their contract; interference with freedom to employ 
and be employed. 



APPENDIX 369 

Martin v. McFall (1903). For Injunction. Secondary 
-Boycott Involving Patronage, and Workmen. Illegal. Mem- 
bers of Bakers' Union endeavored to compel employer to ac- 
cede to their demands by persuading others not to deal with 
him, and by rendering it difficult or uncomfortable for willing 
workers to work. Held these acts unlawful, when used to 
compel complainant to adopt a particular mode of doing his 
business. 

Atkins v. W. and A. Fletcher Co. (1903). For Injunc- 
tion. Blacklist. Legal. Employers in the N. Y. Metal 
Trades' Ass'n refused to employ any person on strike against 
Fletcher Brothers. PL was thus unable to secure employment. 
Held combination of employers could refuse any kind or class 
of men; that, however, if pi. showed that defendants had 
deprived him of all opportunity of securing employment other 
than at Fletcher Brothers, and molested employees in getting 
a job, he would be entitled to an injunction. 

Dressier v. Sellers (1904). Civil Action. Illegal. The 
boycotting of a firm on their failure to pay an arbitrary claim 
on them by a labor union is illegal. 

Van Der Piatt v. Undertakers' and Liverymen's Ass'n of 
Passaic (1905). For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. 
PL charged he was refused undertaker's supplies by def. ass'n 
as a result of a provision in their by-laws. Defs. denied alle- 
gation. Held that one not showing any place of business can- 
not secure injunction restraining defs. from boycotting; that 
personal or property right must be shown. 

Brennan v. United Hatters of No. Am., Local No. 17 
(1906). Civil Action. Labor Boycott. Illegal. Def. or- 
ganization took card away from pi. because he refused to pay 
$500 fine, and then caused discharge. Held that whoever in- 
tentionally, without justification, procures employer to dis- 
charge employee to damage of the latter, is liable for damages, 
although there is no binding contract. 

Alfred W. Booth v. Burgess (1906). Injunction. Com- 
pound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. PL was manu- 
facturer of blinds and trim for building in Bayonne. Def. 



370 BOYCOTTS 

and other union men struck for closed shop, and sought to 
induce boss carpenters to refuse to purchase from pi., declar- 
ing him unfair, and threatening to call employees off if they 
continued to purchase. Some bosses broke contracts and others 
ceased purchasing. Held that an injunction would lie, as ac- 
tions of defs. interfered with the right to a free market, and 
that no surrender of liberty on part of employees on entering 
union could affect this right. 

George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers (1907). 
For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Illegal. Defs., who went on strike against pis., 
tried to induce Whittemore Brothers of Boston, manufac- 
turers of shoe polish, to cease to patronize pi. Whittemore 
Brothers purchased some $35,000 worth of bottles from pi. 
during year. Circulars were sent to unions, and requests made 
that union delegates request merchants to cease their purchase 
of Whittemore's polish. Injunction issued, restraining defs. 
from persuading or inducing persons not to deal with pi. be- 
cause it employs non-union workmen, or refuses to be union- 
ized. Union dictation was condemned. 

Ruddy v. U. Ass'n of Journeymen Plumbers, etc. (1910). 
Civil Action. Compound Labor Bojxott. Illegal. PL 
charges that he was discharged by two employers in Newark 
because they were warned that members of the union would 
quit unless he was dismissed. Object of the workers was to 
induce pi. to join the union. Court held he could recover. 

New York 

Use of violence in boycott is made illegal by statute. The 
secondary boycott, where coercive measures are not resorted 
to, is declared legal by the courts. It is legal to publish cir- 
culars requesting third parties to cease to patronize boycotted 
concerns, and stating that they will lose the custom of the 
boycotters should they not accede to the request. It is legal 
to strike in order to force employers to discharge non-members 
of union, and to promote other forms of labor boycott, provid- 



APPENDIX 371 

ing, however, that the union boycotting has not a monopoly 
of the labor field, and the boycotted workers will not be driven 
out of the locality on account of such boycott. The use of 
actual force, intimidation, etc., is illegal. 

Statutes: St. 1901, Penal Law, Sec. 530, entitled "Coer- 
cion." Illegal for a person to compel another to do or to 
abstain from doing a legal act by the use of violence or the 
infliction of injury upon such person or member of his family 
or his property; also threats of such violence or injury. Penal 
Law, Sec. 580, Par. 5, entitled "Conspiracy." Misdemeanor 
for two or more to interfere with the exercising of a lawful 
trade, etc., by force, threats or intimidation. Sec. 171b, added 
to Penal Code by Chap. 349, Acts of 1903, entitled "Protec- 
tion of Employees as members of the National Guard." Il- 
legal to interfere with employment of any member of the Na- 
tional Guard. 

Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt (1881). For In- 
junction. Secondary Boycott Involving Workmen. Legal. 
Defs. were charged with inducing employees to leave pi. by 
persuasion, personal appeals, the giving of traveling expenses, 
etc. Held that the laws of 1870, Chap. 19, having altered 
the common law rule, there was no ground for injunction. 

Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. (Limited) v. Chas. M. Ever- 
est (1883). Trade Boycott. Def. was charged with enticing 
skilled workmen from employment and of soliciting customers 
of pi. by letters and other means not to deal with the latter, 
and threatening lawsuits. 

People v. Wilzig (1886). (Court of Oyer and Terminer.) 
Criminal Conspiracy. Compound Boycott Involving Patron- 
age. Extortion. Illegal. Members of the Carl Sahm Mu- 
sical Club and of the Waiters' and Bartenders' Unions boy- 
cotted complainant, owner of a large hotel on E. 14th St., 
Manhattan, for refusal to employ only members of their union 
and to concede certain other demands. They were charged, 
in conjunction with the Central Labor Union, with congre- 
gating around the doors of the hotel in large crowds; with dis- 
tributing circulars and parading with placards on which pa- 



372 BOYCOTTS 

trons were urged to bojcott the hotel, as Theiss, the proprie- 
tor, was a foe of organized labor. It was further alleged that 
they pasted stickers on the tables, walls, etc., set fire to a 
machine containing a vile smelling mixture; appealed to one 
Shultz not to furnish complainant with mineral water ; threat- 
ened Ehret, the brewer, with a boycott if he continued to fur- 
nish Theiss with beer, and, finally, that they extorted from the 
proprietor $1,000 to pay the cost of the boycott. Five were 
arrested and indicted on the charge of violating Sees. 552 and 
553 of the Penal Code relating to extortion. Held that these 
acts, when accompanied by force, threats and intimidation, 
were illegal, and that intimidation may be spelled out, although 
unaccompanied by physical violence. The right of peaceful 
secondary boycott was, however, upheld. Defs. were sentenced 
to terms varying from 1 yr. 6 mos. to 2 yrs. 8 mos. 

People v. Kostka (1886). (Court of Oyer and Terminer.) 
Criminal Conspiracy. Compound Boycott Involving Patron- 
age. Illegal. During strike against Landgraff, a baker of 
Manhattan, for higher wages and a union shop, boycotting 
circulars were distributed by numbers of workers before the 
shop. It was alleged that boycotters threatened the life of 
one of the workers and delivered insulting remarks. Six of 
those indicted were sentenced to between 10 and 15 days. The 
court charged that the defs. should be held guilty if intimida- 
tion could be spelled into the acts, and that it was unlawful 
to conspire to prevent the exercise of a lawful calling by means 
of intimidation. The court reiterated its stand in the case of 
People v. Wilzig in favor of the legality of secondary boycotts. 

Walsh v. Wright (1890). (App. Div.) Civil Action. 
Trade Boycott. Legal. Def. contracted with jobbers and 
dealers, w T hereby he agreed to give them one-half cent a pound 
on all purchases of Cow Brand Saleratus and Soda, provided 
the dealers would not sell Dwight's Cow Brand or any other 
brand for less than a certain amount. Held that agreement 
was not in violation of the act against restraints of trade 
(Sherman Law, July 2, 1890, or Chap. 716 of Laws of N. Y., 
1893), an d that there is nothing unlawful in agreeing not to 



APPENDIX 373 

sell property that one owns or will acquire at less than a 
certain amount. It was not here alleged that such contracts 
were entered into with customers of pi., or that any had been 
induced to break existing contracts. 

Ryan v. Burger and Hower Brewing Co. (1891). (Sup. 
Ct.) Civil Action. Trade Boycott Involving False State- 
ments. Illegal. Def., member of Brewers' Ass'n, was charged 
with stating that pi. owed him money, and with threatening 
to hold other brewers liable if they sold to him, pi. having 
hired place in which debtor of def. formerly lived. As a result, 
pi. became insolvent. Held action would lie, and that the 
statements were false, slanderous and despotic. Affirmed in 
App. Div. without comment. 

Dunlap's Cable News Co. v. Stone (1891). (Sup. Ct.) 
For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. Press agency, in 
contracting with customers, made stipulation that they should 
not take news from other agencies. PL, one of the press 
agencies, applied for an injunction. Court refused it, declar- 
ing that it would be time enough to think of relief if cus- 
tomers complained; and that this was an effort to restrain de- 
fendant from transacting business in his own way. 

Rogers v. Evarts (1891). (Sup. Ct.) For Injunction. 
Secondary Boycott Involving Workmen. Also Involves 
Freedom of Press. Legal. Cigar makers struck for higher 
wages. Binghamton Leader published favorable accounts of 
strike, advising and encouraging workers to leave. Held that 
no injunction would be granted forbidding such publications, 
as one has the right to publish fair and impartial accounts, and 
that it is only when accounts of an unlawful conspiracy are so 
colored as to express approval and encouragement that the 
acts become illegal. 

Sinsheimer v. Garment Workers (1894). (App. Div.) 
For Injunction. Secondary Boycott Involving Patronage. 
Legal. Defs., on strike against pis. for discriminating against 
union men, distributed circulars to customers, which stated 
their grievance and asked customers to discontinue trading 



7^ 



374 BOYCOTTS 

with them. Acts held legal, as unaccompanied by acts of 
violence, injury to property, threats or intimidation. 

Reynolds v. Everett (1894). For Injunction. Secondary 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Legal. PL, manufacturer of 
cigars, sought injunction to prevent strikers, on strike against 
a decrease of wages, to induce others to quit. Held that per- 
suasion unconnected with intimidation, was legal, and that the 
injunction is issued only when it is clear that, unless granted, 
there would be irreparable injury and no remedy at law. 
Here the strike was over. 

Davis v. Zimmerman (1895). (Sup. Ct.) For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Bo3^cott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Hat 
and cap manufacturer, whose employees, members of the 
Clothing, Hat and Cap Operators' Union, were on strike, 
applied for injunction to restrain these defs. from inducing 
employees to leave his service by force, threats and intimi- 
dation. Injunction granted as defs. were irresponsible, dam- 
ages were unascertainable, and the civil remedy would entail 
a multitude of suits. Acts declared to constitute injury to 
property. 

Curran v. Galen (1897). Civil Action. Compound Labor 
Boycott. Illegal. Ale Brewers' Ass'n of Rochester entered 
into agreement with the Brewery Workers' Ass'n to the effect 
that the manufacturers shall not employ any worker not a 
member of the association, or retain for more than four weeks 
any employee who refuses to join such union. Action was 
brought by pi., a non-union engineer, on the ground that such 
agreement took away his means of livelihood. Held defs. 
guilty of conspiracy to interfere with liberty of pi. to pursue 
lawful trade without interference, and to coerce him by agree- 
ments with employers to join the union, under penalty of loss 
of position. The combination was declared to be against 
public policy, which prohibits monopolies and exclusive priv- 
ileges. 

Davis v. United Portable Hoisting Engines (1898). (App. 
Div.) For Injunction. Labor Boycott. Legal. Defs., en- 
gineers, threatened to quit work if employer did not discharge 



APPENDIX 375 

non-union engineer, hired temporarily. Held that no injunc- 
tion would issue, as the defs. have a right to refuse to work 
with non-union men, as no contract relations were interfered 
with and as the purpose of the inducement was to procure 
employment for others. 

Park & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Drug Ass'n (1898). 
(App. Div.) For Injunction. Compound Trade Boycott. 
Illegal. Nat. Wholesale Drug Ass'n, organized 1891, induced 
their members to refuse to trade with those dealers not abid- 
ing by the association's rules regarding commissions, rebates, 
cartage, etc., in an effort to make it impossible for such dealers 
to carry on their business. Held that it was necessary to set 
out every step to establish the boycott, and that it was not 
irrelevant to set forth the various actions of defs. by way of 
characterizing the object for which the boycott had been organ- 
ized. Also considered by Court of Appeals, 1903. 

Coons v. Chrystie (1898). (Sup. Ct.) For Injunction. 
Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Def., Christie, president of the Am. Plumbers' and Gas 
Fitters' Benevolent and Prot. Ass'n, entered premises of pi. 
and ordered a strike. Held that unions and walking delegates 
could be enjoined from causing workmen of another to aban- 
don work, although there were no threats or acts of intimida- 
tion, and although the workmen had agreed not to accept em- 
ployment from such unaffiliated persons as pi., also that fact 
that workmen left pl.'s employ makes inference irresistible that 
they were coerced by anticipation of some recognized penalty. 

Matthews v. Shankland (1898). (Sup. Ct.) Compound 
Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. Typographical Union 
No. 9 struck against Buffalo Express, a daily newspaper, be- 
cause of its refusal to unionize shop, pay certain scale of wages 
and abide by rules of union. The United Trades and Labor 
Council of Buffalo resolved that business men of Buffalo be 
notified that Express is a non-union shop and that members of 
other unions be instructed not to patronize any advertisers in 
paper. They informed advertisers that continued patronage 
meant loss of union custom. Other trades sent similar resolu- 



376 BOYCOTTS 

tions to merchants. The beer peddlers imposed a $2 fine on 
those reading the Express. Held that acts threatened and 
intimidated patrons; declared legal, however, for labor or- 
ganizations to refuse to patronize the Express and to refuse 
to give support to any patronizing the paper. 

Tallman v. Gaillard (1899). (Sup. Ct.) For Injunction. 
Compound Labor Boycott. Legal. Defs., carpenters and 
joiners, were charged with threatening a general strike unless 
pi. was discharged. Held that no injunction would be issued 
as there was no allegation of persecution, and the means used 
were lawful. 

Sun Printing and Publishing Co. v. Delaney (1900). (App. 
Div.) For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Pat- 
ronage. Illegal. Defs., members of the Typographical Union 
on strike, endeavored to induce advertisers, through circulars, 
to cease advertising in Sun through fear of loss of business, 
and to persuade newsdealers to cease handling paper. Lower 
court granted sweeping injunction against giving publicity to 
their complaints, and from in any way interfering with property 
or property rights of the pi. App. Div. modified injunction, 
enjoining only those acts accompanied by threats, intimidation, 
etc. 

People v. Chandler (1900). (App. Div.) Criminal Con- 
spiracy. Legal. Def. had posted up circulars, "Boycott the 
Sun," and had been convicted by the Court of Special Ses- 
sions of violating Sec. 168, par. 5, of Penal Code, against 
conspiracy. Inasmuch as no agreement with the printer of 
the posters or anyone else was shown, def. was held not guilty. 

People v. Radt (1900). (Ct. of Gen. Sess.) Criminal 
Conspiracy. Secondary Boycott Involving Patronage. Circu- 
lars Issued. Legal. Here two members of the bakers' union 
were appointed to take charge of boycott proceedings against 
complainant. Circulars were issued, urging union men and 
the public to purchase goods from others. Posters were also 
printed and distributed worded, "Scab Labor, Don't Patron- 
ize," and containing the name and address of pi. Held that, 
as there were no threats or intimidation and no interference 



APPENDIX 377 

with the implements or property used by the employees of the 
complainant, defs. were not guilty of violating the conspiracy 
sec. of the code, Sec. 168, Sub. 5 (Sec. 580 of Penal Law). 

Reynolds v. Plumbers' Material Protective Ass'n (1900). 
Civil Action. Trade Boycott. Legal. In by-laws of the def.'s 
association, it was provided that, unless a member of the asso- 
ciation, indebted to another, settled or consented to arbitrate, 
the corporation might send a statement to the members that 
the debtor's name was taken from the books, and that the 
members would not then be permitted to sell to him except for 
cash before delivery. Held not illegal to combine for the pro- 
tection of each other against irresponsible persons in the ab- 
sence of evidence imputing a guilty motive, and that there 
was no coercion. 

Tanenbaum v. N. Y. Fire Insurance Exchange (1900). 
(Sup. Ct.) For Injunction. Trade Boycott, Involving Un- 
licensed Brokers. Legal. Members of Ins. Ex. agreed to 
pay commissions only to those brokers licensed by Exchange. 
Held that Exchange cannot be enjoined by non-member from 
carrying out this agreement on the ground of conspiracy 
against unlicensed broker or in restraint of trade; that it must 
be shown that pi., by legal right, could insist that business be 
accepted by companies. 

Beattie v. Callahan (1901). (App. Div.) For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage arid Work- 
men. Illegal. Defs., painters in N. Y. City, were charged 
with interfering with pi's, business by threats, force and fraud, 
and with preventing members of the defs. union from working 
for pi. Held these acts could be enjoined. 

Collins v. American News Co. (1902). (App. Div.) For 
Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. Def. refused to sell 
papers to pi. newsdealer because he distributed circulars with 
his newspapers, advertising certain goods. Held no injunc- 
tion would issue; that what one had a right to do, others could 
combine to do, and that there was nothing malicious in defs. 
action, but only a desire to protect itself. 

Cohen v. United Garment Workers (1901). (Sup. Ct.) 



378 BOYCOTTS 

For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Legal. Defs., Garment Workers of N. Y. City, 
on strike against pi., sent circulars to latter's customers, notify- 
ing them of the controversy and requesting that they cease 
dealing with him, threatening, in case of refusal, that they 
would lose the patronage of the combination. Held that, in 
the absence of threats or intimidation, these acts would not 
be restrained. 

Herzog v. Fitzgerald (1902). (App. Div.) For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Here 
an injunction was granted pendente lite, restraining employees 
from conducting acts of violence and intimidation against per- 
sons still in pl.'s employ, where specific instances of threats 
were charged, and there was only a general denial. 

Foster v. Retail Clerks' I. Prot. Ass'n (1902). (Sup. Ct.) 
For Injunction. Secondary Boycott Involving Patronage and 
Workmen. Legal. Retail clerks of Syracuse struck against 
pis. for reduction of hours of labor. They distributed circu- 
lars declaring that Foster, Hinman and Co. had been declared 
unfair by the Retail Clerks' Local Union and Trades Assem- 
bly; endeavored to persuade customers and union men to stay 
away from store and maintained pickets. Held no injunction 
would issue to prevent these acts. Motive and fact of com- 
bination considered immaterial. It would, however, be illegal 
for the defs. to enter premises of the pis. for any purpose 
except for bona fide purpose of trade, or to so act as to collect 
crowds or obstruct movement along the sidewalks at or in 
the neighborhood of the store. 

Trapp v. Du Bois (1902). (App. Div.) Civil Action, 
Involving Trade Boycott. Legal. For failure to pay part of 
bill which pi. stated he didn't owe, he was placed on the 
cash-before-delivery list of Plumbers' Material Prot. Ass'n. 
Held malice must be shown before illegality would be declared. 

National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings (1902). Civil Ac- 
tion. Compound Labor Boycott. Legal. Cummings and 
Nugent, walking delegates, threatened a general strike unless 
McQueed and others were discharged from employment on a 



APPENDIX 379 

building, and members of the Enterprise and Progress Asso- 
ciation were employed. Strike followed. Workmen brought 
action against union. Held that men have right to refuse to 
work for any reason, and that it is not illegal to threaten to 
do what one has a legal right to do; that bad motive does not 
make a legal act illegal, but that in this case the motive was 
a good one — that of helping the members of the union to gain 
employment and of protecting them against the negligence of 
fellow employees. 

Rourke v. Elk Drug Co. (1902). (App. Div.) For In- 
junction. Compound Trade Boycott. Illegal. Def. drug 
association was charged with interfering with the pl.'s adver- 
tising, and preventing them through intimidation and libel 
from reaching customers. Held organization was formed in 
violation of the laws of 1899, which forbid restraining of com- 
petition (Chap. 690) and that any act in furtherance of such 
an unlawful conspiracy could be restrained. 

Green v. Davies (1903). (App. Div.) Civil Action. 
Trade Boycott. (Fraud.) Illegal. PL charged that business 
competitors entered into combination to ruin him through 
sending circulars stating that he was insane and irresponsible. 
He declared he was damaged thereby to the extent of $20,000. 
Held illegal. App. Div. decided only on demurrer. 

Master Horseshoers' Prot. Ass'n v. Quinlivan (1903). For 
Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Defs. struck because they were not able to affix seals 
to manufactured goods, and endeavored to prevent others from 
taking their places. Court issued injunction restraining acts 
of physical violence. 

W. P. Davis Machine Co. v. Robinson (1903). (Sup. 
Ct.) For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott In- 
volving Patronage and Workmen. Illegal. Machinists, on 
strike for a closed shop in Rochester, were charged with con- 
gregating around factory, shouting at and assaulting workers 
and threatening customers with loss of business if they traded 
with pis. Held virtually that any endeavor to entice away 
employees, when not for the purpose of obtaining an advance 



380 BOYCOTTS 

in or of maintaining rate of wages, illegal. Injunction issued, 
enjoining the inducing of employees to leave employment 
through intimidation, etc., and from interfering in any man- 
ner with the business of pi. 

Kellogg v. Sowerby (1904). (App. Div.) Civil Action. 
Trade Boycott Involving Discrimination in Railroad Rates. 
Illegal. Western Elevator Ass'n made agreement with rail- 
roads whereby latter would return to association one-half cent 
a bushel for every bushel of grain shipped by them and pi. 
Held pi. was discriminated against. Def. was characterized 
as an unlawful combination formed to deprive pi. of reason- 
able opportunity to operate profitably. 

People v. McFarlin (1904). (County Ct.) Criminal 
Conspiracy. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Il- 
legal. Carpenters' Union in Rochester, on strike, advertised 
the complainant's factory as unfair; posted unfair notices on 
materials, distributed placards, and threatened to boycott con- 
tractors who would not sign agreement not to purchase any 
material from unfair shops. Held that men had a right to 
strike and to influence others to withdraw . their patronage, 
but that they had no right to coerce would-be customers not 
to purchase from complainant through fear of ruin; that 
agreement with contractors was in restraint of trade, con- 
demned by Subdivision 6 of 168 of the Penal Code; that its 
legality would mean control of the entire business by defs. 
and that threats to promote hostility toward anyone who dares 
employ a non-union man was a conspiracy to prevent another 
from following his lawful occupation, and violative of Subdiv. 
5 of Sec. 168, Penal Code. 

Mills v. U. S. Printing Co. (1904). (App. Div.) For 
Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Il- 
legal. (Secondary Boycott, however, Legal.) Sweeping in- 
junction had been granted by lower court against picketing 
and boycotting by stereotypers and electrotypers on strike. 
Justice Jenks declared that a boycott was not necessarily il- 
legal; that one had right to refuse to deal with another, and 
that a combination may do what one can so long as there is 



APPENDIX 381 

no unlawful object in view; and that two or more may by 
persuasion and entreaty, bring others to their side. Although 
effect of the combination is to injure another, when the result 
sought is to protect the members of a combination or to en- 
hance their welfare, the loss is but an incident of the act, the 
means whereby the ultimate end is gained. The use of vio- 
lence, however, is illegal. 

Jacobs v. Cohen (1905). Labor Boycott. Legal. Coat 
Tailors' Union made agreement with employers that during a 
certain period only union men should be employed. Held such 
agreement was not in violation of public policy; was not made 
to injure other workmen, was not oppressive as involving ex- 
clusion from the entire trade. Employees had a right to limit 
the class of their fellow workmen. Promissory note given by 
employers to guarantee enforcement of contract was declared 
valid. 

Butterick Publishing Co. v. Union No. 6 (1906). (Sup. 
Ct.) If Secondary Boycott, Involving Patronage, Unless 
Malice Shown, Legal; If Compound Boycott, Illegal. Over 
300 pressmen, feeders and compositors, belonging to the I. 
Printing Pressmen, and Assistants' Union, struck for an 8- 
hour day and closed shop against pi., and sent circulars 
throughout the United States requesting customers not to 
purchase pl.'s publications, or those printed by pi. for cus- 
tomers, and stating that they would advise their members and 
friends to withhold patronage from merchants and agents deal- 
ing in such publications. PL alleged that it received 135 let- 
ters canceling subscriptions, or asking for adjustment of dif- 
ferences. It also alleged it had to board some of its employees. 
Held that defs. were within their legal rights in publishing the 
circumstances of the strike, and requesting others to withhold 
patronage, but that if violence was shown, or if acts were 
committed with malevolent motives toward pi. rather than 
with benevolent motives toward defs. own interest, acts would 
lose their lawful character. 

Locker v. American Tobacco Co. (1907). (App. Div.) 
Trade Boycott. Legal. Agent of def. refused to sell to pi. 



382 BOYCOTTS 

Held no violation of State Statute (Laws of 1899, Chap. 690) 
to show that one def., controlling 9 per cent, of the trade, 
had appointed a sole selling agent who had refused to sell to 
pi., and that no unlawful monopoly was proved. 

Kellogg v. Sowerby (1907). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 
cott. Legal, Where Motive Innocent. Elevator owners and 
railroads made agreement to discriminate against non-mem- 
bers, in order to regulate competition in grain business. The 
railroads testified they believed the pis. would come into com- 
bination when they contracted. Held that, inasmuch as rail- 
roads at that time did not mean to discriminate, there was no 
cause of action for conspiracy under Subd. 6 of Sec. 168 of 
Penal Code. 

In Re McCormick (1909). (App. Div.) Compound Boy- 
cott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Typog. Union No. 6 was 
on strike against the Typothetas of N. Y. City and attempted 
to prevent workers from securing employment. Held that this 
was unlawful if more than peaceful persuasion was used. 

Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Union (1910). (Sup. 
Ct.) For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patron- 
age. Illegal. Defs. on strike against pis. threatened to call 
a strike in factories which sold goods to pi. Held that this 
action interfered with pl.'s right to purchase goods where he 
desired and is against spirit of government. 

Schwarcz v. International Ladies' Garment Workers 
(1910). (Sup. Ct.) For Injunction. Compound Labor 
Boycott. Illegal. Strike was ordered by trade union to ob- 
tain closed shop. Held that purpose of the strike was to 
drive out non-union men working at that trade unless they 
joined union, that this was an illegal purpose and that every 
act in pursuance of strike, such as picketing, etc., was illegal. 
It distinguished the case from that of the Nat. Prot. Ass'n 
on ground of the illegal motive, and the wide combination to 
drive non-union men out of the trade of the community. 

McCord v. Thompson Starrett Co. (1910). Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Employers, members 
of Bid. Trades Employers' Ass'n, issued an order that no men 



APPENDIX 383 

not members of a certain union should be retained in the 
employ of any of their members unless they immediately 
joined. Held against public policy of the state for employers 
who control practically the whole trade of the community to 
compel workmen to join a particular union as a condition of 
membership, although it is lawful for an individual employer 
to agree with labor unions to employ its members only. 

Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson (1911). (Sup. Ct.) 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. 
Illegal. Woodwork men on strike against pis. sent circulars 
to contractors stating that union men would not handle ma- 
terial not made under union conditions, and containing list 
of firms working under union agreement. They were 
charged with calling strikes against contractors, enforced by 
fines. Injunctions issued forbade publication of any letter, cir- 
cular, etc., or any communication, written or oral, suggesting 
that labor troubles would follow use of materials and from 
directing person to stop work. 

Louis Bossert and Sons v. U. Br. of Carpenters et al. 
(1912). (Sup. Ct.) Action for Contempt. Compound Boy- 
cott Involving Patronage. Legal. Walking delegate Rice, 
one of the defs., informed union men that they were working 
on non-union material, whereupon a number left. Held legal; 
no compulsion used, and no law to prevent Rice from giving 
information about non-union trim; even if members were 
threatened with fine, not illegal, because it was a peaceful 
strike for purpose of advancing interest of Brotherhood. Dif- 
fers from Newton case on ground that purpose was to advance 
interest of labor. 

Pennsylvania 

There are no laws on statute books specifically condemning 
boycotts. Several injunctions, however, have been issued by 
the courts against boycotts in labor disputes in which third 
parties were coerced by threats of loss of labor or custom, 
and workmen threatened. A trade boycott, on the other hand, 



384 BOYCOTTS 

where third parties were given to understand that they would 
lose trade should they supply the pi., was held legal. Mere 
persuasion not to patronize others, or publication of circulars 
giving a truthful account of trouble, was not declared illegal. 

Statutes: Digest, 1895, Sec. 73. Act provides for legality 
of strikes, and continues by declaring that section shall not 
prevent the prosecution of a workman by any law other than 
that of conspiracy of any person who shall hinder a workman 
in his employment by threats, etc. 

Brace Brothers v. Evans (1888). (County Court.) For In- 
junction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. 
Female operatives, discharged from pl.'s laundry, near Wil- 
kensburgh and refused reinstatement, issued circulars setting 
forth their side of the case, alleging abusive treatment and 
requesting patrons not to deal with pi. They called on public 
to boycott those who refused to resign; hired wagons to dis- 
play boycott signs, distributed circulars before the shop, and 
threatened patrons. Held that in this case it was not neces- 
sary for them to decide whether or not the defs. might in- 
dividually or collectively refuse to patronize pi. and advise 
their friends and such neighbors as they could reach not to 
do so, or that they might not distribute circulars giving truth- 
ful accounts of pl.'s trouble w r ith his employees; that here 
defs. did not limit themselves to peaceful solicitations, but that 
their acts were in their nature threats and calculated to in- 
timidate. Court defined the word boycott as being in itself a 
threat. 

Murdock v. Walker (1893). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Discharged union 
men, printers and pressmen were charged with gathering about 
the place of business and the homes of non-union workers, and 
of following non-union men around. Held the defs. had no 
right by force to prevent workmen from working on such 
terms as they may agree. 

Cote v. Murphy (1894). Civil Action. Compound Trade 
Boycott. Legal. Members of the building trades in Pitts- 
burgh went on strike for higher w T ages. The Allegheny Plan- 



APPENDIX 385 

fng Mill Ass'n issued circular to the lumber trade asking deal- 
ers not to sell material into the section unless it be on order 
of legitimate dealer, and enclosed list on which the pl.'s name 
failed to appear, also wrote letter to firm supplying pi. that 
it would be to its advantage to discontinue sales. It was 
understood that no friend of the combination would deal with 
one selling to pi. PL, thus discriminated against because he 
acceded to demand of workers, was unable to obtain material. 
Held that no action would lie, because association was not 
formed to lower wages of laborers, and methods adopted were 
not illegal. Threats to do a lawful act are not unlawful. 

Buchanan v. Barnes (1894). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 
cott. Similar to Cote v. Murphy. 

Buchanan v. Kerr (1894). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. 
Similar to Cote v. Murphy. Legal. 

Wick China Co. v. Brown (1894). F° r Injunction. Com- 
pound Boycott Involving Workmen. (Partly Picketing.) 
Illegal. Defs., members of the Nat. Br. of Operating Pot- 
ters, were charged with endeavoring to induce others to quit 
employment through threats, intimidation, opprobrious epi- 
thets; by gathering in crowds at places of business, at board- 
ing houses, etc. Held illegal. 

Oneil v. Behanna (1897). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Defs. in strike against 
City Coal Works were charged with surrounding laborers, 
applying opprobrious epithets, and urging them in a hostile 
manner not to work. Held such a display of force consti- 
tuted intimidation. 

Erdman v. Mitchell (1903). For Injunction. Compound 
Labor Boycott. Illegal. Defs., Council of Allied Printing 
Trades of Philadelphia, threatened to strike unless employers 
discharged pis. who belonged to an incorporated organization 
known as the Plumbers' League of Philadelphia. Held com- 
bination to prevent others from obtaining work through 
threats of a strike illegal, interfering as it does with the in- 
defeasible rights of labor to acquire property. 

Purvis v. U. Br. of Carpenters and Joiners (1906). For 



3 86 BOYCOTTS 

Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Defs., on strike in Pittsburgh for a closed shop, threat- 
ened customers with strike if they purchased from pi. At a 
critical time men were taken off a job conducted by a con- 
tractor who continued to patronize pi., and thus contractor 
was induced to cease relations. Held that threats and coercion 
were used and that an act putting one in fear of loss of prop- 
erty may constitute coercion. Injunction forbade defs. to send 
circulars through mails which stated that carpenters would not 
handle materials from certain mills not complying with request 
of their union, or to request customers or prospective customers 
to have work done by firms making an agreement with the 
union, and, finally, to represent that customers would sustain a 
loss. 

Arbour v. Trade Association (1910). (Super. Ct.) For 
Injunction. Trade Boycott. Had Power to Enjoin. Pitts- 
burgh Produce Ass'n declared that, if any member of associa- 
tion had a claim against an outsider, others should not sell to 
the latter except for spot cash. Held that equity, under act 
of June 19, 1 87 1, had power to enjoin trade association, as in 
the case of a corporation, from enforcing by-laws. 

NORTH CENTRAL STATES 

In Iowa, Kansas and Nebraska and Ohio no decisions on 
boycotts by the highest courts have been noted. While in 
Indiana the highest court has not passed upon a boycott case 
in a labor dispute, it has declared a primary boycott legal, and 
one of the lower courts has pronounced a labor boycott, where 
no threats are used, legal. Other decisions indicate that the 
court would probably hold a boycott illegal if coercive meas- 
ures were definitely proved. Boycotts are definitely prohibited 
here by statute, as is also the case in Illinois. 

In Illinois the boycott is illegal, even when persuasive 
measures only are employed, providing malice is present. In 
Michigan the courts have pronounced the boycott illegal. In 
Missouri and Minnesota, where third parties are coerced 



APPENDIX 387 

through fear of loss of labor, the boycotts are also illegal. 
The unfair list has been passed upon in three states. In Illi- 
nois and Minnesota its publication was enjoined. In the 
former state a threat was said to be present ; in the latter, 
the judges specifically stated that threats would have to be 
proved before an injunction would be issued. In Missouri an 
injunction against the publication of circulars in pursuance of 
a boycott was refused, although civil or criminal action was 
declared possible. The Illinois courts, by dicta, declared the 
primary boycott legal. In Wisconsin the labor boycott has been 
declared illegal by the highest court, and from other decisions, 
it seems probable that other boycotts, where coercion or malice 
was present, would be considered illegal. In Ohio, while the 
highest courts have not passed upon these labor weapons, the 
lower courts have, at times, pronounced boycotts illegal, if 
malice or threats were present. Injunctions, however, against 
the issuance of boycotting circulars have been denied. 

Illinois 

Statutes forbid boycotts where two or more distribute cir- 
culars, etc., and which interfere with business by intimidation, 
etc. 

The courts have declared primary boycotts legal, and in an 
early trade boycott case of the Illinois Appeals they also pro- 
nounced a secondary boycott, where persuasive means only 
were used, legal. They have, however, declared illegal the 
issuance of an "unfair list," where an attempt was made to 
influence third parties to withdraw patronage by threats of 
loss of business, even where the threats had to be read into 
the act. They have pronounced strikes illegal, when called in 
furtherance of a boycott; also the mere persuasion of other 
workers — members of organized labor — to cease working on the 
material of the boycotted firm, where malice exists. Coercion 
of third parties by threats to withdraw labor has also come 
under the ban of the court. A trade boycott, where malice 
was present, and an attempt made to induce the breaking of 



388 BOYCOTTS 

contracts, was likewise pronounced illegal. A blacklist, un- 
accompanied by the absolute refusal to furnish any clearance 
card, was decided to be legal. Both civil and equitable suits 
have been resorted to. 

Statutes: Rev. St. 1905, Chap. 38, Sec. 46, entitled "Boy- 
cotting and Blacklisting." Act forbids combination to issue 
circulars to members of association or others, for the purpose 
of establishing a boycott, or to distribute written or printed 
notices with the malicious intent of injuring a person. Max. 
punishment, $2,000, or 5 yrs. Chap. 38, Sec. 158, on intimi- 
dation, forbids combination to deprive owner of use of prop- 
erty, and to interfere with employment by unlawful means. 
Max. fine, $500, or imprisonment of 6 mos. Sec. 159 pro- 
hibits unlawful interference by individual in employment of 
another. Max. fine, $200. Sec. 160 forbids entering prem- 
ises of another with intent to do injury by unlawful means. 

Ulery v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange (1894). ( 111- App.) 
Civil Action. Trade Boycott. Legal. Secretary of the Chi- 
cago Live Stock Exchange posted in the exchange a notice 
directing members not to employ J. D. Ulery, the pi., in the 
live stock commission business until he settled with another 
firm from which he was alleged to have purchased twenty 
head of cattle. PL lost his employment as a salesman, and 
was damaged, he alleged, to the extent of $50,000. Held 
that one or more persons may advise neighbors not to deal 
with a third party, and that they may even command when 
the command amounts only to earnest advice; therefore, no 
action. 

London Guarantee, etc., Co. v. Horn (1902). (111. App.) 
Civil Action. Employer's Boycott. Form of Blacklist. Il- 
legal. Employer discharged employee, who was injured, on 
being threatened by accident insurance company. Held insur- 
ance company responsible, and guilty of a malicious interfer- 
ence with the lawful business of another. 

Doremus v. Hennessy (1898). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 
cott. Illegal. Laundrymen in Chicago combined to boycott 
woman who collected and distributed laundry, and, it was 



APPENDIX 389 

alleged, endeavored to bribe those to whom she distributed it 
to keep back her work as long as possible, thus damaging her 
to the extent of $5,000. Held this action was malicious in- 
jury; illegal to induce others to break their contracts. Peti- 
tion for rehearing was denied. 

McDonald v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (1900). Civil 
Action. Blacklist. Legal. Employee, who took part in the 
American Ry. strike of 1894, was unable to obtain work from 
any other railroad, and was damaged to the extent of $50,000. 
He charged he was unable to obtain a clearance card such as 
would enable him to secure employment, and alleged that rail- 
road companies had agreed not to employ strikers without 
release and consent. Held that it was not here alleged that 
the railroad company had refused to give any clearance card, 
but only such clearance as would enable pi. to obtain work. 

O'Brien v. People (1905). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Strikers induced pi's, 
employees to leave, through threats and unlawful persuasion. 
Held illegal; as was also an attempt to secure closed shop 
through fear of strike illegal. 

Purington v. Hinchliff (1905). Civil Action. Compound 
Boycott Involving Patronage. Trade Boycott. Illegal. 
Masons' and Builders' Ass'n, of Chicago, comprising about two- 
thirds of the master builders, agreed with the Brick Manufac- 
turers' Ass'n, containing 95 per cent, of the manufacturers of 
brick in Cook County, that members of the former association 
secure a trade discount over and above that obtained by out- 
siders, and that they purchase bricks only from the Manufac- 
turers' Ass'n. They also made an agreement with the Brick- 
layers' Union, which was said to contain 98 per cent, of mem- 
bers of this craft in Chicago, whereby the latter promised not 
to handle brick from any manufacturer not in the agreement. 
PI. was the chief competitor of the Brick Manufacturers' 
Ass'n in Cook County, having a capacity of 15,000,000 bricks 
a year. The two associations and the unions employed dele- 
gates to visit pl.'s customers and to threaten them with the 
withdrawal of their labor, and with the imposition of fines, 



39Q BOYCOTTS 

should they continue to purchase from pi. This action ren- 
dered the pl.'s business worthless. Held that it was unlawful, 
directly or indirectly, to obstruct another in the lawful con- 
duct of his business. A verdict of $222,000 was rendered. 

Piano and Organ Workers' I. Union v. Piano and Organ 
Supply Co. (1906). (111. App.) For Injunction. Com- 
pound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. The Piano, 
etc., Union, while on strike against pi., resolved that all men 
employed in factories using pl.'s supplies should refuse to work 
thereupon, and sent circulars to that effect to pl.'s customers, 
printing notice in official journal. Held that, while it is law- 
ful to strike for any cause, it is unlawful to issue a strike 
order for the purpose of establishing a boycott on a person's 
goods, with intent to injure his business and thus to bring 
him to terms. 

Hey v. Wilson (1908). For Injunction. Secondary or 
Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Unfair List. Il- 
legal. Members of Team Drivers' I. Union, on strike against 
pi. for higher wages, appointed, in conjunction with other labor 
unions, a committee to inform business men that pi. was on 
the unfair list. Members of the union ceased to patronize 
him, as did some of his customers. School board was requested 
not to use pl.'s auditorium, but this request was withdrawn. 
Held that, although no threats were used, they were implied, 
and that, if notices excite reasonable fear, it is immaterial 
whether or not there are direct threats; that the use of the 
words "unfair list" was an euphemism for boycott, and the 
action of the defs. an invasion of the right of another to dis- 
pose of his own labor according to his own will and was with- 
out justification. The legality of the primary boycott was, how- 
ever, declared, and it was admitted that "individuals may 
agree among themselves that they will not trade or deal with 
a certain person, and may give notice to others that they have 
made such an agreement." Two judges dissented. 

A. R. Barnes and Co. v. Chicago Typogr. Union No. 10 
(1908). For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott 
Involving Workmen. Illegal. Defs., on strike for an 8-hr. 



APPENDIX 391 

day and closed shop, sent circulars to foremen of labor organ- 
izations in other establishments, directing them to endeavor 
to prevent workmen from working on goods from pl.'s shop. 
Held that employer, whose workmen have gone on strike, has 
an absolute right to fill their places with other workmen, and 
that any interference with this right, whether by threats or by 
persuasion, is a legal wrong, if accomplished by an act of 
malice. Here the immediate purpose was to injure another. 
The court reaffirmed the sweeping injunction of the lower 
court forbidding picketing and boycotting. Two judges dis- 
sented. 

Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. Dist. Council of Chicago of 
United Br. of Carpenters and Joiners of America. (19 10.) 
(111. App.) For Injunction. Contempt. Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Illegal. A strike was called against 
pi., a manufacturer of lumber, and, after injunction was is- 
sued, it was alleged that def. ordered strikes because material 
of pi. was used. Held that, although strikes were legal, a 
conspiracy to ruin the business of an employer by means of 
picketing, boycotts, etc., is unlawful, and subject to an in- 
junction process. 

Kemp v. Div. No. 241, etc. (1910). (111. App.) Civil 
Action. Compound Labor Boycott. Illegal. Employees of 
railroad threatened to strike unless those resigning from union 
were discharged. Held that, when there is no trade dispute 
between employer and employee over a matter of employment, 
a strike for the purpose of coercing employer to discharge em- 
ployee and of coercing employee to join a union is an unlawful 
interference with rights of both, and illegal. 

Indiana 

Boycotts, whereby two or more agree to stop the sale of 
goods, are specifically condemned by statute. However, the 
courts have held a primary boycott legal, by dicta, where no 
threats were used. A labor boycott, unaccompanied by threats, 
was also declared legal by Indiana Appeals. A trade boycott, 



392 BOYCOTTS 

where coercive means were employed against a third party, 
consisting in the imposition of fines, was pronounced illegal. 
Two boycotts, not connected with labor disputes, were pro- 
nounced legal where no threats of a reproachful nature were 
implied. A blacklist, where a worker was described as "labor 
agitator," was pronounced legal. The highest courts have not 
as yet passed on a boycott case against laborers in a labor 
dispute. 

Statutes: Annotated St. of 1894, R- ev - of 1901, Sec. 3312m, 
entitled "Boycotting." Any person who shall enter into an 
arrangement to prevent the sale of any article shall be guilty 
of conspiracy against trade. Max. punishment, $2,000 and 1 
yr. The state may collect $50 a day for violation, and the 
injured party may collect damages and cost. 

Jackson v. Stanfield (1894). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 
cott. Illegal. A boycott was instituted against a broker, a 
dealer in lumber, and, in the course of it, a wholesaler, an 
honorary member of the retail association of which def. was 
member, was fined for violating the rules in selling to pi. 
Court held a conspiracy to prevent the carrying on of a law- 
ful business by preventing those who w T ould be customers from 
buying anything, by threats and intimidation, was in restraint of 
trade, and that the imposition of penalties here constituted 
intimidation and coercion ; further, that a primary boycott was 
legal where no threats were used. 

Clemmitt v. Watson (1895). (Ind. App.) Civil Action. 
Labor Boycott. Legal. Workmen in coal mine agreed to 
stop work if fellow workman was not discharged. Court held 
legal; that each individually had right to quit, and that all 
could so quit if action was taken without threats, violence, etc. 

Guethler v. Altman (1901). (Ind. App.) Civil Action. 
Boycott of Store by Teacher. Legal. Teacher persuaded 
pupils not to patronize a certain storekeeper by threats and 
otherwise, although nothing of a reproachful nature was 
implied. Held that the teacher was exercising her right, and 
the existence of malice did not make the action illegal. 

Wabash Railroad Co. v. Young (1904). Civil Action. 



APPENDIX 393 

Blacklist. Legal. Def., in response to a request, sent letters 
to other railroads, describing pi. as a labor agitator. Held 
that complaint did not describe or allege such malicious inter- 
ference with the business of the appellee as to create a liability 
at common law. 

Karges Furniture Co. v. Amal. Woodworkers' Local Union 
(1905). Strike. Legal. Dicta Holding Peaceful Boycott 
Legal. Held that one could persuade others to cease to 
patronize a third party, and what one may do singly all may 
do in concert. 

Rowan v. Butler (1908). Civil Action. Secondary Boy- 
cott Involving Patronage. (Not in labor dispute.) Legal. 
Governor of a Soldiers' Home, as a result of an agreement with 
others, issued an order that the inmates cease their purchasing 
from pl.'s rest. Held that governor had the right to do this 
singly, and that his act was not unlawful because he agreed 
with others. 

Iowa 

Statute with application doubtful. No court decisions in 
highest court. 

Statutes: Code, 1897, Sec. 5059. Act declares conspiracy, 
with fraudulent and malicious intent wrongfully to injure a 
person in his business, character or person, illegal. (Applica- 
tion doubtful.) 

Funck v. Farmers' Elevator Co., of Gowrie (1909). Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. This was an action in mandamus to secure 
a transfer of stocks. Def. was an organization of farmers in 
Gowrie to buy and sell produce, lumber and coal. This asso- 
ciation was boycotted by the regular dealers, who even estab- 
lished a system of espionage, and threatened dealers having 
anything to do with the corporation. One of agents of regular 
dealers bought stock, and sought to have it transferred. Farm- 
ers refused. Court held that he was not entitled to equitable 
aid and that conspiracy to injure one's trade or business, by 
preventing any one from doing business with him through fear 



394 BOYCOTTS 

of incurring the displeasure, persecution or vengeance of the 
conspirator, is unlawful. 

Kansas 

Various acts against interfering with business by intimida- 
tion, etc. No decision noted in highest court. 

Statutes: Gen. St. 1905, Sec. 2481. Act makes it unlaw- 
ful for any person maliciously by any act or by intimidation 
to interfere or conspire to interfere with lawful business. 
(Application doubtful.) Gen. St. 1901, Sec. 2375, entitled 
"Intimidation," etc. Act makes it illegal wilfully and ma- 
liciously by any act or by intimidation to impede or obstruct 
the regular conduct of a business. Sec. 2376, entitled "Con- 
spiracy." Act makes it illegal wilfully and maliciously to 
combine for such a purpose. Punishment, $20 to $200, or 20 
to 90 days. 

Michigan 

Intimidation of employees is made illegal by statutes. Courts 
have declared boycotts illegal wherein threats are used against 
employees, and threats of loss of trade against patrons. A 
trade boycott was also declared illegal. Those cases connected 
with labor disputes involved injunction and contempt. 

Statutes: Compiled laws of 1897, Sec. 11343, entitled "In- 
timidation of Employees." Act makes illegal interference of 
emploj^ees by threats, intimidation or otherwise, in their lawful 
employment. Punishment, $10 to $100, or 1 mo. to 1 yr., or 
both. 

Beck et at. v. Railway Teamsters' Union et al. (1898). 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. 
Circulars Issued. Illegal. Defs. struck against pis., owners 
of Cereal Mills, for closed shop; issued circulars asking pa- 
trons to boycott pis.; threatened customers with boycott; col- 
lected around door of mill, and drove away truckmen. Held 
that use of threats which tend to overcome the will of others 
through fear of loss of property is illegal and that when their 



APPENDIX 395 

accomplishment will result in irreparable injury, an injunction 
will issue. A libel, when accompanied by threats, may also be 
enjoined. 

U. S. Heater Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union of Am. (1902). 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Held that a labor organization could be enjoined from 
interfering with or intimidating pi. in his employment. 

Enterprise Foundry Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union (1907). 
For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage and Workmen. Contempt. Illegal. This was a 
suit to restrain unionists from persuading or threatening one 
who furnished meals and supplies to non-union employees to 
break contracts, and from denouncing and intimidating em- 
ployees. Injunction w r as granted. Def. was convicted of con- 
tempt for violating it. 

Ideal Manufacturing Co. v. Ludwig (1907). For Injunc- 
tion. Contempt. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage 
and Workmen. Illegal. Workers struck against pi. to obtain 
closed shop. Injunction was issued prohibiting workers from 
molesting patrons by distribution of circulars or otherwise, 
for the purpose of inducing them to cease patronage. Presi- 
dent of union was declared by court to have violated the 
injunction. 

Baldwin v. Escanaba Liquor Dealers' Ass'n (1911). For 
Injunction. Trade Boycott. Illegal. Def. tried to induce 
third parties to take advertising away from pi., a newspaper 
owner, and to withdraw printing. Held illegal. Contains 
definition of boycott. 

Minnesota 

Interference with employment by threats, etc., is declared 
illegal by statute. The court has decided that that form of 
boycott is illegal and subject to injunction in which third 
parties are threatened with withdrawal of labor should they 
continue business relations with others, where there are no 
contract or other relations between boycotters and such third 
party; that laborers can issue "unfair lists," and circularize 



396 BOYCOTTS 

them among customers of the boycotted firm, provided, how- 
ever, there is no threat involved. A trade boycott, on the 
other hand, in which members were coerced into refusing 
business relations with third parties by means of fines and 
expulsion, was declared legal on the ground that coercive 
measures could not be spelled out, and that malice could not 
be considered. The distinction made in the two cases was 
that in the trade boycott only the members of the association 
were told of the action of the pi., and not outsiders. The 
court has also held that representatives of unions cannot be 
enjoined from going on premises of boycotted firm, and order- 
ing men to quit work, where owner of premises doesn't object. 
Trade boycotts which serve no legitimate interest, and black- 
lists, malicious in their nature, have also been pronounced ac- 
tionable in damages. 

Statutes: Rev. Laws, 1905, Sec. 1822, entitled "Interfer- 
ence." Act holds illegal interference with employment of one 
because he has taken part in a strike. (Applies chiefly to 
Blacklist.) Min. Punishment, $25, or 15 days. Sec. 4867, 
entitled "Conspiracy — Interference with Employment." Pro- 
hibits conspiracy of two or more to interfere with another in 
the exercise of his lawful trade, through force, threats, or 
intimidation. Sec. 5140, entitled "Coercion of Workingmen, 
Interference with Employment." Act declares a misdemeanor 
coercion of another through threats, force, and intimidation, 
to compel him to do or abstain from doing lawful act. Sec. 
5168. St. against trusts and combinations may be so extended 
as to apply to trade boycotts. 

Bohn Manufacturing Co. v. Hollis (1893). For Injunc- 
tion. Primary or Compound. Trade Boycott. Legal. In 
1890 one-half of the lumber dealers in la., Minn., Neb., and 
the Dakotas combined in an association known as the N. W. 
Lumbermen's Ass'n, with headquarters at St. Paul. The mem- 
bers agreed that if any of them sold lumber to a dealer not a 
member of the association, residing in a town where a mem- 
ber conducted business, he would have to pay a commission to 
such member within 30 days, amounting to 10 per cent, of his 



APPENDIX 397 

sales. PL, who sold lumber to outsiders, refused to pay com- 
mission, and sought an injunction. Injunction refused. Court 
declared that any man can refuse to deal with any class of 
men as he sees fit unless under contract obligation. That 
combination does not make such act illegal; that the pro- 
vision in the ass'n's by-laws that any member dealing with pi. 
would be expelled, unless he paid commission prescribed, did 
not constitute intimidation; that an action in general restraint 
of trade could not be brought at the instance of third parties, 
and that motive does not make a legal act illegal. 

Ertz v. Produce Exchange (1900). Civil Action. Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. PL, a commission merchant in Minneapolis, 
claimed he was unable to deal in farm products as a result of 
agreement of members of the Produce Ex., and that he had 
been damaged to extent of $25,000. Held that those having 
no legitimate interests to protect may not lawfully injure 
business of another by maliciously inducing others not to deal 
with him; case distinguished from Bohn on the ground of 
legitimate interest. 

Gray v. Building Trades Council et al. (1903). For In- 
junction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. 
Unfair List. Legal, if No Threats. Pis. were electrical con- 
tractors in Minneapolis. Defs., on strike, threatened Minne- 
apolis Industrial and Amusement Ass'n with withdrawal of 
union men working on the construction of booths, should they 
contract with pis., and made a similar threat to the proprietor 
of the Brunswick Hotel. Held that this was an interference 
with the property rights of others, and that when labor resorts 
to unlawful means to cause injury to others with whom it has 
no relation, contractual or otherwise, it will be restrained ; 
that defs. used threats and intimidation, and that these are 
necessary elements of boycotts. Labor, however, cannot be 
restrained from merely notifying customers or prospective cus- 
tomers that certain firms are on unfair list because of their 
employment of non-union labor, unless such acts are intended 
as threat or intimidation. Nor can representatives of labor 
be enjoined from going on premises where firms on unfair list 



398 BOYCOTTS 

are located, and ordering men to quit work, where owner of 
premises doesn't object. 

Joyce v. Great Northern Railway Co. (1907). Civil Ac- 
tion. Blacklist. Illegal. Action against defendant for agree- 
ing with other employer to prevent third person from securing 
employment. PL was injured by engine of def. and, on the 
regaining of pl.'s health, def. induced pl.'s employer, a depot 
company, to refuse emplojonent unless he released them from 
liability. Held actionable as violative of Rev. Laws 1905, 
Sec. 5097, against blacklists; that defs. acted with malice and 
not with justification, the employment not having been denied 
because of incompetency. 

Tuttle v. Buck (1909). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. 
Illegal. Def., a wealthy banker of Howard Lake, set up 
barber store for purpose of injuring pi., an established barber, 
and not for any gain to himself. Held illegal to start an 
opposition place of business for sole purpose of driving com- 
petitor out of business regardless of loss to himself, and with 
intention of withdrawing when other was driven out; that 
this is an application of force without legal justification, and 
that an act, lawful when actuated by one set of motives, may 
be unlawful when actuated by another set. 

Missouri 

Intimidation of employees is forbidden by statute. Courts 
have held that a boycott involving the coercion of customers 
by means of threats of strike, etc., can be enjoined, although 
the publication of such boycott might not be enjoined. Such 
publication, however, might be subject to criminal or civil 
suit. A labor boycott, involving threats of strike and extor- 
tion, has been held actionable in damages. A boycott, not in 
a labor dispute, where expelled member of an association was 
boycotted because of misconduct, and not because of non-mem- 
bership, has been held legal. 

Statutes: Rev. St. 1899, Sec. 2155, Act entitled "Intimi- 
dation of Employees — Interference with Employment." Act 



APPENDIX 399 

makes illegal interference with employment by force, menace 
or threats of violence. Min. punishment three or six months, 
or $50 or $100, or both. 

Hunt v. Simonds (1854). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. 
Legal. Insurance agents conspired to refuse to place insurance 
on pl.'s vessel. Held that it must be shown that acts which 
the def. agreed to do were illegal, in order to warrant recov- 
ery; that existence of malice did not make combination illegal. 

Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey (1895). For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. At- 
tempt was made by def. to force employees to quit work and 
join the union strike. Held that when acts were accompanied 
by intimidation, etc., injunction would issue. 

Marx & Haas Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson et ah (1902). 
For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Not Enjoinable. Defs., garment workers of St. 
Louis, on strike against pis., manufacturers of jeans, clothing 
and pants, visited customers and endeavored to persuade them 
to cease dealing with pis., in some cases threatening them with 
loss of business unless they acceded to demands, but in no 
cases threatening physical violence. Pis. claimed that damage 
would amount to $10,000, unless injunction issued. Held 
injunction would not issue where there is no intimidation 
through fear of personal violence or of destruction of prop- 
erty, but only the mere abstaining from business relations and 
the persuading of others to do likewise; that issuance of an 
injunction would mean the denial of the right of free speech 
guaranteed by the constitution, and would prevent workmen 
from telling the story of their supposed wrongs. It added 
that the impecunious character of defs. constituted no argu- 
ment for an injunction. A civil action, however, might lie. 

Walsh v. Association of Master Plumbers (1902). (St. 
Louis App.) For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Illegal. Mas- 
ter Plumbers' Ass'n agreed with certain dealers and manu- 
facturers that the latter should deal exclusively with members, 
and that members should boycott dealers who sold to non- 
members. Held that this agreement was illegal and void, and 



400 BOYCOTTS 

could be restrained. It violated Rev. St. 1899, Ch. 143, Art. 
2, Sec. 8979, declaring against the regulating of prices or con- 
trol or limiting of trade; that it also contravened Sec. 8982 
relative to pools. 

Gladish v. Bridgeford (1905). (Kansas City App.) 
For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. Members of an 
ass'n refused to have further dealings with another who was 
expelled from membership because he was found guilty of mis- 
conduct. Held that no injunction would issue, inasmuch as 
the pi. was boycotted because he was found guilty, and not 
because he was not a member. 

Carter v. Oster (1908). (St. Louis App.) Civil Action. 
Labor Boycott. Illegal. Delegate of Ass'n of Steam and Hot 
Water Fitters of Am. notified employer of Carter, the pi., 
who worked in the Mo. Heating and Const. Co., to discharge 
pi., and fined the firm the sum of $200, the men quitting 
work until fine was paid. It was alleged that the union 
secured pl.'s discharge in other places, threatening strikes, and 
afterwards prevented him from conducting business on a com- 
mission basis. Held that the means used, threats of strikes 
and extortion, were illegal, malicious and oppressive. 

Burke v. Fay (1908). (Ct. of App.) Civil Action. 
Coerce Employer to Discharge Nbn-Union Men by Fines. 
(Not generally considered boycott.) Unions imposed $200 
fine on master plumber for breach of agreement to employ 
only union men. Held that he could recover such fine, and 
that imposition of it constituted coercion. 

Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle et al. (1908). For In- 
junction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. 
Defs., members of the U. Br. of Carpenters and Joiners, struck 
against pis., manufacturer of sashes, etc., for employing non- 
union men, and instituted boycott against pis. and against those 
purchasing material from them; followed pis.' wagons, issued 
circulars, and in some instances called strikes on pis.' patrons. 
They were charged with impairing business to the extent of 
$10,000. Held illegal as combination to injure trade of one, 



APPENDIX 401 

by threatening to produce injury to those dealing with him, 
and having for their direct object injury of another. 

Differs from Marx and Haas Case, as it enjoins the boycott 
itself, instead of the publication thereof. 

Nebraska 
No Statute Relating Thereto. No Decisions. 

Ohio 

Statute against restraint of trade has been held applicable. 
Thus far the court of last resort has not passed on the ques- 
tion of boycotts in labor disputes. Injunctions have issued 
from lower courts enjoining boycotters from using threats of 
loss of property against third parties, and even from persuad- 
ing third parties to cease their patronage, if the object is mali- 
cious or unlawful, or if a trespass is involved. Injunctions 
have, however, been denied in the Superior Court against the 
issuance of boycotting circulars, although it has been intimated 
that these might be stopped through criminal or civil pro- 
cedure. Compound boycotts have been subject to civil action. 
Coercing a third party to withdraw patronage through fear of 
loss of business has also been held criminal by a police court. 
Blacklists entailing an agreement to refuse a statement of em- 
ployment have been declared legal by the Supreme Court, al- 
though a more general blacklist was previously pronounced 
illegal by one of the Courts of Common Pleas. 

Statute: Act of April 19, 1898, in 930 L. 143. Act pro- 
vides against combination to restrain trade. 

N. Y. L. E. and W. R. Co. v. Wenger (1887). For 
Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. (Tres- 
pass.) Illegal. Court issued injunction to prevent striking 
employees of railroad companies from going on premises for 
purpose of causing other employees, either by threats, intimi- 
dation, or request, to quit work, since such action would con- 
stitute a trespass for which the law affords no adequate remedy. 

Parker v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1 (1889). (Common 



402 BOYCOTTS 

Pleas.) Civil Action. Compound Boycott Involving Patron- 
age and Workmen. Illegal. Held that members of trade 
unions were liable for damages caused by a general boycott 
declared against a contractor in which workmen were induced 
to quit time contracts and dealers in building materials were 
coerced into refusing to deal with contractor, and in which 
persons w T ith whom contractor had contracts for work and 
material were induced to break them. Trade unions and its 
members were also held liable in damages for false circulars 
charging pi. with employing inferior scab labor in his business. 

Richter v. Journeymen Tailors' Union (1890) (Lower 
Court). For Injunction. Libelous circulars. Not Enjoined. 
Defs., on strike, placed on walls, buildings, and bulletin boards 
in vicinity of pl.'s business posters stating that public should 
shun "scab" shop, and sent letters to the public, alleged to 
contain libelous statements. Held that court of equity had no 
jurisdiction to enjoin libel. 

Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union (1890). (Cinn. 
Super. Ct.) For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Illegal. Unions struck against one Parker, a con- 
tractor, for refusing to pay fine of workman and to reinstate 
another. Def. Bricklayers' Union issued a circular threaten- 
ing that its members would not work on material supplied by 
any one who continued to sell to Parker Brothers. PL dis- 
obeyed notice and was subjected to great loss. Parker Bros, 
had recovered damages and pi. had been awarded $2,250 dam- 
ages. This award was affirmed by Judge Taft, and defs. were 
enjoined from refusing to work on pl.'s material wherever it 
was supplied them, when intention of such action was to force 
employers against their will to cease to purchase from pi. 
The immediate motive, that of injury, was malicious, as there 
was no relation between pi. and def. to justify such injury. 

Mattison v. Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. Co. 
(1895). (Ct. of Com. Pleas, Lucas Co.) Civil Action. 
Blacklist. Illegal. Railroad companies were charged with 
combining for purpose of preventing the employment by each 
other of discharged employees. Held companies were liable 



APPENDIX 403 

to those who were prevented from procuring work, as the 
right of a man to seek employment in any honest work shall 
not be interfered with. 

Riggs v. Waiters' Alliance Local No. 58 et al. (1898). 
(Cinn. Super. Ct.) For Injunction. Distribution of Libelous 
Circulars. Not Enjoinable. Waiters, on strike, displayed 
placards and distributed circulars in front of, and in the vicin- 
ity of, pl.'s premises, which stated that pi. was on the unfair 
list, and requested customers not to patronize him. Circulars 
were alleged to be libelous. Held that acts could not be en- 
joined on the ground that they were a nuisance, as the public 
highway was not obstructed, and that equity will not inter- 
fere by injunction to restrain publication or circular ization of 
a libel. "Where the gist of the injury is purely personal, as, 
for instance, in cases of a libel, the fact that, it may be in- 
jurious to property does not give the court jurisdiction." To 
restrain this libel would be to interfere with freedom of speech 
and liberty of the press. Abuse of this right may only be 
punished criminally or subject the offender to civil suit for 
damages. 

State v. E. C. Jacobs (1899). (Police Court of Cleve- 
land.) Criminal Conspiracy. Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Illegal. Motorman def., on strike against Cleve- 
land Electric Ry. Co., declared that Reynolds, who sold ice 
cream to the "scabs," would be boycotted if he continued, 
and also threatened Schindler, who supplied Reynolds with 
the ice cream, with a similar boycott, should he not cease 
dealings with Reynolds. Held that the act of April 19, 1898, 
in 930 L. 143, applied to boycotts, on the ground that they 
restrict trade by means of fear of injury to business or prop- 
erty. 

The Dayton Manufacturing Co. v. Metal Polishers', etc., 
Union No. 5 (1901). (Ohio Com. Pleas.) For Injunction. 
Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving Working on Pl.'s 
Materials. Illegal. Dayton manufacturer in car trimmings, 
etc., employing 150 men, discharged 17 buffers. Union com- 
mittees stated to other establishments that the latter's em- 



404 BOYCOTTS 

ployees would not be permitted to work on any material sup- 
plied by pi., although they were afterwards allowed to place 
union men at work on this material. Held that equity will 
enjoin use of threats against patrons of pi., if those threats 
overcome their will through fear of loss of property, and that 
mere persuasion will also be enjoined, when its end is mali- 
cious or unlawful. It is legal, however, for organizations to 
present their cause to the public in a peaceful way and with no 
attempt at coercion. 

N. Y. C. Street Railway Co. v. Schaffer (1902). Black- 
list. Legal. Here held legal to agree not to employ persons 
who had been on strike, and to refuse to give discharged em- 
ployees a statement of employment. 

Wisconsin 

Acts make illegal combination to injure business maliciously, 
or to interfere with employment by unlawful means. Highest 
courts have not passed on boycotting in labor disputes, except- 
ing in one case of a labor boycott, where courts have held, 
obiter dicta, that interference with employees by force, etc., 
gives right of action. In the three trade boycotts cited, all 
were declared illegal on the ground of malice or monopoly. 
One of these was of a criminal nature. Courts have recog- 
nized malice and combination as elements in torts. The 
decision regarding the legality of boycotts would, in all prob- 
ability, be an adverse one. 

Statutes: Annotated St. of 1898, Sec. 4466a, entitled, 
"Combining to Injure Business," etc. Act makes illegal com- 
bination of two or more persons maliciously to injure another 
in his reputation or business, by any means, or maliciously to 
compel him against his will to perform or not to perform any 
lawful act. Max. punishment, $500, or 1 yr. Sec. 4466c, 
entitled "Interfering with Employment," makes illegal inter- 
ference with employment by force, threats, or intimidation. 
Max. punishment, $100, or 6 mos., or both. 

Gatzow v. Buening (1900). Civil Action. Trade Boy- 



APPENDIX 405 

cott. Involving Element of Monopoly. Illegal. Liverymen's 
Ass'n prohibited members from doing business with any per- 
son who did not deal exclusively with members of the associa- 
tion, and from letting a hearse to a person for a funeral when 
the undertaker in charge patronized non-union men. Held 
an attempt to monopolize business and stifle competition, and 
illegal as against public policy. 

Hawarden v. Youghiogheney (1901). Civil Action. Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. Retail dealer in coal charged wholesaler 
with refusing to sell him coal because he was not a member 
of a certain combination. The defs. owned practically all of 
the docks in that vicinity, near Duluth. Held illegal for a 
combination to refuse to sell goods to another with the purpose 
of injuring that other, and not to benefit themselves. It is 
legal for an individual to attract to himself another's cus- 
tomers with malicious motives, or for a combination thus to 
act to promote their own welfare. 

The State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin (1901). Criminal 
Conspiracy. Trade Boycott. Illegal. Defs., owners of news- 
papers, agreed that, if advertisers paid to another newspaper, 
out of the combination, the increased rate charged, they would 
be compelled to pay such increased rates to defs. Held a 
conspiracy to inflict malicious injury upon another, and action- 
able; that malice and combination may make illegal otherwise 
legal acts, and that fact that ultimate object of the combina- 
tion was beneficial was no defense. 

Badger Brass Manufacturing Co. v. Daly (1909). Civil 
Action. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. 
Metal Polishers and Silver Workers' Union in Kenosha, on 
strike, interfered with other workmen, and destruction of 
trade was threatened. Held that, if a laborer is prevented by 
his fellows from working, it usually gives cause of action to 
laborer alone, and that an employer can sue only when his 
workmen are coerced or induced to break an existing con- 
tract, or where the laborers are prevented by conspiracy from 
accepting employment of employer, in which case there is an 



4 o6 BOYCOTTS 

actionable interference with right of employer to carry on his 
lawful business. 



COURT DECISIONS ON BOYCOTTS IN SOUTH 
ATLANTIC AND SOUTH CENTRAL STATES 

There have been no decisions on boycotts in any form, as 
far as can be learned, in courts of last appeal in Alabama and 
Florida. There have been no adjudicated cases of boycott 
relating to labor disputes in highest courts in Kentucky, 
Mississippi, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, or 
West Virginia. 

From other decisions, it seems probable that the Kentucky 
courts would pronounce a boycott illegal if accompanied by 
threats of loss of business; the Mississippi courts, if coercion 
or malice was present; the South Carolina and West Virginia 
courts, if malice could be spelled out. It is reported that a 
lower court in Oklahoma has declared a secondary boycott 
legal. In Tennessee and Texas, if the judges could be con- 
vinced of the legitimate interest, on the part of the workers, 
to boycott, the use of this weapon would probably be per- 
mitted, although the attitude on the part of the judges is 
doubtful. 

The issuance of an unfair list, which threatened third par- 
ties with loss of labor, was held not to constitute a crime in 
No. Carolina. 

The Arkansas court pronounced legal refusal to work for 
one doing business with an employer of non-union men, where 
no "official boycott" was declared. 

The Virginia court has held the boycott illegal when ac- 
companied by threats of loss of business. A Louisiana court 
pronounced a labor boycott, accompanied by threats, illegal, 
and trade boycotts legal where a legitimate interest was to 
be protected. 



APPENDIX 407 

Alabama 

Sweeping statutes against boycotting by name and other- 
wise. No decisions in highest courts on this subject. 

Statutes: Code, 1907, Sec. 6396, entitled "Boycotting," 
makes it illegal for any person to print or circulate any notice 
of boycott, unfair list, etc., or publish or declare that a boycott 
or ban exists, or is contemplated, against any person. Sec. 
6397, entitled "Threats, etc.," makes illegal any intimidation 
to prevent a person from engaging in any lawful occupation. 
Sec. 6394, entitled "Conspiracy," makes illegal a conspiracy 
of two or more persons to prevent or interfere with the carry- 
ing on of a lawful business. Punishment, $50 to $500, or 
not to exceed 60 days. 

Florida 

Sweeping statutes against labor boycotts when accompanied 
by intimidation, etc. (Word "boycott" not used.) 

Statutes: Gen. St. 1906, Sec. 3515, entitled "Conspiracy 
against Workingmen." Act makes illegal any combination of 
two or more for the purpose of preventing person from pro- 
curing or continuing work, or any threat of injury to firm 
unless person is discharged or not employed. Max. punish- 
ment, $500, or one year. 

Chipley v. Atkinson (1887). Civil Action. Elements of 
Blacklist, Illegal. Def. induced employer to discharge em- 
ployee. Court held actionable, and that the fact that employee 
had no rights against employer did not take away his rights 
against a third person. 

Arkansas 

There is no statute bearing directly on boycotts. Refusal 
to work on structure laid by non-union men, or handle ma- 
terial of non-unionists, has been held to be legal by court. 

Statutes: Digest of 1904, Sec. 5030, as amended by Act 
298 of Acts of 1905, entitled "Interfering with or Enticing 



4 o8 BOYCOTTS 

Employee." Act makes illegal enticing employee, who has 
contracted with another, to leave his employer. (Application 
doubtful.) Max. punishment, $100, and advances made by 
employer. 

Meier v. Speer (1910). Civil Action. Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Legal. (If no official action.) (Boycott 
paper illegal.) Stone masons refused to work on building 
whose superstructure was laid by non-union men, and brick- 
layers refused to handle material secured from non-union con- 
cern. There was no evidence of the declaration of any official 
boycott, or threats. Held legal, where these provisions are 
in rules of union. Intimidation and coercion were declared es- 
sential elements of boj'cotts. Court claimed that every man 
has a right to dispose of his labor as he chooses, as long as 
his action does not contravene any duty to the public or inter- 
fere with legal rights of others, and that appellants can law- 
fully do conjointly what they can do singly, each having like 
interests to promote. 

Georgia 

Labor boycotts, accompanied by intimidation, are illegal by 
statute (word "boycott" not used). Court has held that a 
labor boycott, accompanied by force, is illegal, as well as a 
trade boycott which involves such coercion as comes from 
threat of loss of business to third parties and malicious inter- 
ference with contract relations. Employers' boycott, where 
false notice is given, is not approved. While no case decided 
by highest court, where attempt was made by workers to 
withdraw patronage, is observed, it seems likely that such 
would be condemned if it involved coercion of third parties 
through threats of loss of business. 

Statutes: Penal Code, 1895, Sees. 1 19-126. A misde- 
meanor to hinder engagement of a person in a lawful business 
by threats, intimidation, violence, or other unlawful means. 
Sees. 1 to 4 of the Acts of 1901, p. 63, make it illegal for 
one to interfere with employee under contract relations with 
another. 



APPENDIX 409 

Brown v. Jacobs Pharmacy Co. (1902). For Injunction. 
Trade Boycott. Illegal. Atlantic Retail Drug Ass'n, of 
which pi. was formerly a member, issued circulars stating that 
pi. was an aggressive cutter; required salesmen of whole- 
salers to agree not to sell goods to non-members, and stated 
to wholesalers that members would withdraw patronage unless 
such wholesalers refused to sell to pi. Held by court that 
combination was void and injunction would issue. 

Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co. (1904). Blacklist. Illegal 
(if notice false). Def. and other companies agreed to notify 
each other whenever an employee left without cause and with- 
out giving 6 days' notice. Held that such an agreement was 
legal. PL alleged that he was discharged for refusing to 
change contract, and was afterwards refused employment be- 
cause of false notification. Held it was error to grant non- 
suit. 

Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co. (1905). 
Civil Action. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Employing printers, formed for illegal purpose of reg- 
ulating prices, induced employees of pi., who refused to enter 
combination, to strike, by threatening to discontinue their 
agreement to abide longer by union regulations unless workers 
obeyed. Damage, $10,000. Held the combination consti* 
tuted an unlawful conspiracy and malicious interference with 
contract relations. 

Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin and Machine Works (1908). 
Civil Action. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Il- 
legal. Members of labor organization endeavored to prevent 
others by intimidation to work for pi. Held interference with 
business of another by force, etc., so as to prevent them from 
entering or remaining in employment, was illegal, although legal 
to persuade others not to take employment. 



Kentucky 

Boycott accompanied by coercion is declared illegal by stat- 
ute (word "boycott" not used). No boycott case in which 



410 BOYCOTTS 

workmen were the boycotters has been decided by the highest 
court. A primary boycott, not involved in labor dispute, has, 
however, been pronounced legal, while a trade boycott, in 
which threats of loss of business were evidenced, was found 
illegal. Employers' boycotts, involving false statements or 
coercion, were also declared illegal; interference, in which 
these elements were absent, legal. It is probable that threats 
of loss of business against third parties by employees would 
be considered illegal. 

Statutes: St. 1903, Sec. 802, entitled "Hindering, etc.. 
Transportation by Violence." Act makes unlawful interfer- 
ence with transportation or commerce by violence. Sec. 803, 
entitled "Coercion." Act makes unlawful hindering the free 
and lawful use of property of another by means of coercion. 
Punishment, $25 to $200, or 10 days to 6 mos., or both. 

Brewster v. Miller's Sons (1897). Primary Boycott. (Not 
labor dispute.) Legal. Def. refused to take charge of pl.'s 
wife's funeral. Held with Cooley that one may refuse busi- 
ness relations with another for any reason whatsoever. 

Hundley v. Louisville Railroad Co. (1898). Civil Action. 
Blacklist. Illegal. PL was discharged from def. railroad and 
was unable to secure employment on other railroads, inasmuch 
as def. had entered on the books a false reason for discharge, 
and had agreed with other railroads not to employ discharged 
employees. Held that this is an actionable wrong, but that 
pi. must show that he applied for employment and was dis- 
charged because of def's. act. A malicious interference with 
the right of a person to pursue his trade is actionable. 

Baker v. Met. L. I. Co. (1901). Civil Action. Blacklist. 
Legal. Insurance agent was discharged from Metropolitan 
Co. at the request of the Sun Ins. Co., because of an agree- 
ment entered into between the Sun, Prudential and Metropoli- 
tan, whereby neither company would employ any former em- 
ployee of any company within two years of discontinuance of 
employment. Held that pi. had no right of action where def. 
had right to terminate relation at any time; that there was no 



APPENDIX 411 

falsehood or coercion used, and that pi. had the right to refuse 
business relation with any person for any reason. 

Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle (1904). (Ct. of Apps.) Civil 
Action. Trade Boycott. Illegal. Def. threatened to ruin 
customers of oil merchant if they continued to deal in his 
oils. Illegal. 

Louisiana 

There is no act of a general nature, but one confined to 
seamen. Courts have held that labor and trade boycotts, when 
accompanied either by threats, etc., or malice, are illegal, but 
that trade boycotts, where third parties are coerced through 
fear of loss, are legal if the boycotters have a legitimate inter- 
est to uphold. When the boycott is conducted by one only, 
it is considered especially subject to favorable decision. It is 
doubtful that the courts would work out any justification for 
a boycott in a labor dispute in which third parties were threat- 
ened by workers with loss. 

Rev. Laws, 1904, Sec. 944. Act, entitled "Intimidation of 
Seamen." Act makes illegal intimidating and preventing sea- 
men from shipping on vessel, or unlawfully interfering with 
them. 

Dickson v. Dickson (1881). Civil Action. Secondary or 
Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Illegal. Held il- 
legal to induce laborers to abandon work, by threats, persua- 
sion or otherwise, when wantonly and maliciously done, on the 
ground that the laborers have a right to pursue their lawful 
calling without interference. 

Graham v. St. Charles Street Railroad et al. (1895). Civil 
Action. Compound Trade Boycott. Illegal. Railroad fore- 
man, in hiring and discharging employees, discriminated 
against those dealing in pl.'s grocery store. Held illegal for 
one to influence another to cause a loss to a third party if no 
legitimate right or interest of one's own is served thereby, 
although a person may himself refuse to deal with another 
for any purpose. 

Webb v. Drake (1899). Civil Action. Compound Boy- 



4 i2 BOYCOTTS 

cott to Punish Tax Collector. Illegal. Merchants agreed to 
boycott any commercial traveler who stopped at pl.'s hotel 
for the purpose of punishing pi. for his conduct as tax as- 
sessor. Held, boycott was without justification and illegal. 

Schneider v. Local Union No. 60 (1906). For Injunction 
and Damage. Boycott Own Member. Illegal. Member of 
a labor union, acting in a public capacity as member of the 
Board of Examiners of Plumbers, refused to appoint a fellow 
member recommended by the union as an inspector. He was 
fined and boycotted. Held that he was entitled to relief by 
injunction and to reinstatement in his union without paying 
his fine; that he also should have damages, inasmuch as the 
conduct of the pi. did not justify the injury committed. 

Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co. (1908). Civil Action. 
Compound Trade Boycott Involving Patronage. Legal. 
Lumber owner threatened to discharge employees who pur- 
chased supplies from def.'s store. Court, in holding this action 
legal, distinguished this from Webb v. Drake, on the ground 
that here employer acted singly; distinguished from Graham 
v. St. Charles Street Railway on ground that employer was 
not acting maliciously, but had a legitimate interest to uphold, 
and that men threatened were his own employees — factors not 
present in former case. 

Mississippi 

Boycotts, accompanied by intimidation, are illegal by statute 
(word "boycott" not mentioned). While there has been no 
decision by the highest court on boycotts in labor disputes, 
the principle has been laid down that a boycott is illegal when 
third parties are coerced to withdraw patronage on pain of 
injury, when the coercion is accompanied by malicious mo- 
tives. It seems likely that a boycott in a labor dispute would 
be considered actionable. 

Statutes: Code, 1906, Sec. 1084. Act entitled "Con- 
spiracy against Workingmen." Illegal for combination to 
prevent another from exercising lawful trade, or doing any 



APPENDIX 413 

other lawful act, by force, threats or intimidation. Punish- 
ment, $25 or more, or 1 to 6 mos., or both. Sec. 1146, en- 
titled "Enticing Laborers," declares illegal wilful interference 
with contract relations between laborer and employer. Pun- 
ishment, $25 to $100. 

Wesley v. Native Lumber Co. (1910). Civil Action. 
Compound Trade Boycott. (Coercing Employees.) Illegal. 
Employer ordered employees not to patronize pl.'s store on 
pain of being discharged. Held that it is illegal to influence 
others to refuse to patronize a third party for the purpose of 
injuring his business; that act, and the accompanying mali- 
cious motive^ make the act illegal. 

North Carolina 

There is no statute on the subject. The court has held 
that concerted coercion of third parties through fear of loss 
of employees does not constitute a criminal conspiracy when 
the means used is the publication of an unfair list. 

Statutes: Laws, 1905, Sec. 3365, entitled "Interference 
with Employment." Illegal to entice away servants under 
contract. Max. punishment $100, or 6 mos. 

State v, Van Pelt (1904). Criminal Conspiracy. Unfair 
List. (Connected with Secondary Boycott Involving Work- 
men.) Legal. Carpenters and joiners notified employer that 
he would not be considered in sympathy with organized 
labor unless he employed only union men, and discharged his 
non-union men, some of whom were under contract relations 
with him, and, on his refusal to accede to their demands, 
published a resolution in a newspaper that the employer was 
unfair, and that henceforth union men would refuse to work 
on material from his shop. Held that defs. had a right to 
publish a statement setting forth that they had done or in- 
tended to do acts which they had a legal right to do. Judges 
implied that an unfair list is not a bo}TOtt. They compared 
these actions of unionists with those of farmers, tradesmen, 
reformers, etc. 



4H BOYCOTTS 

Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co. (1904). Civil Action. Ele- 
ment of Blacklist. Illegal. Def. company caused discharge 
of pi., who was employed in the Gibson Man. Co. Held that 
one causing the discharge of another wilfully and maliciously 
was liable in damages to the injured party. 



Oklahoma 

Interfering with workmen by intimidation is declared by 
statute illegal. No cases have been decided by highest court. 
In one of the lower courts a case where boycott has been 
declared legal has been cited. 

Statutes: St. of 1903, par. 2544, entitled "Intimidating 
Workingmen." Misdemeanor, interfering with emplo)'ment 
of workman by force, threats, etc. Par. 2545, "Intimidating 
Employees." Act makes misdemeanor the preventing employer 
from hiring, or compelling employer to hire, another by force, 
etc., or the forcing or inducing of another to alter his mode of 
carrying on business. 

Oklahoma Electric Planing Mill v. Chickasha Trades 
Council (1909). Secondary or Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. Legal. Union fined teamsters who patronized 
pi. Court held legal. Case reported in Am. Fed. Citation 
not given. 

South Carolina 

No statute applying directly to boycotts in labor disputes. 
There is no court decision on boycotts by the highest court. 
Employers' boycott — the blacklist — when accompanied by mal- 
ice, is held actionable. 

Statutes: Code, 1902, entitled "Enticing Employees." 
Makes illegal persuading employees under contract to leave 
service. Laws, 1902, No. 574, Sec. 5. A combination to 
boycott any person for dealing with one not a member of the 
combination is illegal. Applies to trade boycott only. 

Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills (1910). Civil Action. 



APPENDIX 415 

Blacklist. Illegal. Following a strike in Granby Cotton 
Mills, the owner sent a list of names of strikers to other own- 
ers, including thereon the name of the pi., who chanced not 
to be a striker. As a result, pi. was unable to obtain employ- 
ment. Held blacklisting actionable in damages, and the keep- 
ing of name of pi. on list after knowledge of injury and of 
his not being a striker indicated malice. 

Tennessee 

No statutes directly bearing on boycotts. An employer's 
boycott accompanied by threat of injury to third party is 
legal, according to the court. Malice is not material. No 
case of boycott in labor dispute has been decided by highest 
court. It is possible that, following the principles laid down 
in other cases, such a boycott would be regarded as legal, 
unless the court took the view that boycotters had no legiti- 
mate interest to uphold. 

Statutes: Code and Supplement, 1896 and 1904, Sec. 4337, 
entitled "Enticing of Employees." Act makes illegal enticing 
of employees under contract. Liable for damages sustained 
by employer. 

Payne v. Western and Atlantic Ry. Co. (1884). Com- 
pound Trade Boycott. (Coercing Employee.) Legal. Rail- 
road official announced that any one on Chattanooga payroll 
dealing with pi. would be discharged. Held, legal ; that em- 
ployer had right to discharge employee for any reason; that 
threats to do a legal act were not illegal, and that the exis- 
tence of malice did not render the act illegal. 

Texas 

Statute prohibits boycotting when done by two or more, 
and also interference with employment. 

Practically all of the boycotts decided have been trade boy- 
cotts. In these cases it was declared that the boycotter could 
persuade or threaten a third party with loss of employment, 
etc., provided he had a legitimate interest to protect. The 



416 BOYCOTTS 

inducing or threatening of a third party, if done maliciously, 
and not for the protection of some legitimate interest, was 
pronounced illegal. Primary boycotts, by dicta, were declared 
legal. False statements, issued in pursuance of the boycott, 
constituted illegal means. A blacklist, where no wilful bad 
faith was evidenced nor intentionally false statements made, was 
declared legal. In deciding whether or not a boycott in labor 
disputes would be legal, the main consideration would un- 
doubtedly be the question of legitimate interest and lack of 
malice. If the court followed the trend of opinion in other 
states, malice would probably be read into the act. 

Statutes: Acts of 1903, Chap. 94, Sec. 3, entitled "Boy- 
cotting." Act prohibits agreement of two or more persons 
to boycott or threaten to refuse to buy from or sell to any 
other person, etc. Such agreement shall be void; its violation 
shall render the association liable for a fine of $50 a day, and 
may be punishable by imprisonment of from one to ten years. 
Rev. St. 1895, Art. 309, entitled "Interference with Employ- 
ment." Act makes illegal an assembly whose purpose it is 
to interfere in any manner with employment of another. Max. 
punishment, $500. Art. 324, Act makes illegal engaging in 
a riot for the purpose of interfering in any manner with em- 
ployment of another. Punishment, 6 mos. to 1 yr. Art. 600, 
Act makes illegal, interference by any person with employment 
of another by means of threatening words, acts of violence 
and intimidation. Punishment $25 to $500, or 1 to 6 mos. 

Delz v. Winfree (1891). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. 
Illegal. Def. refused to sell pi. beeves, and induced at least 
three other persons to so refuse. Held that inducing of 
others to refuse to sell, without serving any purpose of one's 
own, but maliciously, is illegal; that a primary boycott, a 
refusal to have relations with another for any reason, is legal; 
that the inducement of others to refuse dealings, if such re- 
fusal serves some legitimate right, and violates no right of 
another, is legal, and that the mere fact of combination does not 
make legal act illegal. 

Intern., etc., Railroad v. Greenwood (1893). (Tex. Civ. 



APPENDIX 417 

App.) Trade Boycott. Illegal. Def. railroad company en- 
deavored to induce employees to withdraw their patronage 
from pi. through threats of discharge. PL owned hotel fre- 
quented by railroad men, and def. declared that he feared 
litigation if patronage continued. Action held illegal; that, 
while defs. could make any condition of employment they 
desired with those entering employment, they could discharge 
employees only for reasonable causes, and must give evidence 
showing necessity for instructions before acts could be con- 
sidered legal. 

Olive v. Van Patten (1894). (Tex. Civ. App.) Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. Defs., the Lumber Dealers' Ass'n of 
Texas, issued circulars, asking others not to deal with pi. 
until he agreed to join the association. PL's profit of $100,000 
a year was greatly reduced. Held that such an attempt to 
ruin pi. as competitor could not be deemed a legitimate pur- 
pose, although defs. might be benefited thereby; that motive 
here was malicious. 

Robison v. Texas Pine Land Co. (1897). (Tex. Civ. 
App.) Civil Action. Trade Boycott. Coercing Employees. 
Legal. Def., with log mills at Beaumont, threatened to dis- 
charge those employees dealing with pi., and stated that he 
would not pay the checks passing through pl.'s hands. Def. 
was selling same kind of goods as was pi. Held, that no 
action would lie; that if def. had no property interest of his 
own in so doing, but had acted wantonly in causing loss, the 
rule would be different; that injury to business here is the 
natural result of successful competition. 

Brown v. Am. Freehold Land Mtg. Co. (1904). Civil 
Action. Trade Boycott. (False Statements.) Illegal. Def. 
was accused by pi. of ruining his business as a loan agent 
through issuing false statements to a bank, and thus making 
him unable to obtain loans. Court held pi. stated a good 
cause of action not because of bad motive, but of false state- 
ments, etc., but that a combination to destroy the business 
of another would not be illegal where the end was sought 
by no unlawful means, nor was it rendered actionable by 



4i 8 BOYCOTTS 

malice or wrongful motives, where the means used were 
lawful. 

Wills v. Central Ice Co. (1905). (Tex. Civ. App.) 
Trade Boycott. Legal. Def. companies refused to sell ice 
to the pi. on the ground that they had a five years' contract 
with Wakefield, who bought all ice. Court held that a con- 
spiracy cannot be made subject to a civil action unless some- 
thing is done which, without the conspiracy, would give a 
right of action. 

St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co. of Texas v. Hixon (1911). 
Blacklist. Legal. Employee of railroad, a brakeman, was 
discharged for refusing to act as brakeman on train on which 
air brakes were out of order. The company, in furnishing 
information to other railroad companies as to the reason for 
his discharge, stated that he was discharged for insubordina- 
tion. Chap. 67 of the laws of 1907 declares that an employer 
must furnish a true statement of his discharge to any one so 
requiring. Court reversed judgment of the Ct. of App., de- 
claring that as the reason given here from the standpoint of 
the company was wholly true, and as there was no claim of 
wilful bad faith, no action would lie. 

Virginia 

Summary. No statute on subject. Court has declared boy- 
cott, involving coercion of workers and customers through 
fear of injury, a criminal conspiracy. 

Crump v. Commonwealth (1888). Criminal Conspiracy. 
Compound Boycott Involving Patronage and Workmen. Il- 
legal. Def. was an officer of the Typographical Union of 
Richmond, on strike for a closed shop against Baughman 
Brothers, printers. He, with other members of the union, 
threatened to break up business of patrons of Baughman; 
published their names on a "Blacklist" in Labor World; boy- 
cotted those boarding employees of Baughman, issued circulars 
denouncing customers, and caused a loss to complainant of 
$10,000 net profit. Held that the conspiracy was illegal, as 



APPENDIX 419 

a wanton interference with the business of another in his 
relations with his employees. 

West Virginia 

Statute here prevents unlawful interference with employ- 
ment of miners. There have been no decisions on boycotts 
in labor disputes by highest court. Trade boycotts, in pur- 
suance of the right of competition, are, however, held legal, 
where illegal means are not used. 

Statutes: Labor Laws, 1907, Chap. 78, Sec. 19, entitled 
"Interfering with Employment." Act makes illegal the inter- 
fering with employment of miners by force, threats, menaces 
or intimidation. 

West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co. 
(1901). Civil Action. Trade Boycott. Legal. PL was in 
business of transporting petroleum oils by pipe lines and tank 
cars, and storing oil. Def. company endeavored to divert 
customers from pi. in order to secure trade for itself. Held 
that such inducement was legal in the race for competition, 
there being no breaking of a contract, and that the existence 
of malice was immaterial; that, however, where the injury 
was not done under the right of competition, but maliciously, 
with intent to injure, loss ensuing, the injury would be action- 
able. No mention was made, in the charge, of names of cus- 
tomers who had been coerced. 



WESTERN STATES 

No decisions on boycotts in labor disputes have been made 
in the highest courts in Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, New Mex- 
ico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah or Wyoming. 

In California and Montana secondary and some forms of 
the compound boycotts have been pronounced legal, and the 
publication of the unfair list and other circulars will not be 
enjoined. This is true even though third parties understand 
as a result of the circular that their continued patronage with 



4 20 BOYCOTTS 

the boycotted firm will cause them loss of business. In 
California actual annoyance in the vicinity of the business of 
the boycotted firm, however, is not permitted. In Oregon an 
injunction will not issue, even though threats of loss of cus- 
tom are made, unless absolute proof of irreparable injury can 
be submitted. In Washington the boycotters can be enjoined 
from maliciously inducing customers to cease dealing with 
a firm, and from persuading or coercing the public from 
purchasing, if, in so doing, the boycotters gather around the 
place of business. 

Arizona 

No statute and decisions noted. 



California 

Boycotts, unattended by force, are declared legal by statutes. 
The courts have held that it is legal to declare and give 
publicity to a boycott against an employer; to inform cus- 
tomers of its existence; to request that they cease patronizing 
the boycotted concern; to threaten a like boycott against those 
who refuse; to threaten a loss of the working force to those 
continuing to purchase, and to use other moral suasion. 

It is illegal, on the other hand, as a result of the court's 
decisions, for the boycotters, in the vicinity of the boycotted 
establishments, to annoy and intimidate the boycotted firm in 
its business, or its customers or workmen. Injunctions will 
issue in these cases. Where boycotters are accused of violence, 
acts must definitely be specified. Libel will not be enjoined. 
This is one of the most liberal of states. 

Statutes: Penal Code Appendix, 1906, Sec. 1, entitled 
"Labor Agreements, Not Conspiracy." Act provides that no 
agreement between two or more persons in furtherance of 
any trade dispute between employer and employee shall be 
deemed criminal, if such act, committed by one person, would 
not be punishable as a crime, nor shall such agreement be 
considered in restraint of trade, nor shall any injunction order 






APPENDIX 421 

be issued. Force, violence or threats, however, are prohibited. 

Daily v. Superior Court (1896). For Injunction. Publi- 
cation of Libel. (Not connected with labor dispute.) Not 
Enjoinable. Def. was planning to present facts of a criminal 
suit on the stage, and pi. endeavored to prevent this by in- 
junction. Held that right of a citizen to speak and write 
freely is unlimited, and that to restrain him from exercising 
this right would be to violate the provisions of the constitution. 

Davitt v. American Bakers' Union (1899). For Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. Also Libel- 
ous Circulars. Legal — under particular facts in case. Com- 
plaint charged in a general way that defs. attempted, by force, 
menace and threats, to intimidate workmen, and that they 
maliciously published false circulars, etc. Held that injunc- 
tion would not be granted, and that the charge was too broad. 

Jordahl v. Hayda (1905). (Cal. App.) For Injunction. 
Compound Boycott Involving Patronage and Workmen. Il- 
legal. Members of Cooks' and Waiters' Alliance, Local 220, 
of Eureka, struck because employer failed to obtain union 
card. They congregated about the restaurant, distributed cir- 
culars, displayed "boycott" signs, and sought to keep cus- 
tomers and employees away from the place. The court issued 
an injunction forbidding any acts in the immediate vicinity of 
the pl.'s restaurant tending to hinder, impede or obstruct pi. 
in the transaction of his business, and from hindering, intimi- 
dating or annoying customers going to or coming from the 
restaurant, and from annoying or intimidating workmen. In 
upholding this injunction, the Ct. of App. declared that the 
right of free speech and press is no more important than the 
right of "acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and 
possessing and obtaining safety and happiness," guaranteed by 
the Constitution (Sec. 1, Art. 1), and that an unwarrantable 
interference with pl.'s business, and intimidation of the pi., 
will be prohibited. 

Goldberg, Bowen and Co. v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 
8760 (1906). For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involv- 
ing Patronage and Workmen. Illegal. Defs. in San Fran- 



422 BOYCOTTS 

cisco struck, on account of a reduction in wages, against pis., 
who conducted three grocery and general household goods 
stores. They stationed pickets in front of stores bearing 
placards on which were written, "Unfair Firm; Reduced 
Wages 50 Cents a Day. Please Do Not Patronize." They 
were charged with intimidating customers and employees. The 
Sup. Ct. approved a modified injunction forbidding the har- 
assing, interference with or obstruction of pis. in the conduct 
of their business, the threatening or intimidation of customers, 
and the carrying of placards with words similar to those 
indicated, if these acts were committed in front of or in the 
vicinity of the pis.' stores. It held, however, the injunction 
of the lower court too sweeping, which enjoined defs. from 
the mere expression of opinion, at any time or place, regarding 
pis.' business, but added that, if the section in the penal code 
forbade the court from enjoining such wrongful acts as were 
committed by defs., such section, to that extent, would be 
unconstitutional, because it violated pis.' constitutional right 
to acquire, possess and enjoy protection and property. 

J. F. Parkinson & Co. v. Building Trades' Council of 
Santa Clara Co. et al. (1908). For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Patronage. (Circulars.) Legal. Defs. 
struck against proprietor of a lumber yard, plumbing and 
tinning shop, because of his employment of a non-union man, 
and sent circulars to pl.'s customers, stating that his shop 
was unfair, and that union men would not work for any con- 
tractors purchasing supplies from him. A number of cus- 
tomers ceased dealings, some canceling unfilled orders. Chief 
Justice Beatty held that an injunction should not be granted; 
that the purpose of the strike, to secure the employment only 
of union men, was lawful; as was also the ruling of the 
council that no union man should handle non-union goods; 
that fair dealing required that contractors be informed of the 
status of the pi., and that, therefore, the sending of notice 
was justifiable. Even if this act was without justification 
and malicious, there was no evidence that future notices were 
to be sent, he averred, and that in thir case both purpose and 



APPENDIX 



423 



means were lawful. Judge Sloss declared that defs. had the 
right to cease to deal with one pursuing a course detrimental 
to them, and with one aiding by their patronage the offender's 
detrimental policies; that defs. had a legal right to refuse to 
enter into business relations with others, and that threats to 
exercise their legal right would not be considered unlawful; 
furthermore, that motive does not make a legal act illegal. 

Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local 8760 et ah (1909). 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. 
Legal. Strike in attempt to unionize shop, against pi., who 
kept livery stable in San Francisco. Defs. instituted a boy- 
cott, threatening customers with loss of business if they con- 
tinued to patronize pis. They also established a picket, and 
used menacing language. An injunction was issued. The 
court, in modifying it, stated that the strikers had the right 
by all legitimate means — by fair publication, and fair oral or 
written persuasion — to induce others interested in, or sym- 
pathetic with, their cause to withdraw their social inter- 
course and business patronage from the employer ... to 
request another that he withdraw his patronage, and to use 
moral intimidation and coercion by threatening a like boycott 
against him if he refused so to do. He also contended that 
unionists on strike occupy no contractual relation to their 
former employer, and can employ no means not equally open 
to any other individual. 

Colorado 

Statute makes boycott illegal. No decision in the highest 
court. An early case before 1896 in a lower court has been 
cited as legal. A trade boycott has been pronounced legal, 
in which no coercion was used. 

Statutes: Acts of 1905, Chap. 79, Sec. 2, entitled "Boy- 
cotting." Act declares unlawful the printing or circulating of 
any notice of boycott. Sec. 1, entitled "Picketing Unlawful," 
Act makes illegal loitering around the streets for the purpose of 



424 BOYCOTTS 

influencing others not to trade with or work for any indi- 
vidual. Punishment, $10 to $250, or 60 days, or both. 

DePear v. The Cooks' Union. For Injunction. Secondary 
or Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Union carried 
placards in a parade around the city calling attention to the 
fact that pi. was an enemy of organized labor. Injunction 
was refused. 

Master Builders' Assoc, v. Domascio (1901). (Col. App.) 
Civil Action and for Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. 
Builders' Ass'n of Denver notified architect that, if he re- 
ceived bid from pi., Association would refuse to bid. Court 
held legal, since no coercion or intimidation was suggested, 
and the architects were at liberty to receive bids of others who 
had not signed the notification. 

Idaho 

Statute: No court decisions. Penal Code, 1901, Sec. 4687, 
entitled "Conspiracy — Intimidation of Miners." Makes mis- 
demeanor the association of persons to interfere, by force, etc., 
with miner at work in mine. (Application to boycotts ex- 
tremely doubtful.) 

Montana 

No statute. Legal to issue a circular calling on others to 
cease to patronize third party, even though it is understood by 
such publication that the boycotters will cease to patronize 
those not withdrawing their custom from the boycotted firm. 
Doctrine of malice or of combination not accepted. 

Lindsay and Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor et al. 
(1908). For Injunction. Secondary or Compound Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Legal. In October, 1907, Lindsay & 
Trades' Assembly of Helena, which action had been indorsed 
by the Montana Fed. of Labor. Circulars announcing that 
fact had been sent to the various labor organizations in the 
state, and, on Oct. 25, the Yellowstone Trades' and Labor 
Assembly declared Lindsay unfair, following action of the 



APPENDIX 425 

Helena body, and referred the matter to a grievance com- 
mittee. The following circular was thereafter issued by the 
union, and circulated among the public and business houses 
of Billings: 

"All laboring men, and those in sympathy with organized 
labor are requested not to patronize Lindsay and Co., who 
are engaged in the wholesale fruit business, also distributors 
of cigars and vegetables of all kinds in Billings and vicinity, 
as they are unfair. We urge the retail merchants, laboring 
men and all who are in sympathy with organized labor to 
place themselves in position to patronize friendly wholesalers. 
We further desire to call attention to the fact that Lindsay 
and Co. are operating peddling wagons throughout the city, 
and we ask the people to guard against patronizing these 
wagons. We ask this for your own protection) and for the 
protection of organized labor." 

Circulars were distributed broadcast throughout the city, 
and, as a result, the business of the company at Billings was 
practically paralyzed, and great financial loss followed. A 
sweeping injunction was issued by lower courts. This was 
dissolved by the Sup. Ct. In giving their decision the court 
declared that, judging from the facts in the case, it might 
fairly "be said to have been shown by the evidence that, upon 
the adoption of the resolution of October 25th, and, upon the 
intelligence of that action becoming general among union men 
there, it was understood among those men that they would 
not patronize Lindsay and Co. while the interdict was in 
force, and would not patronize any one who did patronize 
that company, and that they expected that all retailers and 
others in sympathy with their organizations would cease trad- 
ing with the pi. company." Held that these acts constituted 
a boycott. However, Judge Holloway averred there was no 
unlawful act in withdrawing patronage from the company; 
that patronage depends on good will; that, as it was not 
unlawful for an individual to withdraw his patronage from 
Lindsay and Co., or from any other concern which might be 
doing business with that company, for any reason, it was not 



426 BOYCOTTS 

for a combination; that the defendants cannot, therefore, be 
enjoined from boycotting, unless they use unlawful means; 
that the only means here used was the publication of the cir- 
cular, and that a court of equity might not enjoin the publi- 
cation of a circular of this character. If such publication 
was libelous, it could be reached only by civil or criminal 
process. 

Nevada 

Statute provides against combination for the injury of trade 
or commerce, but allows peaceful assembly for the purpose 
of raising wages. The one boycott case decided related to 
the I. W. W. organization. The court declared that boycotts, 
where attended by threats, intimidation and violence, were ac- 
tionable in damages, and that union members could be held. 

Statute: Compiled Laws, 1899, entitled 'Tabor Agree- 
ments Not Conspiracies." Act makes illegal conspiracy of two 
or more to commit acts injurious to trade or commerce, but 
provides that act shall not prohibit peaceable and orderly 
assembling for the purpose of securing an advance in the rate 
of wages or the maintenance of same. Max. punishment, 6 
mos., or $1,000. 

Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World (1908). 
Civil Action. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. For 
facts, see supra, Ch. VII. Illegal. Courts held defs. guilty on 
ground that some of threats were attended with violence and in- 
timidation, and that acts were not covered by Sec. 4751, inas- 
much as they were not done in pursuance of desire to raise 
wages, nor were they peaceful. 

New Mexico 
No statute or legal decisions noted. 

North Dakota 

No decisions noted in highest courts. 

Statutes: Constitution. Sec. 23, entitled "Interfering with 



APPENDIX 427 

Employment." Illegal maliciously to interfere with employ- 
ment of any citizen. Rev, Code, 1905, Sec. 8768, Art. 5, 
entitled "Conspiracy against Workingmen — Conspiring to In- 
terfere with Trade, etc." Illegal to combine to interfere with 
one in his lawful trade or calling, or doing any other lawful 
act, by force, etc., or to interfere with tools or property. 
(Probably confined to workmen.) Sees. 9434 and 9435, en- 
titled "Intimidation of Employers and Employees." Acts 
make it a misdemeanor to interfere with employees in their 
employment or with employers in the conduct of their business, 
by threats, force, intimidation, etc. 



Oregon 

Boycotts accompanied by intimidation, etc., illegal. (Word 
"boycott" not used.) Court has held that mere threats of 
boycotters to cease to patronize third party, or publication of 
boycott notices, will not call forth an injunction unless there 
is a likelihood of a great and lasting injury by an illegal act, 
but that such acts may be reached by civil or criminal processes. 
A trade boycott, where intimidation of third parties — em- 
ployees — was purely moral, and where there was no element 
of monopoly, was declared legal. 

Statutes: Ann. Code and St. 1902, Sec. 197 1, entitled 
"Intimidation, etc., of Employers and Employees." Misde- 
meanor, any interference with employees in continuing or per- 
forming work, through force, threats, or intimidation, and the 
circulation of any false written or printed matter for purpose 
of securing employment or discharge of any one or the alter- 
ing of a person's mode of carrying on his business. Punish- 
ment, 1 to 6 mos., or $10 to $200. 

Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell (1894). F° r Injunc- 
tion. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. (Also Polit- 
ical Boycott.) Injunction Refused. Def., president of the 
Multnomah Typog. Union, ordered dismissal of messenger 
boy. Demand refused, def. called men out; union published 
in Oregonian a request that it be borne in mind that the pi. 



428 BOYCOTTS 

company was a non-union office; its delegates visited patrons 
and threatened to cease dealings if they did not withdraw; 
they posted notices of the boycott, and threatened members of 
the city council with their displeasure at the polls if they 
gave the city printing to the pi., who was the lowest bidder. 
Two customers were shown to have withdrawn during several 
months. Held that these acts did not show likelihood of 
irreparable injury; that the court will not issue an injunction 
until it is satisfied that the case before it is a right about 
to be destroyed, or that a great and lasting injury is about 
to be done by an illegal act, and that the acts here were not 
so direct or positive, nor so persistently and wickedly repeated 
and maintained when taken in connection with accompanying 
incidents, as to warrant an injunction. It inferred, however, 
that a civil or criminal action could be brought. 

Union Labor Hospital Ass'n v. Vance Redwood Lumber 
Co. (191 1 ). Trade Boycott. Legal. Defs., employers of 
labor, as a result of agreement on a certain form of hospital 
relief, gave their employees tickets which would admit them 
to 4 hospitals of the city, excluding pl.'s. Held that no mali- 
cious intent to injure the pl.'s business was shown, and that, 
even if such malice existed, defs. exercised a legal right, and 
motive under these conditions was immaterial; that intimida- 
tion of employees was purely moral, and not illegal, and that 
no element of monopoly entered into case. 

South Dakota 

Statutes: No decision in highest court noted. Rev. Code, 
1903, Sec. 757 and 758, entitled "Intimidation of Employers 
and Employees." Act makes it a misdemeanor to interfere by 
force, etc., with workers in their employment, and employers 
in the conduct of their business. 

Utah 
No decisions. 
Statutes and Constitution: Constitution, Art. 12, Sec. 19, 



APPENDIX 429 

entitled "Interference with Employment." The malicious in- 
terference by any person with the employment of any worker 
is declared a crime. Compiled laws, 1907, Sec. 1347 x, en- 
titled "Interference with Employment." Act makes misde- 
meanor interference with employment of one engaged in labor. 
Sec. 4487 x 11, entitled "Interference with Employment — 
Intimidation." Act makes misdemeanor, threatening to de- 
stroy property, or to do bodily harm in order to prevent per- 
son from entering employment, etc. 

Washington 

Coercion of workingmen is forbidden by statutes. Courts 
have enjoined boycotts, in the course of which customers are 
induced maliciously to cease trading, and the public at large is 
persuaded by the boycotters, gathered around the establish- 
ment, not to patronize the concern. An employer's boycott is 
subject to civil action when he coerces another to discharge a 
workman. 

Statutes: Acts of 1909, Chap. 249, Sec. 130, entitled 
"Conspiracy against Workingmen." Act declares illegal a 
conspiracy of two or more to prevent another from exercising 
any lawful calling or doing any other lawful act, by force, 
threats, or intimidation, or from interfering with his tools. 
No overt act need be proved. Chap. 249, Sec. 362, entitled 
"Coercion of Workmen," etc., makes illegal attempt to in- 
timidate a person by force or threats, or to deprive him of 
his tools in order to induce him to do or abstain from doing 
a lawful act. Code 1902, Sec. 6518, prohibits intimidation 
in case of coal mines. (Application Doubtful.) 

Jensen v. Waiters' Union (1905). For Injunction. Sec- 
ondary or Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. 
Waiters struck against proprietor of the Hotel Bismarck, 
Seattle, whose restaurant had a capacity of 550, and a daily 
patronage of 2,500 to 3,000 a day, on account of the employ- 
ment of non-union waiters. Strikers congregated around the 
restaurant at noon, and attempted to persuade customers not 



430 BOYCOTTS 

to enter, and by this means reduced the dally receipts $100 
to $150 a day. Held that persons having no legitimate inter- 
est to protect could not ruin the business of another by mali- 
ciously inducing patrons and other persons not to deal with 
him, and by congregating about his place and there, by per- 
suasion or force, preventing the public at large from entering 
his place of business. Defs., however, have the right to strike 
at any time, and to state publicly their grievances. 

Jones v. Leslie (1910). Civil Action. Emploj^er's Boy- 
cott. Illegal. Def., for whom pi. formerly worked in Seattle 
as teamster, notified his patron that if he allowed his teamster, 
for whom pi. was then employed, to continue pl.'s emplc^ment, 
he, the def., would withdraw his patronage. Held that this 
action interfered with the right of employment, which was the 
laboring man's property, and was actionable. 

Wyoming 
No statutes or legal decisions noted. 



FEDERAL CASES 

The federal courts have almost unanimously decided that 
secondary and compound boycotts in labor disputes are illegal. 
Judge Caldwell's dissenting opinion in the Oxley Stave Case 
of 1897 well-nigh stands by itself in its liberal character. One 
court has, however, affirmed the right of employees to strike 
or threaten to strike if their employer continued to work on 
material supplied by another firm against which a strike was 
being waged. 

Most of the cases in the eighties and nineties, decided by 
the federal courts, dealt with boycotts on the transportation 
system. A number in recent years have involved workers in 
the building trades. 

While boycotts have thus been considered illegal, labor men 
claim that blacklists have virtually been legalized by the de- 
cision in the Adair Case, in which that portion of the Erdman 



APPENDIX 431 

law preventing employers from discharging employees, on ac- 
count of their membership in labor unions, was declared un- 
constitutional. Some forms of trade boycotts were also de- 
clared legal. 

Among the U. S. Statutes brought to bear against boycot- 
ting have been the Sherman Anti-Trust Law, the Interstate 
Commerce Law and the statute against conspiracy. The laws 
relating to the interference with the U. S. mails have also 
been brought into play. 

For Federal Statutes on subject, see Chapter XL 

U. S. v. Kane (1885). U. S. Circ. Ct., D. of C. For 
Contempt. For Injunction. Intimidation of Workmen (On 
Roads of Receiver). Illegal. Def. was cited for contempt 
for interfering with railroads in the hands of the receiver. 
Employees can persuade others to leave employment, but if 
they resort to intimidation and violence, and thus prevent 
receiver from operating his road, they may be found guilty of 
contempt of court. 

In re Wabash (1885) and In re Higgins, 1886, similar to 
above. 

Francis v. Flinn (1886). (U. S. Sup. Ct.) For Injunc- 
tion. Trade Boycott. (Libelous Circulars.) Not Enjoin- 
able. Owner of a pilot boat in Mississippi charged that defs. 
endeavored to destroy his business by publications in the news- 
papers, suits and injunctions. Held that if the pi. was 
wrongly interfered with he could secure his redress at law, 
and, if publications were false, could prosecute for libel; that, 
if the court could interfere by means of an injunction in such 
cases, it would draw to itself the greater part of the litigation 
properly belonging to courts of law. 

Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna (1887). (U. 
S. Circ. Ct., S. D., N. Y.) Civil Action. Compound Boy- 
cott Involving Patronage and Workmen. Defs., members of 
Longshoremen's Union, were accused of procuring workers to 
leave their employment in a body in order to compel an 
increase of wages given to Southern negroes and also of de- 
terring merchants, through threats, from shipping over the boy- 



432 BOYCOTTS 

cotted lines. An action was brought to recover $20,000 al- 
leged damages. Held a misdemeanor, at common law as well 
as by Sec. 168 of Penal Code of N. Y., to combine to interfere 
by threats with freedom of employers to control their business. 

Emack v. Kane (1888). (U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., 111.) 
For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Illegal. Defs. were 
charged with threatening to sue for infringement those per- 
sons dealing with pl.'s patented article. Held that, where 
these charges of infringement of patents were not made in 
good faith, but with intent to injure pl.'s business by intimi- 
dating customers, court of equity had jurisdiction. If slander 
or libel were purely personal, however, redress might properly 
be left to the courts of law, inasmuch as no falsehood could 
wholly destroy a man's reputation with those who knew him. 

Callan v. Wilson (1888). (U. S. Sup. Ct.) Criminal 
Conspiracy. Compound Labor Boycott. Defs. Entitled to 
Trial by Jury. Musicians were accused of refusing to work 
for complainant, of persuading others to refuse to work, and 
of threatening firms with the withdrawal of patronage if they 
continued to employ musicians not members of the Knights 
of Labor Council. They were charged with conspiring to 
prevent another from pursuing his calling anywhere in the 
United States, and with boycotting, injuring, molesting, op- 
pressing, intimidating and reducing him to want and beggary. 
Defs. had been convicted by a police court. The Supreme 
Court decided police court was without constructive power to 
try, convict and sentence, and that defs. were entitled to trial 
by jury in a conspiracy case. 

Casey v. Cincinnati Typog. Union No. 3 (1891). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct., S. D., Ohio.) For Injunction. Compound Boy- 
cott Involving Patronage. (Circulars.) Illegal. Primary 
Boycott Legal. Defs. struck against the Commonwealth, 
newspaper of Covington, Ky., for refusal to unionize shop, 
and issued handbills and circulars to advertisers declaring that 
the failure on their part to withdraw their advertising would 
mean the loss of the support of organized labor. They urged 
newsdealers to cease to handle pl.'s paper, and organized labor 



APPENDIX 433 

to cease to patronize advertisers. Two firms were induced 
to withdraw advertising, the loss being estimated at $150 a 
month. Defs. denied having visited pl.'s customers. Held 
that equity will enjoin publications in pursuance of a boycott, 
and that the acts of the def. were coercive in their nature 
and in restraint of trade. They declared, however, that the 
unions had the right to say that their members would not 
patronize complainant. 

Coeur d'Alene Consolidated and Mining Co. v. Miners' 
Union of Wardner (1892). (U. S. Circ. Ct., D., Ida.) 
For Injunction. (Chiefly strike and picketing.) 

U. S. v. Patterson (1893). (U. S. Circ. Ct., D., Mass.) 
(Sherman Anti-Trust Law.) Compound Trade Boycott. 
Not Prohibited by Law. Def. was indicted for violating the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Law by threatening prospective custom- 
ers with actions for infringements of patents, by harassing and 
intimidating purchasers, inducing them to break contracts, 
etc. Held that this statute only makes illegal conspiracy to 
restrain trade by engrossing, monopolizing, or grasping the 
market; that the statute must be interpreted as a whole; that 
the second section is limited by its terms to monopoly, and 
evidently has as its basis the engrossing and control of the 
market; that the first section is evidently in pari materia, and 
so has the same basis, and that it is not sufficient, therefore, 
simply to allege a purpose to drive certain competitors out of 
the field by violence, intimidation, or otherwise. 

"If the intention of the statute was that claimed by the 
United States, I think that the nature of the phraseology 
would have been 'to injure trade, to restrain trade,' declared 
the judge. We are now at the point where the paths sep- 
arate. ... If the proposition made by the United States is 
taken with its full force, the inevitable result will be that the 
federal courts will be compelled to apply this statute to all 
attempts to restrain commerce among the states, or commerce 
with foreign nations by strikes or boycotts, and by every 
method of interference by way of violence and intimidation. 
It is not to be presumed that Congress intended thus to extend 
the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States without 



434 BOYCOTTS 

very clear language. Such language I do not find in the 
statute. Therefore I must conclude that there must be alleged 
in the indictment that there was a purpose to restrain trade 
as implied in the common law, expressing 'contract in restraint 
of trade' analogous to that of 'monopoly' in the second section." 

Toledo, Ann Arbor and No. Michigan Ry. Co. v. Penn- 
sylvania Co., Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Ry. (1893). 
(U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., Ohio.) For Contempt. Injunction. 
(Involving Inters. Com. Law.) Compound Boycott Involv- 
ing Patronage. Refusal to Receive Cars from or Deliver Cars 
to Boycotted Road. Illegal. Facts given in Chap. VI. En- 
gineer refused to move trains until permitted by union lead- 
ers. Held that, "if one quits in good faith, absolutely and 
unconditionally, under such circumstances as are now under 
consideration, he is exercising a perfect right which cannot be 
denied him. But so long as he continues in the service, so 
long the power of the court to compel him to discharge all 
the duties of his position is unquestioned and will be exer- 
cised." 

U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalg. Council (1893). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct., E. D., La.) For Injunction. (Involving Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law.) (First Application of Sherman Law to 
Labor Disputes.) Compound Boycott Involving Workmen. 
(Sympathetic Strike.) Illegal. In dispute between ware- 
housemen and draymen and their emploj-ees, arising from re- 
fusal to employ only union men, the Amalgamated Council 
threatened to withdraw men in the subordinate unions until 
differences were adjusted, and succeeded in doing this, and in 
stagnating the commerce of the section. Held that the il- 
legality consisted in the endeavor to prevent and the prevent- 
ing of everybody from moving the commerce of the country; 
that congress, in passing the Sherman Law, meant to deal 
with the whole evil of combination in its entirety. 

Toledo, Ann Arbor and No. Michigan R. R. v. Pennsyl- 
vania Co. et al. (1893). (U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., Ohio, 
Judge Taft.) For Injunction. Facts stated in Chapter VI. 

Judge Taft decided that the issuance of the boycott order 



APPENDIX 



435 



by Arthur was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act, 
which provides (Par. 2, Sec. 3) that each road shall give 
equal facilities to every other connecting road, and declared 
(Sec. 10, as amended) that any corporation or its agent who 
disobeys this provision, or who shall abet such disobedience, 
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and subject to a fine not 
exceeding $5,000. 

He asserted that a locomotive engineer was an agent within 
the meaning of the act, and was guilty of violating its pro- 
visions if he refused to handle freight, etc., with or without 
the orders of his principal. He averred that defs. were also 
guilty of a conspiracy to commit an offense against the U. S., 
and subject to the penalty of Sec. 5440, Rev. St. 

If Sec. 10 referred to managing agents, there would never- 
theless be a violation of the law, Judge Taft contended, for 
any one, though not an officer or agent, succoring and abetting 
or procuring such officer or agent to violate the section, would 
be punishable under it as principal, and Arthur and others, 
if succeeding in procuring managing officers to refuse to handle 
the cars, were guilty. And, if one is found guilty, all con- 
spiring with that one are also guilty. 

The judge further held that the inducing of another to do 
an unlawful act by threat of withholding labor was unlawful 
and subject to the injunction. 

Waterhouse v. Comer (1893). (U. S. Circ. Ct., W. D., 
Ga., S. D., Judge Emory Speer.) Compound Boycott In- 
volving Patronage. (Involving Interstate Commerce Law 
and Sherman Law.) Illegal. During a strike on the Savan- 
nah, Americus and Montgomery R. R., an engineer of the 
Georgia R. R., in the hands of a receiver, refused to transport 
cars of the Savannah railroad and was discharged. The Br. 
of Locomotive Engineers applied to have the former contract 
of employment, with certain modifications, remain in force. 
Held that such a contract could be made, but the boycotting 
section (Sec. 12) would not stand, as it violated the Anti- 
Trust, the I. C. Law and the statute against conspiracy which 



436 BOYCOTTS 

prevented the restraining of trade. The judge concluded his 
opinion with the following remarkable statement: 

"In the presence of these statutes which w T e have cited, and 
in view of the intimate interchange of commodities between 
peoples of several states of the union, it will be practically 
impossible hereafter for a body of men to combine to hinder or 
delay the work of transportation companies without becoming 
amenable to the provisions of these statutes." 

Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch Co. 
(1893). (U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D., N. Y., Judge Coxe.) 
Trade Boycott. (Involving Sherman Law.) Legal. Def. 
stated to patrons of pi. that he would not sell his watches 
to any who bought from pi. Held that it was not in violation 
of the Sherman law to combine to agree not to sell to dealer 
who agrees to purchase goods of another designated trader 
in the same business. 

Farmers' Loan, etc., Co. v. Northern Pacific R. R. Co. 
(1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D., Wis., Judge Jenkins.) 
For Injunction. Strike against Receiver's Railroad. Illegal. 

U. S. v. Agler (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct., Ind., Judge 
Baker.) For Contempt. Injunction. (Involving Sherman 
Law.) Injunction Binding against One Not Served. Def. 
was charged with contempt of court for disobeying an in- 
junction. Held that Sherman law conferred jurisdiction 
over the courts to restrain violation of acts, and that an 
injunction was binding as against one not served with a sub- 
poena or named when injunction was served on him as one 
of the unknown defs. named in bill. Here, however, charge 
lacked certainty, as it was not alleged that def. aided in 
A. R. U. strike. 

In Re Grand Jury (1894). (U. S. Dist. Ct., S. W., Cal., 
Judge Ross.) Criminal Conspiracy. (Interference with 
U. S. Mails.) Refusal of Railroads to Run Separate Cars 
not Illegal. In Pullman strike (see Chap. VI) court de- 
clared that the railroads were not obliged to leave off cars, 
if same would not be moved by employees, and run the rest. 



APPENDIX 437 

When the regular passenger trains are designated for carry- 
ing mail, the failure of the railroad to run others for that 
purpose is not a violation of the provision against the obstruc- 
tion and interruption of mails. 

In Re Grand Jury (1894). (Dist. Ct., N. D., 111., Gross- 
cup.) Criminal Conspiracy. Insurrection. (Involving In- 
terst. Com. Law and U. S. Mails.) Instructions concerning 
U. S. mail and interference with interstate commerce similar 
to other cases. Any demand that others quit service, unless 
those demanding are clothed with lawful authority, is illegal, 
if it constitutes an injury to the U. S. mails or to interstate 
commerce. The judge also charged that, if the mails were 
wilfully obstructed, and attempted arrests were opposed in 
such a way as to constitute a general uprising, an insurrec- 
tion was established. 

In Re Grand Jury (1894). (U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D., Cal., 
Judge Morrow.) Criminal Conspiracy. (Involving Sher- 
man Law and U. S. Mails.) Illegal. In Pullman strike 
(see Chap. VI). 

Defs. charged with and declared guilty of interfering with 
U. S. mails, as they prevented passenger cars, ordinarily con- 
nected with mail cars, from running. Judge Drummond 
said: 

"It is not practicable, as a general thing, for a railroad to 
transport a mail car by itself, because that would be attended 
by serious loss, so that, while nominally they (the defendants) 
permit the mail car to go, they really, by preventing the tran- 
sit of other passenger cars, interfere with the transportation 
of the mails." 

Ex Parte Lennon (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct. App. 6 C.) 
Habeas Corpus. In Pullman strike James Lennon sought 
writ of habeas corpus and declared that he had not been 
served with the injunction writ. Held that it was not neces- 
sary that this writ should be served, but only that the def. 
had knowledge that it had been made. 

U. S. v. Elliott et ah (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D., 
Mo., Judge Phillips.) For Injunction. (Involving Sherman 



438 BOYCOTTS 

Law.) In Pullman strike it was charged that defs. violated 
the Sherman law by interfering with operation of all railroads 
coming into St. Louis. A temporary injunction had been 
issued by Judge Thayer (62 Fed. 801). Ct. held that the 
Sherman Anti-Trust Act applied to prevent combinations by 
railroad employees to prevent all the railroads of a large city, 
engaged in carrying U. S. mails and interstate commerce, from 
carrying freight and passengers, etc. 

Thomas v. Cinn., N. O., and Texas Pac. Ry. Co. (In re 
Phelan) (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct., S. D., Ohio, Judge 
Taft.) For Contempt. Injunction. (Involving Conspir- 
acy, Sherman Law, Interference with U. S. Mails, Breaking 
of Contracts.) In Pullman Strike Coercing Railroad Re- 
ceiver to Withdraw Patronage from Pullman Company 
through Fear of Strike. Connected with Pullman Strike, see 
Chap. VI. Injunction had been issued against Phelan and 
others for boycotting, etc. The court held that Phelan was 
conspiring to do an unlawful act, and that, in disobeying the 
injunction, he was guilty of contempt. The combination 
sought to compel the railroad companies to break their con- 
tracts with Pullman. Judge Taft declared: 

"All the employees had the right to quit their employment, 
but they had no right to combine to quit in order thereby to 
compel their employer to withdraw from a mutually profitable 
relation with third party for the purpose of injuring that third 
person when the relation thus sought to be broken had no 
effect whatever on the character or reward of their service." 

He also characterized the boycott as malicious and as con- 
stituting a violation of the Sherman law and of the statute 
forbidding interference with U. S. mails. The doctrine of 
free speech, he averred, would not prevent the issuance of an 
injunction against continuing the boycott. 

U. S. v. Debs (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., 111., 
Judge Wood.) For Injunction. Contempt. Involving 
Sherman Law, Interference with U. S. mails and Interstate 
Commerce. Illegal. Facts given in Chapter VI. Held that 



APPENDIX 439 

the Sherman law condemned all combinations if they be in 
restraint of trade and not merely trusts. Interference with 
transportation and travel by rail was also worked out. 

In Re Debs (1895). (U. S. Sup. Ct., Justice Brewer.) 
Interference with Interstate Commerce and Transmission of 
the Mails. Illegal. Facts and opinion stated in Chap. VI. 

Arthur v. Oakes (1894). (U. S. Circ. Ct. Apps.) For 
Injunction. Strike against Receiver. Violation of Contracts. 
Illegal. Charge was made that defs. procured others to quit 
service in violation of contracts. Held that combination to 
induce such leaving of service of receiver by the use of intimi- 
dation was illegal; that here the methods used should be de- 
scribed more specifically. 

Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. E. Howard Watch and 
Clock Co. et at. (1895). (U. S. Circ. Ct. Apps., 2 C.) 
Civil Action. Trade Boycott. Legal. See Dueber, etc., 
supra. Held that it was not in violation of the Sherman Anti- 
Trust Law prohibiting monopoly for one to agree not to sell 
goods to firms purchasing of pi. in order to get pi. to join 
with def. in fixing arbitrary prices, as the combination did 
not include all manufacturers of watches, but, at the most, 
resulted in only partial restraint of an article not a prime 
necessity. 

Continental Insurance Co. v. Bd. of Fire Underwriters of 
the Pacific et al. (1895). (U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., Cal., 
Judge McKenna.) For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Il- 
legal. One of agents of the associated companies stated that 
he had authority to cancel certain policies of outside com- 
panies, and to rewrite them at lower rates, when, in fact, he 
had no such authority, and he threatened to boycott the agents 
and customers of such outside companies unless they withdrew 
their patronage. Held that these acts were illegal and would 
be enjoined. 

U. S. v. Cassidy (1895). (U. S. Dist. Ct., N. D., Cal., 
Judge Wm. W. Morrow.) Criminal Conspiracy. (Involv- 
ing U. S. Mail and Restraint of Interstate Commerce.) Il- 
legal. This was an indictment in Pullman strike against John 



440 BOYCOTTS 

Cassfdy and others under Rev. St. 5440 for a conspiracy to 
obstruct the mail of the United States, and a combination 
and conspiracy to restrain trade and commerce between the 
states of the union and with foreign countries. A number of 
acts of violence were also charged. It was said that this was 
the longest charge ever delivered in a criminal case in the 
country, and was only exceeded in any case by the charge of 
Lord Chief Justice Cockburn in the Tichborne Case. In the 
course of his charge the judge declared a strike unlawful, if 
used to boycott a third party or to obstruct mail or restrain 
trade. After 4 days and nights of deliberation the jury failed 
to agree, and defs. were discharged. 

Blumenthal v. Shaw (1897). (U. S. Circ. Ct. Apps., 3 
C, Del., Judge Acheson.) Blacklist. Illegal. PI. was dis- 
charged from factory in Wilmington, Del., and, on going the 
rounds of factories, was refused employment on account of 
the request made by the def. Held action illegal. 

Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins (1897). (U. S. Circ. Ct. 
Apps., 8 C.) 

Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. (Strong 
Dissenting Opinion.) Defs. struck against pis. for placing 
machine-made hoop barrels in their establishment, and re- 
quested the trade and unionists not to buy nor to purchase 
goods packed in these barrels. Held that this combination 
deprived one of right to run business as he thought best 
through threats and intimidation, and was unlawful. Judge 
Caldwell dissented, declaring that workers were within their 
rights to refuse to purchase certain goods and to induce others 
to do likewise, as long as peaceful means were employed; that 
the serving of notice that they would discontinue the purchase 
did not constitute a threat; that combination did not intro- 
duce an illegal element; that the fact that labor had no 
present complaint against its wages, etc., did not signify 
that its action was without proper motive, and that the use 
of the injunction against such a combination would deprive 
labor of employing the same methods of competition as are 
resorted to by capital. Finally, if the courts of equity assumed 



APPENDIX 441 

the right to enjoin "defs. from withdrawing their patronage 
and support from pL, it is not perceived why it cannot, by 
mandate of injunction, make it obligatory upon the defs. to 
purchase the pl.'s barrels and their contents and persuade 
others to do the same. The invasion of the natural rights of 
personal liberty of the def. would be no greater in the one 
case than in the other." 

Chiatovich v. Hanchett (1900). (U. S. Circ. Ct. of Apps., 
9 C, Nev.) Trade Boycott. (Coercing Employees.) Il- 
legal. PL charged def. with publishing a notice asking his 
employees to desist from trading with him, and of thus dam- 
aging him to the extent of $10,000. Held that this was a 
malicious interference with the business of another, and il- 
legal; that, however, a primary boycott was legal. The court 
added that the motive was material when one violated the 
right of another. 

U. S. v. Haggerty (1902). (U. S. Circ. Ct., W. Va.) 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Employees. 
(Chiefly Picketing.) Union men held meetings near homes 
of employees urging workers to strike. Held that such meet- 
ings intimidated employees, and that courts can restrain com- 
bination formed to induce contented employees to strike for 
purpose of inflicting injury on business. 

Boyer et at. v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (1903). 
(U. S. Circ. Ct., E. D., Mo., Judge James H. Rogers.) 
Blacklist. Legal. PL, a member of the Commercial Tel- 
egraphers' Union of Local Lodge No. 3, of St. Louis, alleged 
that he had been discharged by pi. because he was a member 
of the union, and had not been able to procure work else- 
where because of the possession by the def. of a book which 
gave the cause of pl.'s discharge, and because of the conveying of 
such information to other employers. Held that def. had the 
right to discharge pi. for any cause, and the mere keeping 
of a record of such discharge and the giving of such information 
to others was not an illegal act. 

"In the absence of such contract relations, any employer may 
legally discharge his employee," insisted the court, "with or 



442 BOYCOTTS 

without notice at any time. It is not unlawful, in the absence 
of contract relations to the contrary, to discharge them for 
that (for belonging to the union) or for any other reason, or 
for no reason at all. . . . Can a court of equity grant relief 
to a man who says for his cause of action that he belongs to a 
reputable organization, and that he has been discharged solely 
because he did belong to it; that his employer who discharged 
him keeps a book on which he placed his name, and has set 
opposite thereto the fact that he discharged him solely because 
he belonged to such an organization, and that he gives that 
information to other persons who refuse to employ him on that 
act?" 

The court concluded that, in view of the honorable posi- 
tion occupied by the union to which pi. belonged, it was not 
unlawful to keep such a book or to notify others of its con- 
tents. 

Seattle Brewing and Malt Co. v. Hansen (1905). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct., of Cal., N. D., Judge James H. Beatty.) For 
Injunction. Secondary Boycott Involving Patronage. (Cir- 
culars.) Illegal. Defs., on strike, issued a circular bearing 
"Organized Labor and Friends, Don't Drink Scab Beer." 
The circular named certain brands which were unfair, and 
used other signs, followed by admonition, "Guard your health 
by refusing to drink unfair beer." Held that these circulars 
"tended unfairly to obstruct the business of the complainant" 
and to intimidate timid people. 

Aikens v. Wisconsin (1905). (U. S. Sup. Ct., Justice 
Holmes.) Criminal Conspiracy. Trade Boycott. Illegal. 
The Journal Company, a corporation in Milwaukee, raised 
advertising rates 25 per cent., and the managers of the 
other newspapers in the city combined, agreeing to charge 
a proportional increase to advertisers who paid to the Journal 
the increased rates. Defs. were convicted under Sec. 4466a 
of the Sts. of Wisconsin, which imposes imprisonment or fine 
on any "two or more persons who shall combine . . . for 
the purpose of wilfully and maliciously injuring another in 
his reputation, business, trade or profession, by any means 
whatsoever," etc. An attempt was made to have this law 



APPENDIX 443 

declared unconstitutional on the ground that it was in conflict 
with the 14th amendment. Justice Holmes upheld the statute, 
declaring that the legislature had the privilege of preventing 
malicious injury of others. He interpreted "maliciously in- 
juring" as "doing harm malevolently for the sake of the 
harm as an end in itself, and not merely as a means to some 
further end legitimately desired." 

Loewe et al. v. California Fed. of Labor et al. (1905). 
(U. S. Circ. Ct., N. D., Cal.) For Injunction. Compound 
Boycott Involving Patronage. Facts similar to those related 
in Chap. IX, concerning the Danbury Hatters. Labor unions 
of California assisted the hatters and concentrated their boy- 
cott against Trieste and Co., of San Francisco, dealers in 
Loewe's hats. Held direct purpose was that of injury, and 
that combination was an unlawful interference with the busi- 
ness of another. A sweeping injunction was thereupon issued 
forbidding various forms of boycotting. 

Huttig Sash and Door Co. v. Fuelle (1906). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct., Judge Trieber.) For Contempt. Injunction. 
Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. Members 
of the Br. of Carpenters and Joiners, on strike, in an en- 
deavor to induce contractors to purchase from union firms, 
issued a booklet containing names of firms and dealers work- 
ing under an agreement with the District Council, and a 
notice that any material not constructed under strict union 
conditions would not be handled by members of that union. 
Judge Thayer in 1904 had enjoined the defs. from boycotting 
the complainant and from giving notice to any firm to decline 
to purchase materials of any sort from complainant under 
threats that if such purchases were made they would cause 
persons in the employ to quit work. They were also enjoined 
from inducing persons to decline employment, because the 
firm employing might have purchased material from com- 
plainant. Held defendants guilty of contempt. 

Montgomery Ward and Co. v. So. Dakota Retail Mer- 
chants', Etc., Ass'n (1907). (U. S. Circ. Ct., So. Dak.) 
For Injunction. Trade Boycott. Legal. Retail Merchants' 



444 BOYCOTTS 

Ass'n agreed not to purchase from wholesalers or jobbers who 
sold goods to catalog or mail order houses. Def., editor of 
a paper favoring the Retail Merchants, published several ar- 
ticles, including a letter from the secretary of the association, 
in which it was said that the secretary could not come to any 
other conclusion than that they (the wholesalers and jobbers 
selling to the catalog houses) prefer the business of the 
catalog houses to that of the retailers of the state. Held 
that this editor could not be enjoined, as he used but mere 
persuasion. It was also declared that the right to do business 
included the right to buy as well as to sell, and that the retail 
merchants had a right to agree not to purchase merchandise 
from wholesalers or jobbers who sold to catalog or mail 
order houses, and to inform those who sold. 

Shine et al. v. Fox Brothers Mfg. Co. (1907). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct. of App., 8 D., Judge Wm. C. Hook.) For In- 
junction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. Illegal. 
This case was brought from the Circ. Ct. for the E. Dis. of 
Mo. An organizer of the Carpenters' and Joiners' Union 
was sent to St. Louis to assist in the organization of the 
trimmers. About 90 per cent, of the carpenters were organ- 
ized. There were 23 open shops where trimming was done, 
employing about 1,000 employees, only four of whom were 
members of the union. These shops produced about 80 per 
cent, of the trimming used in the city. The organizer and 
delegate from the central organization visited pi. and urged 
him to place his shop under union regulations and to dis- 
charge those employees who refused to join the union. Upon 
pl.'s refusal, defs. had lists printed and adopted similar measures 
to those employed in the boycott against the Huttig Sash 
Co., supra. In some instances they called a strike on the firm 
purchasing of pi. They frequently forced contractors, through 
fear of cessation of work, to sign contracts stating that hence- 
forth they would deal only with union concerns, and in one 
instance fined a contractor as well as union workmen on a 
building, the latter for refusing to quit work when directed by 
def., and placed on the "We Don't Patronize" list firms which 



APPENDIX 445 

allowed non-union trim to be used in the construction of their 
buildings. Held that this was a similar case to that of Hopkins 
v. Oxhy Stave Co., and directed that the order of the Circuit 
Court be affirmed. 

Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. v. Montana Feder- 
ation of Labor (1907). (U. S. Circ. Ct., Mont., Judge 
Hunt.) For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving 
Patronage. (Threatening Circulars.) Illegal. Employees, 
on strike against the company, distributed circulars stating 
that firm was "unfair," "legalized highwaymen," "scabs." 
Defs. exhorted people not to patronize, and voted to give 
patronage only to certain firms because others had refused to 
stop using complainant's telephones. They were quoted as 
saying: "We will win or put the corporation out of busi- 
ness." Held that acts of the defs. constituted intimidation 
and a threat to ruin the business of the pi. unless he yielded, 
and resulted in an unlawful conspiracy to interfere with and 
destroy lawful business of another; that the pi. was therefore 
entitled to an injunction to restrain the prosecution of the 
conspiracy by such methods. 

Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' 
Union No. 220 (1908). (U. S. Circ. Ct., Nev.) Chiefly 
Picketing. Illegal (when intimidation). Held that workers 
can persuade men to quit employment, but cannot use threats 
or compel them to listen to arguments against their will. 

U. S. v. Raish et al. (1908). (U. S. Dist. Ct., So. D., 
111., Judge Humphrey.) Criminal Action. Secondary Boycott 
Involving Patronage. Attempt to Defraud by Use of Post 
Office. Illegal. Pending enlargement of the plant of the 
complainant, the carpenters' union demanded that all of those 
working on the new building should be union men, and, on 
refusal of the company, imposed a fine of $500. The union 
representatives stated that that fine would be remitted if only 
members of the carpenters' union were employed on the job, 
otherwise the complainant would suffer a boycott. Letters 
were afterwards sent to complainant's customers asking them 
not to handle its product, and defs. were indicted for an 



446 BOYCOTTS 

attempt to defraud by use of the post office, under Sec. 5480 
of the federal statutes. The first count in the indictment de- 
clared that the defs., officers of the union, endeavored to 
induce the company to pay a fine under threat of a boycott, 
and that the scheme contemplated the use of the mail. The 
second and third counts charged that the defs. would, through 
use of the mails, cause a boycott to be put in force against 
the business of the Wahlfield Mfg. Co., and thus injure that 
company in its business. Held that the statute was violated 
if either of those counts was proved. Jury held defs. guilty. 

Iron Molders v. Allis Chalmers Co. (1908). (U. S. Circ. 
Ct. App., 7 Circ, Wis., Judge Walker.) For Contempt. In- 
junction. Intimidating Workmen. Chiefly picketing, and 
violation of injunction preventing picketing, accompanied by 
an attempt to intimidate. 

Adair v. U. S. (1908). (U. S. Sup. Ct.) Blacklist (so- 
called). Legal. O. B. Coppage, a locomotive fireman em- 
ployed by the Louisville and Nashville R. R., was discharged 
by William Adair, a master mechanic in employ of this road, 
Oct. 15, 1906, because he was a member of the Br. of Loco- 
motive Firemen. Adair was indicted, charged with violating 
the 10th Sec. of the Erdman law, an act passed by Congress 
June 1, 1898 (30 Stat, at L. 424, Chap. 370, U. S. Comp. 
Stat., 1 90 1, p. 3205), which made it illegal "to threaten any 
employee with loss of employment," or to "discriminate 
against any employee because of his membership in such a 
labor corporation, association or organization." The lower 
court held that this section was constitutional (152 Fed. 737). 
The defendant was therefore found guilty and ordered to pay 
a fine of $100. The case was appealed to the U. S. Sup. Ct. 
Here the section was declared unconstitutional, the judgment 
was reversed, and the case dismissed. 

The court held that the provisions against discrimination 
were repugnant to the fifth amendment of the constitution, 
which declared that no person shall be deprived of liberty or 
property without due process of law; that "such liberty and 
right embraced the right to make contracts for the purchase 



APPENDIX 447 

of the labor of others, and equally the right to make contracts 
for the sale of one's own labor," so long as this right did not 
prove inconsistent with the public interests. 

"It is not within the functions of government — at least in 
the absence of contract between the parties — to compel any 
person, in the course of his business and against his will, to 
accept or retain the personal services of another, or to compel 
any person, against his will, to perform personal services for 
another. The right of a person to sell his labor upon such 
terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the 
right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions upon 
which he will accept such labor from the person offering to 
sell it. . . . In all such particulars the employer and em- 
ployee have equality of right, and any legislation that disturbs 
that equality is an arbitrary interference with the liberty of 
contract which no government can legally justify in a free 
land." 

Judge Harlan claimed that Congress could not pass such a 
law under the general power of regulating interstate com- 
merce, "as there is no such connection between interstate com- 
merce and membership in a labor organization." He also 
averred that, paramount as is the power of Congress to regu- 
late interstate commerce, "it cannot be exerted in violation 
of any fundamental right secured by any other provisions of 
the Constitution." 

Justice Holmes, in a dissenting opinion, claimed that the 
relation of labor unions to interstate commerce was at least 
as intimate a one as that of safety couplers and the liability 
of master to servant; that the provision was a very limited 
interference with freedom to contract, as it did not require 
the carriers to employ anyone or forbid them to refuse to 
employ anyone; that the application of the fifth amendment 
had been stretched to the extreme, in his opinion, and that the 
provision might very well have been passed by Congress as 
good public policy. 

"Where there is, or generally is agreed to be, an important 
ground of public policy for restraint, the Constitution does 
not forbid it (the right to restrain freedom of contract), 



448 BOYCOTTS 

whether this court agrees or disagrees with the policy pur- 
sued." 

The justice averred that such a provision might be effective 
in preventing strikes, and fostering arbitration, and that, even 
though it resulted only in a closed shop, it would not be un- 
warranted for Congress to assume that the results would be 
for the social advantage. 

Citizens' Light, Heat and Power Co. v. Montgomery Light 
and Water Power Co. (1909). (U. S. Circ. Ct., Ala.) Defs. 
were charged with persuading pl.'s customers to break their 
contracts, guaranteeing them against liability. Held at com- 
mon law, a trader, to get other man's customers, could use 
any means not involving violation of the criminal laws or 
amounting to fraud, duress or intimidation, or the wrongful 
inducing of the breach of contract. 

Iron Molders' Union v. Allis-Chalmers Co. (1909). (U. 
S. Circ. Ct. App., Judge Baker, Judge Grosscup concurring.) 
Case originally from Wisconsin. For Injunction. Coercing 
Patrons to Withdraw Patronage Through Fear of Strike. 
Legal. During course of strike, defs. procured iron molders 
in other foundries, who were also members of the Iron Mold- 
ers' Union, to refuse to make the castings of the Chalmers 
Company. These molders notified their employers that, unless 
the latter cancelled his contracts with pis., they (the em- 
ployees) would strike. Held that such action was legal. Judge 
Baker declared: 

"If appellee had the right (and we think the right was per- 
fect) to seek the aid of fellow foundrymen to the end that the 
necessary element of labor should enter into appellee's product, 
appellant had the reciprocal right of seeking the aid of fellow 
molders to prevent that end. To whatever extent employers 
may lawfully combine and cooperate to control the supply and 
conditions of work to be done, to the same extent should be 
recognized the right of workmen to combine and cooperate to 
control the supply and the conditions of the labor that is 
necessary to the doing of the work. In the fullest recognition 
of the equality and mutuality and their restrictions lies the peace 
of capital and labor, for so they, like nations with equally well 



APPENDIX 449 

drilled and equipped armies and navies, will make and keep 
treaties of peace, in the fear of the cost and consequences of 
war." 

Irving v. Joint District Council, U. Br. of Carpenters, etc. 
(1910). (U. S. Circ. Ct., So. D., N. Y., Judge Ward.) 
For Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. 
Illegal. Carpenters and Joiners endeavored to compel Irving 
and Casson, who had a factory in Massachusetts for the pro- 
duction of fine woodwork, to run a closed shop. Letters were 
sent by the officers of the union to a number of present and 
prospective customers stating that the firm was unfair, and 
threatening to take off union workers from jobs for which pi. 
furnished some of the material. Held that these acts were 
illegal, and that defs. could not legally combine "for the pur- 
pose of calling out the workmen of other employers who have 
no grievances or to threaten owners, builders and architects 
that their contracts will be held up if they, or any of their 
subcontractors, use the complainant's trim." The court, there- 
fore, affirmed the granting of the temporary injunction. 

Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi (1910). (U. S. Sup. 
Ct., Judge Burton.) Civil Action. (Sherman Law.) Trade 
Boycott. Illegal. An association, consisting of 77 retail deal- 
ers in lumber, sash, etc., doing business in La. and Miss., 
agreed not to purchase any material or supplies from manu- 
facturers and wholesale dealers selling directly to consumers 
and from certain other specified concerns. Sup. Ct. of Miss, 
declared that this combination was condemned by Sec. 5002 
of the Miss. Code, prohibiting, among other things, trusts and 
monopolies. Appeal was taken on the ground of the statute's 
unconstitutionality. U. S. Sup. Court held law constitutional; 
that the combination of the defs. prevented rhe enjoyment of 
freedom of contract, and that actions, harmless when done by 
one man, may involve a public wrong when done by many. 

Kolley v. Robinson (1911). (U. S. Circ. Ct. App.) Com- 
pound Boycott Involving Workmen. Chiefly Picketing. Il- 
legal. Held unlawful for workmen to induce those taking 



45o BOYCOTTS 

their places to quit, by actual assaults or threats. (Originalh 
from Missouri.) 

BUCK'S STOVE CASE 

Buck's Stove and Range Co. v. American Federation of 
Labor, et al. (Dec. 18, 1907.) (Sup. Ct., D. of C.) For 
Injunction. Compound Boycott Involving Patronage. ("We 
Don't Patronize" List.) Coerce Patrons to Withdraw 
Patronage from Boycotted Firm. Illegal. Facts in Chap. 
VIII. Held that actions of defs. constituted an illegal con- 
spiracy, as they interfered, without justifiable cause, with 
freedom of pi. and customers to buy and sell; that the fact 
that the ultimate end in view was to benefit defs. did not work 
out justification, as the immediate motive was that of punish- 
ment and injury; that actions of combination might be illegal, 
although they would be legal if done by a single individual; 
that boycotting unlawfully interfered with property rights, as 
business was property within the meaning of the law. Nor 
could it be said that the right of freedom of the press was 
infringed by the injunction, since the publication was a step in 
a criminal plot. Sweeping Injunction issued by Judge Gould. 

The Buck's Stove and Range Co. v. The A. F. of L. (Dec. 
23, 1908). (Sup. Ct., D. of C.) For Contempt. Illegal. 
Justice Wright reviewed facts of the boycott, and concluded 
that defs. had been guilty of crime under the common law, 
inasmuch as they had brought about a breach of pl.'s existing 
contracts with others and deprived pi. of good will or prop- 
erty. They furthermore had been guilty of a crime defined 
by the Sherman Anti-Trust law, as they had restrained trade 
and commerce among the several states. The judge affirmed 
that Gompers, Mitchell and Morrison, the three defs., had, in 
advance, determined to violate the injunction, and had violated 
it. He took the same position on the question of interference 
with property rights and on the question of freedom of speech 
as did Judge Gould. 

Finally, he contended that the injunction order was neither 



APPENDIX 451 

void nor erroneous, as had been alleged, but that, admitting 
that the court had fallen into error, the "duty and necessity 
of obedience remained nevertheless the same." 

Samuel Gompers, John Mitchell and Frank Morrison were 
sentenced to 12, 9, and 6 months, respectively. 

The A. F. of L. v. The Buck's Stove and Range Co. (Mar. 
11, 1909). (Ct. of App., D. of C.) For Injunction. Com- 
pound Boycott Involving Patronage. ("We Don't Patronize" 
List.) Illegal. (Injunction Affirmed in Modified Form.) 
Judge Robb declared the issuance of an injunction was proper. 
He took virtually the same position as did Judge Gould re- 
garding the unlawfulness of combined action, the question of 
the right to enjoin free speech and press, and the illegality of 
the immediate object of def.'s combination, and declared that 
it placed an unreasonable obstruction in the course of trade. 
Physical coercion did not need to be proved to make acts 
illegal. The injunction issued by Judge Gould, however, in 
the opinion of Judge Robb, was too broad and was therefore 
modified. 1 

Gompers et al. v. Buck's Stove and Range Company (Nov. 
2, 1909). (Ct. of Apps., D. of C.) For Contempt. Illegal. 
Judge Van Orsdel decided that the contempt was a criminal 
and not a civil one, and that, in the absence of a bill of ex- 
ceptions, the court must "assume that the evidence was suffi- 
cient to establish the truth of each charge contained in the 
petition, of which the trial justices found the defendants 
guilty." The inquiry was therefore limited to one of law. 
The court refused to pass upon the question as to whether 
defs. could be considered guilty of contempt if they disobeyed 
only those portions of the injunction which the Court of 
Appeals had reversed, claiming that "the petition charges a 
direct violation of those provisions of the original decree which 
were on appeal affirmed and approved by the court." 

Chief Justice Shepard dissented, observing that the contempt 
proceeding might be regarded as ancillary to the main suit, 

'See Chap. VIII. 



452 BOYCOTTS 

and that, therefore, the evidence might be considered. He 
contended that "upon the assumption that each and all of the 
defs. committed some acts in violation of the injunction, both 
as originally issued and as modified on appeal," the decree 
should be reversed and the case remanded for trial upon 
evidence confined to the real question involved. 

It was his opinion, however, that the specific acts charged 
against Gompers and Morrison related wholly to declarations 
and publications which violated the preliminary injunction as 
issued, and that a decree rendered in excess of the power of 
the court — a power limited by express provision of the Con- 
stitution — (regarding freedom of speech and press), was ab- 
solutely void. 

Samuel Gompers et al. v. Buck's Stove and Range Co. 
(May 15, 191 1 ). (U. S. Sup. Ct.) For Contempt. Dis- 
missed. Held that "this was a proceeding for civil contempt 
where the only remedial relief possible was a fine payable to 
the complainant," and that there "was therefore a departure — 
a variance between the procedure adopted and the punishment 
imposed, when, in answer to a prayer for remedial relief, in 
the equity cause, the court imposed punitive sentence appro- 
priate only to a proceeding at law for criminal contempt." 
The court contended, in support of this position, that the case 
was entitled "Buck's Stove, etc., v. Samuel Gompers et al./' 
and not "United States v. Samuel Gompers et al." and that 
the contempt proceedings were instituted, entitled, tried, and 
up to the moment of sentence treated as a part of the original 
cause in equity. It continued: 

"The Buck's Stove and Range Company was not only the 
nominal but the actual party on the one side, with the defen- 
dants on the other. The Buck's Stove Co. acted throughout 
as complainant in charge of the litigation. As such, and 
through its counsel, acting in its name, it made consents, 
waivers, and stipulations only proper on the theory that it 
was proceeding in its own right in an equity cause, and not 
as a representative of the United States prosecuting a case of 
criminal contempt. It appears here also as the sole party in 
opposition to the defendants; and its counsel, in its name, 



APPENDIX 453 

have filed briefs and made arguments in this court in favor- 
ing affirmance of the judgment of the court below." 

The court held also that the complainant made each of the 
defendants a witness for the company, and as such each was 
required to testify against himself — a thing which would prob- 
ably not have been suffered if the case had been regarded as 
one in criminal contempt. The petition prayed, furthermore, 
that "the petitioner may have such other and further relief 
as the nature of its case may require," not for punitive punish- 
ment. The court therefore reversed the judgment, "but with- 
out prejudice to the power and right of the Supreme Court 
of the D. of C. to punish, by a proper proceeding, contempt, 
if any, committed against it." In the early part of the de- 
cision Judge Lamar affirmed the position of the other judge 
regarding the power to restrain publications in pursuance of 
a boycott, disagreed, however, with the court below, in its 
claim that the judgment should be affirmed if there was one 
valid count, and declared that the judgment should be re- 
versed if it should appear that the defs. had been sentenced 
on any count which did not constitute a disobedience of the 
injunction. 

In Re Gompers et al. (June 24, 1912). (Sup. Ct., D. of 
C, Justice Wright.) Contempt. Illegal. Facts stated in 
Ch. VIII. Court rehearsed at length the original case and the 
alleged contempt; vigorously denounced defendants for the 
bold and unsubmissive attitude they assumed, declaring that 
the contempt committed by at least one of the defendants was 
"an open and bold deliberate attack upon the foundations of 
society and the law," and ended by doling out to them the 
original sentence. 

In Re Gompers et al. (May 5, 1913). (Ct. of App., D. of 
C, Justice Van Orsdel.) Contempt. Illegal. Facts in Ch. 
VIII. Held that the lower court had the legal right to hold 
the defendants in contempt, but that the sentence was exces- 
sive, and that the Court of Appeals had the right to reduce 
such sentence. A reduction was therefore made, Gompers 



454 BOYCOTTS 

being sentenced to thirty days in jail, and Mitchell and Mor- 
rison being fined $500 each, and in default of payment to be 
confined in jail until released. Justice Shepard again dis- 
sented. He claimed that the criminal contempt charged con- 
stituted an offense against the United States, and was there- 
fore subject to the bar of the Statute of Limitations. 



D ANBURY HATTERS' CASE 

Loewe v. Lawlor (Feb. 3, 1908). (U. S. Sup. Ct.) (In- 
volving Sherman Anti-Trust Law.) Compound Boycott In- 
volving Patronage. Illegal. Facts stated in Chapter IX. 
Held that boycott of hatters was combination in restraint of 
trade, and thus in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Law 
which prohibits "any combination whatsoever to secure action 
which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between 
the states, or restricts, in that regard, the liberty of the trader 
to engage in business." In reply to the argument that the 
acts of defendants did not affect interstate commerce, the court 
averred : 

"If the purpose of the combination were, as alleged, to 
prevent any interstate transportation at all, the fact that the 
means operated at one end before physical transportation com- 
menced and at the other end after physical transportation 
ended was immaterial." 

"Nor can the act in question be held inapplicable because 
defendants were not themselves engaged in interstate com- 
merce. The act made no distinction between classes. It pro- 
vided that 'every' contract, combination, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade was illegal. The records of Congress 
show that several efforts were made to exempt, by legis- 
lation, organizations of farmers and laborers from the opera- 
tion of the act, and that all efforts failed, so that the act 
remained as we have it before us. . . ." 

"The only inquiry is as to the sufficiency of the averments 
of fact. ... It appears from the declaration that it is 
charged that defendants formed a combination to directly re- 
strain pl.'s trade; that the trade to be restrained was 



APPENDIX 455 

interstate; that certain means to attain such restraint were 
contrived to be used and employed to that end; that those 
means were so used and employed by the defendants, and that 
thereby they injured people's property and business. . . . 
We think a case within the statute was set up and that the 
demurrer should have been overruled." 

Lawlor et al. v. Loewe et al. (May 8, 191 1). (U. S. 
Circ. Ct. App., 2nd C.) Damages for Violation of Sherman 
Anti-Trust Law. Judgment Reversed. Defs., who were de- 
clared guilty of violating the Sherman Anti-Trust Law in the 
Circ. Ct. in Connecticut, appealed, chiefly on the ground that 
the action of the court was improper in taking from the jury 
the duty of determining the liability of the various defendants 
for the acts of the officers and agents of the union. Held 
that the trial judge was in error in taking the case from the 
jury that the mere fact that an individual was a member 
of and contributed money to the treasury of the United Hat- 
ters' Ass'n did not make him the principal of any and all 
agents who might be employed by the officers in carrying out 
the objects of the association, and responsible as principal if 
such agents used illegal means or caused illegal methods to be 
used in undertaking to carry out those objects. 

"The clause of the constitution of the United Hatters, 
which provides that certain of the officers 'shall use all the 
means in their power to bring such shops (non-union) into 
the trade,' does not necessarily imply that these officers shall 
use other than lawful means to accomplish such object," de- 
clared the court. "Surely the fact that an individual joins 
an association having such a clause in its constitution cannot 
be taken as expressing assent by him to the perpetuation of 
arson and murder. Something more must be shown, as, for 
instance, that with the knowledge of the members unlawful 
means had been so frequently used with the express or tacit 
approval of the association, that its agents were warranted in 
assuming that they might use such lawful means in the future, 
that the association and its individual members would approve 



456 BOYCOTTS 

or tolerate such use whenever the end sought to be obtained 
might be best obtained thereby." 

While the court admitted that a mass of testimony had 
been given by the complainants tending to show agency, it 
stated that many of the defendants declared their ignorance of 
the boycott, and that it was the function of the jury to deter- 
mine their credibility. It also declared that evidence of the 
payment of dues was not competent for showing ratification, 
and that certain hearsay evidence should be excluded. The 
judgment was therefore reversed, and the petition for a rehear- 
ing denied. 

For later developments, see Chap. IX. 



LIST OF LEGAL DECISIONS 

Aberthaw Construction Co. v. Cameron, Massachusetts, 1907, 

80 N. E., 478, 194 Mass., 208 362 

Adair v. U. S., U. S. Sup. Ct., 1908, 208 U. S., 161 

46, 235, 446-7 
Aikens v. Wisconsin, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1905, 195 U. S., 194, 

25 Sup. Ct. Rep., 3 50, 198, 442-3 

Albro J. Newton Co. v. Erickson, New York, 191 1. 126 

N. Y. Supp., mi 383 

Allen v. Flood, England, 1898, 67 L. J. Q. B., 119, 23 Q. 

B. D., 614 190, 218, 221, 244 

Allis Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union No. 125, U. S. 

Circ. Ct. (Wis.), 1906. 150 Fed., 155. 
American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 

Ct. of App., D. of C, 1909, 33 App. Cases, D. of C, 

83, 37 Washington Law Rep., 154. . . . 183, 186, 199, 451 
Arbour v. Trade Ass'n, Philadelphia, 1910, 44 Pa. Super. 

Ct., 240 386 

Arthur v. Oakes, U. S. Circ. Ct. of App., 1894, 63 Fed., 310. . 

439 

Atkins v. W. & A. Fletcher Co., New Jersey, 1903, 55 Atl., 

1074, 65 N. J. Eq., 658 45, 369 



APPENDIX 457 

Badger Brass Mfg. Co. v. Daly, Wisconsin, 1909, 119 N. W., 
328, 137 Wis., 601 405-6 

Baker v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Kentucky, 1901, 
64 S. W., 913, 23 Ky. L. R., 1 174 410-11 

Baldwin v. Escanaba Liquor Dealers' Ass'n, Michigan, 191 1, 
130 N. W., 224, 162 Mich., 703 395 

Barnes & Co. v. Chicago Typographical Union No. 10, Illi- 
nois, 1908, 83 N. E. 940, 232 111., 424.. 188, 190, 327, 

390-1 

Barr v. Essex Trades Council, New Jersey, 1894, 3° AtL, 
881, 53 N. J. Eq., 101 178, 183, 190, 195, 270, 368 

Beattie v. Callanan, New York, 1901, 67 App. Div., 14, 
73 N. Y. Supp., 518, 1903, 82 App. Div. 7, 81 N. Y. 
Supp., 413 377 

Beck et al. v. Railway Teamsters' Protective Union, Mich- 
igan, 1898, 77 N. W. 13, 118 Mich., 497.. 187, 196, 394-5 

Berry v. Donovan, Massachusetts, 1905, 74 N. E., 603, 188 
Mass., 353 361 

Bixby v. Dunlap, New Hampshire, 1876, 22 Am. Rep., 475, 
56 N. H., 456 362 

Blumenthal v. Shaw, U. S. Circ. Ct. of App., 1897, 77 Fed., 

954 440 

Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hollis, Minnesota, 1893, 55 N. W., 11 19, 

54 Minn., 223 50, 178, 201, 212, 223, 396 

Booth v. Burgess, New Jersey, 1906, 65 AtL, 226, 72 N. J. 

Eq., 181 369-70 

Boutwell et al. v. Marr et al., Vermont, 1899, 42 AtL, 607, 

71 Vt., 1 196, 364 

Bowen v. Hall, 1881, 50 L. J. Q. B., 305, Law Rep., 6, 

& B. D„, 333 190 

Bowen v. Matheson, Massachusetts, 1867, 14 Allen, 499. .178 
Boyer v. Western Union Telegraph Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(Mo.), 1903, 124 Fed., 246 46, 441-2 

Brace Bros. v. Evans, Pennsylvania, 1888, 5 Pa. Co. Ct. 

Rep., 163 197, 384 

Branson v. Industrial Workers of the World, Nevada, 1908, 

95 Pac, 354, 30 Nev., 270 426 



458 BOYCOTTS 

Brennan v. United Hatters, N. A. Local No. 17, New Jer- 
sey, 1906, 65 Atl., 165, 73 N. J. Law, 729 369 

Brewster v. Miller's Sons, Kentucky, 1897, 4 1 S. W., 301, 
101 Ky., 368 410 

Brown v. American Freehold Land Mortg. Co., Texas, 1904, 
80 S. W., 985, 97 Tex., 599 4*7 

Brown v. Jacobs' Pharmacy Co., Georgia, 1902, 41 S. E.' 
553, 115 Ga., 433 50, 409, 417-8 

Buchanan v. Barnes, Pennsylvania, 1894, 28 Atl., 195. . ..385 

Buchanan v. Kerr, Pennsylvania, 1894, 2 8 Atl., 195, 159 
Pa. St., 433 385 

Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. American Federation of Labor, 
et al. Sup. Ct., D. of C, 1907, 35 Wash. Law Rep., 
797, 70 Al. L. J., 8 178, 185, 188, 199, 450 

Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. A. F. of L., Sup. Ct., D. of C, 
1908, 36 Wash. Law Rep., 822 185, 450-1 

Buck's Stove, etc. See also under A. F. of L., Gompers. 

Buffalo Lubricating Oil Co. v. Chas. M. Everest, New York, 
1883, 30 Hun., 586. (Affirmed without decision, 95 
N. Y., 674, 1884.) 37i 

Bulcock v. St. Anne's Master Builders' Federation et al., 
England, 1902, 19 Times L. R., 27 243 

Burke v. Fay, Missouri, 1908, 107 S. W., 408, 128 Mo. App., 
690 400 

Butterick Pub. Co. v. Typog. Union No. 6, New York, 1906, 

100 N. Y. Supp., 292, 50 Misc., 1 381 

Callan v. Wilson, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1888, 127 U. S., 540. .432 
Carew v. Rutherford, Massachusetts, 1870, 106 Mass., 1.. 

177, 187, 359 
Carter v. Oster, Missouri, 1908, 112 S. W., 995, 134 Mo. 

App., 146 400 

Casey v. Cinn. Typographical Union No. 3, U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(Ohio), 1891, 45 Fed., 135 432-3 

Chiatovich v. Hanchett, U. S. Circ. Ct. App. (Nev.), 1900, 

101 Fed., 742 44 1 

Chipley v. Atkinson, Florida, 1887, 1 So., 934, 23 Fla., 206. . 

407 



APPENDIX 459 

Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & 

Water Power Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. (Ala.), 1909, 171 

Fed., 553 448 

Clemmitt v. Watson, Indiana, 1895, 144 Ind. App., 38. . .392 
Coeur dAlene Consolidated Mining Co. v. Miners' Union, 

U. S. Circ. Ct. (Idaho), 1892, 51 Fed., 260 433 

Cohen v. United Garment Workers, New York, 1901, 72 

N. Y. Supp., 341, 35 Misc., 748 377-8 

Collins v. American News Co., New York, 1902, 74 N. Y. 

Supp., 1 123, 68 N. Y. App. Div., 639 50, 377 

Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Philadelphia, 1821, Brightley 

N. P., 36 184 

Commonwealth v. Hunt, Massachusetts, 1842, 38 Am. Dec, 

346, 4 Mete, in 177 

Continental Insurance Co. v. Board of Fire Underwriters 

of the Pacific et al., California, 1912, 67 Fed., 316. .439 
Coons v. Chrystie, New York, 1898, 53 N. Y. Supp., 668, 

24 Misc., 296 375 

Cote v. Murphy, Pennsylvania, 1894, 28 Atl., 190, 159 Pa. 

St., 419 50, 178, 384-5 

Crump v. Commonwealth, Virginia, 1888, 2 S. E., 620, 84 

Va., 927 418-9 

Curran v. Galen, New York, 1897, 46 N. E., 297, 152 N. 

Y., 33 374 

Daily v. Superior Court, California, 1896, 44 Pac, 458, 12 

Cal., 94 229, 421 

Davis (W. P.) Mach. Co. v. Robinson, New York, 1903, 

84 N. Y. Supp., 837, 41 Misc., 329 379-8o 

Davis v. New England R. Pub. Co., Massachusetts, 1909, 

89 N. E., 565, 203 Mass., 470 362 

Davis v. Starrett, Maine, 1903, 55 Atl., 516, 97 Me., 568.. 

358 
Davis v. U. Portable Hoisting Eng., New York, 1898, 28 

App. Div., 396, 51 N. Y. Supp., 180 374-5 

Davis v. Zimmerman, New York, 1895, 36 N. Y. Supp., 303, 

91 Hun., 489 374 



460 BOYCOTTS 

Davitt v. American Bakers' Union, California, 1899, 56 Pac, 

775, 124 Cal., 99 421 

Dayton Mfg. Co. v. Metal Polishers, Buffers, Platers & Brass 

Workers' Union No. 5, Ohio, 1901, 8 Ohio, N. P., 574. . 

403 
Delz v. Winfree, Texas, 1891, 16 S. W., ill, 80 Tex., 400. 

(Also, 1894, 25 S. W., 50, 6 Tex. Civ. Ap., 11.) . .202, 

416 
De Pear v. The Cooks Union, Colorado, 27 Chic. Legal 

News, 387 424 

Debs, In Re j U. S. Sup. Ct., 1895, 158 U. S., 564. See also 

U. S. v. Debs 439 

Dickson v. Dickson, Louisiana, 1881, 33 La. Ann. Rep,, 1261. 

411 
Doremus v. Hennessy, Illinois, 1898, 52 N. E., 924, 176 111., 

608 388-9 

Dressier v. Sellers, New Jersey, 1904, 27 N. J. L. J., 174.369 
Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch Co., U. S. 

Circ. Ct. (N. Y.), 1893, 55 Fed. Rep., 851, 854; Circ. 

Ct. App., 1895, 66 Fed., 637 436, 439 

Dunlap's Cable News Co. v. Stone, New York, 1891, 15 

N. Y. Supp., 2, 60 Hun., 583 50, 373 

Emack v. Kane, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Ohio), 1888, 34 Fed., 

46 432 

Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., Georgia, 

I905. 50 S. E., 352, 122 Ga., 509 50, 409 

Enterprise Foundry Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union of N. A., 

Local No. 186, Michigan, 1907, 112 N. W., 685, 149 

Mich., 31 395 

Erdman v. Mitchell, Pennsylvania, 1903, 56 Atl.,'327. . 188, 

385 
Ertz v. Produce Exchange, Minnesota, 1900, 81 N. W., 737, 

79 Minn., 140 397 

Farmers' Loan and T., Etc., Co. v. No. Pacific Ry., U. S. 

Circ. Ct. (Wis.), 1894, 60 Fed., 803 436 

Foster v. Retail Clerks' Ass'n, New York, 1902, 78 N. Y. 

Supp., 860, 39 Misc., 48 190, 194, 196, 378 



APPENDIX 461 

Francis v. Flinn, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1886, 118 U. S., 385. . . .431 
Frank v. Herold, New Jersey, 1901, 52 AtL, 152, 63 N. J. 

Eq., 443 368 

Funck v. Farmers' Elevator Co. of Gowrie, Iowa, 1909, 121 

N. W., 53, 142 la., 621 393-4 

Gatzow v. Buening, Wisconsin, 1900, 81 N. W., 1003, 106 

Wis., 1 404-5 

George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers, New Jersey, 

1907, 72 N. J. Eq., 653, 66 AtL, 953 37° 

Gladish v. Bridgeford, Missouri, 1905, 89 S. W., 77, 113 

Mo. App., 726 4°° 

Goldberg, Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 

8760, California, 1906, 86 Pac, 806, 149 Cal., 429.. 

421-2 
Goldfield Consolidated Mines Co. v. Goldfield Miners' 

Union No. 220, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Nev.), 1908, 159 Fed., 

500 445 

Gompers et al. v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., Ct. of App., 

D. of C, 1909, 37 Wash. Law Rep., 706, 33 App. 

Cases, D. of C, 515 45 1 

Gompers et al. v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., 

191 1, 221 U. S., 418, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 492 452 

Gompers et al., In re, Sup. Ct., D. of C, 191 2, 40 Wash. 

Law Rep., 417 453 

Gompers et al., In re, Ct. of App., D. of C, 1913, 41 Wash. 

Law Rep., 290 453 

Graham v. St. Charles Street Railway, Louisiana, 1895, 16 

So., 806, 47 La. Ann., 214 411 

Grand Jury, In re, Charge to U. S. Circ. Ct. (111.), 1894, 

62 Fed., 828 437 

Grand Jury, In re U. S. Circ. Ct. (Cal.), 1894, 62 Fed., 

834 436 

Grand Jury, In re U. S. Circ. Ct. (Cal.), 1894, 62 Fed., 

840 437 

Gray v. Building Trades Council, Minnesota, 1903, 97 N. W., 

663, 91 Minn., 171 327, 307 



462 BOYCOTTS 

Green v. Davies, New York, 1903, 83 App. Div., 216, 82 
N. Y. Supp., 54; also 75 N. E., 536, 182 N. Y., 

499 379 

Grenada Lumber Co. v. Mississippi, U. S. Sup. Ct., 19 10, 

217 U. S., 433, 30 Sup. Ct., 535 50, 449 

Guethler v. Altman, Indiana, 1901, 60 N. E., 355, 26 Ind. 

Apps., 587 392 

Hamilton Brown Shoe Co. v. Saxey, Missouri, 1895, 32 

S. W., 1106, 131 Mo., 212 399 

Hawarden v. Youghiogheny L. & C. Co., Wisconsin, 1901, 

87 N. W., 472, in Wis., 545 405 

Herzog v. Fitzgerald, New York, 1902, 77 N. Y. Supp., 

366, 74 App. Div., no 378 

Hey v. Wilson, Illinois, 1908, 83 N. E., 928, 232 111., 

389 178, 390 

Heywood v. Tillson, Maine, 1883, 75 Me., 225 358 

Higgins, In re, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Texas), 1886, 27 Fed., 

443 431 

Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., No. Car., 1904, 47 S. E., 481, 

1905, 50 S. E., 681, 138 N. C, 308 4H 

Hopkins v. Oxley Stave, see Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins. 
Hundley v. Louisville R. R., Kentucky, 1898, 48 S. W., 429, 

105 Ky., 162 42, 45, 410 

Hunt v. Simonds, Missouri, 1854, 1 9 Mo., 583 399 

Huskie v. Griffin, New Hampshire, 1909, 74 Atl., 595, 75 

N. H., 345 362-3 

Huttig Sash & Door Co. v. Fuelle, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Mo.), 

1906, 143 Fed., 363 443 

Ideal Mfg. Co. v. Ludwig, Michigan, 1907, 112 N. W., 

723, 149 Mich., 133 395 

International, etc., Ry. v. Greenwood, Texas, 1893, 21 S. W. 

Rep., 559, 2 Tex. Circ. App., 76 416-7 

Iron Molders v. Allis Chalmers' Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. of 

App. (Wis.), 1908, 166 Fed., 45 446, 448 

Irving v. Joint District Council, U. B. of Carpenters, U. S. 

Circ. Ct. (N. Y.), 1910, 180 Fed., 896 449 



APPENDIX 463 

Iverson v. Dilno et al., Montana, 191 1, 119 Pac, 719, 44 

Mont., 270. 
Jackson v. Stanfield, Indiana, 1894, 36 N. E., 345, 137 Ind., 

592 50, 187, 196, 392 

Jacobs v. Cohen, New York, 1905, 76 N. E., 5, 183 N. Y., 

207 381 

Jensen v. Waiters' Union, Washington, 1905, 81 Pac, 1069, 

39 Wash., 531 429-30 

Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, New Jersey, 1902, 53 

Atl., 230, 63 N. J. Eq., 759 368 

Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, New York, 1881, 9 

Abb. N. C, 393, 60 Howard P., 168 aff. 24 Hun., 

489 371 

Jones v. Leslie, Washington, 1910, 112 Pac, 81, 61 Wash., 

107 430 

Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gin & Machine Works, Georgia, 

1908, 62 S. E., 236, 131 Ga., 336 409 

Jordahl v. Hayda, California, 1905, 82 Pac, 1079, 1 Cal. 

App., 696 199, 421 

Joyce v. Great Northern Ry. Co., Minnesota, 1907, no N. 

W., 975, 100 Minn., 225 45, 190, 398 

Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers' Local 

Union No. 131, et al., Indiana, 1905, 75 N. E., 877, 

165 Ind., 421 178, 202, 393 

Kellogg v. Sowerby, New York, 1904, 93 App. Div., 124, 

87 N. Y. Supp., 412; also, 1907, 83 N. E., 47, 190 

N. Y., 370 380, 382 

Kemp v. Div. No. 241, Ry. Employees, Illinois, 19 10, 153 

111. App., 344 391 

Kolley et al. v. Robinson, U. S. Circ. Ct., App. (Mo.), 191 1, 

187 Fed., 415 449-50 

Lawlor et al., v. Loewe et al., U. S. Circ Ct. of App., 

1911, 187 Fed., 522 455 

Lennon, ex parte, U. S. Circ Ct. App., 1894, 64 Fed., 320, 

1897, 166 U. S., 548 437 

Lewis v. Huie-Hodge Lumber Co., Louisiana, 1908, 46 So., 

686, 121 La., 658 412 



464 BOYCOTTS 

Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, et al. } Mon- 
tana, 1908, 96 Pac, 127, 37 Mont., 264. .201, 209, 229, 

237, 424-6 
Locker v. American Tobacco Co., New York, 1907, 121 

App. Div., 443 381-2 

Loewe v. Lawlor, U. S. Circ. Ct., 1906, 148 Fed., 924, 208 

U. S., 274. 
Loewe v. Lawlor, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1908, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep., 

301 454 

Loewe et al. v. California Federation of Labor et al. } 1 905, 

U. S. Circ. Ct. (Cal.), 139 Fed., 71 443 

Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, Missouri, 1908, 114 S. W., 

997, 215 Mo., 421 184, 400 

London Guarantee, etc., Co. v. Horn, Illinois, 1902, 101 

111. App., 355; also 69 N. E., 526, 206 111., 493. . 187, 388 
Longshore Printing Co. v. Howell, Oregon, 1894, 3$ Pac, 

547, 26 Ore., 527 52, 178, 427-8 

Louis Bossert & Sons v. U. Br. Carpenters & Joiners, New 

York, 1912, 137 N. Y. Supp., 321, 77 Misc., 592.. .383 
Lucke v. Clothing Cutters', etc., Assembly, Maryland, 1893, 

26 Atl., 505, 77 Md., 396 187, 366 

Macauley v. Tierney, Rhode Island, 1895, 33 Atl., 1, 19 

R. I., 255 50, 178, 202, 363 

McCord v. Thompson Starrett Co., New York, 19 10, 92 

N. E., 1090, 198 N. Y., 587, affirming 113 N. Y. Supp., 

385, 129 App. Div., 130 382-3 

McCormick, In re New York, 1909, 117 N. Y. Supp., 70, 

132 App. Div., 921 382 

McDonald v. 111. Cent. Ry. Co., Illinois, 1900, 58 N. E., 

463, 187 111., 529 46, 389 

March v. Bricklayers' & Plasterers' Union, Connecticut, 1906, 

63 Atl., 291, 79 Conn., 7 357 

Martell v. White, Massachusetts, 1904, 69 N. E., 1085, J 85 

Mass., 255 193, 360-1 

Martin v. McFall, New Jersey, 1903, 55 Atl., 465, 65 N. J. 

Eq., 91 , 369 



APPENDIX 465 

Marx v. Haas Jeans Clothing Co., Missouri, 1902, 67 S. W., 

391, 168 Mo., 133 228, 399 

Master Builders' Ass'n v. Domascio, Colorado, 1901, 63 

Pac, 782, 16 Colo. App., 25 424 

Master Horseshoers' Prot. Ass'n v. Quinlivan, N. Y., 1903, 

83 App. Div., 459, 82 N. Y. Supp., 288 379 

Matthews v. Shankland, New York, 1898, 56 N. Y. Supp., 

123, 25 Misc., 604 375-6 

Mattison v. Lakeshore & Michigan S. Ry. Co., Ohio, 1895, 

3 Ohio, Dec, 526 42, 45, 402-3 

May v. Wood, Massachusetts, 1898, 51 N. E., 191, 172 

Mass., 11.... 360 

Mayer v. Stonecutters' Ass'n, New Jersey, 1890, 20 Atl., 

492, 47 N, J. Eq., 519 368 

Mears Slayton Lumber Co. v. District Council of Chicago, 

Illinois, 1910, 156 111. App., 327 391 

Meier v. Speer, Arkansas, 1910, 132 S. W., 988, 96 Ark., 

618 408 

Mills v. U. S. Print. Co., New York, 1904, 99 App. Div., 

605, 91 N. Y. Supp., 185 .203, 237, 380-1 

Mogul S. S. Co. v. Macgregor, England, 1891, 23 Q. B. O., 

598, 66 L. T., N. S., 1, 61 L. J. Q. B., 295. • .242-243 
Montgomery, Ward & Co. v. So. Dakota Retail Merchants, 

etc., Ass'n, U. S. Circ. Ct. (So. Dakota), 1907, 150 

Fed., 413 443-4 

Moores & Co. v. Bricklayers' Union, Ohio, 1890, 23 Weekly 

L. B., 48, 10 Ohio Dec, 645 402 

Murdock v. Walker, Pennsylvania, 1893, 25 Atl., 492, 152 

Pa. St., 595 384 

My Maryland Lodge No. 186, Intern. Ass'n of Machinists ct 

al. v. Adt, Maryland, 1905, 59 Atl. Rep., 721, 100 

Md., 238 366-7 

National Fireproofing Co. v. Mason Builders' Ass'n, U. S. 

Circ Ct. of App. (N. Y.), 169 Fed., 259; also 145 

Fed., 260. 
National Protective Ass'n v. Cummings, New York, 1902, 

63 N. E., 369, 170 N. Y., 315 178, 202, 237, 378-9 



'466 BOYCOTTS 

New York C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Schaffer, Ohio, 1902, 62 
N. E., 1036, 65 Ohio St., 414 .46, 404 

N. Y. L. E. & W. R. Co. 0. Wenger, Ohio, 1887, 17 Weekly- 
Law Bui., 306, 9 Ohio Dec, 815 401 

O'Brien v. People, Illinois, 1905, 75 N. E., 108, 216 111., 

354 389 

Old Dominion Steamship Co. v. McKenna, U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(N. Y.), 1887, 30 Fed., 48, 18 Abbott, N. C, 262.. 

431-2 
Olive v. Van Patten, Texas, 1894, 255 S. W., 428, 7 Tex. 

Civ. App., 631 417 

Oneil v. Behanna, Pennsylvania, 1897, 37 Atl., 843, 182 

Pa. St., 236 385 

Oxley Stave Co. v. Hopkins, U. S. Circ. Ct. App., 1897, 

83 Fed., 912 206, 215, 216, 232, 440-1 

Park (John D.) & Sons Co. v. National Wholesale Drug 

Ass'n, 1903, 175 N. Y., 1 50, 232, 375 

Parker v. Bricklayers' Union No. 1, Ohio, 1889, 10 Ohio 

Dec. (Reprint), 458, 21 Wkly. Law B., 223 401-2 

J. P. Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council, California, 

1908, 98 Pac.,1027, 154 California, 581.. 193, 237, 422-3 
Patch Mfg. Co. v. Protection Lodge, etc., Vermont, 1905, 

60 AtL, 74, 77 Vt., 294 364-5 

Payne v. Railway Co., Tennessee, 1884, 49 Am. Rep., 666, 

13 Lea, 507 197, 231, 415 

People v. Chandler, New York, 1900, 54 App. Div., ill, 

66 N. Y. Supp., 391 376 

People v. Kostka, New York, 1886, 47 N. Y. Crim. R., 

429 372 

People v. McFarlin, New York, 1904, 89 N. Y. Supp., 527, 

43 Misc., 591 380 

People v. Radt, New York, 1900, 15 N. Y. Crim. R., 174, 

71 N. Y. Supp., 846 376-7 

People v. Wilzig, New York, 1886, 4 N. Y. Crim. R., 

403 371-2 

Piano & Organ Workers' International Union v. Piano & 
Organ Supp. Co., Illinois, 1906, 124 111. App., 353. .390 



APPENDIX 467 

Pickett v. Walsh, Massachusetts, 1906, 78 N. E., 753, 192 

Mass., 572 361 

Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, Local No. 8760, California, 

1909, 103 Pac, 324, 156 Cal., 70; also 149 CaL, 429, 
86 Pac, 806 237, 423 

Plant v. Woods, Massachusetts, 1900, 57 N. E., ion, 176 
Mass., 492 191, 195, 197, 213, 360 

Purington v. Hinehlifr", Illinois, 1905, 76 N. E., 47, 219 
111., 159 186, 389-90 

Purvis v. United Brotherhood of Carp, and Joiners, Penn- 
sylvania, 1906, 63 Atl., 585, 214 Pa. St., 348. .188, 195, 

385-6 

Quinn v. Leathern, England, 1901, 85 L. T., 289.. 183, 244 

Raycroft v. Tainter, Vermont, 1896, 35 Atl., 53, 68 Vt., 

219 365 

Reynolds v. Davis, Massachusetts, 1908, 84 N. E., 457, 198 
Mass., 294 361 

Reynolds v. Everett, New York, 1894, 39 N. E., 72, 144 

N. Y., 189 374 

Reynolds v. Plumbers' Material Prot. Ass'n, New York, 

1900, 63 N. Y. Supp., 303, 30 N. Y. Misc., 709 377 

Rhodes v. Granby Cotton Mills, South Carolina, 1910, 68 

S. E., 824 4H-5 

Richter Bros. v. Journeymen Tailors' Union, Ohio, 1890, 

24 Wkly. L. Bui., 189 402 

Riggs v. Waiters' Alliance Local, Ohio, 1898, 5 Ohio N. P., 

386 403 

Robison v. Texas Pine Land Ass'n, Texas, 1897, 4° S. W., 

843 417 

Rocky Mt. Bell Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of 

Labor, Montana, 1907, 156 Fed., 809 445 

Rogers v. Evarts, New York, 1891, 17 N. Y. Supp., 264. .373 
Rourke v. Elk Drug Co., New York, 1902, 77 N. Y. Supp. 

373, 75 App. Div., 145 379 

Rowan v. Butler, Indiana, 1908, 85 N. E., 714 393 

Ruddy v. United Ass'n Journeymen Plumbers, New Jersey, 

1910, 75 Atl., 742, 79 N. J. L., 467 370 



468 BOYCOTTS 

Ryan v. Burger & Hower Brewing Co., New York, 1891, 

59 Hun., 625, 13 N. Y. Supp., 660 373 

St. Louis S. W. Ry. Co. of Texas v. Hixon, Texas, 191 1, 

137 S. W., 343, 104 Tex., 267 418 

Schneider v. Local Union No. 60, Louisiana, 1906, 40 S., 

700, 116 La., 270 412 

Schlang v. Ladies' Waist Makers' Union Local 25, I. L. G. 

W. U., New York, 1910, 124 N. Y. Supp., 289, 67 

Misc., 22 1 382 

Schwarcz v. Intern. Ladies' Garment Workers' Union, New 

York, 1910, 124 N. Y. Supp., 968, 68 Misc., 528.-382 
Scottish Cooperative Wholesale Society v. Glasgow Fleshers' 

Trade Defense Ass'n and others, Scotland, 1898, 35 

Scot. L. Rep., 645 243 

Seattle Brewing & Malting Co. v. Hansen, U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(Cal.), 1905, 144 Fed., ion 442 

Sherry v. Perkins, Massachusetts, 1888, 17 N. E., 307, 147 

Mass., 218 359 

Shine et ah v. Fox Brothers' Mfg. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. of 

App. (Mo.), 1907, 156 Fed., 357 445-5 

Sinsheimer v. United Garment Workers, New York, 1894, 

77 Hun., 215, 28 N. Y. Supp., 321 373-4 

Standard Oil Co. v. Doyle, Kentucky, 1904, 82 S. W., 271, 

118 Ky., 662 4 11 

State v. Duncan et al., Vermont, 1906, 63 Atl., 225, 78 Vt., 

364 ■ ■ ...-.365 

State v. Dyer, Vermont, 1894, 32 Atl., 814, 67 Vt., 790. .364 
State v. Glidden, Connecticut, 1887, 8 Atl., 890, 55 Conn., 

46 184, 187, 188, 207, 356-7 

State ex rel. Durner v. Huegin, Wisconsin, 1901, 85 N. W., 

i046, no Wis., 189 4°5 

State v. E. C. Jacobs, Ohio, 1899, 7 Ohio N. P. Rep., 261 ..403 
State v. Stewart, Vermont, 1887, 9 Atl., 559, 59 Vt., 

273 187, 197, 364 

State v. Stockford, Connecticut, 1904, 58 Atl., 769, 77 Conn., 

227 357 



APPENDIX 469 

State v. Van Pelt, North Carolina, 1904, 49 S. E., 177, 136 

N. C, 633 55, 216, 413 

M. Steinert & Sons Co. v. Tagen, Massachusetts, 191 1, 93 

N. E., 584, 207 Mass., 394 361-2 

Sumwalt Ice Co. v. Knickerbocker Ice Co. of Baltimore City, 

Maryland, 191 1, 80 Atl., 48, 114 Md., 403 367 

Sun Printing & Pub. Co. v. Delaney, New York, 1900, 48 

App. Div., 623, 62 N. Y. Supp. 750 376 

Tallman v. Gaillard, New York, 1899, 57 N. Y. Supp. 419, 

27 Misc., 114 376 

Tanenbaum v. N. Y. Fire Insurance Exchange, New York, 

1900, 68 N. Y. Supp., 342, 33 Misc., 134 377 

Temperton v. Russell, England, 1893, 62 L. J. Q. B., 412, 

1 Q. B., 715 243 

Thomas v. C. N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(Ohio) , 1894, 62 Fed., 803 199, 438 

Toledo, A. A., etc., v. Pennsylvania Co., U. S. Circ. Ct. 

(Ohio), 1893, 54 Fed., 730, 746 434-5 

Trapp v. Du Bois, New York, 1902, 76 App. Div., 314, 78 

N. Y. Supp., 505 378 

Tuttle v. Buck, Minnesota, 1909, 119 N. W., 946, 107 

Minn., 145 398 

Ulery v. Chicago Live Stock Exchange, Illinois, 1894, 54 

111. App., 233 178, 388 

Union Labor Hospital v. Vance Redwood Lumber Co., Ore- 
gon, 191 1, 112 Pac, 886, 158 CaL, 551 428 

U. S. v. Agler, Indiana, 1894, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Ind.), 62 

Fed., 824 436 

U. S. v. Cassidy, U. S. Circ. Ct. (CaL), 1895, 67 Fed., 

698 439-40 

U. S. v. Debs, U. S. Circ. Ct. (111.), 1894, 63 Fed., 436, 

64 Fed., 724, 65 Fed., 210; see also Debs, In re. . .438-9 
U. S. v. Elliott, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Mo.), 1894, 62 Fed., 

801 437-8 

U. S. v. Haggerty, U. S. Circ. Ct., 1902 (W. Va.), 116 

Fed., 510 44 1 



470 BOYCOTTS 

U. S. v. Kane, U. S. Circ. Ct. D., Colorado, 1885, 23 Fed., 
748 431 

U. S. v. Patterson, U. S. Circ. Ct., Mass., 1893, 55 Fed., 
605 433 

U. S. v. Raish et ah, U. S. Circ. Ct. (111.), 1908, 163 Fed., 

911 445-6 

U. S. v. Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of N. A., U. 
S. Circ. Ct. (La.), 1893, 54 Fed., 994 434 

U. S. Heater Co. v. Iron Moulders' Union of N. A., Mich- 
igan, 1902, 88 N. W., 889, 129 Mich., 354 395 

Van der Piatt v. Undertakers' Ass'n of Passaic Co., New 
Jersey, 1905, 62 Atl., 453, 7° N. J. Eq., 116 369 

Van Horn v. Van Horn, New Jersey, 1894, 28 Atl., 669, 
56 N. J. L., 318; also 21 Atl., 1069, 53 N. J. Law, 

5H 368 

Vegelahn v. Guntner, Massachusetts, 1890, 44 N. E., 1077, 

167 Mass., 92 193, 204, 215, 218, 231, 359-60 

Wabash Ry. Co., In re., U. S. Circ. Ct. (Mo.), 1885, 24 

Fed., 217 43 1 

Wabash Ry. Co. v. Young, Indiana, 1904, 69 N. E., 1003, 

162 Ind., 102 46, 392-3, 431 

Walker v. Cronin, Massachusetts, 1871, 107 Mass., 555. .359 
Walsh v. Ass'n of Master Plumbers of St. Louis, Missouri, 

1902, 71 S. W., 455, 97 Mo. App., 280 399-40 

Walsh v. Wright, New York, 1890, 40 App. Div., 51 3. .372-3 
Waterhouse v. Hugh M. Comer, U. S. Circ. Ct. (Ga.), 

1893, 55 Fed., 149 435 

Webb v. Drake, Louisiana, 1899, 26 So., 791, 52 La. Ann., 

290 411-12 

Wesley v. Native Lumber Co., Mississippi, 1910, 53 S., 346, 

97 Miss., 814 413 

Weston v. Barnicoat, Massachusetts, 1900, 56 N. E., 619, 

1 75 Mass., 454 360 

West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 

West Virginia, 1901, 40 S. E., 591, 50 W. Va., 611. . 

214, 419 



APPENDIX 471 

Wick China Co. v. Brown, Pennsylvania, 1894, 3° Atl., 261, 
164 Pa. St., 449 385 

Willcutt & Sons Co. v. Bricklayers' Benevol. & Protect. 
Union No. 3, Massachusetts, 1908, 85 N. E., 897, 200 
Mass., no 361 

Willis v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., Georgia, 1904, 48 S. E., 177, 
120 Ga., 59 45, 409 

Wills v. Central Ice Co., Texas, 1905, 88 S. W., 265, 39 
Tex. Civ. App., 483 418 

Willner v. Silverman, Maryland, 1909, 71 Atl., 962, 109 

Md., 341 367 

Workingmen's Amalgamated Council of N. O. v. U. S., 
U. S. Circ. Ct. of App. (La.), 1893, 57 Fed., 85. . . -434 

Worthington v. Waring, Massachusetts, 1892, 32 N. E., 
744, 157 Mass., 421 359 

Wyeman v. Deady, Connecticut, 1906, 65 Atl., 129, 79 Conn., 
4H 357 



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PARTIAL LIST OF PUBLICATIONS TO WHICH REFERENCE IS 
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Adams, T. S., and H. L. Sumner. Labor Problems. New 

York, 1 910. 
Allen, Charles C. Injunction and Organized Labor. Trans- 
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331. 1894. 
American Digest, including Decennial Edition and American 

Digest annotated. A complete digest of all reported 

American cases from the earliest times to the present. 

See especially under sections referring to "Conspiracy" 

"Injunction" "Monopoly." St. Paul. 
American and English Encyclopaedia of Law. See especially 

Labor Combinations and Injunctions. Northport, N. Y., 

1901. 
American Federation of Labor. Convention Proceedings. 

1881 to 1912. 
American Federation of Labor. Statement and Evidence in 

Support of Petition against U. S. Steel Corporation. 

Washington, 1910. 
Anti-Boycott Association. Literature of, including Million 

Against One. 1 904, etc., New York. 
Bolen, Geo. L. Getting a Living. New York, 1903. 
Bryan, James W. The Development of the English Laiu of 

Conspiracy. Baltimore, 1909. 
Carlton, Frank F. The Llistory and Problems of Organized 

Labor. New York, 191 1. 
Clark, John Bates. Essentials of Economic Theory. New- 
York, 1909. 

473 



474 BOYCOTTS 

Commons, John R. Trade Unionism and Labor Problems. 
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Cooke, Fred. H. The Law of Combination, Monopolies 
and Labor Unions. Chicago, 1909. 

Crosby, Oscar T. Strikes. New York, 19 10. 

Debs, Eugene V. Debs: His Life, Writings and Speeches. 
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Documentary History of American Industrial Society. Espe- 
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Eddy, Arthur J. The Law of Combinations. Chicago, 1901. 

Edwards, Alba M. The Labor Legislation of Connecticut. 
American Economic Association, Third Series, v. 8. 
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Ely, Richard T. The Labor Movement in America. New 
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Encyclopaedia of Pleading and Practice, especially under 
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Friedman, Morris. The Pinkerton Labor Spy. New York, 
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Gompers, Samuel. Labor in Europe and America. New 
York, 1910. 

Groat, George G. Attitude of American Courts in Labor 
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Huebner, Grover G. Boycotting. Madison, 1906. 

Krauthoff, L. C. Malice as an Ingredient in Boycott Ac- 
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Lawyers' Reports Annotated. A digest. Rochester, N. Y., 
1907. 

Martin, Wm. A. A Treatise on the Law of Labor Unions. 
Washington, 19 10. 

Maschke, Prof. Boycott, Sperre und Aussperrung. Eine 
Sozialrechtliche Studie. Jena, 191 1. 

Merritt, Walter G. The Neglected Side of Trade Union- 
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Mitchell, John. Organized Labor. Philadelphia, 1903. 

Moody, John. Manual of Corporations. New York. An- 
nual. 



APPENDIX 475 

National Consumers' League. Literature of, including recent 

annual reports. New York. 
Portenar, A. J. Problems of Organized Labor. New York, 

1912. 
Pouget, Emil. Sabotage, with introduction by Arturo Gio- 

vannitti. Chicago, 1912. 
Ralston, Jackson H. Use and Abuse of Injunctions in Trade 

Disputes. Philadelphia, 19 10. 
Reports of Court Decisions, State, Sectional and Federal. 
Ross, E. A. Changing America. New York, 19 12. 
St. John, Vincent. The I. W. W ., Its History, Structure 

and Methods. Newcastle, Pa. Date not given. 
Seager, Henry R. Introduction to Economics. New York, 

1907. 
Seligman, E. R. A. Principles of Economics. New York, 

1908. 
Spedden, Ernest R. The Trade Union Label. Baltimore, 

1911. 
Stimson, Frederic Jesup. Handbook to the Labor Law of the 

U. S. New York, 1896. 
Stockton, Frank T. The Closed Shop in American Trade 

Unions. Baltimore, 191 1. 
Streighthoff, Frank. Distribution of Incomes in the U. S. 

New York, 19 12. 
Union Label Trades Department. A. F. of L., including 

Convention Proceedings. Washington. 
Walling, Wm. English. Socialis?n as It Is, New York, 

1912. 
Wayland, J. A. (publisher). Spies in the Trade Unions. 

Girard, Kan., 1904. 
Weyl, Walter. The New Democracy. New York, 191 2. 

PUBLIC DOCUMENTS 

Great Britain. The Report of the Royal Commission on 
Trade Disputes and Trade Combinations. London, 
1906. 



476 BOYCOTTS 

Illinois. Annual Report Bureau of Labor Statistics, 1886. 
Massachusetts. Recent Legislation Affecting Workmen. 

Part of Annual Report for 1907 of Bureau of Statistics 

of Labor, 1907. 
Massachusetts. Labor Injunctions in Massachusetts. Labor 

Bulletin No. 70, 1909. 
Massachusetts. Litigation Arising from Labor Disputes and 

Related Causes in the Massachusetts Courts. Labor 

Bulletin No. 78, 19 10. 
New York. Annual Reports Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 

1885 to 1892, inclusive, and 191 1. 
Wisconsin. Annual Report of Bureau of Labor Statistics, 

1885-6. 

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 

Report of Industrial Commission, especially v. 19, part 1, 
ch. III. Also vols. 5, 8, 12, 14, 15, 17, 19, 1902. 

Report on the Chicago Strike of June-July, i8g4, by the 
United States Strike Commission, 1895. 

Labor Disturbances in Colorado. Report of Commissioner 
of Labor, 1905. 

Report on Strike at the Bethlehem Steel Works. Sen. Doc. 
521, 61st Cong., 2nd Ses., 1910. 

Report on Condition of Women and Child Wage Earners 
in the U. S. Senate Document 645, v. 1, 1910. 

Maintenance of a Lobby to Influence Legislation. Hearings 
before a sub-committee of the Committee on the Judi- 
ciary, U. S. Senate, 63d Cong., 1st Session, pursuant to 
S. Res., 92, 1913. 

Conditions in the Paint Creek District of West Virginia. 
Hearings before a sub-committee of the Committee of 
Education and Labor, U. S. Senate, 63d Cong., 1st 
Ses., 1913. 

Anti-Injunction Bill. Complete hearings before the Commit- 
tee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives on 
H. R., 89. 57th Cong., 1st Sess., 1904. 



APPENDIX 477 

Limiting Federal Injunctions. Hearings before a sub-com- 
mittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, U. S. Senate, 
62d Cong., 3d Sess., on H. R. 23635, 1913. 

The Boycott of American Manufactured Goods by the Peo- 
ple of China. Hearings before the Immigration Com- 
mittee, 1906. 

Labor Laws in the United States. Twenty-second Annual 
Report Bureau of Labor, 1907; also Bulletin of Labor, 
1907; also Bulletin of Labor, No. 97, Nov., 191 1. 

Decisions of Courts Affecting Labor. In Bulletins of Labor 
edited by Lindley D. Clark. Bi-monthly until 191 2. 

Injunction Data Filed by Samuel Gompers. Washington, 
1908. 

Statistical Abstract of the United States. Annual. 

Also see Select List of References on Boycotts and In- 
junctions in Labor Disputes. Compiled under the Di- 
rection of H. H. B. Meyer, Chief Bibliographer, 
Library of Congress. Washington, 191 1. 



MAGAZINE ARTICLES 

American Academy of Political and Social Science. 'Admin- 
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1910. 

Ames, J. B. "How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of 
the Wrongful Motive of the Act." Harvard Law Re- 
view, v. 18, pp. 411-422. 

Antonelli, E. "Boycottage Turc." La Grande Revue, v. 
56, p. 338, 1909. 

Boyle, James. "Organized Labor and Court Decisions." 
Forum, v. 42, pp. 535-51, 1909- 

Bradstreet's. "Boycotts." V. 12, pp. 394-397, Dec. 19, 1885. 

Bryan, James Wallace. "Injunctions Against Strikes." 
American Law Review, v. 40, pp. 42-57 and 196-21 1. 
Jan. to Apr., 1906. 



478 BOYCOTTS 

Burnett, J. The Boycott as an Element in Trades Dis- 
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Caldwell, Henry Clay. "Trial by Judge and Jury." Amer- 
ican Federationist. V. 17, pp. 385-399. May, 1910. 

Cheyney, E. P. "Decisions of the Courts in Conspiracy and 
Boycott Cases." Political Science Quarterly, v. 4, pp. 
261-278. June, 1889. 

Darling, Chas. R. "The Law of Strikes and Boycotts." 
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Darling, Chas. R. "Recent American Decisions and English 
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Freund, Ernst. "The Legality of a Boycott in Germany." 
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1906. 

Godkin, E. L. "Genesis of Boycotts." Nation, v. 31, pp. 
437-438. 1880. 

Gompers, Samuel. "The Boycott as a Legitimate Weapon." 
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Gompers, Samuel. "Is the Boycott un-American?" Am. 
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Haldane, R. B. "The Laborer and the Law." Contem- 
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Huffcut, E. W. "Interference with Contracts and Business 
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Irwin, Will. "The American Newspaper." Collier s Mag- 
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Jones, W. Bence. "Boycotted." Contemporary Rev., v. 39, 
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McWilliams, Robt. L. "Evolution of the Law Relating to 
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McQuinston, F. B. "Strike Breakers." Independent, v. 53, 
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APPENDIX 479 

Marcosson, Isaac F. "The Fight for the Open Shop." 
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Schafrner, Margaret Anna. "Effect of the Recent Boycott 
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Seager, Henry R. "The Legal Status of Trade Unions in 
the United Kingdom, with Conclusions Applicable to 
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Dec, 1907. 

Selover, Geo. H. "Economics of Boycotts." Social Econom- 
ics, v. 4, p. 257. 1894- 

Smith, Jeremiah. "Crucial Issues in Labor Litigation." Harv. 
Law Rev., v. 20, pp. 253-279; pp. 345-362; pp. 429- 

455- 1907. 
Stephen, J. F. "Suppression of Boycotting." igth Century, 

v. 20, p. 765. 1886. 
Thompson, Seymour D. "Injunction Against Boycotting." 

Am. Law Rev., v. 33, pp. 885-888. Nov.-Dec, 1899; 

v. 34, pp. 161-185. Apr., 1900. 
Vinton, ' A. D. "History of Boycotting." Magazine of 

Western History, v. 5, pp. 211-224. 1886. 
White, Henry. "Labor Unions in Presidential Campaigns." 

North American Review, v. 188, pp. 372-382. 1908. 
Wigmore, John H. "The Boycott and Kindred Practices as 

Ground of Damages." Am. Law Rev., vol. 21, pp. 

509-532. July-Aug., 1887. 



PERIODICALS 



American Federationist. 
American Industries. 
American Law Register. 



4B0 BOYCOTTS 

American Law Review. 

Annals of American Academy of Political and Social Science. 
Appeal to Reason. 
Contemporary Review. 
Harvard Law Review. 
International Socialist Review. 
Journal of Political Economy. 
Political Science Quarterly. 
The Survey. 
Trade Union Journals. 

New York newspapers, especially New York Times, Call, 
World and Globe. 



INDEX 



Adams, T. S., 60, 64, 70, 275- 

276. 
Akron Press, 36. 
Allen, Charles C, 268. 
Altgeld, Governor, 104. 
American Federationist, 67, in, 

120, I4I, I44, I45, I46, 171. 

American Federation of Labor, 
accomplishments, 278; begin- 
nings of, 70; boycott activi- 
ties, 65, 105, Ch. VII, 139 ff., 
163, 345, 347, 350; label of, 
62 ff. ; obstacles of, 265, 315, 
316; political action in, 52, 
335 «. 

American Flint, 148, 294. 

American Industries, 36, 38, 48, 
282, 293, 294. 

Ames, Prof. J. B., 220. 

Andrews, Judge, 194, 195-6. 

Ann Arbor Strike, 98-100. 

Anthracite Coal Strike, xvii, 
158-9. 

Anti-Boycott Association, 134, 
149, 158, 272, 288. 

Anti-Coolie Law and Order As- 
sociation, 75. 

Anti-Injunction bills, 255 ff. 

Archbold, J. D., 326. 

Arthur, Grand Chief, 98, 99. 

Askwith, G. R., 218, 246. 

Associated Press, 313. 

Austria, 253. 

Bacon, Bill of Congressman, 259. 
Bakeman, Robert A., 317. 
Baker, Judge, 436, 448. 
Bannon, Harry M., 284. 
Barnum, Gertrude, 296-7. 
Bartlett, Congressman, 255, 258, 

260. 
Bechtold, George, 140. 
Beck, James, 149. 
Belgium, 253. 
Benney, Win. M., 281. 
Benson, Allan L., 305. 
Big business and boycotts, 119, 

162. 



481 



Bird, J. Philip, 283. 

Bishop, Dr., on malice, 221. 

Blacklist, 36, 39 ff., 215, 243, 270, 
289. See also Appendix. 

Blaine, James G., campaign, 51. 

Blair, Senator, 172. 

Boston, 29, 31, 310. 

Bowen, Lord, 220. 

Boycott, Captain, 23 ff. 

Boycotter, The, 51, 347. 

Bradstreet's, 71, 72-7, 161. 

Brampton, Lord, 183. 

Brewer, Judge, 106, 107, 439. 

Brooklyn, 31, 43, 277. 

Brooklyn Eagle, 46, 54, 268. 

Brooks, John Graham, 342. 

Brownell, Atherton, 282. 

Bucks' Stove and Range Co., xx, 

64, 71, no, 134-150, 157, 163, 

178, 179, 185, 186, 188, 203, 

234, 235, 288, 297, 327, 331, 

. 333, 336, 345, 450 ff. 

Building Trades, boycotts of, 

157. 
Bureau of Labor Reports : 
Illinois, 49, 71, 77-79. 
Mass., 246. 
New York, 51, 57-58, 70, 71, 

Ch. V., 162, 268, 348. 
Wisconsin, 71, 78, 80. 
Burnett, John, 250. 
Butterick patterns, boycott of, 
156, 157, 161, 272. 



Caldwell, Judge, 206, 214, 216, 

232, 430, 440.^ 
Canada, boycott in, 157. 
Canadian Bank of Commerce, 36. 
Carnegie Steel Company, 44. 
Carpenter, Judge, 182, 184. 
Catholic Societies, Am. Fed. of, 

32. 
Causes of boycotts, 93-94. 164. 
Charities and Commons, 277. 
Cheyney, E. P., 205. 
Chicago, 32, 33, 100, 101, 323. 
Chinese boycotts, 53, 73, 75. 



482 



INDEX 



Citizens' Industrial Alliance, 135, 

.300, 311. 
Civic Federation, 340. 
Civil Action, 239. See also Ap- 
pendix. 
Clabaugh, Chief Justice, 144, 

149. 
Clarendon, Lord, 206. 
Clark, Lindley D., 177. 
Clark, Prof. John B., 269. 
Clayton, Congressman, 255, 258, 

260. 
Cleveland, 32, 137; strike in, 

296-7. 
Cleveland, Grover, 100, 104. 
Closed shop, 38, 152. 
Coercion, 174-6, 194 ff., 230 ff. 

See also Appendix. 
Cohen, Arthur, 221, 247. 
Cole, Congressman, 284. 
Collegiate Alumnae, Ass'n of, 35. 
Colorado, Labor Struggle in, 41, 

42, 292-3, 300-2, 305, 320, 

322-3. 
Coman, 29. 
Combination, law of, 181 ff., 

201 ff. 
Compound boycott, 64-5. 
Congestion, Committee on, New 

York, 277. 
Congress, attempts to legalize 

boycotts in, 255 ff. 
Conspiracy, see Chapters XII, 

XIII, XV. See also Ap- 
pendix. 
Constabulary, 320-2. 
Consumers' boycott, 31 ff. 
Consumers' League, 33 ff. 
Contempt proceedings, 99, 105 ff., 

145 ff., 239, 255. See also 

Appendix. 
Continental Congress, 29. 
Cooley, 221, 227, 228. 
Cooperatives, trade union, 333. 
Corporations' Auxiliary Co., 

289 ff. 
Corruption in trade unions, 273. 
Coudry, Congressman, 284. 
Courts, control of, 325-8; atti- 
tude on boycotting, 234 ff. 

See also Appendix. 
Cox, Judge, 154. 
Crane, A. K., 292-3. 
Criminal procedure in boycott 

cases, 107 ff., 239. See also 

Appendix. 



Cuba, boycott in, 157. 
Cushing, Sec, 286. 

Danbury Hatters' boycott, xx, 
64, 71, 113, 155 ff., 234, 235, 
286, 288, 331, 333, 336, 345, 
454 ff. 

Darling, Chas. R., 217, 218, 222, 
226, 229. 

Darlington, J. J., 149. 

Davenport, Daniel, 149. 

Daughters of Liberty, 29. 

Dawson, Governor, 299. 

Debs, Eugene V., 100 ff., 234. 

Definitions of boycotts, 27, 60, 
63 ff. 

Democratic party, 335, 336, 337. 

Denver Republican, 323. 

Deputy Marshals, U. S., 103. 

Detective Agencies, Baldwin- 
Felts, 297 ff ; Burns, Wm. J., 
295; Humphrey, 319; Joy, 
294; Pinkerton, 293, 303. 

Detectives, 297 ff. 

Detroit Nezvs, 36. 

Dicey, Prof. A. V., 205. 

Dickinson, Sec, 32. 

Distinguishing mark, advantage 
of, 124, 125, 131, 163-4. 

Drummond, Judge, 437. 

Dunedin, Lord, 247. 

Duration of boycotts, 92-3. 

Eagle, H. H., 44. 

Earle, Chief Justice, 186. 

Eddy, 188. 

Edwards, Alba M., 47. 

Ellison, Judge, 205. 

Ely, R. T., 40, 41. 

Emery, James A., 282, 284. 

Employers' Associations, 
Building Trades Employers', 
158; Chicago Employers', 
288-289 ; Denver Advertis- 
ers', 311; Employers' Ass'n 
Bureau, 288; Employers' In- 
formation Service, 294; Gar- 
ment Mfrs.', Cleveland, 
320 ; Laundry Owners', 289 ; 
Mfrs.' Bureau of Hartford 
Co., 47; Mfrs.' Information 
Bureau, Cleveland, 137; 
Manufacturing Woodwork- 
ers', 158; Master Carpen- 
ters', 158; National Ass'n 



INDEX 



483 



Mfrs., see under heading; 
National Council for Indus- 
trial Defense, 282 ff. ; Na- 
tional Erectors', 327 ; Na- 
tional Founders', 37, 138, 
139; National Metal Trades', 
47, 287; Stove Founders' 
National Defense, 135, 138, 
140; see also 281 ff. 

Employers' boycott, 35 ff. 

Employers' Liability Law, 336. 

Employment bureaus, 47. 

Erdman Law, 46, 336, 446 ff. 

Erne, Lord, 24. 

Ettor-Giovannitti trial, 54. 

Evening Wisconsin, 80. 

Farmer, Judge, 177, 327. 

Farmers' boycott, 54 ff. 

Federal Commission on Indus- 
trial Relations, xix, xx. 

Federal Courts, on boycotting, 
234 ff., 430 ff. 

Felton, Samuel W., 106. 

Fenner, Justice, 230. 

Fitch, John A., 319-320, 327. 

Fitzgerald, Mayor John, 31. 

Floaten, A. H., 300. 

France, 27, 28, 253. 

Freedom of press and speech, 
198 ff., 227 ff. 

Freund, E., 251. 

Friedman, Morris, 293. 

Fuller, Chief Justice, 153, 186. 

Gardner, Frederic W., 147, 148. 

Garner, Congressman, 284. 

Garoutte, Judge, 228. 

General Managers' Association, 
103, 105, 107. 

Germany, 54, 157, 251-2, 254. 

Gibson, Justice, 183. 

Giovannitti, 340-1. 

Glasscock, Governor, 298-9. 

GoldHeld Sun, 130. 

Gompers, Samuel, on the black- 
list, 43; attempted bribery 
of, 287; on boycotts, 114, 
329, 332, 344, 346, 350; in 
Buck's Stove Case, 134, 137, 
138, 142, 145, 147, 149, 198; 
in Lincoln Farm Ass'n, 37 \ 
on political action, 336; on 
press, 314; on Sherman An- 
ti-Trust Law, 171-3, 261-2; 
on threats, 232 ; see also Ap- 



pendix, Buck's Stove Case, 
450 ff. 

Gould, Judge, 143, 146, 178, 185, 
187, 198, 450. 

Gray, Mrs., 83, 348. 

Great Britain, boycotts in, 28-9, 
250; boycott of British 
goods, 52, 53; law of con- 
spiracy in, 241-251, 254, 262; 
Laborites, 248, 347; Royal 
Commission and Taff Vale 
decision, see post. 

Great Southern Lumber Co., 
320. 

Greece, ostracism in, 27. 

Green, Vice Chancellor, 182, 195. 

Groat, A. B., 136. 

Groat, George G., 210-11. 

Grose, Judge, 207. 

Grosscup, Judge, 437, 448. 

Haldane, R. B., 246. 
Hall, Covington, 44, 303. 
Hallett, Allen P., 207. 
Hammill, Congressman, 259. 
Hammond, Judge, 191. 
Hardie, J. Keir, 347. 
Harlan, Judge, 181, 447. 
Haskins, Kittridge, 284, 285. 
Hatters' boycott, 69-70, 151 ff. 
Hatters' Journal, 151. 
Hayes, Max, 340. 
Haywood, Wm. D., 131. 
Hearst's Magazine, 49, 326. 
Henry, Congressman, 260. 
Hindoo boycott, 53. 
Hoar, Senator, 173, 255. 
Holland, 254. 
Holloway, Judge, 201, 209, 229, 

425. 
Holmes, Justice, 193, 198, 204, 

213, 215, 216, 218, 231, 360, 

442, 447- 
Homestead, strike in, 303, 304. 
Hopkins, Mayor John P., 104. 
House Wives' League of New 

York, 32. 
Huebner, 253. 
Huffcut, E. W., 191. 
Hughes, Congressman, 259. 284. 

77 Lavatore Italiano, 315. 

Illinois, boycotts in, 77-80. 

Industrial Commission Reports, 
evidence before. 41. 232, 270, 
278, 280, 303, 304-5, 346. 350. 



4 8 4 



INDEX 



Industrial Workers of the 
World, 71-2, 129-13 1, 340, 

342-3. 
Industries, boycotts in, 87 ff., 

117 ff., 125 ff. 
Ingalls, Senator, 172. 
Injunction, when used, 239. 
Injury to business and property, 

attitude of law on, 184 ff., 

209 ff. 
Interest, doctrine of, 213 ff. 
International boycott, 53 ff. 
International Socialist Review, 

303, 317, 320. 
Interstate Commerce Law, 99, 

100, 170 ff., 234. 
Intimidation, see Coercion. 
Ireland, 23-7. 
Irwin, Will, 307, 311. 
Italy, 254. 

Jenkins, John J., 284, 285. 
Jenks, Justice, 203, 380. 
Johnson, Rev. C, 318. 
Jones, Richard L., 302, 313. 
Judiciary Committees, 137, 173, 

258, 260, 284, 285, 314. 
Justifiable cause, 191 ff. 

Kelley, Mrs. Florence, 33. 
Kelley, Hugh, 321. 
Kennedy, John C, 281, 339. 
King Edward VII., 247. 
Kirby, John, Jr., 38. 
Knights of Labor, boycotts of, 

75 ff. ; conflicts with A. F. 

of L., 83, no, 121, 165, 286; 

label, 61, 62; politics, 335; 

success, 57, 70. 
Kosciusko guards, 80. 
Krauthoff, L. C, 223, 224. 
Kreyling, David, 140. 

Label Shop, 34. 

Labor boycotts, definition of, 65; 

see also legal decisions in 

Appendix. 
Labor, Committee on, 258, 285. 
Labor, condition of, 275 ff. 
Lacombe, Judge, 154. 
Lamar, Judge, 453. 
Land League, 24. 
Lawrence, Mass., strike at, 130, 

311-12, 314, 320, 324. 
Lee, Herman, 272. 
Legislation on boycotts, 174 ff., 

241 ff., 253 ff-, 255 ff. 



Lemon, 99. 

Lewis, Sir William Thomas, 

247. 
Lincoln, 37, 38. 

Lincoln Farm Association, 37. 
Little Falls, N. Y., strike in, 

317, 319. 
Littlefield, Congressman Charles 

E., 284, 336. 
Lobby, maintenance of, 282 ff. 
Loewe and Company, D. E., 

151 ff., 336. 
London Times, The, 26, 221. 
Love joy, Owen R., 316-317, 324. 
Lubin, Morris, 296, 297. 
Lucas, Edward, 140. 
Lunn, Geo. R., 317. 
Lushington, Sir Godfrey, 219, 

245, 247. 
Lynch, Michael, 321. 

McDermott, James T., 284. 
McKees Rock, strike in, 303. 
McMaster, 29. 
MacNaughten, Lord, 221. 
McPherson, Judge, 148. 
McQueston, F. B., 304. 
McWilliams, Robt. L., 202. 
Mails, U. S., interference with, 

104, 106, 107, 234; see also 

Appendix, Federal Cases. 
Malice, doctrine of, 189 ff., 213 

ff. 
Marcosson, I. F., 288. 
Markly, Sir William, 221. 
Martine, Senator James E., 299, 

306. 
Maurer, James H., 321. 
Meat, boycott of, 31, 32, 33. 
Memorial National Park, 37. 
Metropolitan Magazine, 306. 
Michaelson, 300, 306, 325. 
Militia, 322-5. 
Miller, Attorney General N. C, 

323- 

Miller, Owen, 113. 

Milwaukee Republican, 80. 

Minimum Wage Board, 34. 

Mitchell, John, on blacklist, 40- 
42; on boycott, 158, 331-2, 
344-6, 349; in Buck's Stove 
Case, 134, 145, see also Ap- 
pendix, under Buck's 
Stove; in Colorado strug- 
gle, 302 ; on label, 169. 

Mitchell, Judge, 211-12, 223. 



INDEX 



4 8 5 



Moffitt, John, 151, 152. 

Monopoly, effect on boycott, 163. 

Moody's Manual of Corpora- 
tions, 119, 122. 

Mooney, James, 302. 

Moorhead, Helen H., 34. 

Morrison, Frank, 125, 134, 142, 
145, 147, 149. 

Morrison, Judge, 326. 

Morrow, Judge, 439-40. 

Morse, Charles W., 44. 

Morton, Quinn, 299. 

Mulhall, Colonel Martin M., 
284 ff. 

Murray, Hon. Andrew Graham, 
247. 

National Association of Manu- 
facturers, activities against 
organized labor, 281 ff., 297 ; 
boycott conducted by, 36-8, 
52; in Buck's Stove case, 

135 ff- 
National Bank of No. Am., 44. 
National Council for Industrial 

Defense, 282 ff. 
Negative boycott, 60, 169 ff. 
New England mills, wages in, 

276. 
New York, 31 ff., 44, 51, 76, 82 

ff., 118, 132, 277 
New York Call, 44, 45, 293, 299, 

306, 313, 317. 
New York Globe, 296. 
New York Herald, 31. 
New York Sun, no. 
New York Times, 52, 54, 277. 
New York Tribune, 51, 52, 109, 

no. 
New York World, 284, 285, 286, 

287. 
Noyes, Judge, 154. 

O'Malley, Father John, 23, 24. 
Orchard, Harry, 293. 

Panama Fair, 54. 

Pankhurst, Mrs., 52. 

Parker, Alton B., 16, 202, 231. 

Parnell, 26. 

Parry, David M., 140, 281. 

Paterson, N. J., strike, 131, 297, 

317, 320. 
Patterson, Senator, 310-11. 
Pavlovitch, M., 53. 
Pearre, George E., 255, 284. 



Persian boycott, 53. 

Phelan, 106. 

Philadelphia, boycott in, 31 ; 
Cordwainer's case, 208; 
strikebreaking in, 285-6. 

Phillips, Judge, 437-8. 

Picardy, boycotting in, 28. 

Picketing, 212. 

Pittsburgh Leader, 44. 

Piatt, Judge James P., 153, 154. 

Plumb, Senator, 172. 

Police, 318-320. 

Political action, 334-40. 

Political boycott, 51 ff. 

Pollock, Sir Frederick, 220. 

Portenar, 156, 271, 333. 

Positive boycott, 63 ff. 

Post, C. W., 36, 148. 

Pouget, Emil, 340. 

Powderly, Grand Master, 77, 83. 

Press, control of, 307-15; free- 
dom of, 198 ff., 227 ff. 

Primary boycott, 64, 177 ff. 

Printers' boycott, 70. 

Printers' Bulletin, 80. 

Prohibitionists, 335. 

Publicity, as element in boy- 
cotts, 163. 

Publicity bureaus, 308. 

Pullman strike, 100-7, 3^7- 

Railroads, boycotts, 98 ff. See 

also Appendix. 
Reasons for boycott, 56-60. 
Redpath, James, 23 ff. 
Reid, Whitelaw, 109. 
Republican party, 51, 335. 
Revolution, American, 28 ff. 
Ricker, A. W., 291. 
Robb, Judge, 183, 186, 199, 451. 
Rocky Mountain News, 311. 
Roddenbery, Congressman, 259. 
Roelof and Company, 152. 
Rogers, Judge, 441. 
Rome, Church of, 27. 
Ross, E. A., 312. 
Royal Commission, report of, 

218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 247. 
Russia, 54. 

Sabotage, 340-1. 
San Diego, Calif., 317. 
San Francisco Bulletin, 36. 
Schwab, Chas. M.. 313. 
Schwedtman F.. 285, 2S6. 
Scots, boycott of, 53-4. 



486 



INDEX 



Scott, Alex., 314. 

Scott, Judge, 177, 327. 

Scripps-McRae papers, 36. 

Seager, Henry R., 250. 

Seattle Times, 52. 

Secondary boycott, definition, 64. 

Secret practice of boycotts, 331. 

Seligman, E. R. A., 60. 

Shepard, Chief Justice, 147, 149, 
179, 203, 230, 451-2. 

Sherman Anti-Trust Law, 
amendments proposed, 255- 
257; blacklists and, 235; in 
Danbury Hatters' Case, 113, 
151 ff., 234, 336, 454 ff.; 
Gompers on, 259-62; labor 
and, 259-62; origin of, 170 
ff. ; railroads and, 100, 105-7, 
234. See also Appendix 
under Federal Cases. 

Sherman, Senator, 172. 

Sherwood, Judge, 227, 228. 

Siebold, Louis, 287. 

Smith, J. H., 291. 

Smith, Jeremiah, 189, 192, 205, 
216. 

Social advantage, doctrine of, 

193. 
Socialists, 36, 52, 251, 300, 335- 

40. 
So. Bethlehem, Pa., 321. 
Southern mills, wages in, 276. 
Spargo, John, 342. 
Spedden, E. R., 61, 63. 
Speech, freedom of, 198 ff., 227 

ff-, 307-315. 

Speer, Judge, 435-6. 

Spokane, Wash., 317. 

Springfield Republican, 310. 

"Spy" system, 138, 289 ff. 

St. John, Vincent, 342. 

St. Louis, 139 ff., 286. 

Stamp Act, 29. 

Standard Oil Co., 32. 

Stanley, Congressman, 44, 255, 
260. 

Star Chamber, 206. 

States, boycotting in, 75 ff. 

legal decisions given by 
state and federal courts : 
Alabama, 407, 448; Arizona, 
420; Arkansas, 407-8; Cali- 
fornia, 420-3, 436, 437, 439, 
442, 443 ; Colorado, 423-4 ; 
Connecticut, 356-7, 455 ; 



Delaware, 365-6, 440 ; Flor- 
ida, 407 ; Georgia, 408, 435 ; 
Idaho, 424, 433; Illinois, 
389-91, 432, 437, 438; Indi- 
ana, 391-3; Iowa, 393-4; 
Kansas, 394; Kentucky, 409- 
11; Louisiana, 411, 434; 
Maine, 357-8; Maryland, 
366-7; Massachusetts, 358-62, 
433 5 Michigan, 394-5 ; Min- 
nesota, 395-8; Mississippi, 
412, 449; Missouri, 398-400. 
437, 440, 441, 444, 449 ; Mon- 
tana, 424-6, 445; Nebraska, 
401 ; Nevada, 426, 441, 445 ; 
New Hampshire, 362-3 ; 
New Mexico, 426; New 
Jersey, 367-70; New York, 
370-83, 431, 436, 449; North 
Carolina, 413-4; North Da- 
kota, 426-7; Ohio, 401-4, 
432, 434, 438; Oklahoma, 
414; Oregon, 427-8; Penn- 
sylvania, 383-6; Rhode Isl- 
and, 363; South Carolina, 
414-5; South Dakota, 428, 
443, 445; Tennessee, 415; 
Texas, 415-8; Utah, 428-9; 
Vermont, 363-5 ', Virginia, 
418-9; West Virginia, 419, 
441 ; Wisconsin, 404-6, 436, 
442, 446, 447; Wyoming, 
430. 

State statutes on boycotts, 174 
ff. and in Appendix, under 
each state; on blacklists, 
48 ff. 

Steel Corporation, U. S., 38, 39, 
278, 318, 441. 

Stephen, Sir James Fitzjames, 
221. 

Stewart, Senator, 172. 

Stimson, F. J., 173. 

Stockton, F. T., 66, 349. 

Stone, Melville E., 313. 

Stone, Wm. A., 326. 

Streightoff, Frank, 275. 

Strike-breaking, 285-6, 304-6, 

Strikes, 75, 90-2, 212, 262. 

Success of boycotts, 85-6, 117 ff., 
Ch. X. 

Suffren, Martha Wentworth, 52. 

Sumner, Helen, 60, 64, 70. 

Sundry Civil bill, 255. 

Survey, 298-9, 317, 320, 324, 327. 

Swadeshi movement, 53. 



INDEX 



487 



Taff Vale decision, 247, 337. 

Taft, Wm. H., on combination, 
182 ; on free speech, 199 ; 
in railroad cases, 99, 106, 
107, 434-5, 438; on Sundry 
Civil bill, 259; in So. Beth- 
lehem investigation, 313. 

Teller, Senator, 172. 

Tertiary boycott, 67. 

Theiss Case, 268. 

Threats, 230 ff. See also Coer- 
cion. 

"Tobacco Trust," 121. 

Tracy, Thomas, 332. 

Trade Associations, 49, 50. 

Trade boycott, 49 ff. See also 
legal decisions in Appendix. 

Trades, 87 if., 126. 

Trades Disputes Act, 249, 250, 

347- 

Trades Disputes and Combina- 
tions, Commission on, 247. 

Tridon, A., 342. 

Triest, 153. 

Troops, U. S., 103, 104. 



Unfair list, see "We Don't 
Patronize" List. 

Unions, American Railway, 42, 
45, 71, 100 ff. ; Bakers', 62, 
339; Boot and Shoe Work- 
ers', 63; Brewers', 62, 339; 
Bridge and Structural Iron 
Workers', 342 ; Carpenters', 
157, 158; Cigar Makers', 61, 
62, 63, 83, 121 ; Colorado, F. 
of L., 41 ; Electrotype Mold- 
ers, 143; Foundry Workers, 
140, 141 ; Garment Work- 
ers', 43, 62, 296; Hat and 
Cap Makers', 63, 339; Hat- 
ters', 63, 151 ff. ; Iron Work- 
ers', 140; I. W. W., see 
supra; Locomotive Engi- 
neers', 98, 99, 100; Machin- 
ists', 43, 339; Metal Polish- 
ers', 135, 140, 141, 142; Mill 
and Smeltermen's, 293 ; 
Miners', Western Federa- 
tion of, 71, 131, 292-3, 300, 
339; Mine Workers, United, 
145, 158, 302, 339; Molders', 
135, 137. 138, 148; Railway 
Telegraphers', 293 ; Timber 
Workers', 303; Typographi- 



cal, 51, 52, 70, 156 ff. ; 161; 
see also 43, 62-3, 122, 125-9; 
Appendix ; general head- 
ings 

Union and Transcript, 70. 

Union label, 37, 38, 60-3, 332-3. 

United Mine Workers' Journal, 
145. 

U. S. Engineering Company, 39. 

U. S. Reduction and Refining 
Company, 292. 

Utah Copper Company, 303. 



Valentine, Joseph, 140. 

Van Cleave, James W., on 
blacklists and boycotts, 47 ; 
in Buck's Stove Case, 135 
ff . ; on legislation, 282, 283. 

Van Orsdel, Judge, 147, 179, 451. 

Vickery, Judge, 295-6. 

Victor Record, 302. 



Wages, 275-7. 

Walker, Edwin, 103. 

Walling, Wm. English, 339. 

War of 1812, 29. 

Wardjon, W. M., 302. 

Washington, George, 38. 

Watson, Congressman James E., 
284. 

"We Don't Patronize" List, 64, 
71, no ff., 115 ff., 140, 144, 
235, 348, 350- See also Ap- 
pendix. 

Webb, Sidney, 218, 247. 

West, Harold E., 297-8. 

Westmoreland County, Pa., 
strike in, 302, 313. 

West, Thomas H., 334. 

West Virginia Investigating 
Committee, 299, 325. 

West Virginia Miners' strike, 
297-300, 317. 

Weyl, Walter, 309-10. 

White, J. Harvey, 310. 

Whitehead, Jack, 304. 

White list, 33 ff., 60. 

Whiton, Lucius E., 291. 

Wigmore, John H., 222. 

Williams, John, 319. 

Williams, Justice, 160. 

Wilson, Sec. William R. 255-8, 
• 284, 340. 345- 

Wilson, Woodrow, 260. 



488 



INDEX 



Wisconsin, jy, 80. 

Wise, Henry A., 45. 

Women and Child Labor, report 

of, 276. 
Women, boycotting by, 161. 
Women's International Union 

Label Leagues, 63. 
Women's Municipal League, 35. 



W T omen's Trade Union League, 

35- 
Wood, Judge, 438-9- 
Woodrow, 40. 
Woods, Judge, 105. 
Wright, 145, 149, 185, 450. 

Yurpee, Senator, 172. 



tfAY 3ij<iQ 



^//'W 



